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This thesis is3designed as a contribution to the study of the 
life and career of James Stephen (1789-1859) who was permanent 
under-secretary in the Colonial Office from 1836 until 181+7. It 
comprises a series of case studies in two parts. The first part 
deals with the Colonial Office as an administrative institution and 
examines Stephents influence on its development. The second part 
comprises three separate studies of what were called "crown colonies" 
and investigates Stephen's opinions on their administrative problems. 
In the Introduction the scope of the thesis is outlined and some of 
the main attacks on Stephen by his contemporaries and by more recent 
critics are analysed. In Chapter Ia sketch is provided of Stephen's 
early career and of the process bV which he rose to become the leading 
Colonial Office civil servant. Chapter II deals with Stephen as a 
reformer of the Colonial Office bureaucracy and attempts to assess his 
contribution to the development of the civil service in the nineteenth 
century. Chapter III is an analysis of Stephen's views on the admin- 
istration of Trinidad with particular reference to questions of slavery 
and'the social) economic and political consequences of emancipation. 
Chapter IV deals with Sierrm Leone administratlon and covers such topics 
as imperial expansion and the problem of recaptive settlement. Chapter 
V examines the administration of Ceylon and explores Stephen's policies 
2 
on subjects like the caste system., religion and legal reforms. In 
each of the three crown colony studies-an attempt is made to probe 
Stephen's underlying philosopby from an examination of hisiactual 
policies and opinions. The Conclusion attempts to tring together., 
along with the author's judgmentsp some of the main themes which have 
emerged. 
3 
I N'T 11 0D TJ C T- 10N 
Throughout his life James Stephen was the target of virulent 
public abuse. Edward Gibbon Wakefield., Charles Buller and Sir 
William Molesworth were merely the most famous of a great number of 
hostile critics. The man who was the Colonial Office's legal counsel 
from 1813 and its permanent under-secretary from 1836 spent his official 
life in the glare of public opprobrium. The much-repeated criticisms 
gradually gained currency. Despite contradictions from many leading 
statesmenp they continued to attract public attention long after Stephen 
retired from government service in 1847. The legend was born of James 
Stephen as IqIx. Mother-Country" (an ironic and nots as perhaps it sounds.. 
a flattering title)) "King StephenlIp "Mr. Over-Secretary Stephenflp the 
1 
domineering bureaucrat with all the worst characteristics of his kind. 
The charges which were made against Stephen during his lifetime 
have today an oddly contemporary ring. Here for the first time an 
official was-,. regaled in public with those vices which are now customarily 
attributed to rampant bureaucracy - the tred-tapet., the legalistic 
pedantry.. the dilatoriness,, the stultifying formality.. the insensitivity.. 
the detachment from the real problems and requirements of the public at 
large. Stephen was held to epitomise the self-perpetuatings pettifoggingp 
E-M. Wrong., (ed. )y Charles Buller and Responsible Government 
(Oxford, 1926), pp. 137-62 is the most famous attack. A list 
of the main attacks in periodicals is given in the Bibliography,?. 3-15. 
4 
proserastinating officialdom, churning out its-endless reams of ill- 
written memoranda to baffle both patrons and penitents. 
Had he been to his critics simply the prototype of the faceless 
men of Whitehall,, however, Stephen would have suffered less of their 
constant and prolonged abuse. But he was certainly well known and 
his critics claimed to detect method in his errant ways. He was the 
son of a fanatical parliamentary abolitionist and the brother of a 
leading anti-slavery propagandist. His enemies were only too well 
aware that he himself sympathised with the family campaign. He was 
also a devout churchmant an ardent supporter of missionary activities 
and a generous philanthropist. These were the marks of a I'Saintup a 
man'connected with the circle of E7angelicals popularly known as "the 
Clapham Sect". This groupp which was extremely influential in the 
empire, in the early nineteenth centuryp had acquired for itself through 
its abolitionist agitation a great many enemies and its unpopularity 
was passed on to its disciples. 
His-identification as a Shint allowed his critics to complete the 
caricature of the CoWonial Office bureaucrat. To the follies of the 
desk-bound mind were to be added the self-indulgences of the altruistic 
fanatic. Not only was Stephen interfering and inefficientp it was 
saidp but his influence was used perniciously. Like all bureaucrats) 
E. M. Howsep Saints in Politics (London, 1952) gives an account 
of their activities. 
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he was an authoritarian., wishing to dictate to his chiefs and his 
subordinates as well as to all governors and colonial officials. 
Nothing could be done in the Colonial Office or in the colonies 
without first a reference to Mr. Mother Country. Like all zealots,, 
he was a visionary. 9 imposing wildly impracticable schemes on unwary 
colonists,, frustrating them by his tortuous pedantries or by his 
grandiose attempts to serve some foolish ideal at the cost of an that 
good sense and moderation dictated. Some critics., on the lunatic 
fringe., were even more hostile. They regarded Stephen's philanthropy 
and his official secrecy as a cover for something more sinisterp, perbaps 
an attempt to subvert the empire in the name of republicanism or to use 
it for his own private ends. Against such dishonest and misguided 
authority., energetic governors and industrious settlers laboured in vain. 
In every case where colonial policy faileds so these critics maintained., 
Stephen's secret influence was the ultimate cause. 
This portrait of Stephen was the work of many hands and yet it left 
such a powerful impression that later historians incorporated it into 
2 
their works. But it did not go unchallenged. Stephen's children., 
1. See the artibles in The Sipectator, John Bull, and The QMrter3y 
Revi cited in the Biblibgrapby, V. 3-15. 
2.. E. g. JG, 'S.. Mkraisp The Colonization of New Zealand (Oxford., 1927)., 
pp, 19-229 1+0$ 193; Paul Bloomfield., Edward Gibbon- Wakefield: 
Builder of the British Commonwealth (London., 1961)s po 1+8; 
W. P. GreswelIq The Growth and Administration of the British 
Colonies. 1637-1697 (Londong 1696)9 PPo 159 30. 
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his sons,. James Fitzjames and Leslie., and his daughter., Caroline 
Emelia., denied the likeness. They attempted to rescue their fatherts 
reputation by publishing the forgotten testimonials which he had 
received from the leading political figures of his day,, Sir Robert 
reel, Lord John RusaeU.. Wi3-Uam Ewart Gladstone., lord Stanley and 
Farl Grey. Piecing together their memories of childhood and youth and 
the information which friends conveyedp they ver6 able to present a 
1 
more sympathetic picture of Mr. Mother-Country. The plablicationtin 
1885 of an autobiograpby by Henry Taylor., the Colonial Office clerk and 
playwight who was Stephen's close friendj. helped to undermine some of 2 
the criticisms which had been made of Stephen in his lifetime. But 
Stephenfsýchildren and Taylor were so obviously prejudiced that their 
portraits seemed equal3, v inexact. 
it was not until the 19209 when the late Paul Knaplund produced his 
celebrated articles on I'Mr. Over-secretary Stephen" that a reliable 
1. E. g. James Fitzjames-iStephen"s introduction to the 1860 edition 
of James Ste enp EssaYs in Ecclesiastic&3. Biography (3rd edit.., 
London, 1860 , pp. xi--xvi; Leslie Stephen,, The Life of Sir James 
FitzJmes SteT)hen (London., 1895)., Pp. 41-65; & C. E. Stephen 
The First Sir james Ste2hen (Gloucester, 1906). In his later 
years Stephen had been gathering material for his children to usw. 
in defending himV Stephen to Grey., 3 Mar. 1848., Grey Papers., 
Stephen. 




account of Stephen's work and beliefs began to emerge. Thirty years 
later Knaplund himself in his book "James Stephen and the British 
Colonial System., 1813-18/+711 demolished marq of the criticisms advanced 
2 
by Molesworths Buller and Wakefield. Stephen is presented by Knaplund 
az a man of acuteness., courage and integrity., a skilled administrator 
largely free from such vices as legal pedantry or dilatory formalismV 
an influential but not a domineering subordinate. Kýaplundlsvork is 
impressive but by his own admission it is not couprehensive. He worked 
almost entirely from Stephen's reports on colonial laws. His treatment 
is too general to allow for a detailed study of Stephen's contribution 
to the empire# too technical to appreciate his role as a bureaucrat. 
But Enaplund had opened a mine mhere other scholars could quarry. 
Subsequent research on Stephen and the empire in his day has tended 
to suppor. t Knaplund's conclusions. Scholars morking on such different 
topics3as the vexed problems of responsible government., land settlement., 
imperial expansion and slavery# have in general preferred his interpretation 
1. Paul Knaplund. 9 "Sir James Stephen and British North American 
IýL-oblemsjp 18/+0-1847"j, Canadian Historical Reviepm., V., 1924., 
pp. 22-41; &, "Mr. 07ersecretary ftephen"# JoMMal of Modem 
HistoZ: Z., I,, 1929j. pp. 40-66; & "Sir James Stephen on a White 
Australia"., Victorian Historical M=zine., XTI,, 1928., pp. 240-2. 
2. Paul Khaplund., &Mes Stephen a - LrLd 
the British Colonigil Sygtem., 
1813-1847 (Madison., Wisconsin# 1953)- 
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to that of Wakefield. On Australia and New Zealand especially,, where 
the colonial reformerst charges were most bitter and persistentp thorough 
and painstaking research has revealed Wakefield's weaknesses and shown 
the strength of the permanent under-secretary's case. In Canada and 
in the West Indiesf toot the charges brought against Stephen have been 
1 
largely discredited, But Khaplund's interpretation., though it has - 
'provided 
the starting point for all subsequent research on Stephen., has 
certainly not received unanimous support. Mother Country" is 
still a controversial figure. 
Though the modern critics may have changed their arguments., they 
have lost little of the emotion of their nineteenth century predecessors. 
There is., for example., no mistaldng the heavy irony vith which Oliver 
MacDonagh refers to "the great James Stephenn though Wakefield for one 
would have been startled to hear that on colonial affairs Stephen 
"contented himself with a melancho3y contemplation of the folly and 
2 
hopeless misex7 of mortalan. Mor can it be doubted that Felon Taft 
10. E, g. The extensive references to Stephen in A. C. V. Melbournes ALE]z 
Constitutional DeveloEMent in Austra (Londont 19309 especially 
po 91; Peter Burroughss Britain and Australia. 1831-1g5l (Oxford., 1967) 
especia3-ly, p pp. 152-3; J. S. Clilbraith., Reluctant EmRLxe (Berkeley and 
- Los Angeles., 1963), * especially pp. 12-16; Trevor Williams. 9 "James 
Stephen and British Inter7ention in New Zealand 1838-40"s X67-MI of 
modern Histor-7, IIIIp 1941, pp. 18-35; D. J. Murrays The Vegt Indies. 
ggid the Development of Colonial Goverment (Oxfordp 1965),, especially 
PP- 149-50- 
2* Oliver MacDonaght A PAttern of Government Growth. 1800- 
(i-ondon., 1961)., p. 86 
9 
MannIng's impatience. with Stephen and his political clique has in its-. 
sentiment a long and respectable pedigree though. the colonial reformers 
would have probab3. y been amazed to hear her impugn Stephen's intelligence. 
Among modern commentators MacDonagh and Manning must answer David Murray 
and D. M. Young who are at one with Hbnry Taylor in their admiration and 
.2 
praise for Stephen and his work. Was Stephen then.. as his now critics- 
maintainy a man-with small influence and little sense.. an ineffective 
fumbler who turned his back on awkward problems., a hopeless reactionary 
on all except slavery and missionary questions and a blind bigot on them? 
Or are the new criticisms as unjustified as the old? 
Interpretations differ so wide3, v part3, v because the basic researchp 
colorgr by colorq# subject by subject,. has still not been completed. 
Each historian deals simp3, v vith his own interests in terms of subject 
1 
and period. As Stephen held an, 'administrative office for thirty-four yearsý 
some change over this period in his views and in his contribution should 
3 
not occasion surprise. A complete account of his extensive career will 
H. T, Manningj "Who Ran the British Empire., 1830-507".. Journal of 
British Studies, 1965., V,, no. 1. pp. 88-121. 
2. D. -T. Murray., The Melt Lngels pp. 321-2; D. M. Youngs The Colonia 
Office in the Early Nineteenth Centurry(Londons 1961)v p. 58. 
A recent study of Stephen's legal reviews suggests that he did alter 
his opinions particular3, v on the question of colonial self-rule: 
D. B. %dnfen., "Attitudes within the Colonial Office towards Imperial 
Control of Colonial Legislationj. 1826-1865". University of Oxford 
D. Pbil thesisp 19659 Pp. 72-3. 
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only be possible when individual and detailed studies have been made 
of the relevant Colonial Office records. Such was Stephen's energy 
and productiveness in office., however., that this will be no easy task. 
Stephen left behind him in the records of the Colonial Office a docu- 
mentary legacy of forbidding dimensions. To amlyse all the minutes., 
memorandap notesq drafts and dispatches which he wrote would be an 
enormous undertaking. One method of beginning a more detailed inves- 
tigation is to make specialist studies of major topics or of individual 
colonies. This thesiss by concentrating on t-wo topics hitherto rather 
neglectedp Stephen's contribution to the bureaucracy and to the adminis- 
tration of the crown colonies., is a modest attempt to supply one such 
stucbr- 
There is still no agreement on the role Stephen played as a 
bureaucrat. Most recent verdicts assert that he was an able civil 
I 
servant with enlightened views on the conduct of administration. But 
doubts remain. For R. B. Pugh "the head of a great Office should be 
versona grata with what has been called its Ispocial public$., and by that 
test Stephen must be accounted a failure". He also "engrossed too much 
work" arA consequently both delayed an improvement in the quality of 
2 
clerks and prevented a better distribution of their functions. Oliver 
Eg. D. M. Young., The Colonial Officep pp. 115-20; D. J. Murrayp The 
W6st Indioss pp. 224-9. 
2. B. A. Benians., Sir -Tames Butler & C. E. Carrington (ods. )., The Cambridge 
History of the British Empire (Cambridge,, 1959)., (herinafter cited as 
C, H. B, E. ), IIIp p. 724. 
3.1 
MacDonagh has even less to say for him. He was lacking in sympatby 
and creativeness and too legalistic and Pessimistic ever to see'how 
the faults of the civil service could be corrected. These verdicts 
must be set in historical perspective. Stephen joined an office in 
1813 which had been created only twelve years before. The process by 
which he rose to become the leading civil servant is paralleled by the 
rise of the office as an institution of government. Only by studying 
the former process and its interaction with the latter can the full 
significance of Stephen"s bureaucratic reforms be appreciated. 
The crown colony system of government was also newwhen Stephen 
became legal counsel. Some historians insist-that its origins must be 
traced back to the Quebec Act of 1774 which first allowed a colony within 
the British Empire to practise the laws and customs of an alien society 
while denying it the grant of a representative assembly. Others prefer 
to see the crown colony system as a product of the American War of I" 
Independence when captured foreign settlements were governed under a 
similar arrangement. But most historians would maintain that the more 
immediate origins lie in the acquisitions of the French Revolutionary 
2 
and Napoleonic Wars. Then the captured colonies were used not just as:; 
1.0. M&cDonagh., k Pattern of Goverment Growthp pp. 106-7. 
2. For the fullest account see Vincent Harlow., The Founding of the 
Second-British Empire (London., 1952,1964., 2 vols). See also D. J. 
Murray# The West Indies., PP- 32-88; H. Z, Manningv British Colonial 
Government after the American Revolution (New Haven) Connecticutý 
,, pp. 
289-392. 193317-, Pp As a legal device, howevery the crown coloiW 
concept can be traced back to medieval origins. See the essay by 
Dr. Madden "Some Origins and Purposes in the Formation of British 
Colonial Government" in Kenneth ]Robinson and Frederick Madden (eds. )p 
Essays in Imperial Government Presented to Margery Perham (Oxford, 19631 
pp. 1-22.. esppcially pp. 8-9. 
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bargaining counters for the peace settlement but as part of a now 
imperial plan to acquire strategic posts or entrepfto to aid commercial 
ventures. By this interpretation St. Lucia, Trinidad and British 
Guiana gave accessto South American markets; ý Sierra Leone.. the Cape 
of Good Hope., Mauritius and Ceylon secured one route to India and the 
East; Gibraltar. * Malta and the Ionian Islands secured another. 
This is not the place to discuss the eighteenth century origins of 
the crown colony concept nor to ana3yse the motives which led to the 
acquisition and establishment of crown colonies in the early nineteenth 
century. But to understand Stephen's work it is essential to appreciate 
that with crown colonies as with the Colonial Office he was dealing with 
a largely undefined entity. In the early part of his career. * when he 
was legal counselp the indefinite nature of the crown colony system 
secured important advantages for him. Because of the contemporary debate 
on what a crown colony constitution involved and because of the increased 
powers which the crown and the crown's ministers possessed In crowa 
colonies., an opportunity was provided for the legal counsel to define 
and exercise his official powers more widely than had been possible under 
the old colonial system. Just as the indefinite nature of colonial 
goverment in Britain affected Stephen's role in the officeo so the 
indefinite nature and growing importance of the crown colony system 
enabled Stephen to increase his influence and develop his role in the 
formation of colonial policy. The two processes, 9 in fact, * complemented 
and reinforced each other. I 
13 
The basic distinction between a crown colony and a colony of 
the old colonial system was in legal status and had its immediate 
origins in the celebrated judgement of Lord Mansfield in the Campbell 
I 
Vs Rall case of 1774. There Lord Mansfield had ruled that in a 
colony conqi; ered from a foreign power,, as opposed to a colony of British 
settlement., the crown., by virtue of its prerogatives had the power to 
alter old laws and to make new ones. This power -was subordinate to 
that of the King in Parliament and it could not be exercised contrary 
to certain largely undefined fundamental principles. When the conquered 
colony was promised representative institutions., the crown divested 
itself of this legislative power which passed to the colonial legislature. 
A second aspect of Lord Mansfield's judgement of great importance for a b,. A d-. &* 
legal counsel was that the local law and legislation of the colo2W was 
held to be the true law for questions arising there., subject to any 
articles of capitulation under which the colozW was surrendered. The 
2 
local law remained in force until altered by the conqueror. 
Most of the colonies which by 1836 were norma3ly called crown 
colonies had originally been conquered and ceded during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Ware and so were subject to Lord Mansfield's 
decision. But marq were not. Sierra Leone# for example.. was 
. 1. IIq pp. 
1534. 
2. A. B. Keith, (ed).. Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policyl 
1763-1917 (Word., 194S., 2nd edit. )., pp. 35-52. 
This appliod to Trinidad., St. Lucia., British Guiana (Berbice.. 
Demerara & Esseiquibo)v Gibraltar, Maltap The Capes Mauritius and 
Ceylon. 
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acquijred by purchase and cession., not by conquest., and it was established 
as a settlement colony even though the settlers were not predominantly 
native-born Englishmen. New South Wales was claimed by right of pricr 
discovery and was also a settlement colony though not predominantly of 
free Englishmen. In the nineteenth century every new colomy., however. - 
acquireds by settlementp purchase., cession or conquest., became initially 
a crown colony. Lord Mansfield! s original definition no longer covered 
every case. A "crown colony" was simply a colloquial title for all 
1 
colonies whicht for whatever reasonsp did not possess an assembly. 
Not only was the definition vague but there was little uniformity 
in the conduct of crown colony administration. 
L Legislation affecting 
crown colonies was passed not only by the crown in Parliament and the 
crown in privy council but also and preeminently by local legislatures. 
] 
j, W 
The line between the two spheres of authority., local and imperial -as 
left undefined., as it was with colonies possessing assemblies.. but in 
general the metropolitan government preferred to remain aloof. One 
historian has recently maintained convincingly thateven in crown colonies 
in the West Indies., the initiative in legislative and administrative 
activity., except for certain questions of surpassing importance such as 
2 
slavery. t lay in practice almost entirely with the local governments. 
E. g. Table of colonial statistics for 1829; Memoranda on the 
Colonial Office, 3.43/3/5., Grey Papers. It was simp3, v a working 
distinction in the C. O. e. g. Horton to Griffinp 12 Jan. 1826.. C. O. 
324/145,9 pp. 229-31. 
D. J. Murrayp The jLelt InSUes., pp. 67-88j, 230-2. 
157, 
Since each croun colony was governed by a set of laws Peculiar to 
itself and general3, v guaranteed by its articles of capitulationp the 
amount of local variation was prodigious. 
Because of this high degree of local variety.. a study of Stephen's 
role in relation to the crown colonies mould involve an almost unmanageable 
survey of specialised colonial problems. By choosing three colonies 
which appear both significant and representative it may be possible 
perhaps to discover how Stephen was able to utilise and to influence the 
developing crown colox3y system. In this stucV Trinidad., the laboratory 
of the crown color3y experimentp will serve to illustrate trends in the 
West Indies.. Sierra Toone will demonstrate the African variant., and 
Ceylon will stand for the empire in the East. 
Trinidad., separated by the narrow gulf of Paria from the coast of 
Venezuelap is the largest and most southerly of the islands of the 
Lesser Antilles. Discovered by Europeans in 3.498., the colony was 
settled and ruled by the Spanish at the end of the sixteenth century. 
Despite several attempts to develop it as a commercial enterprise., the 
island remained for the most part uncultivated and it possessed only a 
tizq population until the second half of the eighteenth century. - The 
promulgation of the famous royal cedula on colonisation In 1783 which 
Colonies which became predominantljv British settlements Ond 
early acquired responsible government have been omitted from 
consideration in order to provide a clearer focus. This 
omission is justified since contemporaries considered them as-, 
a separate caser Ley to Colonial Office, 6 June 18/4/+p Stephents 
minute 12 June 18/+4, C. O. 323/230p f. 6. 
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broke with the exclusive Spanish imperial system and invited Roman 
Catholic settlers of any nationality to acquire land, led to an influx 
of French planters. The liberal provisions of the Spanish law vhich 
promised full riahts of citizenship to white and coloured citizens 
alikeo attracted also a large number of free Negroes to the island, 
giving Trinidad a distinctly higher proportion of free citizens than 
other West Indian islands. 
Trinidad was captured by the British in 1797 and was recognised as 
a British possession at the Peace of Amiens in 1802. By the terms of 
capitulation, Spanish lawsp institutions and civil rights were retained. 
The British thereby inherited a Spanish system of colonial goverrment 
which was autocratic and unrepresentative but not entirely absolutist. 
Checks had been placed on the governor's absolubism by three methods. 
He was made responsible for some of his actions to the royal audiencia, 
in Caracas; his administration was the subject of an enquiryý the residencia., 
on his retirementp and he had to consider the wishes of the cabildo or 
the local council in Port of Spain. These checks were abandoned with 
the British conquest. Early British governorsy perplexed by enormous 
land problems in a colony still largely uncultivated and alarmed at the 
prospect of ruling potentially rebellious Frenchmenp had no time to 
examine the finer points of Spanish government. Instead they simply 
substituted a British for a Spanish autocratic colonial system with an 
appointed council to aid the governor but with no representative institutions. 
In the years before Stephen became counsel in 1813v the battles between 
17 
contending interests of merchants., planters., anti-slave trade supporters 
and colonial administrators had begun to break down the Spanish system 
in favour of more familiar Vest Indian precedents. The legislative 
initiative of governor and council was assumed and the separation of 
the executive and judicature was instituted on the model of the old 
West Indian colonies. Buts, since an assembly was refusedo Spanish 
lavs and institutions remained. 
The colony of SiermiLeonep on the coast of West A: fricas occupied 
in the first half of the nineteenth century only the small peninsula.. 
eighteen miles long and twelve miles wide.. on which Freetown now stands. 
This area was purchasad in 1788 from the local Temne chief and coded to 
the Sierra Leone Company which derived its sovereign authority from a 
royal charter of 1791. From the first., the settlement was designed as 
a philanthropic venture to furnish free Negroes in Europe and the New-t 
I 
World vith an African home. Intending settlers were promised a freer. 
passage and a grant of land. Once settled., the colorq was to attempt 
by example and persuasion to suppress slave trading throughout Twest 
Al'rica. The early settlers were recruited from amongst T-Ondon's "black 
poor"., from NovwScotian and New Brunswick Negroes.. marw of whom had 
1. For the earlv history of British Trinidad see Gertrude Carmichael., 
1498-1900 (London.. 1961).. PP. 1-101+; D. J. Murray., Thg 'West Indies, 
pp. 67-88; J. C. Millette., "Constitutional Development in Trinidad., 
1783-1810"j, University of London, Ph. D. thesis, 1961+; L. M Fraser) 
Higtomr- of TriniLad. 1781-1839 (Port-of-Spainp n. d. & 1896i., 2 vols. 
18 
once been Loyalists in the American revolution and dis3iked their new 
homes in the north., and from the Maroons in Jamaica. There was also 
a European element of merchants., adventurers and officials and., after 
the first settlements., indigenous peoples from elsewhere on the coast 
found temporary employment or resIdence in the colorq. 
The Sierra Leone charter allowed the Compamy directors to make 
laws and create institutions for governing the colony. After many 
vicissitudes, a local goverment comprising an autocratic governor with 
an advisory council, was eventually established. A charter of justice 
of 1800., subsequently amended in 1810.9 adapted English lawito meet the 
circumstances of Sierra Leone. The early years of the colony"s exis- 
tence were severely troubled by internal dissensions and by wars with 
the neighbouring Temne tribes. But in 18(77, the year of the Slave 
Trade Abolition Actp three events final3y put the colony on a stable 
footing. A:,. settlement was wrung from the Temne which guaranteed the 
Companyls rights to its territory; control of the colony was taken over 
from the Company by the crown though leaving the government and legal 
system unchanged; and Freetown was designated a seat of a Vice Admiralty 
Court which could try cases of slave trading at sea., Thereafter captured 
slave ships were brought to the colony. 9 providing a new source of Negro 
settlers in their released Slave cargoess and beginning in earnest the 
process of settlement and development. 
For the early history of Siorra Leone. 9 see Christopher Fyfev A HistoZZ 
of Sierra Leone (Oxford.. 1962)j, pp. 1-126; G. R. Mellor., "British 
Policy in Relation to Sierra Leone 1808-185211, University of London 
M. A'. thesist 1935s especially chapter 1; E. C. Martinp The British 
Zpst 
African &ettlementS: - A Stucbr in Local Administration, 1750-1821 
(London,, 19Z7)) pp. 103-66:. 
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Ceylonj, lying in the Indian Ocean., just off the south-eastern 
tip of the Indian subcontinentp is the largest of the three crown 
colonies. In the ear3, T nineteenth centur7 it had an extreme rge 
indigenous population composed of two main racial stocks., Sinhalese 
and-Takil. Its recorded history went back to several centuries before 
the birth of Christ. Ceylon was known to the Greeks and Romans. it 
was first visited by the Portuguese in the later fifteenth century and 
from 1505 until 1658 the Portuguese ruled a small coastal strip., about 
twenty miles deepp stretching round the island. Portuguese colonial 
government was highly centralised with an autocratic governor at the 
top ruling over the feudal hierarchical indigenous government. The 
main preoccupation of the Portuguese was-, to enforce an economic monopoly 
over the production and export of cinnamon. The Portuguese were ousted 
by their rivals in Eastern trade., the Dutcho who ruled the maritime 
provinces from 1658 until 1796. The Dutch continued the system of 
central. ised.. autocratic government. 9 making further inroads into native 
self-rule though alsolimiting their control to the top echelons of 
goverment and interesting themselves mainly in protecting their economic 
monopoly. Dutch law was introduced to facilitate commercial and fiscal 
undertakings. Though the effects of Portuguese and Dutch rule may not 
have been very profound outside commercial circles.. there is no doubt 
that they began the process of undermining indigenous laws and institutions* 
The face of Ceylon was slowly turning to the west. In the "Burgher"- 
community.. for example., composed of people of mixed parentagey Dutch, and 
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native-bornp a westernized,, urbanized bureaucratic class was created 
which was to be of considerable help to the British. 
The Dutch possessions in Ceylon were captured by the British in 
1796. Until 3.802 the new colony was governed from Madras though, 
under the terms of the articles of capitulation., Dutch laws, institutions 
and civil rights were conceded to the local population. , The period of 
"dual control" of East India Company and crown from 1798 to 1802 uas3an 
unhappy one characterised by civil unrest but in these years Ceylon 
emerged as a typical crown colony with a governor and advisory council. 
In 1802 the connection with the East India Company was broken and Ceylon 
was placed fully under the control of the recently formed Colonial Depart- 
ment in London. But Dutch laws and institutions and traditional: -Ceylonese 
indigenous offices and customs were continued. No assembly was created 
and certain monopolistic features such as the control of cinnamon exports 
were retained. 
Even before 1815 the British government in Ceylon began to institute 
a series of reforms which departed from the traditional feudal and 
autocratic system of government. The local civil service was reformed 
and the judiciary and exchequer system reorganised. European settlement 
was encouraged to stimul te commercial development. The greatest 
achievement was the acquisition in 1815 of the hitherto independent 
Kingdom of Kandy which occupied the large mountainous region in the centre 
of the island. For the first time since the Europeans arrived, Ceylon 
was united under one ruler. But Kandy was not conqt; ered. The kingdom 
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was ceded to the British in the so-called Kandyan Convention by a-, 
deputation of leading citizens who had conspired to depose their monarch 
and put the British king in his place. Consequently,, in the Convention 
the British negotiators conceded to the Kandyans the full enjoyment of 
their traditional system of laws., religion and customs which meant., in 
effect.. perpetuating a feudal-type of government hitherto largely 
unaffected by Europeans and so continuing two administrative systems in 
Ceylon. Some Kandyan chiefs., however,. were unhappy under their now 
ruler and only after a rebellion had been ruthless3. y suppressed in 1817-8 
1 
did Kandy submit to the legislative power of the central government. 
Though their problems were very different the three crown colonies 
had certain features in common. All of them had large populations of 
non-British stocks unrepresented in the local government; in all of 
them there was a European minority, with a powerful influence in the 
local government.. whose interests might be at odds with those of the 
non-European colonists; all had a confused legal system and a tradition 
of authoritarianism; all had an autocratic governor whose powers.. 
especially legislatives were practically unrestricted though in each 
colony there was an advisox7 council to aid the governor; and all were 
economically undeveloped and in financial difficulties. Theses thens 
were the problems which Stephen first confronted in 1813* 
For the. early history of British Ceylon see L. A. Hills., Ceylon undpX 
British Rule. 1795-1232 (Londony 1933). * Pp- 1-58; C. R. de Silva, Ceylon under the British Occuition (Colombo, 1953)p 2 vols; P. D. 
\'J!, ppangara. q The History of the Ce-vIon Civil Service. 1802-1813 (Dehiwala. 9, Ceylon; 1966)., xi-xxxip 1-188; G. C. Mendis (ed),, The 
Colebrooke-C'Ameron Papers (Londonp 1956)., especiaUýr volume 2. 
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James Stephen and the Emergence of the Colonial Office 
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(1) lbrmative Years; 
. Tames-, Stephen.. the third son of James Stephens the abolitionists 
and Annac-Stent., the daughter of a city financier., was born on January, 
3rdp 1789p in the borough of Lambeth. His parents were then on holiday 
in England. StephWs father., a lawyer by profession., was employed in 
the island of St. Christopher in the 'West Indiess and he returned there 
with his family a few months after the birth of his'son. They were 
soon back in England for good. His father's increasing dissatisfaction 
with West Indian society and the attractions of a career in England led 
1 
to their final departure from St. Kitts in 1794- 
The period of five years which Stephen Junior spent in the West 
Indies was the only occasion on which tmýýýal Office under- 
secretary actually set foot in a colony. He was obviously too young to 
have acquired any lasting impression of what he saw and nothing of the 
2 
experience is mentioned in his later correspondence or writings. Yet 
he had encountered without knowing it the problem which was in large 
measure to dominate his working life - slavery and its victims. In 
England he grew up., one of a fairly large family.. in the calm and comfort 
For the career of James Stephenp Senior# see the article Iby Leslie 
Stephen in the 
, 
Dictionary of National Biograpby 
, 
(London., 2nd edit... 
1909), vol. xviii,, pp. 10/+8-50; Leslie Stepheng The W2 of Sir 
James Fitziames Stephen (London,, 1895), especially Chapter v.. ! p. 41-65; 
& Merle Bevingtons The Memoirs of James Stephen (London., 1954) 
2. No mention is made of it., for example., in. his diary for 1846 nor in 
his published vorks. For a full list of material consulted., see the 
Bibliograpby. 
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of residential Kensington and Clapham. His early upbringing was 
very strict and seemed to him in retrospect characterised by sadness.. 
1 
dreariness and a total absence of humour. In 1796# when he was 
only seven years old.. his mother died,, and this loss doubtless worsened 
the painful sbyness and heavy seriousness which he exhibited in child- 
hood and adult life. Four years later., his father married Mrs. Clarke., 
the widowed sister of his friend.. William Wilberforce. Her eccentricities 
made the second Mrs. Stephen an odd and difficult step-mother. Parental 
strictness might have been offset by intelligent schooling but the 
children's education was rather desultory. James Junior )s farmed out 
to a variety of schoolmasters; yet somehow he acquired at this time an 
appetite for reading which not even defective eyesightp caused by an 
2 
attack of smallpox in childhoodp could assuage. 
His family environment had a profound influence in shaping Stephen's 
early life. By 1800 the elder Stephen had become one of the pillars of 
that circle of Evangelicals and anti-slave27 supporters known as the 
1. Stephen Dlwyp entry for 25 July 181+6 made on 16 August 181,6. The 
original dia-ry is deposited in the Cambridge University Library §L Add. 7511(F-)7 and a copy made by Caroline Emelia Stephen is 
contained among the Stephen Papers. Stephen may have been a-, rather 
rebellious child as this extract and particularly the 'confession' 
would seem to indicate. 
2. Descriptions of Stephen's early life are found in the article by 
Leslie Stephen in the D. NB, (2nd edit,., 1909)., Xviiiv 1050; 
Leslie Stephen,, The Life of Sir James-Fitziames Stephenv pp. 16-20.. 
. 31-33, -- and the biogrqiLcal sketch by James Fitzjames Stephen in the introduction to James Stephen,, Essays in Ecclesiastical Biograpby 
(Londons 3rd edit.,, 1883)., pp. xi-xvi. 
original - diary(is deposited in the Cambridge University Library §L Add. 7511 Ff and a copy made by Caroline Emelia Stephen is 
contained among the Stephen Papers. Stephen may have been a-, rather 
rebellious child as this extract and particularly the 'confession' 
would seem to indicate. 
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Glapham Sect. He had established close contacts with William 
Wi:, Jberforce'and his political followers whose views on the iniquities 
of the slave trade he fully shared. Partly through their help he had 
become an influential figure. He kept his knowledge of colonial 
affairs alive by his work in the Prize Appeals Court of the Privy 
Council and he provided the opponents of the slave trade with propaganda 
about slavery conditions gathered from his own experience in the West 
Indies. Frequently, he and hir. children attended the meetings of the 
group in Clapham and they participated fully in its social life. 
Their Evangelical faith was the cement which bound the Clapham 
Sect together and it was this element in his domestic environment which 
first captured the younger James Stephen. Shortly before his eighteenth 
birthday he experienced a conversion which brought him within the fold 
1 
of his father's Evangelical circle. Nothing in his early life so 
clearly marked out his future development as the influences exerted 
upon him by the politicaLly-active, crusading religious group which he 
then joined. Although he was sharply critical of Clapham's "spirit of 
coterie" which he found restricting., Stephen always looked on the 
members of the Sect as the giants of his age: no-one in his own generation 
could compare with them. Above all his father's close relationship 
with Wilberforce had the most profound influence on Stephen) for in the 
leader of the Sect he found the hero of his youth and his life-long idol. 
To emulate Wilberforce in his saintliness# in his business talentsy in 
his personal integrityj, in his concern for the children of Ham# in his 
1. Stephen Diary, entry for 2 Jan. 18/+6. 
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humanitarianism., these were the ideals which he strove for and judged 
himself by for the rest of his life. 
In 1806 Stephen was admitted as a pensioner to Trinity Halls 
Cambridge.. which was celebrated for its teaching in legal studies. 
The college had an additional attraction for a man following in his 
father's footsteps as it had then recently come under the influence 
2 
of L7angelicals. Stephen's career at Cambridge is nonetheless something 
of a imystery. He himself., in recalling his university days., was positively 
scathing about the standards which had prevailed early in the century. 
nThe three or four years during which I lived on the banks of the Cam".. 
he wrote in 1851p "were passed in a very pleasant., though not a very 
cheap., hotel. But if they had been passed at the Clarendon# in Bond 
Street.. I do not think that the exchange would have deprived me of arq 
aids for intellectual disciplinep or for acquiring literary or scientific 
3 
knowledge". This may explain why after his first year at Gambridgep 
mhen Stephen applied himself sufficiently to win.. apparently without much 
1. For Stephent-s oun description of life at Clapham see James Stephen., 
Issaysp pp. 523-584; for his views on Wilberforce., ibid.. pp. 469-522.6 
2. D. A. Winstanley, Earl-v Victorian Cambridge (Cambridge) 1940). pp. 18-25. 
Stephents uncle., William Farish., who was Jacksonian Professor at 
Cambridges was also a leading Evangelical light as was Joseph Jowetts 
a Fellow and Tutor of Trinity Hall and Regius Professor of Civil Law. 
For a recent account of Evangelical activities in the early nineteenth 
century see Standish Meacham.,, Henr-v Thornton of Clapham. 1760-1815 (Cambridges Mass. s 1964). 
3- James Stephens Lectures on the History-of France (Londonj, 1851)., ý, 
pp. vii-viii. 
26 
effortp the first prize in his class, his interest in purely academic 
study seems to have waned. It is also possible that he became obsessed 
by religious'studies at this timep thereby diverting his attention from 
2 
other work; or perhaps keeping terms at Lincoln's Inn and aiding in the 
battle for the abolition of the slave trade took up most of his time. 
Many of his retrospective criticismsp howeverp must be taken with 
a pinch of salt. Stephen found much to interest him in Cambridge. One 
attraction was the preaching of Charles Simeonp vicar of Holy Trinity and 
3 
a very active Evangelical: another was the friendship of his cousin 
Thomas Edward Diceyj, a fellow undergraduate and the son of the proprietor 
4 
of the old Whig newspaper., the NorthamPton Mercury. Their influence on 
him is perceptible in his theological and in his political opinions but he 
was no unthinking disciple of either sect or party. During his Cambridge 
years Stephen's views became markedly independent. Though he remained 
1. ýStephen to T. E. Dicey, 27 May . 18(77., Stephen Paperso journal of letters to various correspondents., 18(77-3.839. 
2. An entry for 10 Ju3, y 1811 in H. C. Robinson's diary quoted in Leslie 
Stephen# The Life of Sir James Fitziames-Stephen, p. 33# suggests 
this, as does his choice of college. Robinson called Stephen a 
"pious sentimentalist and moralist". 
3. His admiration is evident in James Stepheng Egsays., PP. 574-579. 
4- Pbr Dicey see Frederic Boasep Modern English Biography (Trurop 
1892)9 column 871; W. W. Hadleyp The Bi-Centenary Record of the 
Northampton Mercurr. 1720-1920 (Northampton., 1920)., pp. 39-1+2. 
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faithful to his early religious creedy no-one saw more shrewdly or 
1 
perceptively the faults and foibles of the Mapham Seat. As early 
as 18CY7,, when he was nineteen.. he had already begun to question the 
2 
value of sectarianism. In 1808 his father had been brought into , 
parliament by the government of SPencer Perceval to act as one of its 
defenders in the House of Commons; but at Cambridge James was breaking 
free from his father's political views and becoming increasingly critical 
of the elder Stephen's Tory allies. 
During much of his Cambridge undergraduate 3. ife. 9 Stephen was-, 
resident in London and in attendance at Lincoln's Inn to which he was 
admitted in 1806. There he worked harderp spending eight hours a day 
4 
at his studies. But his education was furthered as much by the company 
of his father's Evangelical friends as by more formal means since he 
took a keen interest in their activities. With the passing of the 
Slave Trade Abolition Act in 18(77# the Seat had scored its greatest 
success but it had not been content to rest on its laurels. The act had 
to be made effective., the conditions of slaves ameliorated., and there 
were new ventures to which they might give their support such as 
Stephen.. Essaysj, p. 536. 
2. Stephen to Dicey.. Z7 May 18D7., Stephen Papers., jownal of letters to 
various correspondentsp 18(Y7-1839. 
Stephen to Diceyp 1 Dec. 1809, Stephen Papers,, journal of letters to 
various correspondentsp 1807-1839. 
The work was apparently rather boring. Stephen to Diceyp 1 Deo. 
1809, Stephen, Papers, Journal of letters to various correspondentsj 
l8(Y7-lE*9- 
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propagating the Gospel in British India where missionaries had been 
1 
forbidden to proselytize. 
A1.1 these activities required a detailed legal knowledge since it 
was only through the strict enforcement of a reformed law that their 
objects could be met. 
LSkýejýeý., S6nior as an experienced lawyer, came 
to play a central role in the agitation for reform and Jamesp Junior., 
along with his brother., Henx7 Johng who practised before the Court of 
Chancery,. followed him in his career. In 1811 James was admitted to 
the bar and in the same year his father was apppinted Master in Chancery 
as a reward for political services. A year later., the younger Stephen 
received his LL. B. degree and joined the small family concern in the 
Court of Chancery. Although little is known of him in these years it 
seems likely that he ful3, v participated in all the activities of his 
father"s circle., professional., political and social. Whatever their 
individual differencesp they were united in the cause of Clapham. In 
this the Stephen family resembles the other great Clapham figures,. the 
Macaulaysp the Grants and the Venns. Like them# too., the Stephen sons 
carried the campaign into new fieldsý a lawyer, 
Ees D%Tunio 
was 
both able and talented.. possessing a clear, 9 incisive mind and a quite 
remarkably retentive memory. He seems to have taken a special interest 
The work of the Sect on Imperial problems is discussed in E. M. 
Howse., Saints in-Politics (Londons 1952) and more fully explored 
in A'*F. Maddens 'The Attitude of the Evangelicals to the Empire 
and Imperial Problems (1820-1850)lp University of Oxford., D. Phil. 
thesis., 1950. Stephenýs discipleship is obvious from his account 
in Stephens IsslZo, PP. 523-584p especially p. 543. 
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in foreign and colonial lawv even going to the length of preparing a 
1 
code on the latter. This work brought him, to the attention of Lord 
Bathurstp then secretary of state for the colonies, and in 18139 doubtless 
owing to his family connections and his father's parliamentary influencep 
he was appointed as-, -legal counsel to the Colonial Department.. a consul- 2 
tative fee-paid post which gave prestige to his private practice. His 
administrative career had begun. 
It was not the Colonial Departmentp however., but Westminster Hall 
which took up most of the time and attention of the younger Stephen in 
the years after his appointment. There he received the legal training 
which forms a most important element in his administrative education. 
As a barrister., though he may have been handicapped by his shyness., he 
was strikingly successful., and showed remarkable energy as well as talent. 
Initially# too-p there was always time for more private business. In 
1813 he was called upon to help his father in settling the affairs of his 
friend John Vennp the pastor of the Clapham circlej. who died inýthe spring 
L. Stephenp James Fitzjames Stepheny p. 32. The interest in 
foreign and colonial law can be deduced from later legal opinions 
in Colonial Office records such as Stephen to Bathurstp Nov. 18139 
C-0- 323/39. - ff. 175-8p, which also shows his comprehensive knowledge 
of West Indian slave legislation. 
2. D. M. Young.. The Colonial Offig -e 
in the Early Nineteenth Century 
(Iondon., 1961)., p. 58; Leslie Stephen) James Fitzjames SteRhenj 
P. 32; J. Stephen, Snr. p Speech at African Institution (Lordon, 1817)9 
pp. 3 5- 
'60 3- This is clear from his income at the bar and the prospects which 
he felt were opening to him. Stephen to Wilmot, 21 Apr. 1823P 
C. O. 323/197.9 ff. 162-164. 
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of that year* Hippier reasons took him back on subsequent occasions 
to the Vem household. In December 1814 Stephen mrried Jane Catherine 
Venn, the second daughter of the pastor. They were singularly well 
matched. The quiet.. placid, devout Mrs. Stephen provided the under- 
0-tanding and sympathy which her more restless and emotional husband 
needed. Nothing emerges so clearly from their letters to each other 
than the depth and intensity of their attachment, Without this 
domestic security it is doubtful if Stephen could have, surtived the 
2 
strain under which he was forced to work in later years. 
His marriage strengthened his religious convictions and gave him a 
renewed interest in the cause of the Negroes. John Venn., a founder of 
a group later known as the Church Missionary Society. 9 had been an active 
participant in the organization of British missionary ventures to Africa 
and Asia in the later eighteenth century. The Venns also played w 
3 
prominent role in the running of the African Institution. Stephen 
joined the Church Missionary Society as a Committee member and in the 
1'. Stephen to T. C. Stephen., Stephen Paperss, 3 vols. of copied letters. 
The early relations between the Stephens and the Venns may be traced. 
in the collections of papers relating to John Venn made by Jane 
Catherine Venn which are among the Stephen Papers. See also 
Michael'Hennellp John Venn and the Clapham, Sect (London) 19581P 
pp. 173-6k-o. 
2. Leslie Stephenp James Fitzjames Stephen, 33-41; for an 
independent judgements Thomas Sadler (ed. The Di=. Reminiscences 
and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson'( np 3rd edit. 9 1872), 
vol- iii P- 4t entry for 12 June 1825. 
3. Ue=e3.1, Tbhn Vmn v pp. 21, T-251. 
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first few years after his marriage he supplied the missionaries with 
legal as well as financial assistance. He also found time to help 
his father with his parliamentary activities., no doubt aiding'in the 
preparation of abolitionist schemes for the registration of slaves 
and providing moral support in the running battles with the represen- 
1 
tatives of the West India p2anters in the House of Commons. Profess- 
ionallyp too. 9 his work was becoming recognised. Perhaps part3jy through 
his work for a government department he acquired a number of clients of 
2 
some social eminence. By 1819 the demands for his services were 
outrunning the time which he had available and he was obliged to turn 
down even attractive cases. 
In 1822p after nearly eight years of marriagep Stephen's first 
child was born., a sonp who was called Herbert Venn Stephen. At about 
the same time., for reasons that are rather obscure., he suffered a bout 
of depression which ultimately issued in pbysical collapses the first of 
several such nervous U-Inesses in his life. For three months in 1823, 
he was too ill to appear in court and even the continimnee of his work 
for the Colonial Department was in doubt. Irorced to re-consider his 
1. He list37his daily occupations in Stephen to J. C. Stephen.. 2 Jan., 
5 Jan. and 12 June 1816# Stephen Papers., Wournal of letters to 
JeCeS... 1816-1845. 
2. Stephen to J. C. Stepheny 29 July, 1816p Stephen Papers, Journal of 
letters to J. C. S.., 1816-1845. 
3. Stephen to J. C. Stephen., 13. kpr. 1819v Stephen Paperso journalýof 
letters to J. C. S-,.. 1816-181+5- 
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futurej, he finally decided to seek full-time employment in the Department 
as its legal adviser and to sacrifice his previously highly promising 
legal career to considerations-of security. Perhaps, as several writers 
. j. have suggested# his new responsibilities as a family man 
(and, even more, 
the wish to protect his name from attack for the sake of his child) 
1 
played a large part in his decision to seek security as a civil servant. 
But equally important.. though usually ignoredp was the direction which 
his career as adviser to the Colonial Department had already taken. 
(II) As Counsel. 1813-1825. 
The Colonial Office to which Stephen was appointed in 1813 was a 
relatively new institution. Before 1801,, apart from the short-lived 
secretaryship of state for America., colonial administration had never 
commanded the status of a separate department but was parcelled out 
amongst a variety of government offices. Of these only the Board of 
Trade provided for any length of time a reservoir of officials with 
experience and expertise in handling colonial affairs. In the reductions 
consequent on the loss of the Aherican colonies the Board of Trade was 
abolished and its specialist advisers were lost to colonial administration. 
Though resurrected in 1786 as the Privy Council Committee for Trade and 
Caroline E. Stephens The First Sir James Stephen (Gloucester# 1907), 
pp. 13-14- Both Crabb Robinson and James Fitzjames Stephen maintain 
that Stephen was 'dissatisfied' by. his work at the courts buts though 
this may be truej, there is little evidence that he disliked his 
employment. In later years he frequently volunteered to return to 
his legal profession which suggests that he found it not too intolerable$ 
Sadler., The Diajyj, vol. iis P- 4P entry for 12 June 1825; Stephen, 
F, 85ffs. 9 pp. xi-xii; Stephen to Auckland, 6 Oct. 1832P Stephen Papersp 
loose leaf notes. 
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Plantations.. a body of some influence in settling colonial affairs 
until the end of the century., the Board never regained its pre-eminent 
I 
role in colonial administration. 
General responsibility for the colonies was transferred in 1782 
to the office of the home secretary.. a rather unsatisfactory arrangement 
as the Home Office was already overworked, After the outbreak of the 
French Revolutionary war., pressure on the Home Office was partly relieved 
through the creation of a new secretaryship with special responsibility 
for the conduct of war. In 1801j, with the signing of preliminary terms 
for the peace of Amiens which ended the first phase of the war with France., 
the War Secretary was required to relieve the Home Office of further 
2 
duties by assuming its share of colonial business. 
For ten years the bybrid nature of the duties of the office of 
secretary of state for war and the colonies., as it became known., and the 
exigencies of the war in which Britain wan engaged for much of the periodj, 
resulted in the steady neglect of colonial business. The new department 
had emerged with a minister of cabinet rank at its head presiding over 
C. M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History (New Haven, 
1938)., vol. iv-. - especially pp. 272-317; & Guide to the Materials 
for Aberic History to 1793 in the Public Record Office of Great 
Britain (Washingtonp D. C.., 1912)., vol. i., especially pp. 78-112; 
D. J. Muxrayv The Ubst IndieM and the Development of Colonia 
Government (Oxford, 1965).. pp. 1-10. 
2. H. T. Mannings British Colonial Government after the American 
Revolution. 1782-1820 (New Havens 1933)) PP. 75-99P 474-542; D. M. 
Yourw,, The Colonial Office in the Early-Nineteenth Century (Iandong 
19611p pp. 8-12; D. J. Murray# The Vest Indies, pp. 10-12. See 
also R. B. Pugh# The Records of the Colonial aiia Dominions Offices 
(London.. 1964), t pp. 3-7. 
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one under-secretary who had a seat in parliament and a small clerical 
1 
establishment. It was too small to cope with the manifold problems 
of empire: the clerks were too ignorant of colonial matters since 
none of them had handled colonial correspondence before 3.801 and the 
po1itical head was too distracted by the conduct of the war to give 
2 
much attention to colonies emept as instruments in economic warfare. 
Theory fitted the facts. Colonies., to a very large extent.. were 
3 
expected to rwnage themselves without interference from Britain. 
A'change in the nature of the now office became evident in 1812. 
In that year Earl Bathurst was appointed secretary of state at the 
Colonial Office and Henry Goulburn was chosen as his parliamentary 
under-secretary. They speededthe change by strengthening the staff., 
resuming a regular correspondence with the governors and beginning the 
process of building up a body of information about the colonies., the 
vital prerequisite of efficient administration. Efficiency, in fact,, 
4 
became their watchword. Their work was a product in part of the 
changes which were taking place in the nature of imperial problems. 
1. ks fixed by an order in council of 27 Feb. 1795: Young, The 
Colonial Office# p. 3J+. 
2. Young,, The Colonial Office, pp. 12-14. 
3- Murray., The West Indiesj, pp. 137A. 
See Goulburn's defence of the office in Parliamentary Debateop 




The number of colonies had grown considerably with war-time acquisitions, 
and a new form of government later known as crown colony government had 
been applied to them. This gave increased power and authority to the 
secretary of statep especially in the legislative field. More strikingly 
there had also arisen a concern., in parliament and in the country., for 
West Indian slavery., a problem which was recognised as coming within the 
purview of the new secretary of state. These developments so greatly 
influenced the uork of the department., forcing it to become an authority 
on colonial questionsp that in 1815., when the conclusion of peace terminated 
almost all of the secretary's military duties, the office survived as a 
separate administrative department with a general and recognised respon- 
sibility for the colonies. The novelty and flexibility of the office 
in its early years provided the opportunity for an ambitious man to carve 
out a career for himself and helps to explain the influence which Stephen 
was subsequently able to exert. 
Stephen's rise in the office was achieved by professional expertise# 
not by political connections. If he owed his appointment in the Colonial 
Department to his father's influence with the Earl of Liverpool's govern- 
ment., he had to maintain it without parental assistance. James Stephen., 
Senior., who held a government seat at East Grinstead,, had acquired in 
parliament a reputation as an extremist abolitionist., as an authority on 
1. Hurrays The West Indies, pp. 110-13-1; Youngp The Colonial Office# 
pp. 21+-20; Manning. 9 British Colonial Government, p. 483. It was 
not until 185/+ that the C. O. was finally dissociated from all its 
war office duties. 
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colonial law and., when Spencer Ferceval was Prime minister. 9 as an 
impassioned defender of the governmentts policies. His skill as a 
debater and his knowledge of the colonies were frequently used by the 
government and it was this support which was rewarded by the appointment 
of his son to a Colonial Office post and by his own elevation to the 
Mastership in Chancery in 1813. But two years later. 9 after a disagree- 
ment over colonial policyy Stephenp Seniorp resigned his seat and broke 
off his connections with the department. His sonp much less involved 
in politics.. retained his post despite the loss--of his patron and continued 
to work with the government. Stephent Seniorj, meanwhile., carried on 
his anti-slavery agitation outside parliament. 
Though their methods differedp father and son were not far apart 
in aims. If his subsequent statements can be trusted., Stepheno Juniorp 
accepted the position of legal counsel in the hope that it would eventually 
prove politically influential. He wanted to make his opinions felt on 
the goverment's decisions in regard to slavery and the slave trade by 
working,, in his administrative capacity# towards the achievement of 
slavery emancipation. The legal counselship, in some ways a uniquep 
even an anachronisticp position in the past., might be madep in his view., 
2 
a useful instrument of agitation. This was the object he set himself 
Liverpool to Stephen., Snr. 
j, 
22 Mar. 183,5s B. M. Add MS. 38.9416, 
ff. 362-3; Bevingtons Memoirs, pp. 16-22; Manning., British 
Colonial Governments pp. 485-7p 503. 
2. Stephen to Taylor., 12 July 2833ý and Stephen to T. F. Buxton..? Apr. 
2837., Stephen Paperss, journal of letters to various correspondents., 
18CY7-1839. 
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to achieve in his first years as an official of the Colonial Department. 
Stephen's assessment of the potentialities of the counselship was 
remarkably acute. Although the fragmentation of responsibility for 
colonial administration did not end with the creation of the colonial 
secretaryship - indeed it remained as a ý! Jor problem throughout the 
nineteenth century - colonial questions were generally settled within 
the existing government departments. The use made by the Colonial 
Office of a legal counsellor in the period up to 1825 was exceptional. 
The counselship was not a full-time post and was not even on the estab- 
lishment. In relation to the Colonial Office., the counselvas simply 
a consultant professional lawyer paid by fees to examine colonial 
legislation: he accepted the position as merely part of his work as a 
barrister. But with all these shortcomings.. the counsel still possessed 
functions which were central to imperial administration and had a recog- 
2 
nised and vital part to play in the work of the office. In origin 
the counselship can be traced back to the earliest dealings between 
Britain and her colonies. 
The first British Empire had been characterized by legislative 
1. Another exception was the use made of Major Thomas Moody., the 
Home Secretary for Foreign Parliamentary Commissioners: Murray., 
The West-Indies.. pp. 122-/+; Young., The Colonial Office., Pp. 71-4- 
2. For a recent survey of the counsel's role., D. B. Suinfenp 'Attitudes 
within the Colonial Office towards the imperial control of colonial 
legislationp 1826-65v vith particular reference to the South 
Australia crisis.. which led to the passing of the Colonial Laws 
Validity Adt'j, University of Oxfordp D. Pbil. thesis, 1965. 
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decentralisation. All the colonies, though subject to the control 
of the imperial legislature of crown and parliament in London., possessed 
local governments with full legislative powers within their own spheres. 
Yet., in both theory and practice, the monarch as the-font of all laws 
was required to assent to every legislative measure passed by colonial 
legislatures before it could become operativee In order to facilitate 
this procedure,, governors were told in their instructions to send home 
copies of all the bills or ordinances of their local legislatures together 
with their comments on them. In London,, the bills were submitted to 
the king in council which delegated the power to scrutinize them to the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations., a Privy Council committee known as the 
I 
Board of Trade. 
The review of laws could impose. areal check on the powers of the 
colonial legislatures. If found objectionable for any reason., the bills 
might be returned to the colorq for changes while the royal assent was 
withheld or they might be expressly disallowed by order of the king in 
council. This power of review was unpopular in the colonies and the 
outbreak of the American Revolution further discredited it; but it was 
2 
not surrendered. The imperial constitution., as enunciated for example 
in the Declaratory, Act of 1766, reasserted constitutional control and 
expressly prohibited colonial legislation which conflicted with imperial 
statutes or which dealt with subjects of more than local concern. NO 
1. Mamingt British CoJ2. nial Goverrmentp pp. 76-81. 
2* O. M. Dickersons American Colonial Government. 1ý96-1763 (Clevelandp 
Ohio, 1912)j p.. 
)2Z7;, 
J. C. Miller., Origins of the American Revolution 
(Nbw York.. 1943 - PP- 31-9- 
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period of disillusionment with the empire after 1783 ever affected the 
1 
validity of this doctrine., 
The position of counsel which Stephen in time inherited was created 
by the Home Office after it assumed responsibility for the colonies in 
1782. The provision of a professional counsel was designed to replace 
the Board of Trade in reviewing colonial legislation. The subsequent 
resurrection of the Board and its appointment of its own full-time legal 
counsel in 1785p howeverp did not result in the discharge of the counsel 
to the Home Office. Perhaps departmental jealousies or the desire to 
retain the patronage gave rise to the anomaly. Whatever the explanation., 
the Board was immediately restored to its old duties in regard to law 
reviewing.. so that the two offices for some time shared the responsibilityt 
the Board made its decisions in the light of the recommendations of the 
colonial legal counsel but on3y after conducting its own independent 
2 
enquiries. 
The fact that the counselship was given to someone as young and 
inexperienced as Stephen who had been in practice for only a year., reveals 
a loss in status which it had suffered before 1813. But from this low 
ebb it developed into a prototype of the statutory boards which are a 
major feature of nineteenth century administration. This has a signi- 
ficance for the early history of the Colonial Office which has been 
1. Murray., The West Indies) pp. 1-2. 
2. A. L. Lingelbach., Me Inception of the British Board of Trade'# in 
Ainerican Historical Review., vol. xxx. 9 1925, pp. 713-73.4. 
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largely overlooked.. It shows thatpat, least in departments of low 
status) the officials by their personal expertise., as wen as through 
the shortcomings of their superiorsy might become the motivating force 
behind the administrative changes of the early nineteenth century. It 
'also demonstrates the process by which a more positive approach to colonial 
administration could emerge. 
The increasing importance of the counselship in the Colonial Office 
owed most to Stephens's search for influence and to his incredible powers 
of work. But circumstances combined to further his ambitions. In the 
French wars the colonies which were acquired had been formerly in the 
possession of other European countries and consequently were ruled under 
alien laws and traditions. The integration of these foreign legal 
systems into the imperial framework and the subsequent settlement of 
the individual constitutions were far too technical problems for statesmen 
to tackle and too intricate to be settled in detail by the law officers 
of the crown, Here was one opportunity for the counsel. Another 
stemmed from the increasing load of work which the Colonial Office was 
required to consume. The colonial governments.. as they gained release 
from the trammels of wýrtime; embarked on a new phase of legislative 
development which severely strained the administrative resources of the 
1 
Colonial Office. At, the same time as the opportunities for the counsel 
In one year,, from 1816 to 1817# the number of colonial acts which 
Stephen reviewed doubled: certificates by H. Goulburn for 18 Nov, 
1817 and 8 July 1818, C. O. 323/1+0.. ff. 120-1p 152. For the changing 
policiesq see V. T. Harlow.. 'The New Imperial System,, 1783-18151., 
C. H. B. E. 
14 vol. 
ii, pp. 153-187. 
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to find work increased., any fear of competition from the Board of Trade 
decreased since all its attention was needed for the codificatiom of 
commercial and fiscal regulations which was undertaken shortly after 
1 
the close of the war. As early as 1816 the Board relinquished its 
right to draw up orders 
2 
in council for the colonies andit was the counsel 
who inherited the task. &en without Stephen the colonial counselship 
would have become a more influential post after 1815. Because of him 
it changed out of recognition. 
Stephen's contribution to the development of the legal counselship 
can best be Eýged by comparing his work with that of his predecessor.. 
William Baldwin. Officially the counsel wasýrequired by the secretary 
of state to give his "opinion in point of law" on colonial bills sent 
to his chambers from the Colonial Office. For each act examined and 
reported on) a fee of three guineas was paid with a deduction of one 
twelfth to pay for the messenger employed to carry the documents and 
the replies to and from the counsel's chambers. "Opinion in point 
of law" was a rather vague criterion. Baldwin must have felt it allowed 
him littlo scope for his reports vex7 seldom offered any objections to 
A+ 
colonial legislation. Where he did object, it was rather to the 
1. Idngelbach, A. H. R. p xxxp 1925., Pp. 701-727p and her article., 'William Huskisson at the Board of Tradelp AjH. R. v x1iiis 1938p 
ppi 759-774. 
2. Stephen to J. C. Stephenp 10 July 1816p Stephen Papers, journal of 
letters to J. C. S., 1816-1845.. 
3. The system is described in Stephen to Horton, 21 Apr. 1823, C. O.. 
323/197v f. 162. 
Counsels' reports since 1801 are in the C-0.323/ series. 
42 
"informality and irregularityn in framing the acts than to any 
particular provision in them. Marv species of laws which Stephen was 
2 
later to pronounce objectionable were entirely overlooked. 
Baldwin seems to have regarded the counselship not as an authority 
representing the Colonial Office.. as Stephen did later., but as an agency 
which provided technical assistance to the gove=ment in reviewing 
colonial legislation. If he felt some provisions in the bills were 
questionablep Baldwin contented himself with drawing them to the particular 
3 
attention of the political officials. His only unequivocal objection 
4 
was to the repeal of British statutes by colonial legislatures. The 
Board of Trade in Baldwin's period had become equally complacent. Its 
concern with fiscal and commercial questions had led to the neglect of 
its imperial responsibilities long before the close of the Napoleonic 
war* Even on imperial economic regulationsp once one of the pillars of 
the Board's authority., colonial acts contrary to British statutes were 
5 






Baldwin's reportp 23 N6v- 1810.9 C. O. 323/39j, ff. 42-3. 
For example.. those relating to transient trading: Baldwin's report., 
7 Sept. 18112 C. O. 323/39j, f. 69. 
Baldwin's report., 28 Sept. 3.811., C. O. 323/39., ff. 71-3. 
Baldwin's report., 16 Mar. 1813y C-0.323/39., ff. 137-8. 
For examplep on monopolios: Stephen to Bathursto 8 July 18]J+p 
C-0 . 323//+Ot ff. 8-13. 
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business in the early years-, of the nineteenth century isp in fact, 
nowhere better typified than in regard to colonial legislation. 
It was Stephen who restored law-reviewing to its place as a major 
feature of colonial administration. His contribution parallels the 
work done by Bathurst and Goulburn in other areas. He showed a willing- 
ness to question colonial legislation and to use the powers confided in 
the crown and its representatives. His reports., unlike BaldwinIsj, were 
not restricted to technical criticisms but embraced the entire field of 
legislative administration so that the Board of Trade's secondary review 
1 
became quite otiose. 
Not surprisingly in view of his interests$ Stephen's work expanded 
the meaning of an opinion "in point of lawl'. Instead of restricting 
himself to comments on the competence of the colonial legislatures to 
pass, the laws., he sought to examine the political consequences of colonial 
laws and then to judge them bv the standard of political 'convenience, as 
well as equity. To test a bill., its conformity with goverment policy., 
consistency with the governors' commissions and instructions and, the 
12rdib d of its achieving what it intended to do, were all regularly 
examined even though this often required that Stephen himself interpret 
what the policy was or what the colonial societies desired to do. The 
Paul Knaplund., James Stephen and the British Colonial System 
(Madisonp 1956)-Tv-esan idea of the variety of material which can 
be found in the series on which it is based - C. O. 323/39 to 63. 
Any volune of his reports would serve to illustrate the range of 
Stephen2s work, even the earliestwhere he examines "the general 
scope and tendency" as well as the terms of the laws reviewed. On 
occasionp he would peremptorily state that a colonial legislature 
had "exceeded the bounds of their authority". See, for example.. 
Stephen's reports to Bathursts 12 Oct. to 31 Dec. 18139 C. O. 323/39. 
ff. 167-86. 
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reviews clearly became increasingly political. 
Stephen's reports were not only more political but also infinitely 
more searchingp more detailed and more alive to the responsibilities 
involved. Doubtless his own wish to influence made him try to see 
that the government enforced its powers on subjects where his opinion 
was required. But he was more than a mere propagandist. He professed 
a concept of public service., more characteristic of the attitude of 
imperial civil servants later in the century than in his day, as a high 
2 
ennobling calling in the service of one's fellow men. To this he 
united a truly remarkable) unsparing dedication to his work -a wish., 
as he saw it) to utilise fully the opportunity and the gifts which God 
had given him. His energy and capacity matched this devotion and amazed 
3 
all who knew him. He was prepared., from the start., to take infinite 
pains over his work even to the extent of undertaking elaborate researches. 
4 
1. This too is true even of his earliest reports. Seel for example, 
Stephen to Bathurstp Nov. 1813, C-0.323/390 ff. 175-8. 
2. Stephen to Taylorp 12 July 18332 Stephen paperso journal of letters 
to various correspondentsp 1807-1839. 
3. Many examples could be cited. Amond the most revealing are Horton's 
and Stanleyls: Hortonts speechy 3 Mar. 1826., in Parliamentary- Debates., 
n. s. p xivt 1080; Stanley to Stephent 1 Apr. 1833P Stephen Papersp 
separate letters. See also C. E. Stephen, Sir James Stephenp pp. 4-5. 
4. In 1813. - for example# he postponed the consideration of certain laws until he had made detailed enquiries about them. Stephen's 
reportP 31 Dec. 18132 C. O. 323/39p ff. 181-6. 
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These qualities.. reflected in his reports to the under-secretary 
and the secretary of state., rather than demands for the indiscriminate 
wielding of the imperial veto., as his enemies claimed. 9 gave Stephen the 
influence he sought and early obtained over colonial policy. Nonetheless., 
he bad to guard himself against his critics' charges. His reports,, much 
more than those of his predecessors., were designed with the ultimate 
responsibility of the secretary of state in view. They sought to clarify 
the technicalities involved in the laws.. to examine their contents in a 
manner intelligible to the layman and., where necessary., to make suggestions 
for improvements. The cooperation of his political superiors or at least 
their consent was actively sought to bolster his opinion. This was 
especially true in cases where Stephen could offer no legal objections 
but instead used his report to expose questionable political actions on 
the part of colonial legislatures taken under the guise of acts or ordin- 
ances. Once he had presented his casej, he left the ultimate decision 
to the secretary of state., clearly indicating that he was doing so 
2 
intentionally. In this Way he made what had former3, v been merely a 
technical process of review into part and parcel of the business of 
administration. The subject of legislation became one of the routine 
matters of correspondence between Britain and the colonies. 
A: s in Stephen to Bathurst,, 10 Dec. 1816; & Stephen to Bathurst, 6 
Q-A. 1817. - C. O. 323/40., ff- 216,3.42-51., 
2. As in Stephen to Bathurst., 17 Mar. 1817t C. O. 323/40t ff. 154-60. 
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Both Bathurst and Goulburn came to rely heavily on the opinion of 
their counsel. On colonial legislation not infrequently., even in his 
early days in officep his suggestions for amendments or for further 
supporting legislation were incorporatedj. word for word., into despatches 
I 
from the Colonial Office to the colonies. It is quite clear that 
Stephen's work as an administrator was imperceptibly bringing about the 
abandonment of long-pursued policies of 'salutary neglect' and helping 
to create a more dynamic and professional approach tovards the supervision 
of colonial legislation. 
1817., Stephen's growing authority and his value to his superiors 
bad become a matter for comment in parliament. From his first days in 
office Stephen had inherited the obloquy which,, through his father2s 
notoriously extremist viewsp attached itself to all his family. To this 
inheritance, Stephen had added a personal reputation as a "more than 
2 
suspected" member of the anti-slavery group. The Vest Indian group in 
parliament and other interested parties turned their invective and scorn 
on to him. He was regarded as the instrument in office of the bumani- 
tarians who supported the abolition of the slave trade and the amelioration 
3 
of slavery. It was even said that his counselshipýwas a sinecurep 
Stephen to Bathurstp 6 Oct. 1817p C, O. 323AOP f. 216, illustrates 
how eas: Uy they could be adapted. 
2. Stephen to E. Venn., 16 Aug. 3.8Z7,9 Stephen Paperss Journal of letters 
to various correspondents, 1807-1839. 
Joseph Marryatt2 M. P. j of the West India groupp was the leader of this agitation. His arguments are presented in Joseph Marryatt.. 
More Thoughts Still on the State of the West India Colonies (Londons 
1818)., pp. 51-3. 
47 
designed only to give the abolitionists official access to goverment 
1 
records. The attacks were so vitriolic and insistent that in May 1817 
Goulburn felt impelled to counter the abuse by bearing testimony in the 
House of Commons to Stephen's impartiality and to the quality and value 
2 
of his work. 
His enemies were right to charge him as being a supporter of the 
Saints., but were wrong to believe he used his knowledge of the Colonial 
Office to provide the humanitarians with, ammunition. Perhaps because 
of his training as a lawyer Stephen invariably maintained the brittle 
('ýraditionýof official secrecy. This was quite unusual in his day. 
Stephen's father., for example., held no official position but had been in 
the confidence of ministers and had been admitted to examine colonial 
records. Presumably this was why Goulburn., in introducing Stephen to 
the departments felt it necessary to point out that certain official 
A+ 
information could not be divulged to private societies. If so it 
suggests a failure on Goulburn's part to appreciate the full. potentialities 
of the counselship and an unfounded suspicion of Stephents motives in 
1. Joseph Marryatt) M. P. p An mination of the ReROr-t of the Bgrrice CoTmissioners ... 
(Iondon,, 1817)., PP. 73-6. 
2* Stephen to Goulburnp 20 May 18172 C. O. 323//+0.. ff. 173-44, 
3- Office memorand=., C-0.323/182., f. 29; Manning.. British Colonial 
Government, pp. 1+85-7. 
46. Stephen to Goulburn, 7 Apr. 3-813 & 3-1 -Tune 1813, C. O. 137/138- 
48 
accepting the post. 
1 
Stephen's influence came purely from the quality 
and scope of his work. He treated his material as confidential and 
after his appointment even his father was compelled to seek permission 
2 
to examine colonial legislation through the regular official channels. 
Before 1821j, extensive and varied as his services becamev Stephen 
was still only an occasional official. He valued Goulburnis testimony 
of support not so much because it signified confidence in his official 
work bat because it prevented him from losing clients through the slanders 
3 
of the Vest Indian group. Colonial work was a diverting and fairly 
A+ 
lucrative sideline. Even the prestige of his official employment was, i 
appreciated as much because it contributed to his professional standing 
5. 
as because it was gratifYing in itself. ' But there is no doubt that 
Stephen increasing3, y considered his official duties as more important 
than his private practice.. at least after the assurances that his opinions 
1. Young., The Colonial Offices p. 58. Official secrecy., of course., 
helped to protect him from his enemies' accusations. 
2. George Stephen A'Memoir of-the Late James Stephen ... 
(Brighton, 
Victoria# 18751t Pp. 37-8. 
3- Stephen to Goulburn.. 20 May 1817, C. O. 323/40., ff. 174-5. 
4- Stephen to J. C. Stephens June 1816,8 July 1816, & 10 July 1816p 
Stephen Papers., journal of letters to J. C. S.., 3.816-18/+5. 
5. Stephen to Goulburn, 6 Aug. 3.817, C. O. 323A87s, f. 510. 
were valued in the office. So great was the time and attention which 
he was willing to bestow on his government services., in facto that by 1 
1820 he had given up a considerable amount of private business. 
The change in his position from an occasional official to a 
subordinate administrator with a special departmental responsibility for 
legal questions was completed after R. J. Wilmot Horton became parliamentary 
under-secretary in 1821. Under Goulburn Stephen had expressed a willing- 
ness to undertake gratuitously duties in addition to reviewing colonial 
2 
laws. Partly as a result., he had worked after 1815 on subjects outside 
his official duties such as the formulation of constitutions of conquered 
colonies. He had also drawn up draft orders in council and examined 
3 
court rules for the under-secretary. These services Goulburn treated A+ 
as exceptional and sparingly used his offer of extra assistance. Under 
Wilmot Horton the exceptional services became regular and an entirely now 
range of duties were assigned to the counsel. 
Wilmot Horton's first task as under-secretary was to complete the 
work of reform and reorganization in the Colonial Office which Goulburn 
1. Stephen to Goulburn) 20 July 1820,, C. O. 323A921, f. 135. 
2. Stephen to Goulburn., 18 NOv- 1817., C-0- 323AS7., f. 528. 
3. Stephen to Horton., 21 Apr. 1823.. C-0- 323A97t f. 162; Stephen 
to Goulburn., 6 kug. 1817., C-0- 323A87.9 fe 510. 
4. Tjjis is clear from his ay certificates: office memorandap 
17 Nov. 1817., C. O. 323/40. - ff. 120-1. 
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had set in train. Horton was a clever and capable administrator whose 
reputation in the history of the Office stands high. He reformed the 
personnel of his department by forcing the old and incapable clerks to 
retire, and he showed himself a shrewd judge of ability in his selection 
of the new younger group who replaced them. It was Horton who introduced 
into the office almost all the leading clerks of the second quarter of 
the 19th century including Henry Taylor., the celebrated head of the West 
India department.. poetp, playwright and political philosopher., and Stephen's 
close friend. Horton also got the beat from his staff. To an extent 
almost unknown previously, he allowed senior clerks to share in the 
routine and the business of administration instead of confining them to 1 
the work of copyists. 
Horton's judgement of candidates for office was matched by his 
assessment of the talent available in the office. Of thisp Stephen is 
the best example. He was attracted by Hortonto friendliness and energy 
and the confidence was reciprocated. Horton was willing to be guided by 
Stephen's professional opinion and experience. In a letter to a friend 
in 1827,, Stephen flippantly but acutely described their respective roles 
in administration. "He imparts motion to me".. he wrote,, "and I keep him 
2 
moving in the right line". Their relations were not always so smooth 
1. Young., The Colonial Officep pp. 48-58; Murray'. * The West Indies., 
pp. . 119-126; 
D. N. B., ix.. p. 128/+. For a fuller biograpby of Horton# 
see E. G. Jonesp 'Sir R*J. Wilmot Hortonp Bartp Politician & Pamphleteer' 
University of Bristolp M. A. thesis.. 1936. His surname was Wilmot until 
May 1823 when he added Horton by royal licence: Youngp The Colonial 
Officep p. 1+9. Horton is used consistently here to avoid confusion. 
2. Stephen to E. Vemp 16 Aug., 18V., Stephen Papers., journal of letters to 
various correspondents., 3.8(Y7-1839. 
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but wbile it lasted the mutual confidence was productive of a vastly 
increased range of duties and responsibi3-ities for Stephen. 
Im addition to legislationp all colonial legal questions, such as 
disputes or appeals on different casesp technical difficulties in prosecuting 
questionable verdicts in colonial courts., competing jurisdictions and the 
interpretation of British legal statutes., were regularly referred to the 
counsel for his opinion. Only if he felt it impossible for the secretary 
of state to deal with them without the aid of higher legal authority were 
1 
they then sent to the law officers of the crown. Stephen was also 
required to aid in the initiation of legal measures. Drafts of orders 
in council and parliamentary bills and instructions to governors on 
various topicss formerly extra services specially remunerated., became 
part of his normal services. He was even required to attend for personal 
consultations with the under-secretary in the Colonial Office and to consult 
2 
with local experts on the business that he undertook. 
These new services imposed a heavy burden on Stephen's time and 
energ7 as he explained to Horton in 1823& 
"In effect rry employments have comprized not only the 
functions of a Counsel., but many also of those which 
belong to the solicitors of the different Boards in 
other departments of government. Like them I have 
brought the questions laid before me into such a shape 
and compass as to enable Lord Bathurst to obtain the 
opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor General upon 
any important points.. without imposing on them the 
necessity of perusing a mass of voluminous and partly 
irrelevant documents". 3 
1. There are indexes of his extra reports for 1823 and 1824 in C, O. 323A29 
ff. 7-8. 
2. As exEmplest Horton to Stephen, 26 June 1833, C. O. 32.044, p. 166; 
Stephen to Hortonp 21 Apr. 1823P C-O- 323A97.9 f. 162. 
3- Stephen to Hortons 21 Apr. 18230 C. O. 323/3-979 ff. 162-164. 
-I1 -1-1 -ý I- 
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This. 9 with all his other servicesy was too much for-one man to perform. 
He appealed to the under-secretary when his health began to break 
under the strain in April 1823. A'. few months earlier he hadlibecome 
a father with new responsibilities to consider. Reluctantly., he 
reaUzed that he would have to choose ultimately between his two occu- 
pationsr but the choice was never in doubt. Hortonp who well knew 
what the department owed to Stephen., was sympathetic and respectful. 
He arranged for his counsel to obtain what he requested.. a promise of 
permanent employment in the Colonial Office in a position on the same 
footing as a clerk and at a salary of 91., 000 per annum. In return.. he 
was to undertake to make the service of the Colonial Department his first 
1 
duty; what free time he had left could be devoted to his practice. 
Although it guaranteed him an income and an official career# the 
change in Stephen's status in 1823 was mainly formaL He had already 
become de Lqcto legal adviser to the secretary of state. Horton arranged 
to have him so considered and so paid; but the arrangement was merely 
provisional. Though given an assurance of permanent tenure from the 
Prime Minister., Stephen was not yet a member of the establishment. He 
was vulnerable in that he neither possessed the legal security of tenure 
nor the rights to a retirement pension which clerks in the office possessed. 
Harrison (Treasur7) to Hortonj, /+ Nov. 1823., C. O. 323A97# f. 246. 
It does Stephen less than credit to say., as Dr. Murray does., that 
he was employed "as an expert in West Indian law" (Murray# Th2 MRst 
Indiesp p. 121). His duties were broader than this and important 
as much for their general administrative skill as for their legal 
content. Murray is rightp howeverp to stressthat in legal matters 
Stephen was indispensable. 
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He remained simply &, fee-paid counsel whose extra-, mervices were 
remunerated out of the contingency funds by a sun equal to 91., 000 
1 
minus hio earnings from law reviewing. The significance of the 
aTrangemeat concluded in 1823 was that it showed Stephen? b eagerness 
to adopt a future career in government service. Although he still 
2 
derived over half his income from his work at the courtsq he had 
practically agreed to sacrifice that salary if., as seemed likely., his 
official duties continued to expand. 
In 1823 and 1824 there was a drop in the number of acts to be 
reviewed., but the new services,, most of which had., according to Stephenj 
3 
"but a faint and fictitious relation to his profession as a, lawyer"., 
A+ 
were much more numerous and obviously much more time-consuming. He 
must have had to give up part of his remaining private practice and he 
knew that in the legal profession the neglect of a client is liable to 
This is clear from Stephenýs applications for salary: Stephen to 
Horton# 28 Fbb-. 1824t C-0.323/192., f. 366v and from the order in 
council., 2 Feb. 1825., C. O. 878/ly f. 91. 
2. Memorandum by James Stephen for Sir George Murray., 16 Feb. 1830., 
Murray Paperaf N. L. %p Vol. 171, f. 55- " There isj, however., some 
confusion on this point. The figures given in the document are 
repeated in Stephen to Auckland., 6 Oct. 1832f Stephen Paperst loose 
leaf.. letters, on which Ieslie Stephen seems to have relied for his 
account in L. Stephen, JWes Fitzjames Stephenp p. 32. But whereas 
in the former Stephen implies that his income of 92.. 700 applied to 
the year 184-5s in the latter he says explicitly that it wasifor 
1822. Most probablyf the recorded figure of 1: 2., 700 applied to 
1824-5 and he simply deduced that his earnings "exceeded" that amount 
in 1822. 
3. Stephen to Howicks 10 Eeb. 1832,, Grey Papers., Stephen correspondence. 
4. The indexes and accounts are in C. O. 323/42p ff. 1-18; C-0- 323A97f 
ff. 157-189; ' C-0- 323A98., PP. 361-405; C-0- 324/245., pp. 2., 18j. 
30. - 36-8- 
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risk the entire practice. 
1 
Fortunately for himq an attempt was being 
made at this time to provide assistance for the over-worked under- 
secretary through the creation of a new senior administrative post. 
Hortonp whose-scheme it wasp failed initially to win permission from 
the Treasury for the creation of a second under-secretaryship but., as 
a substitute,, he used such funds axwere available to create a new 
position for Stephen on the establishment of permanent colonial: counsel., 2 
at a salary of 9lj5OO per annum. This provided the Office -with the 
full-time services of a professional lawyer and a well-proveds assiduous,, 
administrative talent. The appointment meant a considerable financial 
sacrifice for Stephen since he was required to give up his private practice 
3 
entirely. But it provided him with the security of tenure which he had 
sought and ensured the continuance of his influence in colonial adminis- 
tration. 
In later years,, when under attack., Stephen consistently maintained 
A+ 
that he was not responsible for the creation of the permanent counselship. 
There is no reason to doubt that the actual arrangementsp the preparation 
L. Stephen to Horton., 21 Apr. 1823, C-0.323A97# ff. 163-164. 
2. The detailed manoeuvres can be followed in Young, The Colonial Office., 
pp. 77-80. 
3- Stephen to A: ucklnnA, 6 Oct. 18329 Stephen Papersp loose leaf letters. 




of the relevant order in council., the settlement of the salary and 
the determination of the conditions of employment, were made without 
directly consulting him. It would be equally unreasonable to maintain 
that Stephen was-not the moving force behind the change. Doubtless 
the Colonial Office would have discovered at some time the necessity 
for a specialist legal officer within the department to deal promptly 
with this highly technical branch of administration. Yet it was 
Stephen's skill and industry which had first brought a consultative 
legal office into colonial government and it was his ability and knowledge 
of subjects outside the normal business of Westminster Hall which convinced 
Horton and his colleagues that they needed him on the establishment in 
1 
3.825. 
(III) From Counsel to Under-Secretary. 1825-1836. 
The institution of a departmental legal officer.. a development of 
lasting significance for the office., probably made little difference to 
Stephen's work in the office. He continued to act as legal counsel and 
confidential adviser to the under-secretary and secretary, of state. By 
1832., he had actually forgotten when the change occurred and confused the 
2 
arrangement of 1823 with the formalities two years later. This is not 
In the draft order in council Bathurst mentioned "the continual 
requisitions for his attendance at the office": Bathurst to Lord 
President, 31 Jan, 1825, C, O- 324/145., 75-76. The order in 
council is dated 2 Feb. 1825., C. O. 878/lpv*f. 91. 
2. Stephen to Aackland, 6 Oct. 1832p Stephen Papersp loose leaf letters. 
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surprising. His ambitions were certainly not bounded by the counselship, 
and his promotion in 1825 was almost immediately overshadowed by his loss 
of status when passed over in the choice of a permanent under-secretary. 
1 
The decision to create a second or additional under-secr6tary was 
part of a general scheme of office reorganization undertaken in the course 
of 1824 and 1825 of which Stephen's appointment as permanent counsel 
forms a part. The second under-secretaryship had been postponed and 
2 
implemented last becausw of the increased expenditure involved. In the 
interval Stephen's promotion created an office whichy Unlike'the clerical 
positionsp was in scope commensurate with the whole empire and involved 
him in constant attendance on-the political heads. His functions were 
not precisely definedf but it was clear that they did not stop short of 
3 
services in the despatch writing line. He was, in factp in the position 
of an assistant under-secretary orp as CraWý Robinsonp the diarist., put 4 
it at the time. 9 "a sort of additioml Under-Secretary of State". 
1. The term 'permanent' under-secretary was not used in 1825. 
2. For the provisionsp see order in council 2 Feb. 1825, order in council 
5 July 1825., and order in council 2 Aug. 1825j C. O. 87SAl ff. 87-St 
93v and 95-6. The developments are outlined in Young., The Colonill 
Officep pp. 77-81. 
Stephen to E. Venn., 16 Aixg. 18272 Stephen Papers# journal of letters 
to various correspondentsp 18(Y7-1839. 
/+. H. C. Robinsons Diaryp entry for 12 June.. 1825., Sadler, iip p. 296. 
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This was also the government's view, for.. on the subsequent appointment 
of a second under-secretary., it was assumed that Stephen's duties would 
be Lightened. 
Why then was Stephen., surely the obvious choice.. not appointed as 
additional under-secretary in 18257 Although there is little evidence 
to show on what grounds he was rejectedq there are several substantial 
reasons wby he might have been. Administrative offices,. particular3, v 
well-paid ones., were always allotted on the grounds of patronage until 
I 
after the mid-century. The appointment to an office worth 92., 000 a 
year was important enough to warrant the attention of the Prime Minister. 
Stephen., as he himself admitted.. lacked the wealth., influence and aristo- 
2 
cratic connections which would have given him a powerful claim. 
Equal: Ly important was the fact that the under-secretaryship was; 
conceived as part of an expanding official pattern. The Wilmot Horton 
reforms in the Colonial Office were aimed at increasing the numbers of 
senior members in the office staff. During 1824 and 1825 two members 
were added to the senior rank of clerks and a registrarship, created as 
well as the counselship. The funds for these appointments were only 
very reluctantly conceded since retrenchment in civil administration was 
1. Memo by Stephen for Murray., 16 Feb. 1830,, Murray Paperss N. L. S., 
vol. 171, ff. 54-57. But the assumption may initially have been Stephenls:. Stephen to Auckland, 6 Oct. 1832, Stephen Paperso loose 
leaf letters. 
2. Stephen to E. Vem., 16 Aug. 1827., Stephen ]Papers., journal of letters to various correspondents., 1807-1839. 
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a first principle of governments in the early nineteenth century. The 
under-secretaryship was the hardest won victory of all and was followed 
1 
immediately by the loss of one of the senior clerkships. Had Stephen 
been selectedp the Treasury and the House of Commons would very probab3, v 
have insisted upon the amalgamation of the offices of counsel and under- 
secretax7. Instead of adding one extra senior official) the appointment 
would merely have involved a small salary increment for Stephen. 
Ab the decision was ultimate3, y politicals howeverp the decisive 
factor was unquestionably Stephen's family name. Not for the last time.. 
his career was handicapped by those who insisted upon associating him 
with his fatherts extremist views. When his appointment as permanent 
counsel was announced in parliament., it was greeted by a typical burst 
of invective from the humanitarian, Joseph Hume, the spokesman on this 
occasion for the Vest India interest. He declared that; 
"Nothing could be more objectionable to the colonies 
than such an appointment. He 
34iepheO 
was the son 
of the person whom the colonists supposed to be their 
greatest enemy; and to put him in an office in which 
every communication to and from the colonies must pass 
through his hands., was highly objectionable". 2 
Though shrewdly guessing that Stephen's work was more than simply forensic, 
Hume, of course2 had considerably exaggerated his role. Nonetheless if 
Hume's view prevailed., Stephen could certainly not hope for further 
promotion. 
Order in council, 2 Abg. 1825,, C. O. 878At ff. 95-6; Young., The 
Colonial Office, pp. 77-9. 
LqLl_iamentar-v Debatgsp n. s.., vol. 3dvp c1m. 1081,3 Mar. 1826. 
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The now under-secretaryship went to Robert William Hays a man of 
safe conser7ative viewss good aristocratic and political co=ections 
and a self-proclaimed supporter of the Liverpool government. The 
choice was obviously political. This was an interesting precedents 
revealing in its reflection the contemporar7 attitude to civil service 
appointments. No attempt 'was made to disguise the political bias in 
the selection of an official who would not have to resign with his political 
superiors even though his office might involve him in every detail of 
the department's administrative policies. The partisan method of 
selection was a significant and bitter lesson not lost on Stephen who 
thereafter fully appreciated the importance of political support in his 
struggle for promotion. 
Shortly after Ray's appointment Stephen agreed to act as counsel 
to the Board of Trade., without increase in salary., in addition to his 
other services. He believed that his parliamentary enemies might maintain 
that the creation of a second under-secretary would leave him idle. To 
forestall their criticisms, he fell in with a plan originating with 
William Huskissons then President of the Board of Trades to get his 
assistance in the legal business of that office. In 1823, the Board 
had been deprived altogether of the official services of a legal counsel. 
1. Young., The Colonial Offices pp. 85-8. 
2. A. L. Lingelbach, 'William Huskisson at the Board of Trade's A. H. R. 
x1iiii. 1938j. P. 7. 
2 
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Since then Stephen apparently had been gratuitously performing legal 
services for Huskisson and his colleagues. Retrenchment pressed as-, 
heavily on the Board as on the Colonial Office and., as the Board's 
chief clerkship fell under the axe in 1825., Huskisson must have been 
I 
relieved to obtain Stephen's valuable services officially. 
The new scheme was the cause of yet another anomalous arrangement 
aimed at preserving the meagre establishment funds. The Board agreed 
to pay out of its finances one thirds 9500., of Stephen's salary plus 
2 
contingent expensesp the rest of it being borne by the Colonial Office. 
Despite this formalityp it seems to have been assumed on both sides that 
his work for the Board would be only in the nature of occasional services 
such as he had performed for the Colonial Office before 1821. His first 
.3 duty was still with colonial legal affairs. 
The association vith the Board proved., neverthelessp most valuable 
for Stephen. To serve with and be favoured by a man of Huskisson's 
talent and reputation as an administrator was a strong recommendation 
4 
for an official. The association also brought Stephen into contact 
1. Stephen to Aucklamdp 6 Oct. 18321 Stephen Papers) loose leaf letters; 
minutes of 30 July 1825) B. T; 5134P pp. 67-70; & B. T. 6/2829 Council. 
2. Order in councilp 2 Aug. 1825, C. O. 878/1j, ff- 95-6; minutes of 30 
July 1825., B. T. 5134., pp. 69-7o. 
3- Simh.. at any rate# was Stephen's opinion,, and the relative scale 
of remunerations would seem to confirm it: order in'council., 5 July 
1825o C. -O. 878/1, f. 93; Stephen to Auckland, 6 Oct. 1832# Stephen Papersy loose leaf letters. 
4- C. R. Fay., Huskisson and Hig Age (London., 3.951), pp. 35-138 outlines Huskisson's contribution. 
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with an old Claphamite acquaintance2 Charles Grant,, then vice president 
of the Board andý like Huskisson, a future colonial secretary of state. 
Both of his superiors were very sympathetic to Stephen's views and 
impressed by his work on colonial lawsp especially those relating to 
slave colonies. Frequently.. they brought his opinions to the particular 
1 
attention of the colonial secretary of state. In practice, his 
services at the Board were more than occasional. They included reporting 
on colonial and foreign commercial laws., preparing and reviewing legal 
cases and drafting legal documents. 
nothing to do with colonial affairs. 
Much of this work had little or 
2 
While Huskissonwas president. 
Stephen's services were in frequent use and they did not substantially 
diminish until James Deacon Hume was appointed secretary to the Board of 
3 
Trade in 1828. To keep up with this work and his regular duties at 
the Colonial Office, he must have performed herculean tasks daily. 
Despite expectations.. Stephen's work at the Colonial Office did not 
slacken as a result of Hay's appointmentr indeed his purely legal dutiesp 
the basis of his aulhorityp considerably increased. Gradually he was 
gaining the experience and sharpening the expertise which wasito make him 
See.. for examplep minutes 9 Aug. 1825p minutes 29 Aug. 1825.9 minutes 
16 Sept. 1825, and minutes 6 Jan. 1826p B. T. 5/340 pp., 92., 3.1gy 141-21 
& 295. 
2. E. g. minutes 12 Aug. 1825Y minutes 29 Aug. 1825Y minutes 16 Sept. 
1825'j minutes 6 Jan. 1826f B. T. 5/34j pp. 102.. 119p 3.41-22 & 295. 
Stephen to Au. ckland, 6 Oct. 1832p Stephen Papersp loose leaf letters. 
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an indispensable member of the office. Colonial legislatures, continued 
to utilise their powers frequently and legal disputes were inevitably 
recurrent in an empire composed of such varied and nmaerous legislatures. 
The amount of work which he mas forced to undertake was truly prodigious. 
As the crown lawyers were overworked and refused-to attend to the compli- 
cated legal business of the Colonial Office, he alone was able to provide 
2 
the professional advice required. His contribution was greater in 
variety as well asIn amountp covering almost every aspect of administration., 
political as well as forensic. Mariy colonial despatches were referred to' 
him by his superiors and his comments and opinions on them were almost 
invariably turned into despatches nominally from the secretary of statep 
3 
well spiced with advice to the governors concerned. 
Stephents abilitiesy experience and professional authority could in 
themselves account for the major role he played in the work of the Office; 
but there was another factor. R. W. Hay did not realize the full poten- 
tial-ities of his office andf partly as a result# did not assume a large 
part of Stephen's work. Though he was hard-working and serious-mindedy 
Some of the difficulties are outlined by Young., The Colonial Office.. 
P. 100. 
2. Stephents reports, being no longer separately remuneratedy enter 
the general colonial series of correspondence after 1825. But there 
is a list of his work in Stephen's supplementary memorandum for Sir 
George Murray, n. d.., IT. L. S., vol. 171ý ff. 58-60. See also Stephen 
to Horton., 13 Oct. 1825p C-0- 323/202,, ff. 195-6. 
For Stephen's legal opinionspC-0- 323/205'., 2CY7,208p 211p, 212., 213. t 217.9 218 under tStephen' and C. O. 323/43-50p Passim. For an example 
which shows the extent of this work see Stephen to Horton., 5 May 1827., 
C. O.. 323/44P ff- 107-55. 
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HaY Probably lacked both the capacity and the aptitude., and also the 
experience., which Stephen's work demanded. His failure to appreciate 
the significance of his new post ultimatelv had even more serious 
I 
conseqiences. 
The position of 'permanent' under-secretary was relative2y newin 
2 
1825 and had not attained the significance which it now bears. Dr. D. 
M. Young., in his study of the early years of the Colonial Offices, traces 
back the origin of the modern permanent under-secretaryship, to the 
appointments of additional under-secretaries in the Home Office and 
Fbreign Office shortly after the close of the Napoleonic war. Their 
function was "to provide an incoming secretary of state with information 
and initiate the political under-secretaries into the habits of official 
3 
business". There was nothing new., of courses in using non-parliamen- 
tarians or officials in leading administrative posts., nor. was there 
anything unique in an under-secretary outlasting the secretary who 
appointed him and serving his successor - that occurred in the Colonial 
Office in the 1820s even vith parliamentary under-secretaries like Wilmot 
For Hay., Young, The Colonial Office, pp. 85-9; Murrayp The 'West 
Indies, pp. 3.47-8. Hay subsequently gave a-full statement of his 
views on the permanent under-secretary's role: Hay's memorandum., 
2 Apr. 1832,, C. O. 537/22.. ff. 17-18. 
2. For a recent discussion of the subjectp see Henry Parrisp 'The Origins of the Permanent Civil Service., 1780-1830". Public Adminip-- 
trati6 . x1vip 1968., PP- 143-66. ' 
Youngq. The Colonial Officej p. /+7. 
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1 
Horton. But in the first three decades of the nineteenth century 
two developments of vital importance in the history of civil adminis- 
tration had taken place which affected the under-secretary's role. 
The first was that the political heads of the Colonial Office were 
being forced increasingly to devolve major duties onto their permanent 
2 
staff. The second was that the idea of administration by 'King's 
Friends', by officials who served the King under any minister not 
peculiarly unpopular., vas giving way to a new concept of ministerial 
responsibility in which the political head strictly controlled the 
3 
personnel of his office and was-ýheld accountable for what they did. 
Neither development was complete by 1830 but they were clearly fore- 
shadowed and they made the relationship between the under-secretary and 
secretary of state crucial. There was a danger that an under-secretary 
might take a decision in the name of a secretary of state on a problem 
of a political nature when the former was neither appointed by nor in 
agreement with the latter. To offset this danger it was vital to 
establish a demarcation of duties and responsibilities between political 
For 18th century cases., see the essay by A. F. McC. Madden# 'The 
Imperial Machinery of the Younger Pitt' in H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed. ).. 
Essays in British History Presented to Sir Keith-Feiling (Londonp 
1964)j, PP. . 173-193. 
2., This is one of the main conclusions of Dr. Young's book. The 
argument is summ rised in Young.. The Colonial Office,., pp. 1-6. 
This is one of the main conclusions, of Dr. Murray's book. The 
argument is sumwrised in Murray., Mie-West Indies,, p. 125. 
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and non-political officials. Stephen., with customary presciencep saw 
this quite clearly, but Hay and his political superiors refused to 
listen. 
This disagreement did not assume significance until the 1830s. 
From 1812 until 1830igoverments of a similar political complexions 
usually classed as 'Tory', were in office. While this political 
stability may have contributed to the emergence of the concept of a 
permanent civil servicep it'obscured the potential conflict between 
permanent under-secretary and secretary of state. Despite Stephents 
misgivings., Hay and Horton., who shared political views., simply divided 
the work of the office between them on a geographical basisp Hay 
taking mainly the colonies in the Mediterranean and the East and leaving 
Horton to handle those of the West Indies and North America. Although 
the colonies which fell to the respective under-secretaries sometimes 
changed hands in the years after 1825.. some such sharing of the duties 
2 
was always adopted. 
Though almost unrecognized at the timep this division of labour meant 
'I 
that Hay could not fulfil even those functions which the earliest permanent' 
under-secretaries had done. He was not acquainted with the work of the 
entire office and so could not brief an incoming secretary of statef; except 
on a small section of the work. Since he ser7ed precisely in the same 
Stephen's memorandums 30 Mar. 1832j. C. O. 537/22j. ff. 3,16; Hay's 
rebuttal is in his memorandum for 2 A: Pr. 1832j, ibid... ff. 17-8. 
2. Youngs, The Colonial Offices, po 88; Murray, The West Indies., pp. 120j. 
147- 
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administrative capacity as the parliamentary under-secretary it is 
difficult to see his role as anything other than political and therefore 
inevitably an embarrassment to an incoming government of a different 
political complexion. He neither provided continuity nor co-ordination., 
1 
the two principal functions of the modern permanent civil service. When 
a change of ministers took place.. as in 1828 or 1830., it fell principally 
2 
to Stephen to perform what Hay neglected. 
Is Stephen's services in the years after 1825 still far outran his 
formal responsibilitiess he retained the character of an assistant under- 
secretary. In the period up to 1830s for examples he was increasingly 
involved with constitutional questions., with drawing up new sets of 
commissions and instructions to governorss or drafting important parlia- 
mentary bills or orders-in-council setting out new constitutional provisionso 
or in preparing charters or legal codes. He was also frequently consulted 
on slavery qgestions and qpestions pertaining to ecclesiastical affairst 3 
his two chief interests. With all these extra duties, he was allowed 
a sum of 2200 out of office funds in 1826 to employ a secretary.. bringing 
There is., of courseo no unanimity about the functions of a 
bureaucracy; but continuity and - co-ordination are two elements 
most generally stressed. E. g. Max Weberts 'Ideal type' Of bureau- 
cracy in C. 'Wright Mills and H. Gerth 
(eds. )., From max Veber. Essaya 
in S6ciolbgZ (londonp 194SYP PP. 196-239. 
2. E. g. Stephents office Memorandum, 3 Feb. 1831) C. O. 323/213., 
ff . 70-75. 
3, Stephen's supplementarY memorandum for Murray., n. d: , N*L. S.. p Vol. 171., 
ff, 58-60; see also vols. cited under note 3 on p 62. 
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him more nearly into equality of status with the permanent under- 
1 
secretary. Even so., pressure of mork forced him to engage a second 
2 
clerk at his own expense. 
Yet the only attempt., in 1828., to create an office of assistant 
under-secretaryship for him formally, failed on the old grounds of "official 
3 
retrenchment" and his "unpopplar name". It was not until . 1834 that a 
secretary of state would agree to the creation of that position. Stephen's 
disappointment reflects the general torpor which overtook the work of 
office reform in the decade after 1825. In April 1827, the government 
of the Earl of Liverpool which had held office since 1812 finally collapsed.. 
A period of political stability was followed by constantly changing 
ministries. Liverpool was succeeded in turn by George Canningp Lord 
Goderichp the Duke of Wellington and Earl Grey, all in the space of three 
years. At the Colonial Office., Bathurst gave way to Goderichp Huskisson 
and Sir George Murray before Goderich returned to the post. Political 
instability meant the postponement of long-range official reforms and yet 
put the onus for maintaining administrative continuity on the permanent 
staff. In company with other senior civil servants like Taylor., Stephen 
4 
was forced to assume responsibility for keeping the office going. 
1. Stephen to Horton# 5 June 1826y and enclosures, C. O. 323/205p ff. 195-6. 
2. Stephen's memorandum for Murray, 16 Feb. 1830P N. L. S. 0 171. t ff. 56-7. 
3- Huskisson to Wilmotp 18 Oct. 1827., B. M. AdcLMS. 38751., f. 267. 
E. g, Taylor to Miss Fenwick., 13 Nov. 1827,9 Taylor Paperso Bodleian#'CZ 
letters d. 6, ff. 177-8; Stephen to J. C. Stephen., I+ Mar. 1828.. 
Stephen Papers, journal of letters to T. C. S., 1816-181+5. 
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Their efforts to do so merely aggravated the discrepancy between 
their positions and their duties. Stephen was thrust into a position 
of intimate confidence with either or both of his political superiors. 
Under Horton., who served Bathurst., Goderich and., for a time, Huskisson.. 
this helped to expedite business. But when Huskisson began to consult 
Stephen to the neglect of his own parliamentaz7 under-secretary.. 'E. G. 
Stanley., it proved embarrassing. It is even possible that Stanleyt 
then an ambitious young politician in his first office.. acquired from 
the experience his deep resentment about the participation of officials 
in policy decisions. Certain3, y Stephen felt exposed and would have 
2 
welcomed more protection than Huskisson was willing to afford him. 
Despite objectionsp the close relationship between Stephen and his 
superiors continued after Huskisson left office. Stephen's services 
had become virtually indispensable. He drove himself without consider- 
ation for his health., exhausting every ounce of stamina. He was forced 
to work from six in the morning until late at night on office business.. 
providing his clerks with four times the amount of work which their 
3 
colleagues in the Office performed. By 1828,9 his influence over his 
Stephen to J. C. Stephen) 25 Oct. 1828j, Stephen Papers.. letters to 
J. C. S. 0 1816-1845. 
2. It was to offset Stanleyto disfavour that the scheme of creating an 
assistant under-secretaryship was suggested to Huskisson: Huskisson 
to Wilmoty 18 Oct. 18Z7,, B. M. Add. MS. 387511ý-Ul- 
Stephents memorandum for Murray# 16 Yeb. 1830, N. L. S. 0 vol. 171) ff. 56-7. 
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secretaries of state had become a matter of comment not only in 
parliament but even in the cabinet. One prime minister., -the Duke of 
Wellingtons struggled valiantly to remove his colonial secretary from 
1 
Mr. Stephen's supposed great and insidious influence. His efforts 
were unsuccessful. But undoubtedly Stephen himself was excruciatingly 
embarrassed and hurt at being used so ruthlessly and cynically without 
his desired and due reward of official promotion. H6 began to appreciate 
the need for ruthlessness if his work was ever to be official3, V acImow- 
2 
ledged and recognised. 
In November . 1830.9 with the creation of the second Earl Grey, is 
administrationp the Whigs had finally unseated their opponents. Iord 
Goderich returned to the Colonial Office as secretary of state 'with 
Greyts sonp Viscount Howick., as his parliamentary under-secretary. Could 
Stephens who had certainly some sympathy for the Whigs., hope for better 
treatment from them than he had received from the Tories? The answer 
hinged on the attitude of his political superiors. Grey's great reforming 
ministry had a deep influence on colonial as well as dome stic"', -a-f-f-aUsT but 
Wellington to Murray.. 10 Oct. 1829 & Z7 Jan. 1830j, in Wellington., 
DesDatches,, vol. n, pp. 206p 4". See also H. T. Manningv 'Colonial 
Crises Before the Cabinetp 1829-, 351., B. I. H. R. j, xxxt 1957., p. 1+7. 
2. The anguish is evident in his memorandum to Murray,, 16 Feb., 1830, 
mentioned above and in Stephen to E. Venno 21 July 1830., Stephem 
Papers., Journal of letters to various correspondents. By 3.832 
his feelings had turned to anger in Stephen to A'acklandp 6 Oct. 
1832.. Stephen Papers,, loose leaf letters. 
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-little of the impulse to reform came from Lord Goderich. Hep like his 
immediate predecessors Sir George Murrayt was quite incompetent. ks 
Frederick Robinson., IG6ody' Goderich had earlier been under-secretaz7 
at the Colonial Office in 1809y president of the Board'of Trade from 
1818 to 1823 during the period when commercial legislation was liberalizedf 
chancellor of the e=hequer from 1823 to 1827 and prime minister for five 
months in 1827. His reputations unlike his offices., had steadily declined 
since his work at the Board of Trade and suffered considerably from his 
tenure as prime minister when he failed to hold together the different 
sections of his goverment. In the Colonial Office his vacillation and 
inertia showed themselves more openly thoughp to Henry Taylor at leastp 
he seemed to possess bursts of energy and a core of friendliness to offset 
1 
his weaknesses. Fortunately for the offices he was supported in 
Viscount Howick) his parliamentary under-secretary., by an assistant of 
great ability and considerable prospects to whom he frequently deferred. 
As the third Earl Greyj. Howick was to prove himself in Lord John 
2 
Russellts first ministry from 3.848 until 1852 to be one of the most able 
of nineteenth century colonial secretaries of state. Alreacly., by 1830., 
when he was only 28., his talents were manifest. Taylor. 9 usually a 
shrewd judge of characterp was unstinting in his praises. To him Howick 
H. Taylor.. Autobiom-ADhv (Londono 1885)p vol. ij, p. 2-18; Taylor to 
Miss Amwick., 2! 7 Nov. 1830., Bod.., M. S. Eng. lettersp d. 7,, f. 17. 
2, Howick was painfully amare of the deference: Grey Paperop journal 
entries for Jan. 1834v Grey Papers., yournals. 
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was Ilactives vigorous and decisive in business., honest-minded) and 
1 
ardent.. and in his nature and manners particularly gentlemanly". He 
undoubtedly ranks with Horton and Goulburn among those who made a significant 
contribution to the early development of the Colonial Office. 
With an ineffectual secretary of state, an energetic but inexperienced 
under-secretary in the office and a new government in power., Stephen's 
increasingly powerful role of confidential adviser and tutor to his chiefs 
gave him the opportunity to stake out a claim for the under-secretaryship. 
2 
He grabbed it with both hands. Howick was quickly converted to Stephen's 
cause. By the breadth and depth of his knowledgey Stephen was able to 
make a profound impression on Howick who in later life always looked upon 
3 
him as his mentor and as Ahe greatest authority on colonial affairs. - 
Stephen,, in his turn.. appreciated Howick's talent and potential. , Such 
perfect rapport between leading officials and their political head had 
a mrked effect on the conduct of business. It seemed to the clerks as 
5 
if the Office had burst into life after years of torpor. 
H. Taylor., Autobiop-Taphy7) p. 119; Taylor to Miss Fenwick., Z7 Nov. 
1830p &9 Dec. 1830) & n. d. 18312 Bod. p M. S. Eng. letters# d. 71 ff. 17., 18-20., 31+-5. See also W. P. Morrellj Britigh Colonial Po: Licy 
in the Lae of Peel and Russell (Londonp 1930)p pp. 201-8. 
2. See Taylor's comments in Taylor to Mrs. -T. Taylor., 19 Mar. 1831# Bod. # M. S. Eng.. lettersy d. 7p ff. 32-3. This was the period when Stephen 
enunciated officially his views on the development of the under- 
secretaryship: Stephen to Howickp 10 Feb. 18ý2p Grey Paper3p Stephen; 
Stephen's memorandums 30 Mar. 1832, C. O. 537/22p ff. 3-16. 
3. Taylor sensed this at the time correctly: Taylor to Howicý, n. d. # Bod. s M. S. Eng.. letters d. 7, ff. 139-40. The impression was still clear 
after Stephen retired: Howick to Stephen, 28 Feb. 1853P Stephen Paperaj, 
letters. 
4- Stephen to Howickp 26 Jan. 1832p Grey Papers., Stephen. 
Such was certain3, v Taylor's impression: Taylor to Miss Fenwick, Bod-P 
M. S. Eng. letters, d. 7y ff. 18-20. 
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Among many discussions then renewed was the question of reforming 
the structure of the Colonial Office. As the discussion progressed 
Taylor and Stephen, with strong personal interests, emerged along with 
Howick in the van of reform. By a neat stroke both Taylor and Stephen 
attached their own claims to promotion to the new movement for office 
reform. But Hay., equally interested in the questionp threw his weight 
against substantial changes and wasp for once, backed by Goderichp a 
staunch advocate of retrenchment. The deadlock lasted until Goderich's 
last months in office. In the course of their two-year battle, the 
reformers moved from a particular to a general attack which involved the 
whole question of the structure and functioning of the Colonial Office 
civil service in the nineteenth century. 
The first demand for reform came, in 1831., from Stephen as a personal 
claim designed to force the issue. After years as an unofficial under- 
secretaryp he was beginning to find his position exasperating. His main 
complaint was that the office clerksp whose co-operation he sometimes 
was required to enlist in the preparation of his reports, resented having 
1 
to take orders from someone who was not their official superior. Lacking 
2 
"a substantive or independent station"s he felt tempted to resign and 
3 
seek a legal post in the colonies. Goderich certainly did not under- 
1. Stephen to Grant.. 24 Apr. 1835P Stephen Papers, separate letters. 
2. Stephen to Howicky 17 May., 1833., Grey Papersv Stephen. 
3. Stephen to J. C. Stephený 12 Oct. 1831; 9 May 1832; 10 May 1832, 
Stephen Papers, journal of letters to J. C. S., 1816-1845- 1 have not 
been able to trace the original letter to Goderich. 
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estimate the value of his counsel's services.. but he saw no need'to 
1 
placate him in view of a certain weakness in Stephen's position. The 
Whigs had resumed consideration of the slavery question. It was easily 
seen that with the emancipation bill in the offing,, Stephen would not 
resign or insist upon contracting out of the critical stages: of the 
2 
settlement of a question which so deeply interested him. Goderich 
could safely ignore him. 
Stephen alone was stilL not strong enough to persuade his reluctant 
superiorf and a frontal assault on the secretary of state was in any case 
a bad tactic to adopt. Taylor demonstrated the best method of proceeding 
when eliciting Howick's support in a private salary claim. Unlike 
Stephenf he attacked on general principles. As the Colonial Office 
servants were poorer paid than their colleagues in other state departments, 
3 
he demanded a general revision of salary scales. Houickp typically, 
took up Taylor"s scheme and carried it one stage further. The whole 
office., in his opinionp demanded reform particularly in view of the 
1. Hay to Spring Rice., Feb. 1831P C-0.324A33.9 P. 99. Goderich listened 
to Stephen on appointments too: Stephen to C. E. Douglas, 30 July 
1832j. Ripon Papers., B. M. Add. MS- 40880p ff. 303-6. 
2. Stephen to Alfred Stephen., n. d.., quoted in C. E. Stephen, Sir James- 
Stephe . pp. 16-7. Even if this letter belongs to anothor date the sentiments would obviously apply to 1832. 
3. Taylor to Howick, 6 Feb. 1832p Grey Papersp Colonial Office. 
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recommendations of the parliamentary committee- on public offices which 
had reported in the previous year. Extra a3-lowancesp fees and perquisites# 
should be abolishedt the salary scales for the senior classes raisedt 
and the whole scheme rationalized. Howick's plan of reform appeared 
in February 1832. It was comprehensives rather too firmly adhering to 
the supposed need for retrenchment,, but aiming at introducing professionalism 
In the senior classes of clerks by abolishing their extra-official services 
and raising their salaries. To effect a saving, without which he felt 
it impossible to propose the scheme to the Treasuryp Howick planned to 
1 
abolish the positions of chief clerk and precis writer. 
Though omitted from the planj, Stephen was not forgotten. It is 
characteristic of Howick that he sent his draft first to Stephen rather 
than to Goderich or Hay. Stephen took the opportunity thus presented 
to him to again plead his case., going further in his claims than he had 
ever done before. The private nature of the correspondence and the close 
approximation of his views and Howick's allowed him to write with absolute 
freedom andp for the first time., he indicated that he would no longer be 
satisfied with an assistant under-secretaryship. He told Howick that in 
the Colonial Office$ 
"we have two under-secretaries of state and one Barrister... 
which last person has long been occupied in &orks which 
have but a faint and fictitious relation to his profession 
as a Iawyer. Without the reproach of arrogating too much 
The scheme was never fully worked out though we have three draft 
plans among the Grey Papers,, Colonial Office, j1) - (317, 
the 
last being the one Stephen commented ons Grey's memorandap 9 Feb. 
1832, Grey Papersp C. O. The parliamentary report on which the 
soheme was based is printed in H. C., 1833, viii (650)p pp-1-354. 
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I may perhaps say that we have three Under-secretaries. 
Now I frankly think two quite enough .... 11 
This was clearly a direct challenge to Howick to obtain Ray's dismissal. 
He was not going to wait for his promotion until Hay retired. There 
was only one option left to Howick. Stephen himself could be retired 
I 
with the award of a Queen's Counselship for faithful service. Howick's 
plan had stopped far short of this. 
His letter to Howick seems to show Stephen in an unaccustomed light 
as a determined power-seeker. This is misleading. Itwas not the 
power of an under-secretary which Stephen lacked - he alreadyp in effect, 
possessed that - but the securityp the fames the salary and the perquisites 
which promotion could bring. There were good reasons for his determination. 
His best chance of promotion had come when the Whigs entered offices but 
he still lacked political connections and had to balance this by a spirited 
assertion of the value of his services. He was certainly ruthless towards 
Hay but they had become implacable enemies by 3.830, partly because of 
political differences., partly because Hay suspected that Stephen was 
usurping his authority and Stephen rightly felt that Hay was unsympathetic 
to Whig policies andby dragging his feet during every measure of reformp 
2 
was preventing the under-secretaryship from developing as it should. 
L Stephen to Howicky 10 Feb. 1832#, Grey Papersp Stephen. 
2. As usualp Taylor was more outspoken than Stephen on the feelings 
which they shared: e. g. Taylor to Miss Fenwickp 18 Feb. 1829j. Bod., 
M. S. Eng. lettersq d. 6j. ff. 347-8. But thoir antipathy to Hay is 
evident though unspoken in thelt, rival views of the Colonial Office: 
Stephen's memorandump 30 Mar, 1832; & Hay's memo., 2 Apr. 1832p C. O. 
537/22p ff. 3-16p 17-8. 
76 
If Stephen was stillL not ]promoted by the time the Tories returned to 
office, he might well be evicted from the administration altogether: 
Hay and his friends would merely haveto charge that Stephen unjustly 
usurped political functions properly belonging to the under-secretary. 
This was, after all.. exactly what his opponents in and out of parliament 
1 
had been maintaining all along. 
Had his critics but known itp Stephen was guilty of a far more 
culpable offense in their eyes. During the crisis over the Reform Bill 
I 
of 1832, he was busily writing anonymous articles in support of the 
government"s case in his brother-in-law's newspaper., the Northampton 
Mere If this constituted a breach of official etiquette., his strength)< 
of feelings on the subject and his hope for Whig support in his promotion 
2 
struggle may explain it. 
The movement to reform the structure of the Colonial Office depended 
entire2y on Howickts attempt to convert his chief and when he failed the 
scheme collapsed. Parliamentax7 reform took up most of the cabinet's 
time and Goderich.. unfortunatelyl never had much enthusiasm for the changes. 
Stephen's reaction is clear in Stephen to J. C. Stephens n May 1832., 
Stephen Paperst Journal of letters to J. C. S., 1816-1845. See also 
Stephen to Auckland, 6 Oct. 1832, Stephen Papers., loose leaf letters# 
where he says: "In the times in which we lives a subordinate official 
who is not secured of the favourable report of the head of his 
Department is in a situation so precarious as to justify a very lively 
anxiety as to the possible consequences of such a position". 
2. Stephen to T. C. Stephen, U Mayy 1832y Stephen Pa ersj journal of 
letters to J. C. S. j, 1816-28/+5. W. W. Hadley (ed. 
ý) 
The Bi-CentenA= 
Record of the Northampton Mercy= (Northmptn. 1920). p. 41. 
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The plans projected at this time look forward to the Colonial Office 
reforms of 1836 and beyonds but there was little immediate sign of 
their influence. Having shot his bolts Stephen had the choice of 
resigning or accepting his position and persevering with his workýon 
slavery emancipation. It was an agonising time for him when he felt 
increasingly betrayed and on the defensive but he ultimately and inevitably 
1 
chose to stay. 
Something of his disillusionment is seen in his unhappy squabble 
with the Board of Trade in -1832. The transformation of the Board between 
3.830 and 1850 from a small advisory branch of the Privy Council to a major 
department of government can be regarded as one of the most striking 
examples of administrative flexibility in nineteenth century governmento 
It was accomplished only by a considerable augmentation of its establishment 
and sophistication of its duties and the resultant upheaval had repercussions 
2 
in other departments of government. 
After 1828 Stephen was seldom employed extensively at the Board of 
Trade. His work in the Colonial Office expanded so much during the 
period of rapidly changing ministries and afterwards that it was quite 
The agony was aggravated by his father's death on 10 Oct. 1832 - before the passing of the Abolition Act. As usualy Taylor puts 
Stephen's case more bluntly than he would have ever done himself: 
Taylor to Howicky 6 Feb. 1833., Grey Papersp Taylor. 
2. H. L. Smithy The Board of Trade (London., 1928)p pp. 51+-2/+3; Roger 
Prouty.. The Transformation of the Board of Trade. 1830-55 (Londonp 1957), 
passi ; Lucy Brown., The Board of Trade and the Free Trade Movementy 
2830-42 (Oxford 1958)y especially pp. 20-. 33.1,1 1- 
4 
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impossible for him to give any considerable amount of time to the Board. 
In 18320 Lord Aucklandq the President of the Board., attempting to retrench 
in his establishment in order to effect a saving with which to create 
new postsp turned on the legal counselship. Stephen's position was 
vulnerable since his allowance of E500 did not correspond to his duties 
1 
and Auckland decided to attack it. 
Herep though he failed to see it, was a solution to Stephen's problems. 
If the Board wanted E500 of his salary.. the Colonial Office would have to 
compensate him andp in order to obtain Treasury permission for the extra 
sum) his new and more demanding duties could easily be pleaded. This# 
2 
in turnp would necessitate a review of his position in the office. But 
Stephen was too upset to see things so logically. What he found in 
Auckland's attempt to question his value to the Board was a threat to 
emasculate his official position and salar7. In a vex7 strongly vorded 
letter to Auckland.. he rehearsed the agreement under which he had given 
up his legal career originallyp and he threatened immediate resignation 
3 
unless it was fully honoured by the government. Auckland) shocked, into 
an Immediate reply by Stephen's vehemencep disclaimed all intentions of 
foregoing his servicesp even in their truncated state,, and gave the 
1. Stephen to Aucklands 6 Oct. 1832j, Stephen Papersy loose leaf letters* 
2. This was, in fact, what subseqýiently happened in 1835-6: see belowp 93. 
Stephen to Auckland, 6 Oct. 1832, Stephen Papersj, loose leaf letters. 
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strongest assurances of his own personal awareness of Stephen's valuable 
1 
aid over the years to the Board. This evaded the real issue. The 
Board had a good case for rationalizing its legal services which was not 
to be lost so easily. 
In 1833 Stephen's worst fears seemed realized. Goderich and Howick 
left office to be replaced by Stanley and John Lefevre. Neither of his 
new political superiors had much regard for his views nor for his claims. 
Worse.. ' under Howickts influencep Stephen's work from 1830 until 1833 had 
been so far removed from his formal responsibilities that the two bore 
little or no relation to each other. He knew that Stanley would not 
tolerate this but he was determined that he would neither be confined to 
his original duties nor be forced to compensate for the shortcomings of 
2 
, his superiors without a struggle. 
Even before Stanley had accepted the seals of the departments Stephen, 
obviously in great distress) had warned him that he would resign unless 
3 
his duties were strictly defined. Again he was bluffing. The emanci- 
pation question was nearly at its final stage when Stephents knowledge and 
4 
skill at drafting would be most useful. In reply Stanley was adamant 
1. Auckland to Stephen, 6 Oct. 1832, Stephen Papers, loose leaf letters. 
2. Taylor to Miss Fenwick., 17 Mar. 1833p Bod., M. S. Eng. letterop d. 7., 
ff. 184-5. 
Stanley to Stephen., 1 Apr. 1833., Stephen Papers) separatei letters. 
He had remained at his post even when he knew his father had only 
a few weeks to live: Taylor to Howick, 1 Oct. 1832p Grey Papersp 
Taylor. 
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where Goderich had been apathetic. Ile pointed out that he could make 
matters, difficult for Stephen by giving his, resignation the appearance 
of a dismissal. No lawyer could expect to find suitable employment 
after having left government office under a cloud. Stanley's tough 
approach was, accompanied by the concession of a partial definition of 
Stephen's dutiest 
"I look upon you as'the, confidential adviser 
of the secretary of state upon all the compli- 
cated points of law arising out of the various 
colonial codes, as well as upon those constit- 
utioml questions on which turn the relations 
between the colonies and the Mother Country". 
This was not to be considered an exhaustive list of his services in 
addition to legal counselling but only of those on which the secretary 
1 
of state could not act without consulting him. 
Stanley suffered the worst relations with his senior staff of any 
secretary of state in the entire period of Stephen's public life. He 
was twice colonial secretary during these yearsp once from April 1833 
until June 1834 and'. then again from September 18/+l until December 1845. 
As the Earl of Derbyp he was later to be Prime Minister three times. 
Whatever his reputation as a colonial administrator his ineptitude in 
dealing with the office establishment is beyond question. Part of the 
trouble, lay in his personality. Stanley was a coldp forbidding man with 
the mighty superciliousness of the traditional landed aristocrat. Immensely 
ambitiousp he had'an acute sense of the dignity of a minister of the 
crown. In 1833, he was serving for the last time in a Whig goverment 
1. Stanley to Stepheny 1 Apr. 1833t Stephen Papers, separate letters. 
before his defection to the Tories. 
1 
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His settled policy from the first 
as secretar7 was to excludes as far as possible.. all non-political officials 
2 
from the process of administrative decision-making. In implementing 
this reactionary viewpoint., he was dogmatic but at least decisive. Taylor 
admitted thatt 
'the had forcep energy and vivacity: and he was an effective 
speakerp always clear and strongp sometimes commonplace but 
not seldom brilliant. He was not a man of genius., nor 
could it be said that he had a great intellect". 3 
Despite his promises of consultations Stanley made life difficult 
for Stephen when in office. He insisted upon rejecting his officials' 
views on emancipation and interfered in every brEnch of administration. 
For years it was his proud boast, though it was not particularly accurate,, 
that he had begun a revolution in the Colonial Office by stopping the 
practice of allowing Stephen's minutes to stand as draft despatches to 
A+ 
the governors. In fact., Stephen's work was not so much diminished by 
Stanleyts interference as frustrated. By, setting an emmple of magnam- 
inity under his superiorlýs slights., Stephen was required to work harder 
and more extensive3, v if anything than before. It is certainly doubtful 
if Stanley could have carried on without him since most of the other senior 
For Derby's first period at the C. O. see D. J. Murray, The west Indies., 
pp. 23.0-3.4. 
2. GreyPs Journal., entry for 30 June 1833) Grey Paperap Journals. 
3. Taylorp AutobiograpIrr,., ij 131. 
A+- Gladstone's entry for 19 Apr. 1839 in Black Leather Book of Secret 
Political Memoranda., Gladstone Papersp B. M. Add. MS. /+4819., f. 1+5. 
1 
officials were in revolt. 
The Sisyphean labours he performed under Stanley brought on a 
2 
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nervous disability in the mid-summer of . 1833. After a short rest he 
recovered sufficiently to perform his most celebrated task of drafting 
the whole Emancipation Bill in less than 48 hours. Actually, he atrongly 
disapproved of the clauses on apprenticeship but2 true to his code, 
3 
faithfully performed the service required of him. 
Unsatisfactory Wit wasv the Emancipation Act was a Climax of a 
great deal of work which he had performed in the department since 1813. 
On its completion he determined to leave the Office for good. There 
seemed no prospect of promotion under Stanley. The Stephen family campaign 
against slavery had ended in victory even though the terms of peace dis- 
pleased them. It seemed hardly worth while fighting on. For a time he 
toyed with the idea of going to India. There was a post available at 
Calcutta which would allow him to serve as legal adviser to the East India 
4 
Company. Another possibility, if Stanley could be persuaded to obtain 
1. He performed the briefing and the sýade-work: Stanley to Stephen, 
2 Apr. 1833P Stephen Papers.. separate letters; Taylor to Miss 
Fenwick., 12 May 1833., & Taylor to G. Taylor, 15 June 1833, Bod.., M. S. 
Eng. letters) d. 7# ff. 206-11,212; Stephen to J. C. Stephen, 23 July 
1833) Stephen Papers, journal of letters to J. C. S., 1816-1845; 
Taylor to Miss Fenwick, 24 July 1833j. Bod.., M. S. Eng. Letters, d. 7j, 
ff. 196-7; Greyts journal entry for 28 Feb. 1834p Grey Paperso Journals. 
2. Stephen to Taylorp 12 July 1833Y Stephen Papersp Journal of letters to 
various correspondents.. 18D7-1839; Taylor to Fenwicks 24 J'uly 1833P 
Bod. y M. S. Eng. lettersy d. 7P ff. 196-7. 
3. W. L. Burn.. Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the West Indies (London 
1937)p pp. 116-8; H. T. Manningo 'Colonial Crises Before the Cabinetp 
1829-1835'p B. I. H. R. -p =p 1957j pp. 55-6. 
4- R. Grant to Stephen, 6 Sept. 1833. - Stephen Papersy separate letters. 
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a Queents Counselship for him, was to return to private practicey 
1 
but there Stanley's support was in doubt. Before a decision could 
be taken on these matters his nervous illness recurredp this time acutelyp 
2 
and hewasýforced to take leave. 
The period of depressiony howevery was short-lived and on his 
recovery Stephen determined to stand his groimd and strike back at 
Stanley. Perhaps the realization of the eternal administrative vigilance 
which would be required to make the Emancipation Act and its apprenticeship 
3 
system effective was the deciding factor. Whatever it was, he was in 
fighting mood. He tried first to make use of Hay and then Lefevre by 
forcing them to oppose their superior, but they proved too pliant to suit 
4 
his-purposes. The experiment was costly. Early in 1834 Stanley 
ordered Lefevre not to show Stephen any official paper except what 
5 
pertained to his work as legal counsel. 
1. 
2. 
Rebuffed in the Colonial Officep Stephen had to look elsewhere to 
Stephen to Taylor, 20 Sept. 18332 Stephen Papers, Journal of letters to 
various correspondents,, 18(77-1839. 
Taylor to Howick2 25 Sept. 1833.9 Grey Papers) Taylor. 
There is an obvious hint of this in Stephen to Taylor, 3 Nov. 1833, 
Stephen Papers, Journal of letters to various correspondents., 18017-1839. 
Grey's journal entry for 28 Yeb. 1834P Grey Papers, Journals; 
Stephen to Hovick, 9 July 1835,9 Grey Papers, Stephen. 
Journal entry for 20 Mar. 1834, Grey Papersv Journals. 
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guard his future prospects andy as in 1825., he looked outside his own 
department though still within goverment service. To offset Stanley's 
animosity he cultivated Howick's friendship. Howickp who became under- 
secretary at the Home Office after leaving the Colonial Office.. found 
an opportunity of introducing Stephen to the Home Secretary., Lord 
1 
Melbourne. Stephents opinion was then asked on methods of legislating 
on the creation of a Poor Law Commission. From thisp there emerged the 
2 
idea of Stephents competing for a place on the Poor Law Board. 
-Though it proved, impossible.. this plan was more than a desire to 
put pressure on Stanley. The endless press criticismso the ingratitude 
of superiors) the over-work.. the strain of colonial questionsq and 
vituperation of political opponents.. could not be borne easily without 
some compensation,. in public standing or in wealth. Even after Stanley's 
resignation in June 1834 Stephen continued to press for a seat on the 
Poor Law Board.. winning the support of Nassau Senior in, his claim. He 
did not finally give up hope of success until lord Grey resigned and 
4 
Howick went out of office. 
1. Stephen to Howick., 18 4r. 1834Y Grey Papersp Stephen. 
2. Howick to Stephenp 18 Apr. 183/+, t Stephen Papers) separate letters. 
3. Stephen to Taylor., 20 Sept. 1833) Stephen Papers., letters to 
various correspondents) 1807-1839; Howick to Stephen, 19 June 
1834p Stephen Papersp separate letters. 
4. Stephen to J. C. Stephemp 10 July 1834P & 31 July 1834, Stephen 
Papersp journal of letters to J. C. S.., '1816-181+5. 
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Stanley's departure from the Colonial Office was followed by the 
very brief tenure of Thomas Spring Rice as secretary of state with Sir 
George Grey as his parliamentary under-secretary. UnUke their 
predecessors they had no qualms about allowing the permanent staff a 
role in the business of the office. Spring Rice., a sympathiser and 
friend of Evangelicalsy was more susceptible to Stephen's pressure and 
agreed to secure permission to create a new post designed especially to 
1 
do justice to his claims. In September 1834 Stephen entered upon the 
2 
first assistant under-secrotaryship in the Colonial Office. The 
position was purely honorary: the promotion was not accompanied by an 
increase in salary and Stephen was still required to act as counsel for 
the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade. Needless to say# though 
he was, gratified by the official recognitionp Stephen felt the award 
3 
stopped short of his deserts. 
In one way Stephen's nominal promotion amounted actually to a 
demotion. Since 1830 he had been recognized to be independent of the 
under-secretaries though they could seek his advice, if they wished. 
In 1834 as assistant under-secretary.. his duties were stated to be: 
See Taylor! s co=entp Taylor to Grey., 3 Oct. 1834j, Grey Papers,, 
Taylor. 
2. Order in councilp 17 Sept. 1834p C. O. 878/1., ff. 107-9. 
3. Stephen to -T. C. Stephenp 17 Sept. 1835 (writtent 18.34)t Stephen Papers, journal of letters to -T. C. S. p 1816-1845; Spring Rice to Stephen, 1 Sept. 1834t Monteagle Papereq M-S. 5509 ff-76-83. 
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"to exercise a general control and superintendence 
over the routine business of the office .... and 
under the orders of the secretary of state and his 
under-secretaries, to take care that regularity and 
despatch prevails throughout the department". 1 
2 
The price of promotion was to become Hay's subordinate. 
In the other provisions for the new office it was noticeable that 
Stephen was taking over from his new superior. Office discipline., for 
example,, bad been formerly a function of the permanent under-secretary. 
The preservation of regularity and despatch was a function uhich Stephen 
had earlier envisaged in an office memorandum as a desirable one for a 
3 
permanent under-secretax7 to have. Feeble though it was., there was no 
Mistaking the significance of the new position. Stephen was one step 
nearer his goal. The stumbling block was still Hay; but after 1831+ 
there was a very good case for requiring Hay's resignation since he was 
frequently ill and absent from work. As he stillLiclung to office Stephen 
was forced to deputize for him for months on end. Greyp too, was in 
ill health while in office and had to abdicate his official responsibilities 
to Stephen whoi, for a period of about two months., served as parliamentary 
under-secretarys permanent under-secretary and assistant under-secretary 
A+ 





Order in council, 17 Sept. 18340 C. O. 878/ly ff. 108-9. The underlining 
is mine. 
Taylor to Grey.. 3 Oct. 1834., Grey Papers, Taylor. 
Office memorandums 30 Mar. 1832j. C. O. 537/22p f. 14. 
Taylor to Greyj, 3 Oct. 1834, Grey Papers., Taylor; Stephen to Shortp 
Taylorp Elliot & Gairdnerp 13 Novo 1834j, C. O. 32j/218. 
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for which he had specific authority. 
Stephen was also driven to extra work by the political instability 
of the Whig governments. Spring Rice left office when the goverment 
t, CJG-) 
fell in November 1834. The Duke of Wellington then bridged a two month 
interregnum until the formation of the first Feel ministry in December. 
The return of the Tories brought to the Colonial Office the Earl of 
Aberdeen# as secretaryg and William Ewart Gladstonep as parliamentary 
under-secretary., for a four month's stay. Despite its brzvity, the 
Feel administration succeeded in Iringing the struggle for the permanent 
under-secretary-ship to a head. 
With his political allies back in officep Hay decided to make his 
move to undercut his rival. He asked and received from Feel a dormant 
retiring pension. This enabled him to retire at wills irrespective of 
I 
the state of his health or the length of his service. It removed the 
one strong inducement which a secretary of state could offer to facilitate 
the retirement of an official. Howickp Stephen and Taylor# all saw this 
as a political manoeuvre. Hay., they believedv would make use of his 
pension by, chosing to retire only when his political Priends were in 
office so that a suitable successor of similar political affiliations 
2 
could be appointed. As Stephen was taken to be of the Whig or party of 
Hay to*Peel, 26 Feb. 1835p B. M. Add. MS. 1+01+15, f. 212. This seems 
to have been a secret arrangement and Stephen heard of it only later - Stephen to Howickp 7 Jan. 1836, Grey Papers, Stephen. 
2. Grey's journal entry for 22 Dec. 1835 &8 Jan. 1836y Grey Papersp 
Journals; ý Taylor,, Autobiograph-Yo i., p. 232. 
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Reform, this was certain to frustrate his hopes of ever winning the 
under-secretaryship. 
Nothing had been done about finding a successorp howevero before 
the fall of the Peel government and the succession of Viscount Melbourne's 
administration in April 1835 which brought Charles Grantp later Lord 
Glenelgj as Secretary of Statey and Sir George Greyyas parliamentary 
under-secretary. to the Colonial Office. Glenelg could be safely numbered' 
among Stephenýs political friends from their association in boyhood at 
Claphamy in business at Westminster Hall and in office at the Board of 
Trade. Both Glenelg and Grey were notable adherents of the Evangelical 
1 
group which also commanded Stephen's sympathies. Stephen's promotion 
seemed assured. All that uas required was to expose the scheme to co-opt 
a Tory appointee and then to prove the legitimacy and desirability of 
disposing of Hay. Since Hay's illness had worsenedp this was no insuperable 
2 
difficultY. 
Much to Stephen's distress it took twelve months to convince Glenelg. 
Several reasons were advanced to explain bis intransigence. Henry 
Taylor pointed to one. Although "amiable and excellent" as a superiorp 
Glenelg., he feltp was incapable Of filling an office requiring "activity 
3' 
and a ready judgement". Howick suspected more sinister motives. Glenelg 
J. S. Galbraithp Reluctant Empire (Berkeley, 1963)., p. 12.4; W. P. 
Morrell. British Colonial Policyp p. lQ4. 
2. Stephen to Howicks 26 Oct. 1835., Grey Papers., Stephen. ' For Stephen! s 
first 
, attempt 
to do sop see Stephen to Grant) 24 Apr. 1835p Stephen 
Papers2 letters. 
3- Taylor) Autobiography, p. 147. 
6n 
07 
had a brother-in-law., Mr. Philipsp at the Home Office who might be used 
1 
by the Tories to exact revenge for Hay's dismissal. Neither of these V-1 
explanations seems to fit Menelg. He was scrupulous and fastidious., 
conscientious to a fault. It seems more likely*that he was too impressed 
by the traditional idea of an office as a freehold., an inalienable right. 
Even when he was forced to admit that Hay's failings justified his 
dismissalp he still felt it necessary to take time so as to ensure that 
the good of the office was protected above all. If he were to sacrifice 
patronage unnecessarily his political reputation would be affected; and 
to choose Stephen as permanent under-secretary would almost certainly mean 
the incorporation of the assistant under-secretaryship in the under- 
secretaryship. Furthermores though Stephen could definitely play both 
roles simultaneously., Glenelg had to consider whether his successors could 
2 
be expected to do so. 
Left to himselfj Glenelg might have remained too paralysed by his 
perception of the difficulties to come to a decision. Fortunatelyt 
neither his cabinet colleagues nor Stephen himself were prepared to wait. 
Stephen especially used the most blunt pressure to coerce Glenelg. He 
repeated his old demand for a re-definition of his duties in the light of 
changed circumstances and he declared that he would serve only in the 
1. Grey's journal entry for 20 Jan. 1836, Grey Papers., Journals. 
2. GlenelgIs views can be gathered from Glenelg to Stephent 7 (? ) 
May 1835; ' 15 Aug. 1835; 10 Nov. 3.835; 17 Nov. " 1835 & 3. /+ Jan. 1,836,9 
Stephen Papers, separate letters. 
go 
1 
capacities which had been officially designated, to him. Glenelgls 
promise that Stephen would succeed., on a vacancy., to Hay's position was 
brushed aside angrily by him as unconstitutional and Unlikely to be 
2 
acceptable to GleneIg's successors - the real point at issue. 
Though GlenelgIs difficulties were real enought'his continual refusal 
to remove Hay created an intolerable position for Stephen. But Stephen 
himself was partly to blame. Had he really withdrawn all of his services 
except for his legal advice and his work on the maintenance of the discipline, 
of the department., Glenelg would have been forced to change his views 
3 
immediately. Stephen, with his phenomenal capacity for work and his 
elevated concept of public servicep merely delayed a decision. At one 
point,, in October 1835., he -was attempting to cope not only with the work 
of both under-secretaries but also with that of four of the senior clerks 
4 
who were absent from the office. Inevitablys his work burgeoned-rather 
than slackened. Even when Hay was well enough to attend to his duties 
only the title stood between Stephen and the under-secretaryship. Glenelg., 
5 
who had no faith in Hayj, almost entirely excluded him from his counsels. 
1. -Stephen to Grantp 21+ Apr. 1835.9 Stephen Paperst separate letters. 
2. Stephen to Glenelgj 3.1 Nov. 1835., Stephen Papersp separate letters. 
3- As he di(A. in 1836: Glenelg to Stepheny 14 Jan. 1836, Stepben Papersj, 
separate letters. 
4- Stephen to Howick., 26 Oct. 1835, Grey Papers., Stephen. 
5. Stephen to Glene1g, 11 Nov. 1835p Stephen Papersp separate letters; 
Grey's journal entry for 12 Nov. 3.835.9 Grey Papers,, Journals. 
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Understandably., Hay felt not a little peeved at his treatment and 
made no pretence of his feelings to Stephen who was unquestionably under- 
taking duties which belonged rightly to the permanent under-secretary 
alone. It was hardly an adequate defence to claim that the duties had 
been invited and the irregularity condoned by the secretary of state. 
The power struggle was in the open and Stephen knew how vulnerable he was. 
Consequently, he combined periods of intense activity with sudden bouts 
of inaction when he feared that the government would fail him and his 
whole career would be in jeopardy. 
For monthsp painfully and persistently., he spelt out his case to 
Glenelg. As the permanent under-secretary elect he had for all practical 
purposes taken over from Hay with only the excuse of learning his duties, 
If Hay was allowed to outlast the Melbourne administration# he would claim 
that Stephen had encroached unjustly on the under-secretary's authority. 
Doubtless Hays who was as effectively excluded from power under Glenelg 
2 
as Stephen had been under Stanleyp would insist upon a dismissal. 
His friendship with Howick offered Stephen his one real hope fcr the 
future. In the cabinets as secretary at war., Howick championed Stephen's 
3 
cause and tried to interest his, colleagues in it. At one point he 
A+ 
attempted to get an offer of the governorship of Upper Canada for him. 
Grey's Journal entry for 12 Nov. 1835, Grey Papers, -Tourna3s; Stephen to Glenelg, 16 Nov. 1835t Stephen Papersp separate letters. 
2. This fear is clearly expressed in Stephen to Glenelg., 11 Nov. 1835j, 
Stephen Papers, separate letters) & Stephen to Howick, 7 Jan. 1836s 
Grey -Papers) Stephen. Howý real it was is shown in Grey's-journal 
entry for 18 Nov. . 1835. g Grey Papers, Journals. 
3- They oth corresponded and met: Stephen to Howickp 26 Oct. 1835P Gr4ý.. 
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In conversations with the Prime Minister) Lord Melbourne.. Howick also 
urged Stephen' s promotion on political grounds. Until the Reform Abtj 
Howick believedy the indefinite nature of party politics had concealed 
the importance of patronage in the selection of officials forthe civil 
, 
service. But the long tenure of the Liverpool government had in fact 
resulted in the appointment to the permanent civil service of men with 
extremely conservative views who tended to be Tories. As these appoint- 
ments were of increasing importance in the conduct of administration., it 
was necessaryp he suggested., to put "steady friends of our own into the 
I 
most important" of them. 
What irritated Howick was that the political opponents of the Whigs 
seemed fully aware of the importance of the permanent civil service. How 
else could one explain the fact that four Tox7 officials., Hay at the 
Colonial Office., George Barrow at the Admiraltyp James Stewart at the 
Treasury and Sir Francis Freeling at the General Post Office., were all in 
bad' health and yet were known to be postponing their retirements until 
the return of a Tory government. The worst case was Ray. Howick 
"most strongly urgedn his dismissal on the grounds of: 
"his incompetence) of the impropriety of keeping a man 
3. (continued) Grey Paperso Stephen: Grey's journal entry for 13 Nov. 
1835 & 21 Nov. 1835., Grey Papers.. Journals; Howick to Stephen., 7 Jan. 
1836, Stephen Papers., separate letters; journal entries for 18 Nov- 1835., 
22 Dec. 1835, & 8. Jan. 1836, Grey Papersp Journals. 
4- Grey's journal entry for 18 Nov. 1835, Grey Papersp Jouimals. 
Greyls'journal entry for 22 Dec. 1835t Grey Papers# Journals. 
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in such a situation and at the same time placing in 
him no confidence whatever., and of the facility of 
getting rid of him by reducing the under-3ocretaryships 
to two which is quite ample". 1 
The last point., of coursep imediate3, v recalls Stephen's letter to Howick 
2 
in 1832. 
In desperationp Stephen had also become interested in StewartIs 
impending retirement and applied to be considered for the TreasuX7 post 
3 
early in 1836. The application never matured., however., as the crisis 
in the Colonial Office finally collapsed. The deus ex machina on this 
occasion was the Board of Trade. Under its president Charles Poulett-, 
Th=son., the Board of Trade re-embarkod on a programme of reform and 
re-organization in 1835 on the occasion of the retirement of its chief 4 
clerk,, Thomas lack. Thomson., unlike his predecessor Auckland, worked 
in concert with Stephen in regard to the counselship.. The Treasury was 
instructed to stop the payment of Stephen's 9500 from the Board's funds. 
At the same time.. with Thomson"s connivance# Stephen made it known that 
he had been suggested for the vacant chief clerkship and that he would 
5 
accept it if Gienelg persisted in his refusal to got rid of Hay. 
1. Grey's Journal entry for 22 Dec. 1835j, Grey Papersp Journals. 
2. Stephen to Howicky 10 Yeb. 1832j, Grey Papers., Stephen. 
3- Stephen to Ho-wickp 7 Jan. 1836p Grey Papersp Stophen. 
4- Howick to Stephen.. 7 Jan. 1836p Stephen Papers,, separate letters. 
Grey's jo-urnal entries for 8 Jan. 1836; 20 Xan. 3.836; Gray 
Papers.. -T-ournals; Glenelg to Stephen., 34 Jan. 1836, Stephen . Papers, 
separate letters. 
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Although Glenelg continued to prevaricate until the last moment, 
1 
the pressure from his colleagues and from Stephen finally told. At 
the end of January 1836. Hay was dismissed and arrangements were made 
with the Treasury to enable Stephen to succeed him. Like all changes 
in the establishment in this period2 the alteration was prosented as aý 
measure of retrenchment. As Stephen and Hay had suggestedv the post 
of assistant under-secretary was abolished and Stephen became the sole 
permanent under-secretary2 serving as legal counsel in addition to his 
new duties. 
It was unfortunate that such an unseemly squabble should have character- 
ised the elevation of a most deserving official: it was doubly unfortunate 
in that it left a lasting fear in Stephen's mind that he would one day be 
unseated., as he had been appointed2 on political grounds. Glenelg must 
3 
bear a large part of the blame for the creation of this impression. Yet 
Stephen's rise can be set in too narrow a compass. The personality 
squabble reflects., in part.. the deep changes which were occurring within 
VI" 
the civil service in the early nineteenth century. 
Howick correctly detected the increasing importance of party politics 
in government and hence in the civil service in the 1820s and 1830s. 
1. Grey's journal entry for 27 Jan. 1836., Grey Papersp Journals. 
2. Spearman to Greyy 19 Feb. 1836, C-0- 323/222p f. 175. 
3-- I-I&y thought so too: Grey's journalp entry for 28 Jan. 1836, 
Grey Papersp Journals. 
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Though the establishments had been stratified.. the avenue of official 
promotion from the ranks still stopped short of the top position in the 
civil service hierarcby since this was a special appointment of the 
secretary of state with a political significance which was fairly widely 
1 
appreciated. But the increasing complexities of government demanded 
particular qualities of the senior civil servant. The day of the amateur 
was passing though the ideas which he represented lingered on. In the 
last analysis., the party machine was replacing the influential patron in 
the selection of candidates and intellectual capacity, not political 
2 
affiliation. 9 would have to be the first consideration. Caught between 
the eighteenth century conception of King's Friends giving voluntarily of 
their time and energy to the state and the nineteenth century's embryonic 
professionalism in public service., the aspiring civil servant of Stephen's 
day was uncomfortably placed. The resolving of Stephents dilemmaq in 
this sensej, signifies the birth pangs of the modern civil service. 
L Grey's journal entry for 22 Dec. 1835) Grey Papersp Journals. 
2. G. Kitson Clark, "Statesmen in Disgidse"; Reflections on the 
History of the Neutrality of the Civil Sirvicel., The Historical 
Jo , vol. iip no. 1.1959P PP. 19-39, 
95a 
C, HAPT: RR' II 
Men and Machinery: The Reormnization of 
the Colonial Office. 18 
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(1) A Plan for Reform. 
Between his appointment as permanent under-secretary in 1836 and 
his retirement eleven years laterp Stephen witnessed the creation of 
two goverrmentsp those of Sir Robert Peel in 18/+1 and Lord John Russell 
in 1846, and a succession of no less3than six colonial secretaries of 
states Lord Glenelgp the Marquess of Norms j, Lord John Russell., Viscount 
Stanley.. William Ewart, Gladstone and Farl, Grey. Normanby and Gladstone 
served only for six months and Stephen retired in effect only a year after 
Grey's appointment; but Russell stayed as a colleague fcr two years., 
Glenelg for nearly four and Stanley for over four years. These longer 
tenures of the headship of the office by eminent politicians in part 
reflected a growing recognition of the importance of colonial affairs in 1 
the conduct of government. This was mainly attributable to events in 
the empire. The eleven years-, of Stephen's under-secretaryship were years 
urmoilý In Upper and Iower Canada minor rebellions broke out and of 
(tu== 
produced in consequence the mission of Lord Durham and the Canada Act of 
181+0 which marked the beginning of the evolution of the system of respon- 
oible government. In the southern hemisphere the acquisition and settlo- 
ment of new territories in Australasia proceeded apace in a blaze of 
Stanley,. Russell and Gladstone were subsequently Arime Ministers; 
Stanley., Gladstone and Grey had hold posts at the Colonial Office 
before 1836 and therefore knew something of its ways. Peel, as Prime 
Ministerp also prized the office and recommended it to Gladstone and 
Stanley as a position of great importance. See R. B. Pugh,, 'The 
Colonial Office.. 1801-19251, C. H. B. E.. * IIIv pp. 711-768. 
97 
publicity quite new in nineteenth century imperial history* In South 
Africa the Boers trekked and the empire reluctantly trekked after them. 
In the West Indies slavery finally disappeared and efforts were made to 
find new sources of labour in an attempt to keep the economy alive, And 
on the marches of Indiag around the Straits Settlements# in China and in 
the Pacificp the imperial frontiers continued to expand. 
Though every investigation into the functioning of the Colonial 
Office between 1836 and 1850 elicited evidence of tho vast increase in 
the amount and in the complexity of colonial business which was taking 
2 
place no major increases were made in the office establishment. How,, 
then, was the office able-to cope? Clearly neither the appointment of 
a talented permanent under-secretary., no matter how prodigious his energy, 
nor the increasing average length of tenure of secretaries of state are 
in themselves a sufficient explanation. A fuller explanation lies in 
the changes in administrative procedure undertaken on Stephen's appointment 
and in the series of devices'adopted at his suggestion for assisting the 
work of the department. This was a major contribution to the reform of 
the Colonial Office administration but,, perhaps because his methods were 
There is no single work on this period but C. H. B. E. I vol. Jjp givos 
much background information. 
2* 'Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee or, public Office.,, 
Downing Street'j, H. C., 1839,, nII (466). pp. 235-59; 'Report of 
the Committee of Enquiry into the Colonial Office# dated Dec. 150 
1849ti H-C-9 1854P XXVII (1715), t pp. 79-97. See also Henry Hall., 
The Colonial Office, p. 24. 
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infbrmal or perhaps because., bureaucratic changes seem dull' and boring., 
the extent of Stephen's achievementshas never been ful3. y appreciated. 
Yet, In this unelevating worky he in many ways anticipated the structural 
reforms undertaken throughout the civil service over two decades after he 
had left office. His reforms have a further significance., for it was 
through the structure and functioning of the office as he envisaged it 
that Stephen and the other permanent officials exerted their influence on 
1 
the conduct of administration. 
Stephen's ideas on the reorganization of the office matured over a 
long period before his appointment as under-3ecretary. His opinions 
were formed in the early decades of the nineteenth century when retrenchment 
was the first principle of government and expenditure- on the non-productive 
agencies of administrative bureaucracy was the cardinal sin. Even men 
like Stepheny who deplored Treasury parsimony when political projects or 
the interests of private individuals were at stakep were devoted to the 
2 
idea of keeping down expenditure on the machinery of government. Since 
the Colonial Office was a new? department., it had been in the period before 
There are three'pioneer articles which are relevant for this problem: 
Edward Hughesy 'Sir Charles Trevelyan and Civil Service Reformp 1853-51l 
English Historical Revie P' LX-TV,, 1949., pp. 53-88# 206-234; & 'Civil 
Service Reform) 1853-5'.. Public Administrationp XXXII, 1954p pp. 17-51; 
G. Kitson Clark, " 'Statesmen in Disguise'; Reflactions on the History 
of the Neutrality of the Civil Service"p The Historical JoWMal. III it 
1959t pp. 19-39. ' 
2. Compare., for examplep Stephen's minute 3 Mar. 3.840 on Trevelyan to 
Stephenp 2 Mar. 181+0. C-0- 323/226p with Stephen to Mrs* Austin, 
26 Feb. 3.839, Stephen Papersp Journal of Letters to Various Corres- 
pondents., 18(Y7-1839. 
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1825 initially prodigal of public finances-, and its expenditure was often 
the subject of parliamentary protests. Thereafter, like all other 
departments) it was subjected 
1 
to the strict econony imposed by the Treasury 
on establishment expenditure. As an admirer of Bentham's philosophyp 
Stephený throughout his career.. usually responded to the call for retrench- 
ment in the public service. But. to a Utilitarian., economy was not to be 
favoured at the expense of efficiency. Cons-equentlyp he was still able 
to exercise his critical faculties on the prospects; for administrative 
reform. 
As counsel and as assistant under-secretary) Stephen had been a 
determined critic not only of office procedure) though that was always perhaps 
his first consideration, but also of the structure and composition of the 
office. His keen mind and comprehensive knowledge had given him a fresh 
insight into the problem of the division of labour in the office. Essen- 
tiallyp he had felt that the office was top heavy: there was a need for 
a demarcation of duties which would differentiate between "intellectual" 
and "mechanical" labourersy instead of leaving everyone clamouring for the 
former duties. The "intellectual" and numerically smaller group should be 
confined to the establishment grades. cf officials. The "mechanical" duties 
should be assigned ideally to a new class employed purely as copyists and 
paid by fees. 
Young, The Colonial Office, 
- pp. 
147-168. Each year the Treasury in 
asking for the preparation of the annual estimates insisted upon "the 
most rigid economy, excluding every charge whatever which is not indispensably necessary for the due performance of the Public Service% 
Treasury to Stephen, 20 Nov. 1845f C. O. 323/230f f. 269. 
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This new class could profitably replace all clerkships below the second 
class so that a reduction in the total establishment might thereby be 
secured. Not only would a copying class be cheaper# he claimedp but 
ultimately it would also be. more efficient as copyists provided "all the 
advantages of task work". The demarcation of duties would ensure that the 
leading officials would be free to devote themselves to creative work without 
being burdened intolerably by routine matters; and it would create also 
a class whichp unlike the existing lower clerical gradesp did not feel 
humiliated by being asked to undertake matters of official drudgery. 
These radical suggestions seem to have originated in Stephen's legal 
training (copyists were regularly used by legal firms) and in his Colonial 
office experience as Counsel where his eager professionalism had come into 
conflict with the superior bearing of clerks recruited wholly on consider- 
ations of patronage. 
His second chief concern was to evolve: 
"a scheme by which some unity of principle and action 
might be maintained throughout the various departments 
of the office". 2 
Not only was the office top-heavy but it also lacked central control. The 
procedure for taking decisions and assigning responsibility for the office 
work was haphazard and confused. After 1830,9 Stephen became increasing3y 
convinced that the only solution lay in making the permanent under-secrotary 
1. Stephen to Grant, 24 Apr. 1835P Stephen Paperst separate letters. 
2. Stephen to Howick., 10 Feb. 1832t Grey Papersp Stephon. 
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the central co-ordinator of office business - an opinion whichp of course 
underlay his conflict with Hay. The permanent under-secretary would 
undertake to supervise all the work which involved the permanent officials.. 
Again it is easy to see how Stephen's own experiences sharpened his insightp 
particularly as he believed in an active colonial policy on the question 
of slavery, and yet wished to avoid the charge of unduly influencing policy 
decisions. The scheme he suggested had the additional merits at least in 
the Treasury's view., of eliminating one salary from the establishment by 
fusing the offices of assistant and permanent under-secretary a saving 
that was accomplished in 1836 on Stephen's promotion. 
His third main consideration before 1836 - "the advancement of our 
most able men to the most responsible placesn - was equally unlikely to 
involve increased bureaucratic expenditure. Convinced as Stephen was of 
the great importance and delicacy of the work of the Colonial Office 
especially in the years before the final abolition of slavery., he naturally 
wished to see talent rewarded - including his own - by immediate promotion 
to positions of influence. In order to make this possiblep however# it 
would have been necessary either to abolish the existing rules or conventions 
on promotions which acknowledged only the grounds of seniority., or to 
the incompetent officials and then to demand a high CC 
1. His three main ideas are summarised and set out in two stages: the 
first as a response to a Howick memorandum 'On the Establishmont of the 
Colonial Office.. 9 Feb. 3.832' p Grey Papersp Colonial Office., to which 
Stephen to Howick 10 Feb. 1832, Grey Papersp Stephen# is the reply; 
and the second as part of the attack on Hay in Stephen's memorandum, 
30 Mar. 1832, C. O. 537/22p f. 3. 
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measure of pub-lie responsibility in the use which secretaries of state 
made of their patronage. This.. at basep was nothing less than an attack 
on the traditional use of patronage in the civil service as a political 
lubricant. It was not an attack on patronage itself., which Stephen 
continued to support., but merely on its abuses for political ends. He 
was sufficiently impressed by the quality of at least some of the clerks 
appointed in the 1830S to feel that the office could solve its immediate 
problems by merely giving merit its due reward in future vacancies. Put 
in this way, the suggestion seemed more acceptable than a blunt plea for 
the valuing of expertise over experiencep or capacity over connections ands 
no doubt in consequence, it was the first of his suggestions to be imple- 
mented in practice. when he himself and 
1a 
few of his clerical colleagues 
were raised rapidly through the ranks. 
Stephents ideas on office reform went largely unheeded before 1836 
apart from the re-arrangements involved in pAting the junior clerks under 
the discipline of a senior official and in keeping a regular record of 
colonial businessp both of which functions were attached to the assistant 2 
under-secretaryship created in 1834. Copyists were employed more 
Stephen's most able colleagues, H. Taylorg T. F. Ealiott and W. H. C. 
Murdochthad all been promoted by 1836: Young, The coionial offIC2, 
pp. 52-3,69-70,95-9 , 
6s 98. They are spocifical2y mentioned in 
Stephen to Howick., 10',, Feb. 1832j, Grey Papersp Stephen. 
2. Order in Council., 17 Sýpt. 1834., C. O. 878/19 f. 107; Spring Rice's 
memorandump 7 Oct. 2834p enclosing Stephen's memorandum, 4 Oct. 1834, 




frequently but were not organized nor related to the establishment. The 
permanent under-secretary.. Hayp continued to divide office business between 
himself and the parliamentary under-secretax7. The rules about the norma3L 
promotion of clerks by seniority were retained and no attempt was made 
2 
to co-ordinate office policy. 
On his appointment as permanent under-secretarys Stephen attained 
a position of power and influence which largely allowed him to determine 
how the office would operate. The parmanent under-secretary was unquestion- 
ably the chief civil servant in the Colonial Office. If his powers were 
undefinedy they were nonetheless substantial and well recognized. In 
terms of salary and in general estimation he ranked at least equal to the 
3 
parliamentary under-secretary and above any clerk or other official. 
BY 18369when his ideas had maturedv Stephen saw that the post meant 
much more than had ever been realized. Since the parliamentary officials 
at the head of the office were increasingly dependent on the civil servants 
for the discharge of their duties., the permanent under-secretaryship must 
1. Stephen's list of Colonial Department Contingenciesp item 211'Return 
of Contingency Expenses for 18351., H. C.., 1836, XXXVII (537). Compare 
this figure of over 24000 with the V7000 in 1829; Young, The Colonial 
Officep p. 121. 
2. Taylor to Grey, 3 Oct. 3-834y Grey Papersp Taylor. 
3- Since 1833 the salary of the permanent under-cecretary (Z2000/ann) 
had been greater than that of the parliamentary under-secretary (1: 1500 
per ann); 'Proposed Scale of the Establishment of the Colonial 
Departmenty 1 Apr. 1833') C-0- 878/4 f. 100. Taylor says the two 
posts were 'of similar rank': H. Taylor# The Statesman (Cambridgep 19Z7; 
edited H. J. Laski), p. 106. 
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become a crucial position. Only the permanent under-secretary could 
adequately fill the role which secretaries of state invariably required 
--A of zýýSbn \ of knowledge on the intentions as well as on the decisions and 
motives of previous governments, on the current problems and prospects in 
colonial policy and on the ability and conduct of all officers with whom 
the secretaries must correspond. He alone could provide the continuity 
and the detailed knowledge on which ever7 effective decision must be based. 
Hayp by dividing the duties of the office and neglecting to keep himself 
informedf had disguised these functions and perverted the natural develop- 
ment of the office. His successorts first task would be to correct Hay's 
mistakes and revert to the original conception of the permanent under- 
secretaryship. 
In the same year that Stephen attained the under-secretaryship his 
friend and colleague Henry Taylor published his celebrated "dicquisitions 
2? 
on the attributes of a statesman". 'The Statesmants unjustly neglected 
by historiansp is a unique and remarkable book., most revealing in its 
reflection of contemporary bureaucratic opinion. Taylor based his central 
1. Stephen to Howickj 10 Feb. 1832p Grey Papersp Stephen; Stephen's 
memorandump 30 Mar. 1832, C. O. 5,37/22) f. 3. Notice too the criticism 
implied in the creation of the assistant under-secretax7ship which 
clearly echoes Stephents opinions: Order in Council, 17 Sept. 1834P 
C. O. 878/1) f. 107. Stephen'acknowledges this in Stephen to Grant# 
24 Apr. 1835, Stephen Paperov separate letters. 
2. Henry Taylor., The Statesmang originally published in 1836 has been 
frequently reprinted. It is surveyed in Wilfrid Harrisonp 'Sir II 75ýylor- -- '--"T 11 1 
pp. 61-70. 
LhwStatesman , Public Administration., 
XXXp 1952p 
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argument on two rather controversial premises. The first was that a 
civil service was., by the time he was writingv an inevitable$ desirable 
and indispensable part of the business of government and that statesman hip 
had come to consist largely of finding and utilising the best civil service 
talents available. The second was that to a statesman the real business 
of government consisted almost exclusively of adjudicating on alternative 
solutions to problems presented to him by his official subordinatesp and 
the mark of high statesmanship consisted in the ability to take wise 
1 
decisions on the evidence provided by his civil servants. These assu: mp- 
tions., like Taylorts whole bookj, were partly the product of his twelve 
years of obser7ation and experience in the Colonial Office but also partly 
the product of discussions with the man in whom he considered "the active 
2 
and contemplative faculties most strongly meet" - James Stephen. 
Undoubtedly Stephents influence went very deep. In the chapters 
where Taylor discusses his proposals for reforming the office his two main 
recommendations - the introduction of an official copying class and the 
elevation to a position of solitary eminence and power of the permanent 
under-secretary (orp in Taylor's view., under-secretaries, for he wanted 
four to six instead of just one) - were personal variations on a Stephen 
Taylor., The Statesmanp see especiallyp Preface & Chapter$ 39 5t So Ili 
12., 339 34., 382 & 31+1 pp. 3-1-17; 25-28; 37-/+/+; 56-9; 60-5; 106-18; 
3-19-35; 152-5; 187-91. 
2, Taylor, ibid., Dedication, p. v. See also Preface and Conclusiont 
pp. vii-xiip 187-191. 
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theme. Even the concern for "DhilosoDhical" Lmvernmant. or Intur +,,, -rn 
political planning., deriving from but above routineadministrationp had 
2 
its origin in a suggestion from Stephen. It is also significant that 
Taylor) apart from his recommendations on the permanent under-secretaries, 
concentrated like Stephen more on changing the mechanics of the office 
(the methods of choosing, personnel and of promoting and remunerating them) 
3 
than on a massive reconstruction of the establishment. The Wilmot 
Horton reforms# in fact, had done enough in the opinion of the leading 
civil servants to supply the number of men and the degree of professionalism 
required to tackle all office business. It was not expansion that was 
required but the consolidation of official forces and the efficient 
4 
standardisation of business methods. 
In order to establish or., as Stephen insisted, to re-establish the 
permanent under-secretary as the 3-Ynchpin of the Official administrative 
Compare Stephen to Howickp 10 Feb. 1832., Grey Papers, Stephent and Stephen's memorandum) 30 Mar. 1832,, C-0.537/22j, f. 30p with Taylor's 
Chapters 22 and 23 in 'The Statesmant. The similarity stretches to the use of identical words and phrasesp for eimmplep in the suggested division between tintel-lectuall and Imechanicall clerks. 
2. Stephen suggested this in a letter to Taylors Stephen to Taylors 
16 Nov. 1835, Stephen Papersp Journal of letters to various corresPon- 
dentsý 18CY7-1839. The debt which Taylor's Chapter 22 owes to thia 
letter extends to the use Of wry hUMOur in. co=cnting on the goverment's 
devotion to "getting off the mails". 
Taylor is more explicit than Stephen in suggesting how the adjustments 
are to be made. Taylor., The Statesmanp Chaps. 22 & 23. 
young', The Colonial Officey p. 123- 
l(Y7 
systemt it was vital)that he should assume supreme control of all office 
business handled by the clerks and of all communications between the 
clerks and the parliamentary officials. The direct access of clerks to 
the political heads had to cease; and internal office correspondence had 
2 
to be regularised so as to pass via the permanent under-secretary. Only 
in this way could the permanent under-secretary be fully apprized both 
of the work which the officials felt required attention and the policies 
and programmes which the political heads wished to implement. Otherwise 
the left hand would not know what the right hand was doing since the 
political heads were too pre-occupied elsewhere to remember and the 
junior clerks, were not 
"in 
a position to know which decisions taken in one 
area were relevant in examining problems in arq other. The permanent 
under-secretary had to be the official storehouse of memory and the political 
co-ordinator,. particularly as 
'otherwise 
the resignation of a secretary of 
state or the promotion of an official would total3, v disrupt the line of 
continuity. 
1. In his memorandum Stephen says that "it was intended" that the 
pBrmanent under-secretary of state should play a different role from 
Hay'so obviously meaning that he was informed of Wilmot Horton's 
intentions in 1825: Young., The Colonial Office, p. 115. But Horton 
is said merely to have wanted "a font of knowledge". It was Stephen# 
apparentlyp who decided that this role could only be played once "a 
proper division of labour throughout the Departmentn had been made and 
"a settled plan .... for, the methodical dispatch of business" introduced: 
Stephen's memorandumt' 30 Mar. 1832ý C. O. 5,37/22, f. 3. 
2. Hay's methods of businesso of which this was a criticism* are set out 
in Youngs The Colonial Offices pp. 86-80 94-5. Hay expounds his 
administrative philosophy in a memorandum which rejects the idea of 
co-ordination and contro, 
,1 
centred on the permanent under-secretary-in 
Hay's Mdmorandumpý2, Apr. 
I 
1832j_C. O. 537/22, f. 17. 
3. Stephen to Howick,, 10 Feb. 1832) Grey Paperap Stephen; Stephen's 
memorandums 30 Mar. 1832., C. O. 537/22., f, 3. Between 18Z7 and 1836 
there were eight secretaries of state in nine years. 
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The weakness in Stephen's conception of the under-secretaryship, as 
Hay, with his pessimistic intuition., grasped immediate2ys was that the 
secretary of state and parliamentary under-secretary would have to agree 
to take decisions more on the opinion of their subordinates than on any 
1 
personal examination of the individual cases abinitio., Taylor and 
Stephen differed from Hay in thinking this an already complete and inevitable,! 
development. They maintained that colonial government had become too 
complex for politicians to be able to act on their own initiative. 
Secretaries of state and parliamentary under-secretaries entered office 
ignorant of colonial business and were subsequently pre-occupied throughout 
most of their period in office by cabinet or parliamentary affairs. In 
this view, Taylor and Stephen were generally correct. But in fixing on 
the permanent under-secretary as the sole consultant for the parliamentary 
headsp though a logical and even enlightened notions they ignored the other 
officials and sources of information open to a statesman and forgot that 
the ultimate judge of office procedure would be the secretaries of state. 
For them efficiency and consistency., which the permanent under-secretary 
could ensure, might not weigh as heavily as others more political) consid- 
erations,, Since Stephen implicitly and Taylor explicitly accepted that the 
permanent under-secretary must help to make policy) it seems that they were 
already assuming that civil servants would act and would be treated as 
1. Hay's memorandum, 2 Apr. 1832p C. O. 537/22t f. 17. 
1 
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a-political officials. This assumption was perhaps a little premature 
before 1836. 
(II) Reform Achieved: Correspondence and Copyists. 
In 1836 Stephen2s ideas were put to the test. Fortunatelyt Lord 
Glenelg and Sir George Greyp despite the incident over his promotion., 
were decidedly friendly towards Stephen and great admirers of his abilities. 
Even in November 1835 Glenelg had assured Stephen of this fact. He was 
"sensible".. he wrotey "of all your kindness to mey and how warmly and 
generously you have worked with me and for me at all times before I was in 
2 
this office and in a still more abundant degree since I came into it". 
This confidence was at least. partially reciprocated. Stephen enjoyed 
the freedom which Glenelg allowed him and thought his superior's "kindness... 
3 
inexhaustible". When the pattern of office business came to be worked 
out it was Stephen's views which prevailed; and by the time Normanby 
Stephents memorandump 30 Mar. 1832, C. O. 537/22p f. 3 and Taylor 
The Statesmang Chapter 32. Their blindness may be partly attributable 
to their correct insistence on the 7i---politicid-nature of the vast 
majority of the problems with which the bureaucracy had to deal. 
2. Glenelg to Stephen2 Privatep 17 Nov.. 1835, Stephen Papers.. separate 
letters. It is interesting that in the accompanying open letter 
Glenelg comments favourably on the doctrine of laissez-faire in admin- 
istration which was exactly what Stephen wanted to destroy: Glenelg 
to Stephenp 17 Nov. 1835P Stephen Papers, separate letters. 
3., Stephen to Howick, 26 Oct. 1835., Grey Papers2 Stephen. Stephen trusted 
that Glenelg's tolerance would allow him to write to Howick on political topics under consideration in the Colonial Office even before they had 
been submitted to the secretary or parliamentary undený-secretary: 
Stephen to Howickf 1 July 1837p Grey Papers, Stephen. 
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succeeded Glenelgy fully three years later, these views had become 
standardised and institutionalised in the structure and functioning of the 
office. 
It was typical of Stephents self-effacing business methods that the 
changes he introduced were made informally: no legislative act or order 
1 
in council established the new methods of proceeding. Politicians and 
civil servants alike were content to rely on Stephents rules as if adopted by 
common consent and implemented merely as a matter of departmental convenience 
or as a simple rationalization of a system long recognized in theory though 
2 
never before carried out in practice. The administrative revolution of 1836 
in the Colonial Office (for it is no exaggeration to call it that) was, apart 
from Hayts dismissal, both bloodlessand silent. This is no doubt partly 
to be explained by Stephents wish to avoid criticism in parliament or in the 
cabinet, but it is also a reflection of his skill in manipulating the office 
machine so as to meet his three main criticisms of its functioning; without 
3 
disturbing what had already been achieved. 
1. This was most exceptional. All the five secretaries of state whom 
Stephen served except Glenelg resorted to orders in council when trying 
to effect reforms in the office: List of Orders in Council for the 
Colonial Department) C. O. 878/1.. 
2. Since no official except Stephen-was given extra work as a result of 
Stephents re-organisation., none felt aggrieved. Such., at least) was 
Taylor's view - and he well appreciated how extensive the changes were. 
Taylor to Gladstone) 8 May 1846, B. M. Add. MS. 44361ý, f. ? 9. 
3. By the time the Cabinet did get to hear of the changes in the 
regulationsp Glenelg was able to answer their criticisms by appealing 
to the obvious success of the new methods: Cabinet Memorandum, Russell 
Papersy P. R. O. 30/22/3G. 
Some of the changes he made are generally known. 
I 
ill 
Stephen did not 
invent but he adopted., systematized and regularised a method of handling 
departmental correspondence which became standard in all departments in 
the second half of the nineteenth centui7. On this system his whole 
administrative philosophy was, pivoted. Basically what he did was to 
institute a strict demarcation of functions between the permanent civil 
service on the one hand and the political heads on the other. All 
official departmental correspondence was to be handled first by the civil 
servants: they,, through the agency of the permanent under-secretaryj, and 
through him alone., would then refer the matter to the political heads in 
such a form as to enable them to come to a decision. Once the politicians 
had decided on some form of action., the papers were to be handed back to 
2 
the civil servants and the appropriate replies drafted. 
Each stop was recorded by a written notificationg caUed a 'minute'# 
as the papers passed from one hand to another. On every set of papers 
there would be at least three minutes: firstly.. the permanent under- 
secretary's minute referring the question to the parliamentary under- 
1. The system is described in R. P. Pugh.. The Records of the Colonial 
and Dominions Offices (London., 196/+),, PP. 36-7; and in 'Report of 
the Committee of Enquiry into the Colonial Office., 15 Dec. 18491., 
H. C.,, 1854) XXVII (1715)s pp. 47-8. Both these., however., describe 
the system after Stephen's resignation when it had been altered 
somewhat. The minutes were generally made on the back of the dispatchp 
or in the margin or on the "turn-ups", unless a specially long minute 
was required. 
2. Seev for examplep Stephen's minute of 12 Jan. 1840 on Gordon to 
Stephenj 18 Nov. 1840y C. O. 323/226,9 f. 213. 
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secretarys then the parliamentary under-secretary's minute with his view 
and finally the secretary of state's minute announcing the final decision. 
Since the secretary of state then passed the papers back to the permanent 
under-secretary there wasy of course) a possibility that further correspon- 
dence might be occasioned before the q4estions were finally disposed of; 
but the idea of a chain of command or of responsibility was implicit in 
the structure and marks its great advance over the previous system. NO 
question could be decided unilaterally or peremptorily. For Stephen., 
himselfy a standardised system had a particular attraction since it made 
the individual official mere3, v part of the machine and so while it "could 
not obviate the reproach of undue interference) would at least render it 
1 
ill-founded and unjust". 
Below the political level the system was more complex. Once papers 
had arrived in the office and been registered they were invariably to be 
sent to the permanent under-secretary's desk. He then distributed them 
to the heads of the appropriate divisioný or sub-departmentp or other 
authority. The departmental heads arranged for the consultation of past 
papers, the preparation of precis and ary other work which had to be done 
before a decision-could be taken on the questions involved. Once this 
Cabinet Memorandum., 1839p Russell Papers, P-R-0.30/22/3C. In this 
defence which Gienelg prepared for the Cabinet in 1839 there is not 
only a description of the essentials of the procedure but a statement 
as to motives and authorship. Compare the procedure there described 
with the pre-1836 model sketched by Taylor in Taylor to Gladstone, 
8 May 1846j, B. M. Add. MS. 4436/+p f. 79. 
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had been completedy the divisional heads re-submitted the papers*-to the 
permanent under-secretary (adding their own minutes if asked to do so).. 
with the relevant enclosures attached. On examining all the materialp 
the permanent under-secretar7 added his minute referring the question 
to the political heads. When the secretary of state's decision was:; 
known, the permanent under-secretax7 personally drafted a reply based on 
the minutes or# more usuallyp passed the papers back to the appropriate 
1 
departmental head for the preparation of drafts within his division. 
These drafts then passed up the ladder to be seen, initialled., and if 
necessary amended by the permanent under-secretar7p the pýarliamentary 
under-secretary and the secretary of statep before being finally copied 
2 
and signed for transmission to the correspondent. 
The maintenance of continuity and co-ordinations the restriction of 
lintellectuall labour to a few by a stratified system of commandp these 
important considerations were well served by Stephen's system. It was 
admittedly rather-cumbersomeand its critics,, contemporary and recent, in 
examining it in operationy have been able to unearth unelevating instances 
3 
of bureaucratic formalism. Nonetheless, it is surely significant that 
1. For the junior clerks the system is described in Jadis & Halksworth 
et al, to Stephenp 1 Apr. 1846.. C. O. 537/22j, f. 169. Russell gives a 
further account in Russell to Treasury.. 17 Dec. 1839. - C. O. 537/22j, f. 89. 
2, The procedure can be observed by studying the relevant In-letters series 
of Colonial Office papers. For details, R. B. Pughp The Recordsp 
pp. 21-43- 
3. The contemporary charges aeainst the system are most conveniently 
studied in Charles Buller's lampoonsp "Mr. Over-Secretary Stephen" and 
I'Mr. Mother-Country": see E. M. Wrong., Charles Buller and Responsible 
Government for the Colonies (Oxfordo 1926),, pp. 137-162.. The more 
recent charges are summarised in R. B. Pugh,, "The Colonial Office., 
1801-19251t) C. H. B. E. j IIIp p. 721. 
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1 
the now system coped well with an ever-increasing volume of correspondence. 
It was not the failure of the Colonial Office to arrive at decisions which 
Lord Durham bewailedý for example, but the inconvenience of frequent 
2 
Colonial Office interference. The system had also two supremely important 
advantages over former methods. By establishing the dichotomy between 
civil and political officials through confining the latter to matters of 
deliberation and decisionp it made possible the evolution of an anonymous 
civil service and shaped the concept of parliamentar7 or ministerial 
responsibility. The parliamentary officials were enabled to take full 
cognizance of every decision taken in their department and so came 
3 
eventually to play their familiar modern role. That this was no mere 
accident is quite clear from Stephen's precocious views on the role of 
A+ 
the secretariat as early as 1833. He then even imagined, perhaps somewhat 
naively.. that the politicians., freed from official drudgery., might use their 
5 
new, positions to devise and plan long-term policies. 
1. For an idea of the extent of the extra work see Unwin to Stephen., 
27 Mar. 18/+6ý Jadis & Halksworth et al. to Stephenp 1 Apr. 181+6, C. O. 
537/22p ff. 155,169. 
2. Sir C. P. Lucas (ed. ).. lord Durham's Re-port on the Affairs of British 
North America (Oxford.. 1912).. 11., pp. 101-7. 
3. G. Kitson Clark, 11 'Statesmen in Disguise' 11, The Historical Journalp 
II) it 1959) Ppi 19-39. 
Stephen to Howick, 17 May 1833j. Grey Papers, Stephen. See also 
E. Hughes, tSir James Stephen and the Anonymity of the Civil Servantly 
Public Administration, XXXVI., pp. 29-33. 
5. Stephen to Taylor, 16 Nov. 1835Y Stephen Papers, Journal of letters 
to various correspondents.. 18U7-1839. 
3.15 
The second advantage of Stephen's system was that it enabled the 
civil service departments to acquire a genuine corporate identity and 
sense of purpose. The clerical hierarchy.. structured in terms of function 
1 
and salaryý was given a new apex in the permanent under-secretal7ship. 
Stephen's scheme ensured that each head clerk wasikept informed of all 
that passed in the office in relation to his division. Moreover his duty 
embraced the selection and presentation of the papers on which a final 
decision was to be madep and, as Taylor well knewp the selection of material 
2 
often constituted mcrethan half the process of deciding. Consequently, 
although they lost the power to communicate directly with the political 
headsy the head clerks gained the right to play a definite role in the 
3 
administrative hierarchyv a less arduous but not an inferior role. 
The people adversely affected by Stephents reforms were the clerks 
below the senior grade who were to be removed from the dispatch-writing 
line and might be confined to the functions of copyists or archivistsý and., 
possibly, the parliamentary under-secretaries whose opinions were to be 
given only after the permanent under-secretary's and before those of the 
1, It wass of course a tstaffl post and therefore open to men outside 
the establishment but equally it was a civil service post which clerks 
might hope to fill. Ch Stephen's retirement clerks were considered 
before outsiders. 
2. Taylor# The Statesm , pp. 136-41. 
3- Taylor to Gladstonep 8 May 1846p B. M. Add. MS. 44364; Stephen to 
Smithp 20 May 1840, & Stephen to Russell, 29 Aug. 181+0.. C. O. 537/22j. 
ff. 110., 122. 
116 
secretaries of statey so that they had neither the first nor the last 
voice. In practice, however., the system did not work entirely as intended. 
Since more work was done under the new system without substantial increases 
in personnel, the more responsible duties filtered down the ranks, 
particularly when illness or holidays temporarily carried off the senior 
officials. The parliamentary under-secretaries were compensated too by 
being given an additional role# or the sole possession of a role hitherto 
much delegated - the public representation of the office. This was also 
one of Stephen's suggestions and sprang from his difficult experiences 
2 
dealing with the public in the period before 1836. 
When the secretary of state was not personally involvedt all callers 
at the offices whether in a private or public capacityp except colonial 
officials, were interviewed by the parliamentary under-secretary. This 
also helped to establish a barrier between the public side of the office 
and the private and bureaucratic side which was important since Stephen 
insisted upon absolute secrecy in relation to the latter, especial2'y with 
3 
regard to the examination of private documents. Stephen judged himself 
1. How extensive this became is clear from Stephen to Wilder., 7 Mar. 
18392 & Stephen to Stanleyp 28 Sept. 1842, C. O. 537/22p ff. 64.. 130- 
See-also Jadis & Halksworth to Stephen, 1 Apr. 1846j, C. O. 537/22P 
f. i6q. 
2. Stephen to Howickp 16 June 1845., Grey Papers, Stephen; Stephen to 
Gladstone, -30 Dec. 1845p B. M. Add. MS. 443630 f. 84; Stephen's Diaryp 
entry for 24 Jan. 1846. 
3- Stephen-to IWpet 9 Dec. 181+1, N. L. S., MS- 3669., f. 233- 
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unfit for the task of interviewing suitors or complainants., partly 
because of his nervous loquacity which Taylor warned him was embarrassing 
for strangersp and partly because he was a man with too many enemies and 
did not relish the thought of presenting his views to the public under 
circumstances in which hd might easily be subsequently misrepresented. 
In this duty,, as in the results of official correspondence., the public 
responsibility for the conduct of office business would lie best, he 
1 
judged,, with the parliamentary officials. 
In other., more minor wayst Stephen left his mark on the fimetioning 
of the office machine. H6 did not., at least while in officep suggest a 
wholesale re-structuring of clerical business and such changes as were 
made in this sphere during his under-secretaryship generally originated 
with the secretaries of state in their efforts to conserve meagre depart- 
2 
mental resources. His desire to see the best men in the top positions 
was met indirectly by the creation of two offices in the senior grade in 
1840 and 1843 and by the partial amendment of the rule on seniority 
promotions in 1839 to allow for promotions by merit when one candidate 
had a-decided superiority over the others. This helped to bolster the 
3 
'intellectual' calibre of the office. He also encouraged., with 
Stephen to Gladstoneo 30 Dec. 181+5.. B. M. Add. MS. 44363Y f- 84- 
2. For exampleo Spearman to Sir George Grey., A+ Mar 1836o C. O. 323/2229 
f. 177; Stephen to Treasury., 29 Aug. 1839, C-0: 323/226, f. 271. 
One was the chief clerkships Stephen to Treasurys 18 Oct. 1839s 
C. O. 323/226, f. 282; the other was the precis writers Stephen to 
Smithp 27 Jan. 1843, C. O. 878/2. 
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considerable effectp the growth of individual clerical specialization. 
Specific duties over one field of office business would be assigned to a 
particular clerk. Here the most fruitful but by no means the only 
instances were James SPedding's control of parliamentary correspondence 
and T. F. EZLliot's work on land and emigration problems which anticipated 
1 
by some years the creation of a separate Land and Emigration Board. 
Curiously Stephens alwzqs in the van of reform elsewhere., lagged 
behind in refusing to recommend the appointment of a senior Registrar to 
supervise the registration of departmental correspondence. Instead he 
preferred the work to be performed initially by the clerks in the various 
separate, clerical divisions and then to be set out in fair copy by a 
2 
specially appointed junior clerk. This was at least an improvement on 
the system as he found it and the funds for the junior clerkto salary were 
3 
conceded only after several running battles with the Treasury. It was 
less than was-, required to keep complete records.. but for Stephen it was 
enough. His own phenomenal memory.. the long tenures of most of the senior 
For EIIJ tI see Stephen to Spearman, 9 Jan. 1837 & 22 Apr. 1837j, 
C-0- 31 PP. 312p 342; for Spedding., Stephen to Wilderv 30 Apr. 
1838, C. . 537/22,, f. 47; and Russell to Smithj, 16 Oct. 1839p C. O. 537/22o f. 81; and for an early example of clerical specialisationo 
Stephen to Smith, 29 Sept. 183/+, C-0- 323/2180 f. 2021L 
2. Russell to Treasuryi, 17 Dec. 1839p C. O. 537/22.. f. 89; Stephen to 
Halksworth 25 Nov. 1847f enclosed in Halksworth to Elliot, 29 Nov. 18471 
Grey Papers., Colonial Office; minute on Gladstone to Stephen) 6 A: pr. 
1846y B. M. Add. MS. 44,364P f. 14. 
3. Stephen to Smitho 21 Sept. 1835.9 C. O. 537/22y f. 39; Stephen to 
Spearmans 30 Aug- 1838j, C. O. 324/147., Pýi 378; BL-ing to C. O., 15 Nov. 
1838.9 C. O. 323/22/+) f. 5Z7. 
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clerks and the care--with which the junior clerk who worked on the 
registers was chosens all meant that the imperfect state of the registers 
1 
did not hinder business very much. Arq lack of informality in keeping 
the registers was at least partially offset by the better ordering of the 
incoming papers with their standard forms and numbering., a reform for which 
2 
Stephen may well have been responsible. The serious weakness in his 
argument was that the creation of a new registrarship would probably not 
3 
have involved much extra expense. 
Once in operation) Stephents plans required amendments. With the 
ever-increasing burden of work.. and the provisions for vacancies occasioned 
by clerical secondmentst holidays and U-Inesses., Stephen's scheme to 
separate the 'mechanical' from lintellectualt labourers and to secure a 
sufficient supply of routine clerical assistants began to collapse only 
4 
two years. -, after it had been introduced. The only solution., as befores 
seemed to be to secure the MreasUrYts permission to employ extra occasional 
5 
clerks as copyists outside the establishment. With unusual audacity., 
1. Russell's criticisms and those of the 1849 Commissioners suggest that 
the failing was more in theory than in practices Russell to Treasury., 
17 Dec. 1839., C. O. 537/22,, f. 89; 'Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Colonial Officep 18491, H. C., 1854P XXVII (1715)p pp. 59-60. 
2. Stephen's circularp 1 Dec. 1841, C-0- 323/227.. f. 334. 
3. 'Report of the Committee of 1hquiry into the Colonial Office, 1491, 
P. 79. 
A+. Stephen to Wildery 30 Apr- 1838p C. O. 537/22p f. 47. 
5. Stephen to Spearman.. 14 July 1838v C-0.323/224s f. 237. 
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Stephen seized on this opportunity to return to his old idea of creating 
a copying class. His superiors cheerfully acquiesced in a programme 
whichj as no doubt they were assured.. would both save expense and solve 
1 
their difficulties without resorting to the cabinet. 
In 18382 on the strength of a'general contingency grant from the 
2 
Treasury for extra copyingp the scheme was informally instituted. A 
head and deputy head copyist were appointed from two of the longest-serving 
occasional clerks and theyýýwere given charge of the recruitment and payment 
of such extra clerks as the daily amount of copying required once establish- 
3 
ment copying resources had been exhausted. At Stephen's insistence, and 
to the detriment of their health as it provedp the copyists were given 
their own separate rooms in the damp and gloomy basement of the Office 
building. It was hoped that their physical separation from the rest of 
the officials would guard against the dangers that they might be used to 
relieve the establishment clerks of their routine copying duties or that 
they might become simply the bottom rung of the clerical hierarchy. Stephen 
, was afraid that the establishment clerks would come to feel that copying 
I 
1. Stephen gives a history of the case in Stephen to Smith, 27 Nov. 1839p 
C. O. 878/2, item 3-1. 
ýLR-Nr. O To 
2. Lopearman to Stephen, 11 )Cuý. 
'A 
1 38P C. O. 323/223p f. 234. See also 
Mayer to Stephen, 19 Jan. 1839, C. O. 537/22p f. 50. 
3- Stephen to Wilders 7 Mar. 1839P C-0.537/220 f. 64; Stephen to 
Russell's 2 Nov. 1839, C. O. 537/22., f. 83v and Mayer and Smith's 
memorandum,, 12 Mar. 1847,, C. O. 878/2p item 33- 
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was beneath their dignity or that the copyists would come to demand 
1 
continuous employment as a matter of right. His precautionary measures., 
however,, were only as strong as the men who operated them, and Stephen was 
always too trusting, 
In 1839 scandal resulted. It was discovered that Mr. Miller., the 
head copyist, had obtained sums fraudulently by falsifying his returns and., 
2 
when faced with this fact., he committed suicide. This was a blow to 
Stephen and without his faith the copyist class might have been sacrificed 
and the department returned to its old haphazard methods. But he was 
determined to defend his creation: he appointed more trustworthy head 
copyistso chosen personally and with great care2 and then produced a set 
of regulations designed to avoid the pitfalls to which the scheme had been 
liable. 
3 
This headed off criticism and ensured that the copyist service 
4 
would survive but by no means ended the controversy. The greatest care 
was required to ensure that further abuses were checked even though they 
might not always be prevented. Criticisms about the operation' of the 
1. Stephen to Smithy 27 Nov. 1839, C. O. 878/2p item 3.1. 
2. Stephen to Russell$ 2 Nov. 1839, C. O. 537/22t f. 83. 
3- Stephen to clerks, 4 Nov. 1839., C-0.537/22t f. 87: Stephen to Smith 
Z7 Nov. 1839s C. O. 878/2y item 3.1. 
4- Stephen's circulars2 18 Oct. 1842t 23 Oct. 18/+2s C. O. 878/2., items 
37 and 38; Compton to Stanleys 1/+ Oct. 1844., C. 0.523M., f. 2og; 
Stephen's circulars 31 Dec. 1846, C. O. 878/2p item 31. 
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1 
service from secretaries of state had to be met. Even so the copying 
department proved its utility so well thatý in 18/+9p when the desirability 
of separating the civil service into Imechanicall'and *intellectual' grades 
was endorsed by the parliamentary commissioners investigating the Colonial 
Office, it was clear that Stephen's copyists had set a pattern for the 
2 
whole government service. 
Stephen's achievements in a short period had been remarkable. He 
had produced an office machine in which the modern conception of the 
division between parliamentary heads and subordinate civil servants was, 
perfectly exemplified. By the invention of a copyists department he had 
gone some way towards establishing a dichotomy between tintellectuall and 
ImechanicaV grades in the civil service. His reforms made it possible 
for the office machine to cope with an increasing volume of work without 
a substantial increase in personnel. These achievements must be set 
against any defect which his methods involved. That such defects did existt 
of course,, is unquestionable.. though not always in the way that his critics 
have claimed. It is true that Stephen made the office machine more -7. 
cumbersome, but he did so in order to make it more sophisticatedp more 
1. Minutes on Stephen's memorandum,, 27 Nov. 1839, C. O. 878/2p item ll; 
Stephen to Russell, 6 May 1840, C. O. 537/22, f. 104; Compton to 
Stanley) 14 Oct. 1840Y C-0- 5231ýAý f. 209. 
2. It was pronounced 'absolutely essential' by 1839; Stephen to Smithp 
Z7 Nov. 1839,, C. O. 878/2j item 11. This view is borne out in Mayer 
to Smith, 12 Mar. 1847, C. O. 878/2t item 33 and the 'Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into the Colonial Office 18491., H. C. 1851+1 
XXVII (1715)t pp. 50-1+j, 61-2. 
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capable of tackling a great deal more work and doing so systematically. 
One of the great defects of Stephents administration, it has been 
maintainedp was that he outlawed informal procedures for conducting 
business, such as verbal consultationsp and so decelerated the process of 
1 
reaching decisions. Certainly he preferred "words written to words 
spoke" (he would have loathed the telephone) and he did attempt to instil 
this preference even in his superiors. But this is defensible. Verbal 
agreements, as he recognizedp are indefini-te and are much more easily open 
2 
to misinterpretation and much less easy to recall exactly. He was not 
against the use of short notes or verbal communications or any method 
which increased consultation or provided technical assistance except when 
this was done at the expense of what he considered the primary goal - good 
order and method. It was to achieve this goal that he was prepared to 
3 
err on the side of formality and completeness. Taylor said of him that 
as captain of the office ship he "was never tired of circumnavigation., 
4' 
though sure enough of steering into the right port at last. " 
L' C. H. B. E... Mt P. 721. 
2. Hope to Stephen) 16 Jan. 1846p Stephen Papers, separate letters. See 
also Stephen to Howickf 16 June 1845.. Grey Papersý Stephen. 
3. This was particularly true of his own preserve - departmental 
organisation: - Stephen to Smith, 21 Sept. 1835, C. O. 537/22f f. 39; 
Senior Clerks to Stephen 20 Jan. to 25'. Tan. 1841., C. O. 323/227p 
ff. 169-178; minute on Hill to Colonial Office, 12 Dec. 1838, C. O. 
323/2249 C. in C. Stephen hated ttinkeringt: Stephen to Wilderp 
6 Aug. 1835 YC-0.7/45. 
4- Taylor to Spring Rice.. 31 Oct. 1847, Taylor Papers, MS. Eng. letters 
d. 262 f. 43. 
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It must be allowed that this was preferable to the laissez-faire confusion 
of the Hay era and was partly made inevitable by the increasing complexity 
1 
of government in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Other charges against his business methods have rather less validity. 
To accusations of bureaucratic delaysy Stephen always insisted that the 
fault lay not with the Colonial Office but with the other offices concerned 
2 
with colonial government. There is much truth in this. Before 1830 
most government departments with colonial interests possessed their own 
3 
officers in the colonies and corresponded directly with them2 but in the 
course of the 1830Ss with increasing vigour after Stephen took up the 
reins, the Colonial Office attempted to restrict the channel of colonial 
correspondence to communications between the governors and the colonial 
4 
secretary of state. This meant that on the one hand the governors had 
to act as the agents for all colonial officials and on the other the 
Colonial Office had to consult many departments before replying to a 
colonial dispatch. In time they did so even without a specific reference 
1) 
Dr. Murray cites a case of confusion under Hay which is worse than 
any under Stephen: Murrayt"Th-eWeeýs-t Indies, p. 124. 
2. Minute on Trevelyan to Stephen, 24 Dec. 1840, C. O. 323/226, f. 243P 
blames the Treasury; and minute on Horton to Lackp 23 June 18ý6, 
C. O. 323/2052 f. 201, blames the Board of Trade. 
3- Youngg The Colonial Office2 pp. 172-3. 
E. g., Macdomld to Greyo 24 JUlY 18/+72 No,. 98.. minutep C. O. 267/198. 
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in order to secure specialist advice or to maintain consistency throughout 
1 
the goverment. The problem was again one of a desire for order and 
sophistication resulting in increasing the complexity of administration. 
In addition2 it was during this period that the Treasury tightened 
up its control over colonial finances) insisting on its right to sanction 
2 
or reject every project for the expenditure of public finances. Stephen 
was forced) unwillingly,, to acquiesce but, as a believer in professionalism 
and the necessity of sound technical advice, he contributed as much as 
anyone to the further proliferation of government business by this habit 
3 
of sub-contracting to other departments. It is also true that the 
Stephen scheme of departmental procedure made it quite impossible for even 
the Colonial Office itself to return an immediate answer to a correspondent. 
But., of coursep neither he nor the office generally can be blamed for the 
criminal delays of up to two years which took place at the other departments 
since this was caused basically by the low priority rating given to 
5 
colonial over domestic business. Stephen did make representations against 
1. E. g., Admiralty to Colonial Office, 15 Feb. 1836., minutev C. O. 323/222., 
f. 11., 
2. Youngp The Colonial Office., pp. 184-96,202-/+0. 
3. E. g., Minutes on Chichester to Stanley, 1 Jan. 1843y No. 93p and 
Chichester to Stanleyp 1 Feb. 1843, No. 97, C. O. 295A39- 
4. Each step took about a day making the minimum time about a week. 
5- Emplund., James Stephen, pp. /+1-2; C. H. D. E. IIIp p. 715; Hall, 
The Colonial Office: A History (Tzndon., 1937)p PP. 30-31. 
Stephen claimed that only one clerk at the Treasury worked on colonial 
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1 
the delays) but he was ignored. 
126 
The least justifiable charge which has been raised against him is 
2 
that Stephen was a dictator in the Colonial Office. He acceptedp even 
rejoiced in, the fact that the political heads were his superiors and, 
therefore2 he hoped., the responsible officers. The office system which 
he established was designed to ensure that an under-secretary could not 
give orders to his parliamentary under-secretary or his secretary of state. 
The political chiefs were required to give the final decision on eveX7 
3 
problem down to the most trivial. In practice they reached their 
decisions only after seeing his opinion on the problems presented to them 
and they could not hope to match his knowledge of detail nor to escape 
from the authority with which he presented the evidence. But to counter- 
balance his influence the political heads had their oun private sources 
of information from which the permanent under-secretary might be excluded. 
Stephen influenced not by dictating but by persuading. As each 
4 
1. Minute on Spearman to Stephen, 3 Aug. 18382 C. O. 323/2242 f. 231; 
and on Trevelyan to Stephen., 24 Dec. 1840, C. O. 323/226, f. 2/+3. 
2. This was the main charge which Wakefield made: see E. M. Wrong., 
Charles Buller and Responsible-Government, pp. 144-150. 
3. Cabinet Memorandumt 1839p PRO 30/22/3C; Stephen to Gladstoney 30 Dec. 
1845ý B. M. Add. MS. 44363p f. 84. 
Many secretaries., for example, Russellt corresponded privately with 
governors: see his papers PRO 30/22/3C. Gladstone also did so. 
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secretary of state testified in turnp Stepheni, though naturally reserved 
and hesitant in putting forward his own viewso was frequently not only the 
best but also the only authority available to them on particular colonial 
1 
problems. They were bound to consult him: he was bound to defer to 
their final judgements. Much of the success of office business., therefore., 
inclixUng the plans for the reform and re-organization of the department, 
depended on the relations between Stephen and the secretaries df,, state. 
(III) Stephen and his SuDeriors. 
Of all the politicians whom he served after 1836, Stephen was closest 
to Glenelg and Sir George Grey. From the freedom with which he departed 
2 
from the strict official rules of etiquette when dealing with them and 
3 
from their eager efforts to consult him on every subject it is obvious 
4 
that there existed among them an implicit understanding. Undoubtedly 
this was partly based on personal regard - they shared a great deal 
including their Evangelical upbringing and their activities on behalf of 
1. See the testimonials from two very different sources - Stanley and 
Grey: Stanley to Stephenp 23 May 1844j, Stephen Papers., separate 
letters; Grey to Stephen., 25, Feb. 18/+5,, Stephen Papers.. loose leaf 
letters. 
2. Stephen to Howicks 1 July 1837,9 Grey Papers., Stephen. 
3- Grey to Howick, 29 Aug. 1836p Grey Papers.. Sir George Grey. 
A+- Governors consulted all three of them to be fully informed: Reddie 
to Gladstone, 28 Dec. 1836p B. M. Add. MS. 44355, 
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the Church Missionary Society - and also partly involved a certain 
1 
political sympathy. But it is wrong to imagine that their interests 
were identical. This common misunderstanding probably stems from a 
private letter written by Stephen after Glenelgts retirement in which he 
referred to his former superior as "the most laborious) the most conscien- 
2 
tious and the most enlightened" of Colonial Secretaries -a verdict which 
stands in glaring contrast to the then current popular view ofhim, as a 
3 
twittering somnam ulist. The letter deserves close attention. Stephen's 
sympathetic remarks were sincere but they are typically barbed. The 
words were obviously carefully chosen. 'Laborioust might imply indecisive- 
, //I, 
essp 'conscientious' might also mean over-scrupulousness and 'enlightened' 
might represent at times the characteristic of the visionary. Glenelg, 
the letter goes on to explain in a less well-known and more cynical passagef 
was a man of morals who deserved praise; but moral refinement was not a 
quality which would ever be appreciated in Downing Street though Stephen 
4 
himself might still be humane enough to recognize it in another. In 
1. Glenelg to Stephen, 17 Nov. 1835j Stephen Papersp separate letters; 
Stephen to Howick., 26 Oct. 1835p Grey Papersp Stephen; Stephen to 
Macvey Napierg 22-'Mar. 1838,, Stephen Papersp loose leaf letters; Wilder 
to H. Stephen & Glenelg to Stephen,, 17 Aug. 3.838, Stephen Papersp 
separate letters. 
2. Stephen to Mrs. Austin.. 12 Feb. 1839., Stephen Papers, Journal of 
letters to various correspondentsp 18(77-1839. C. E. Stephenp Sir James 
Stephenp pp. 56-57. 
3. Galbraithy Reluctant Empirep pp. 19-20. See also Edith Dobie, 
'The Dismissal of Iord Glenelg from the Office of Colonial Secretarylp 
Canadian Historical Review) XXIIIP 1942, No. 3P pp. 280-5. 
4. Stephen to Mrs. Austin., 12 Feb. 1839, Stephen Papers, Journal of 
letters to various correspondentsy 18017-1839. 




resignationp when all those who disliked his administration laid their 
2 
complaints at Stephen's door.. he came to like him even less. 
3 
Stephen neither pressed policy when Glenelg was secretary of state 
A+ 
nor blindly and slavishly followed his superior. He was more tolerant 
of Glenelgýs views than he later admitted but he frequently disagreed with 
V 
him and was overruled. His strength lay in his superior's goodwill. 
When decisions were taken against his judgementp Stephen seldom hesitated. 
to make his views known to Glenelg so as to face his superior with the 
5 
awkward necessity of having to contradict a well-informed subordinate. 
It is probably this which explains the complete triumph of Stephen's views 
on office reorganization during the years-, of Glenelg's secretaryship. 
Lord Normanby., an experienced statesman with a reputation as a liberal., 
was in office for too short a time to make much impression on tho civil 
servants. His position was peculiarly difficult. Lord Melbournets 
government to uhich he belonged had become highly unstable, its fall being 
1. Stephen to J. C. Stephen., 18 Nov. 1837, Stephen Papers., Journal to 
J. S. C., 1816-18451 Stephen to Napier., 20 Sept. 18380 B. M. Add. MS. 
34619p f. 395. 
2. IGlenelgI had become a term of abuse by 1846: Stephen's Diaryp 
entry for 12 Mar. 1846. 
3- Stephen to Wilberforces 10 May 1837., Stephen Papersp Journal of 
letters to various 6orrespondentop 18017-1839. 
4. Stephen to Mrs. Austinp 28 Oct. 1837, Stephen Papersp ibid. 
5. Stephen to Howick, Feb. 1845p Grey Papers., Stephen. 




rumoured daily as ministers vied for position. Normahby was not left 
-undist-urbedo either, as Russell interfered increasingly with the conduct 
2 
of colonial gover=ent. Nonetheless Normanby's parliamentary under- 
secretaryp Henry Labouchere, was in office long enough to remember how 
3 
dependent they both were on Stephents daily contribution. Stephen's 
relations with them) however) got steadily worse throughout their six 
months in office. Normanby began well by cataloguing the main debat(a-ble 
4 
colonial issues and then failed to do arWthing about them. StePhen, as 
usual with a dilatory superior., was forced into extra worky preparing the 
5 
outstanding questions and reserving them for the secretary's opinion, only 
to find that Normanby had decided that colonial business was best settled, 
as he later told Russell; "by postponement .... a process to which you will 
116 find after a little practice many colonial questions are not inapt to yield . 
Doubtless., Stephen felt disillusioned. To mke mattersucrsep Normanby's 
Taylor to G. Taylor, 22 Apr. 183gy Taylor Papers, MS. Eng. letters 
d. 91 f. 191. 
2. He had intended to take the office himself: Russell to Howardt 
26 Feb. 1839, PRO 30/22/3C. See also Russell to Grey, 27 Aug. 1839, 
Grey Paperst Russell. 
3- Iabouchere to Stephenp 12 Apr. 1856, Stephen Papers, separate letters. 
4- He later handed his list (with comments) to Russell: Normanby to 
Russell, 2 Sept. 1839j, PRO 30/22/3D. 
5. Stephen to Napier, 10 Aug. 18391 B. M. Add. 10.34620y f. 327. 
6. Normanby to Russellp 2 Sept. 1839) PRO 30/22/3D. 
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secretaryship was a period when the fierce press attacks on Stephen were 
1 
at their height but he received no support from his superiors. It is 
not surprising that at this time he applied for a transfer to another 
2 
department and even considered resignation. But., perhaps with the 
knowledge that the secretaryship would be short-lived., he finally decided 
to remain after receiving letters of support from his friendsp both 
3 
political and private. 
Russells who succeeded Normanbyp was more willing to act decisively 
and, in consequences Stephen enjoyed much better relations with him. But 
they were never very close. After Stephen's resignation., Russell gave an 
opinion of his former under-secretary which was far from charitable: 
"It was the fault of Stephen that instead of being 
under-secretary for the Colonies he was more under- 
secretary again the colonies..... If we cry stinking 
fishp it is no wonder our customers are few". S 
1. He turned elsewhere for support: Stephen to Aberdeen., 31 May 1839., 
Stephen Papers., Journal of letters to various correspondentsp 1807-1839. 
2. Taylor to G. Taylor, 1 Mar. 1839p Taylor Papersj MS. Eng. misc. ) 
f. 58, f. 10; Stephen to Aberdeen, 31 May 1839, Stephen Papersp 
Journal of letters to various correspondentst 1807-1839. 
3. Aberdeen to Stepheny 4 Juno 1839v Stephen to Mrs. Austing 12 Feb. 1839., 
Stephen to H. Ve=., -3 Apr. 1839j, and Stephen to Mrs. Hodson, 18 Apr. 
1839s Stephen Papersp Journal of letters to various correspondentss 
1807-1839. 
4., Taylor to Villiersp 14 Oct. 1839j, Taylor Papers, MS. Eng. misc. p 
f. 58p f. 9. 
5. Russell to Grey., 16 Mar. 18/+8p Grey Papersp Russell. 
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This statement and Russell's behavio-ur after 1847 in rejecting Grey's 
attempts to retain Stephen's services in some new capacity reveal an 
unexpected bitternesst even vindictivenessy in their relationship. 
Russell explained that the reason for this ill-will was that no politician 
who wished to make friends could afford to court a man as unpopular as 
1 
Stephen. One cannot avoid the impression that this belief derived 
Partly from Russell's two years in office wheng in Melbourne's unstable 
ministry ., 
he had borne part of the brunt of the constant attacks of the 
2 
Colonial Reformers on Stephen. 
Russell's harsh opinion of Stephen is in contrast to Stephents 
generous opinion of Russell for he remembered most his superior's "dominant 
3 
soul". Stephen always appreciated a secretary who would give him a 
lead and clearly admired Russell's determination. But though he revered 
the "dominant soul" he was not particularly impressed by Russell's under- 
A+ 
standing. In officep their personal differences were kept in check. 
Two thorough professionals in their own spheres, they worked out a useful 
5 
scheme of give and take which largely satisfied both. There is no doubt 
1. See J. M. Ward, 'The Retirement of a Titan:, James Stephen., 1847-50", 
Journal of Modern History) =. - 111., 1959., pp. 195., 201ý 203. 
2. Stephen to Napierp 20 Sept. 1839y B. M. Add. MS. 346202 f. 389. 
3. Stephents Dia , entry for 22 Jan. 1846. 
4- Stephen's Dia , entry for 25 Jan. 1846. 
5. Stephen to Ndpier, 18 Oct. 18393 B. M. Add. MS. 34620p f. "L 
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whatever that Russell valued Stephen's professional abilities and deferred 
to him on many occasions even against the opinion of his rather dogmatic 
parliamentary under-secretaryp Robert Vernon Smith. When a tempting 
vacancy occurred in the assistant under-secretaryship at the Treasury, it 
was Russell who personallyl with the aid of the Prime Ministert persuaded 
Stephen to forego the chance of a quieter life and to remain with him at 
2 
the Colonial Office. 
3 
Russellt who wanted his office to stand well in the public eyep 
showed considerable interest in the subject of further office reorganization. 
Despite the improvements from 1836 to 1838 the leading officials were still 
4 
too busy to give any time to concerns of philosophical goverment. 
Stephen had again turned his thoughts to the problem and his ideas were 
not yet exhausted. Perhaps encouraged by Russell's interest, he produced 
a new plan for aiding the department by appointing to it an advisory board 
of distinguished men with professional interest in or experience of 
colonial life -a body rather like in many ways the 17th century Board of 
1. Granville to Dilket (Nov. 1880), B. M. Add. MS. 4387$,, f. 191. A 
typical example can be found in the minutes on Stephen to Treasury., 
6 Dec. 1839, C. O. 323/226, f. 294. 
2. Stephen to Russelly 4 Jan. 1840, PRO 30/22/3D; Melbourne to Stephen, 
8 Jan. 1840$ Stephen Papers, loose leaf letters. 
3- For example.. Russell to Smithp 16 Oct. 1839v C. O. 537/22p f. 81. 
4., Stephen to Wildery 31 Dec. 1840., C. O. 537/22., f. 127. 
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Trade. This would not only provide for long-term planning but would 
also supply the first-hand knowledge of colonial affairs which the office 
lacked. Russell thought the idea too radical and too expensive and 
rejected it out of hand. 
Russell's own suggestions for strengthening the top ranks of the 
office were much less sweeping but much more practicable. He felt there 
was a case for appointing a third or assistant under-secretary: but the 
time was not yet ripe. Since the holders of the'permanent under-secretary- 
ship and the senior clerkships were so able it seemed unnecessary to do 
more in the first instance than re-create the old position of chief clerk 
to allow one of the senior clerks to supervise and co-ordinate some of the 
2 
routine work. His more solid achievement - the creation., in 181+Oy of 
the Land and Emigration Commission to handle the specialised problems 
relating to land sales and emigration - did noty in fact.. deprive the 
Colonial Office of control of one branch of its business but merely created 
a technical advisory service whose decisions continued to be examined, and 
3 
initially to be questionedp in the Colonial Office. Stephen played a 
big role in bringing about both of these arrangements but the form they took 
1. T. M. Ward) -T. M. s =f iiiY 1959P P. 195; Russell to Greys 11 Nov. 181+7s Stephen to Grey., 10 Nov. 1847, Grey Papersp Russell & Stephen. 
2. Russell to Treasuryý 17 Dec. 1839p C. O. 537/22p f. 89. 




probably owed more to Russell than to him. 
The appointment of Stanley as secretary of state in 1841 must have 
upset Stephen after their unfortunate troubles during Stanley's first 
secretaryship in 1833-4- But, surprisinglysince he never learned how 
to protect himself from his detractorsp Stephen succeeded in establishing 
a fairly good working relationship with him. It wasp admittedly) a 
relationship of superior and subordinate in a way that it never was with 
any other secretary but Stephen appeared to derive more than merely 
philosophical consolation from being forced to remain in the background. 
If Stanley's views on the proper relationship between secretary and 
permanent under-secretary were rather old-fashioned, they had at least the 
unquestionable merit of ensuring that the secretary could be pressed to 
assume responsibility for answering criticisms directed at his subordinates. 
3 
Only when he failed to do so did Stephen rebel. 
Other factors helped to make life bearable. Stanley's young 
Stephen's role in the origin of the Land and Emigration Commission 
has recently been examined in Peter Burroughs, Britain and Australia 
1831-1855, (Oxford 1967), pp. 217-8. Stephen's disapproval of the 
abolition of the chief clerkship in 1833 is on record: Stephen to 
Treasur7,6 Dec. 1839, C. O. 323/2214) f. 294- Nonetheless Stephen 
did not approve of Russell's re-arrangement to create a registry 
department: minutes on Porter to Smith, 10 Dec. 1840t C-0- 323/226s 
f- 74. 
2. Stanley to Stepheng 23 May 1844p 6 June 1841+ &7 June 18, V+p Private, 
Stephen Papersp separate letters. 
3. Stephen to Greyp n. d. Feb. 1845j, Grey Papers.. Stephen. 
2 
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parliamentary under-secretaryp George Hope., proved to be a good friend 
and an eager disciple of the permanent under-secretarywhich largely 
offset his superior's lofty indifference. When there was no bitter issue 
like slavery to quarrel over even that indifference was no longer so painful. 
Stephen looked forward himself to a date not long distant when he might 
hope to retire from the political squabbles withp on Stanley's assurancep 
2 
some suitable reward for his services. In such circumstances the future 
seemed more secure with a remote but powerful superior than with an intimate 
but ambitious politician. Stephen had "learned to like and ... come to 
3 
desiderate an aristocratic bearing". Stanley.. whatever his faultsp was 
still the epitome of the aristocratic statesman. 
Naturally they had their differences and there were times,, though 
remarkably few., when Stephen felt irked at being left out of ministerial 
4 
confidence; but on most matters when they disagreed a compromise was arranged 
to prevent Stephen feeling too aggrieved. Stanley had none of Stephen's 
concern for "philosophical government'If for examplej, but he was prepared 
to join him part of the way in the cause of office reform. On Stephen's 
1. Hope to Stephen, 16 Jan. 1846, Stephen Papersp separate letters. 
2. Stanley to Stephenp 2 Nov. 18/+7.9 Stephen Papers; Stephen to Greyp 
12 Oct. 181+7p Grey Papersp Stephen. 
3. Stephen's Dia entry for 28 June 18/+6. 
4- E. g. p minutes on Carr to Russell, 16 Aug. 18/+l., C. O. 267A65., no. 32. 
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recommendationv Stanley proposed to create the office of assistant legal 
counsel. In return for immediate help with his legal dutieso Stephen 
would train the assistant counsel in the vork of the office. This would 
make the office more prepared for Stephen's eventual retirement. The 
plan was postponedp partly because of Treasury opposition and partly because 
Stanley, on encountering oppositiony triedýfoolishlyj to accomplish the 
same object by farming out colonial legal duties to other government 
departments. In the face of Stephen's opposition'to this alternative 
2 
suggestion) he abandoned the subject entirely. 
Where Stanley interfered less the achievements were more positive. 
He delegated to the permanent under-secretar7 the responsibility for what 
3 
was usually called "the discipline of the office". This meant simply 
ensuring that all of the clerks performed their share of the work and that 
they attended regularly as required., taking their leaves of absence and 
holidaysso as to cause minimum inconvenience to the office as a whole. 
Because of the small number of officials and the great seasonal pressure 
of work at the Colonial Officej, these apparently trivial problems were# in 
1. Minutes on Trevelyan to Stephen, 26 Mar. 1842,, & Bethune to Hopey 
11 Aug- -1842, C. O. 323/2282 ff. 108,183. 
2. Minutes on Lefevre to Stanley, 19 Feb. 181+5 and Trevelyan to Stephenp 
28 Mar. 1845.. C. O. 323/230., ff. 248., 250. 
3? This responsibility was first mentioned on Stephen's appointment as 
assistant under-secretary in 1834: Order in Council) 17 Sept. 1834, 
C. 0.878/1) f. 107. 
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fact.. a constant headache) seriously affecting the departmentts working 
1 
capacity. 
The first systematic attempt to deal with the problem of office 
discipline had been made by Stephen when assistant under-secretary in 1834- 
He had then laid down certain principles for the office to follow, Firstly,, 
it was made a rule that each member of the office was entitled to eight 
weeks holidays each year during a specified part of the year. The actual 
dates were to be settled by the assistant under-secretary in advance in 
order to ensure that a minimum number of staff in each division was always 
available throughout the whole year. Where the requested dates overlapped 
seniority would prevail. Secondly. an attendance register was instituted 
and it was declared that clerks who were negligent or unpunctual, might 
2 
forfeit their right to their holiday. 
This scheme worked very badlyperhaps because it centred on the role 
of the assistant under-secretary -a position abolished in 1836. Some 
clerks continued to take their holidays when they liked and refused to 
perform routine copying. As a result the diligent clerks were overworked,, 
arrears piled up and the demand for extra copyists increased. Stephen) 
1. Stephen to Stanleyp 28 Sept. 1842, C-0.537/22p f. 130. 
2. Spring Rice's memorandumv 7 Oct. 18340 C. O. 537/22) f. 30 and 
enclosures. 
3- Stephen to Wilder., 31 Dec. 1840., C. O. 537/22) f. 127. 
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with some Justice) blamed the senior clerks who failed to keep a rein on 
their juniors and allowed office discipline to become very lax. He also 
recognized that the failure was partly owing to his own lack of firmness 
and authority in dealing with his subordinates: 
"Government is not my gift.. I mean the rule of persons 
near about me. I want affability, gravity and awfulness 
and am neither popular nor foxmidable in the Colonial Office". 2 
Stephen would never have made a politician. But prompted by Stanley to 
assume full responsibility, he resolved on several changes designed to 
offset these weaknesses. 
He had already decided that a hierarchical structure of control was- 
necessary. The senior clerks must take the responsibility for the conduct 
3 
and claims of their junior clerks. In 1842 he carried this further by 
insisting that in addition to clerical claims for leaves of absence requests 
for extra copying must be certified by the relevant senior clerks and 
4 
countersigned by himself. This stopped the worst abuses but could not 
solve the whole problem. In January 1843 aýmore thorough refom was 
attempted when the chief clerk, George Wilder, retired. 
1. Stephen to Stanley, 28 Sept. 181,2, C. O. 537/22) f. 130. 
2. Stephen's Dia 9 entry for 17 Jan. 1846. 
3. Stephen to Wilderv 31 Dec. 18/+02 C-0.537/22p f. 127; Stephen to 
Smitho 3 Apr. 181+2. C-0- 323/228P f. 344- 
4- Stephen's circularg 18 Oct. 18/+2 (? ), C. O. 878/2, item 37. 
The binder suggests 18 Oct. 1847 as the date. 
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Russ, ellv in urging the recreation of the chief clerkship in 1840P 
gave as one of its duties "the general cognizance of the Department" which 
1 
he said was related to "the order and regularity of the service". This 
appears to have been minly a reference to the chief clerk's superintendence 
2 
of office finance and procedure rather than to office discipline. When 
Wilder retiredp howevert Stephen felt that the functions of the office 
ought to be enlarged. The new chief clerk., Peter Smithp was a talented 
and very experienced clerk who had become an expert on the office's 
military questions and on the. orders of knighthood within the secretary 
3 
of state's gift. It was ob7iously desirable that Smith should continue 
even in his new capacity as special adviser to the secretary of state on 
these rather technical questions. In additioný Stephen asked him to 
undertake an extra function., viz.; 
'Ithe discipline of the officet understanding by 
that term the duty of enforcing the rules which 
areý or shall bep established for the regular 
dispatch of the public business of this 
Department". 
To cope with these increased duties the new chief clerk was provided with 
an assistant. Venturing beyond this general central control., Stephen) 
Drafts of Colonial Office to Treasuryý 16 Jan. 181+0,, C. O. 323/226t 
f. 311. 
2. Young, The Colonial Officei pp. 29-30. 
3. In 1843 he was one of the longest-serving clerks and his expertise 
on military questions went back to his service with that side of 
the secretary of state's duties during the Napoleonic Wart Stephen 
to Smith, 27 Jan. 1843, C. O. 878/2. 
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with Stanleyts entire concurrencep laid doun a series of specific rules 
governing the hours of attendance for clerks and the conditions for the 
requisitioning of extra copying assistance. 
There was nothing unique or particularly novel in these changes. 
Every government department had-. to reduce its office discipline to a 
series of rules and to establish authorities to exercise them. But 
Stephen's plan had the special merit of being adapted to the materials at 
hand. Smith was experienced in disciplinary matters and being in daily 
touch with the clerks was better able to prevent backsliding than the 
2 
remote and austere permanent under-secretary. If it is also true that 
it*$- success was merely relativep the plan was obviously capable of 
3 
extension and amendment. It undoubtedly marked an important stage in 
the growing professionalism of the office machine. 
An improvement in office discipline was one method of increasing 
efficiency: another was to make the office machine more sophisticated by 
supplying sppcialised services. The adaptation of the functions of the 
chief clerkship was not the only example of how this was done. Stanley 
1. Stephen to Smithp 27 Jan. 1843, C. O. 878/2., minutes. 
2. Stephen himself fully appreciated his ineffectiveness: Stephen to 
Stanley., 28 Sept. 1842p C. O. 537/220 f. 130. 
3- Compton to Stanleyp 14 Oct. 1844., C. O. 523/1AP f. 209p minutes. 
One of many examples of later amendments can be found in Stephen's 
circular., 31 Dec. 1846, C. O. 878/2p item 31. 
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acted as catalyst on another occasion by refusing to read the voluminous 
papers connected with the cases sent to him for verdict. Instead) he 
forced Stephen and the clerks to present him with a precis of the arguments 
in each case. Because of this extra and difficult workp it seems to 
have occurred to Stephen that the old office of precis writer (abolished'in 
1833), was much needed. On the other handp the registry department which 
2 
had been augmented by Russell in 1840 remained consistently under-employed. 
Stanley was brought to agree and in 181+3 the registry department was cut 
down from four to two clerks and from this saving the post of precis writer 
3 
was created as head of a new division of miscellaneous correspondence. 
Again Stephen built well. Even though this separate division collapsed, 
A+ 
the office of precis writer survived and grow in importance. Its creation 
illustrates very well how Stephen could adapt his ideas to accommodate his 
secretary of state and thereby successfully advance the cause of office 
reform. 
Gladstonef who succeeded Stanleyj. was already an old acquaintance of 
Stephents. They had worked together when Gladstone served as Iord 
Aberdeen's parliamentary under-secretary in 1835 and ever since Stephen 
1. Stephen to Smith., 3 Apr. 1842,, C-0- 323/2282 f. 3". 
2. Minute on Porter to Smithp 10 Dec. 1840, C-0- 323/226, f. 71'. 
3. Stephen to Smith., Z7 Jan. 1843, C. 0.878/2. 
A+ - Pugh, C. H. B. E 2 IIIy p. 729. 
1 
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had kept a benevolent eye on Gladstone's Political progress. By the 
time Gladstone arrived as head of the offices howeverp both men had changed 
a great deal. Stephen was no longer the enthusiast; Gladstone no longer 
the student. After four years of directing from the wings Stephen was 
2 
determined not to return to the glare of the footlights. After his 
successes at the Board of Tradey Gladstone was ambitious and determined 
3 
to leave his mark on colonial policy. Personal differences had also 
begun to divide them. In the 1830S Stephen had admired Gladstone's 
4 
concern for the Church and for political morality but the growth of the 
Oxford Movement had come between them., as Gladstone was an admirer while 
5 
Stephen disliked it. Since for both men religious feeling ran deep, 
this was an ominous development. 
But no-one could have predicted how bad their relations were to be. 
On the surface they just managed to appear reconciled but underneath they 
felt a growing mutual antipathy. When Gladstone left the office after 
Stephen to Gladstone* 3 Oct. 18379 B. M. Add. MS-P 44355s f. 257; 
Stephen to Gladstonev 18 Apr. 1838, B. M. Add. MS-P 443560 f. 45. 
2. Stephen to Gladstones 30 Dec. 1845, B. M. Add. MS.? 44363P f. 84. 
3- See Paul Knaplund., Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, (London, 
1927).. pp. 1-53. 
4- Stephen to Napierp 27 Dec. 1838, B. M. Add. MS-P 34619, f. 579. 
5. For Gladstone's position, see John Morley, Thg Life of William -Ewart Gladstone, I. - PP. 303-26. For Stephent Stephen to Napierp n. d. j, Stephen Papers$ on 'Newmanism'. 
only six monthsp "with a shout of joy" according to Paul Knaplunds he 
complained that Stephen had proved "unmanageable". But this was compli- 
mentary language compared to that which Stephen had used of him. In a 
diary which he kept for five months from January 1846, Stephen recorded 
the whole course of this alienation. On the day of Gladstone's resignationp 
he poured out his final verdict on his superior in a great emotional torrent, 
Gladstone displayed: 
it a-want of magniminity and of all other imperial 
virtueso microscopic in his views and in his ways, 
too civil and not quite civil enough, something of 
a Jesuit in manner and address.. subtle almost to a 
diseasep there is neither force) nor expansionp nor 
gracev nor dignityp nor high couraget at least none 
of these things make themselves manifest if there 
they are". 2 
This violent dislike can only be explained by Gladstone's conduct in 
office and his treatment of Stephen. Gladstone was not content to listen 
to his permanent under-secretary before making up his mind on an issue 
and he seemed quite determined to rush into suggested solutions to half 
understood problems. Stephen was forced into the preparation of extra 
memoranda: 
"to convince my new master that he cannot govern 
colonies by bestowing his subtlety and fostering 
advice on themp and treating them like children". 
What was equally embarrassing for Stephen., when his rashness-was pointed 
out to him. Gladstone accepted the criticisms "with an almost painful 
1. Knaplund., Gladstonýt P. 53- 
2. Stephen's Diaryp entry for 28 June 1846. 




Stephents harsh verdict on Gladstone is neither inexplicable nor 
altogether unjustified. Gladstone's only earlier major officep the 
Presidency of the Board of Tradep had established his business methods as 
well as his reputation. But the Board had clearly not developed an 
administrative routine during his time there andy since it was a largely 
partisan bodyy Gladstone dispensed with its permanent secretariat in working 
2 
out his own policy. Unfortunately., he failed to appreciate that conditions 
were very different at the Colonial Office where the civil service had 
become an integral part of the administrative machine and where the problems 
3 
were of great complexity and difficulty. Even if he had realized it 
Gladstone's inadequacies as a manager of men would have caused difficulties 
4 
in an office with a-prima donna like Stephen. 
There were also particular difficulties such as the disparity in their 
ages - Stephen was now 57p Gladstone twenty years his juniorp by far the 
youngest man Stephen had served. Gladstone., a., career politician2 also 
lacked the aristocratic bearing that Stephen had come to cherish. He had 
also a most unfortunately loose style of expression which irritated the 
1. Stephen's Diary, entry for 14 Jan. 1846. 
2. Lucy Brown., The Board of Trade and the Free Trade Movement, 1830-42., 
(Oxford, 1958), pp. 225-31. 
3- A point Taylor grasped; Thylorp The Statesmanp chap. xxq pp. 98-101. 
4- As they consistently did in his later career: Philip Magnus, 
Gladstone: BiograpIly -3 -7. ,, 
(Londonp 1954)p PP 46 
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permanent under-secretary. Worst of all, he became increasingly attached 
1 
to the ideas of the Colonial Reformers - Stephen's inveterate enemies. 
Nothing was calculated to alarm Stephen more than the fear that his 
superiors would truckle to Wakefield. On this issue he was prepared to 
2 
withdraw his services entirely. 
The unfortunate relations with Gladstone might have been offset by 
a tactful and talented parliamentary under-secretary, as Hope had shielded 
Stephen from Stanley. In this respect Gladstone's choice of his brother- 
i n-law, Lord Lyttelton., proved doubly unfortunate. Lyttelton wasitoo 
young and inexperienced to have been of any help in office business; and 
3 
too interfering and supercilious to have been merely inoccuous. He was-, 
quite unable to cope with the torrents of despatches which rained on his 
desk and, after only three days in the office# felt compelled by exhaustion 
A+ 
to take a holiday. To the tseasoned roadstert like Stephenp the collapse 
appeared effete and reprehensible and it was almost two months before he 
could bring himself to treat his parliamentary colleague seriously. 
5 
1. Knapl=d,, Gladstones pp. I+ls 47-8; Stephen's Diary, entries for 
16 Jan. . 22 Jan. & 26 Jan. 1846. 
2. - 
Stephen's Diaryp entry for 12 Mar. 1846. 
3. Stephen's Diarys entries for 9 Jan. & 13 Feb. 18/+6. 
4- Stephen's Diaryp entries for 12 Jan. ) 19 Jan., 30 Jan. p 4 Feb. 0 12 Feb. ) 1846. 
Stephen's Diarv2 entry for Z7 Feb. 1846. See, also Stephen to Napiery 
10 Jan. 1846ý B. M. Add'MS- 34626, f. 21. 
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Fortunately for Stephený Lyttelton also took his rebukes in good part. 
Stephen's final impression was of "a great rude boy - but a clever one". 
2 
Despite these difficultiess Gladstone did leave his mark on the office 
machine for it was under his auspices that the assistant under-secretaryship 
which Russell had contemplated and Stanley partially endorsed was finally 
created. It may explain a good deal about their relationship that 
Gladstone handled the matter entirely on his own. Certainly Stephen was 
consulted, his ideas were utilised to the full and he was kept informed 
of his superior's intentionsp but to a remarkable extent the achievement 
3 
was Gladstone's alone. 
Within a month of his arrival as secretary of state.. Gladstone 
allowed a rumour that he intended to re-organise the whole structure of 
the office to be spread through the office grapevine. In doing so he 
committed a major blunder because he roused expectations on the part of the 
clerks and of the senior officials which he was not able to satisfy. The 
re-organisation of the office was2 by 181+62 one of the thorniestj most 
delicate problems which a secretary of state could choose to tackle. The 
1. Stephents Diary, entry for 13 Mar. 1846. 
2. Stephen's Di , entry for 28 June 18/. 6. 
3. Stephen's Diary) entries for 25-27 March made 28 Mar. 1846. 
4. Stephen to J. C. Stephen, 34 Jan. 181+6. Stephen Papersý Journal to 
J-C-S-P 1845-1857. The plans were announced in parliament on 
29 May 181+6: Hansard., 3rd series) LXMI, 1846) elms. 11+20-1. 
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effect of the reforms of the previous twenty years had been to make the 
office a professional organization but it was still hampered both by the 
methods of choosing clerks (which remained purely a matter of ministerial 
patronage) and by the continuance of outmoded traditions especially in 
relation to promotion. Since all the previous reforms had been piecemeal 
a full-scale reorganization was likely to involve the immediate interests 1 
of everyone in the department. 
It is extremely doubtful if Gladstone saw these difficulties* His 
analysis probably went no further than a realisation that the office 
structure might be rationalised and improved by strengthening the higher 
2 
echelons and lopping off some of the lower echelons. There was also a 
further factor in his calculations which he did not announce openly. He 
saw in his permanent under-secretary a greatly over-worked old man whose 
offer of resignation in March 1846 he had kindly rejected. He almost 
certainly expected that Stephen's final retirement could not be long 
delayed and therefore anticipated, the need to devise some scheme to soften 
1. As-was shown by the commission of enquiry in, 1849: Reportt H. C. 01854p 
XXV-Uy (1715)ý ff. 79-97. 
2. See, for example, Gladstone to Clerks, 24 Apr. 1846, C. O. 537/22v 
f. 179. See also the significant deleted passage in his farewell 
letter: Gladstone's memorandum., 4 July 1846p B. M. Add MS. 44735. 
3- Stephen to Napierp 9 Mar. 1846p B. M. Add. MS- 34626t f. 112; and 
Stephen to Gladstone) 12 Mar. 1846 (two letters), B. M. Add. MS. 
41+363) ff. 287p 289. 
1 
1/0 LI+7 
the blow of losing his services. 
Gladstone worked on his plan for three months, consulting Goulburn 
at the Treasury and finally producing a memorandum which he sent to 
Stephen for comment. To win acceptance at the Treasuryp almost every 
plan for reform had to at least appear to effect a saving in departmental 
Gladstone took this obligation seriously. He suggested the expenses* 
gradual abolition of five clerical positionsp one senior clerkship and all 
four probationers; the only new addition he wanted for the lower grades 
was the appointment of a junior position of registrar. Using some of the 
funds saved by this retrencbmentp Gladstone proposed "to appoint an 
2 
assistant under-secretary who shall be also a Third Co=issioner of EmigratiorD 
This was Gladstone's contribution to office reform. He told the 
Treasury that to aid the heavily-worked Commission of Land and Emigration 
a third or legal member would be appointed in place of the unpaid legal 
3 
assistance hitherto provided by the Board of Trade. His services would 
be shared by the Colonial Office. Though the new official was given the 
1. In rejecting the resignation, Gladstone in fact told Stephen that he 
had a successor in mind for the permanent under-secretax7ship: Stephen's 
Diciry.. entry for 2 Mar. 1846. 
2. See Gladstone to Stephen, 6 Apr. 1846, with enclosed draft paperp 
B. M. Add. MS. 44364t f- 14- 
3. In this he was being slightly devious since the assistant under- 
secretary's services were not to be regularly available to the 
Commission: Gladstone to Rogersp IS May, 1846p B. M. Add. MS- 445281 
f. 45. The idea of obtaining further legal assistance seems to have 
originated with Stanley. See the minutes on Macleod to Stanley, 
2 Jan. 181+4, C. 0.295/142. 
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title of assistant under-secretaryl his work on the colonial side was 
only a slightly elevated version of what Stephen had called a legal 
assistantship. Gladstone wanted someone with "legal qualities and habits 
of mind, and evenp to some extent., of legal attainments"., to aid the 
1 
permanent under-secretary in discharging a large Part of his duties. 
Since these duties were technicaly the position could not be given to a 
member already on the establishment: it would create; therefore, a senior 
position, like the 
2 
permanent under-secretaryship., outside the range of 
the establishment. 
The announcement of Gladstone's decision was greeted by a howl of 
protests from the officials. The lower grade clerks bitterly resented 
the extra routine work imposed on them by the loss of the supernumeraries 
3 
and vehemently protested. At least two of the senior clerks similarly 
reacted to the threat of extra uork which the loss of one of their number 
and the diminution of their clerical assistance might involve. 
4 
The 
only person who might have thought his interests well protected by 
Gladstone's plan was Stephen, but he was equally dejected. The creation 
1. Gladstonets draft plany April 1846, B. M. Add. MS. 44735P f. 176. 
2. Drafts"of C. O. -to Treasuryy 17 Apr. 1846, C. O. 537/22p f. 210. 
3- Chapman, Unwin, et al. ) to Gladstone 21 Apr. 1846, C. O. 537/22t f. 178. 
4- Stephen's Mary, entry for 6 May 1846. 
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of an assistant under-secretaryshipp he doelaredp vas the word of doom 
to his official importance: 
"Yet I am very glad of it. My importance has 
grown a heavy burden to me., and never yet (as 
far as I can remember) brought with it any 
worship or contentment". 1 
Stephen's comment is very surprising since Gladstone made it quite 
clear to the new assistant under-secretax7., Frederick Rogerso that he 
must ordinarily arrange the application of his time "in concert with., and 
2 
in subordination top the permanent under-secretary". There are several 
possible explanations. Rogers' duties were to include the review of 
colonial legislation and all. the other functions which had originally 
3 
attached to the role of counsel. Stephent whose career had begun with 
the counselship and whose legal services continued to be one of the most 
important elements in his influence on secretaries of state., 
4 
obviously 
resented the loss of the duties he had performed for 33 years. Small 
wonder that he felt at the end of an era. When Rogers began his work 
Stephen simply could not stop himself re-reviewing in lengthy minutes 
5 
Rogers' reports. It seems possible also that Stephen caught the drift 
1. Stephen's Diary, entry for 6 May 146. 
2. Gladstone to Rogersý 18 May 1846, B. M. add. MS. 41+528s f- 45. 
3. Draft C. O. to Treasury, 17 Apr. 1846., c. o. 537/22, f. 210; 
Gladstone to Rogers, 18 May 1846, B. M. Add. MS. 44528p f. 45. 
4- Seet for examplep Stephen to Napiers 24 Mar. 1840, B. M. Add. MS' 
34621ý f. 83. 
5. C-0- 323/61 and C. O. 323/62 provide a great many examples. 
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of Gladstone's thought and realized that these measures were preparations 
for his retirement. Since Stephen had not yet reconciled himself to the 
1 
idea of leavingp Gladstone's actions must have seemed unfeeling. For 
the restp Stephen's disappointment probably reflects a feeling of empathy 
with his friends among the clerks. 
Despite his protestations to the contrary, Gladstone"s plan probably 
left Stephen relatively content. In return for training the new official 
in legal counsellingp Stephen gained assistance with his work and retained 
control both as permanent under-secretary and counsel. His claim that 
only family responsibiiitiess his conscience and his instinct kept him in 
2 
office must be regarded rather sceptically. 
When Grey followed Gladstones Stephen found him3elf faced with the 
problem of restoring good relations with his chief. This was not achieved 
without difficulty. He was forced again to deal with a man who had 
earlier sat at his feet and whop on his return to the Colonial Offices 
appeared much changed; 
"a little allayed in manners less abrupt and harshp 
but colds peremptorys self-willed, of strong clear 
sense". 3 
In the intervening period Grey.. far more than Gladstonep had moved towards 
1. How painful this prospect was can be gathered from Ward's article: 
J. M. Ward, J. M. H., XXXIq iiiv 1959s pp. 189-205. 
2. Stephents Diary, entry for 6 May 1846. 
3- Stephen's klaU.. entry for 6 July 1846p written 12 July 1846. 
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the Colonial Reformers. In 1846 he insisted on bringirginto the Cabinet 
his friend Charles Bul I er, Wakefield's 4QýLose) associate and a man who 
I 
Stephen admired at a distance but could never trust. To Stephen's 
further annoyance Grey insisted that Buller be allowed to examine the 
Colonial Office records. But in his attempt to make Buller "a sort of 
super-numerary under-secretary") he agreed to compromise and confine 
Buller's activity to parliamentary business and not to allow him to meddle 
2 
in the daily concerns of the office. 
Stephen and Taylor had almost identical opinions of Grey. They 
both liked him exceedingly as a persony admired his talents and distrusted 
his professional judgement. In their view his main defect was that he 
was too precipitate; he rushed into decisions and then was borne along 
3 
on the wings of his enthusiasm without regard for immediate practicalities. 
This was a weakness rare in a secretary of state and in many ways rather 
endearing. It did not hamper the restoration of domestic peace at the 
office - after the initial doubts. By the end of the first month the 
office was again grappling with the major issues of colonial policy. 
A+ 
For Stephen and Buller see Stephents DiaZZ9 entries for 21 Jan., 
28 -Tan. 1 16 Mar. p 16 May &5 July 1846. 
2. Stephen's Di , entry for 7 July 1846p written 12 July 1846; Morrellp 
British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell, p. 203. 
3. Stephen to Gladstonep 22 Aug. 181+8. B. M. Add. MS. /+/+367p f. 272; 
Taylor to Speddingp 12 Aug. 181+6.. Taylor Papers, M. S. Eng. letters d. 10# 
f. 164. 
See,, for example., correspondence between Grey and Stephen in AUgust 
1846, Grey Papers) especially Stephen to Grey, 21 Aug. 1846, Grey 
Papers, Stephen. 
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Unfortunately the peace was shattered in October 1847 when Stephen 
, Uook 
1 
il I and was forcecF. to leave the office and ultimately to resign. 
There was no time in the bustle of activity which Grey brought to 
the office to consider further schemes of office re-organisation before 
Stephen withdrew. Grey was certainly interested and in an attempt to 
compensate for the loss of Stephen's services a minor reconstruction was 
2 
attempted in 1847 but two years later the basic structure was still as 3 
it had been before Stephen's departure. Professor J. M. Ward, in his 
article on Stephen's retirementt has shown how Grey's determination to 
retain Stephents services combined with Stephen's wish to continue aiding 
the Colonial Office produced a number of plans between 1847 and 1849 
designed to provide the office with the assistance of an expert consultative 
service - undoubtedly one further attempt to introduce philosophical 4 
goverment into colonial administration. 
Most of these plans originated with suggestions from Stephen. One 
of them., which reached fruition under Grey., has been called by John M. Ward. 
"one of the memorable acts of Grey's public life" - "the temporary revival 
of the work of the board of tradep or Committee Of council for trade and 
1. For these eventst JA Wardy J. M. H., =s, iiit 1959Y pp. 109-205 
is indispensable. 
2. J. M. Ward, J. M. H., =Y iiiy 1959P p. 3-94- The best source for 
Greyls ideas are his Journal for Oct. and Nov. 1847., Grey Papers, 
Journalsp and the Office Minutess, C. O. 878/2o nos- 39-41- See also 
C. O. to Treasuryy 27 Nov. 1847, C-0- 323/232p f. 170. 
3- Committee of Enquiry into the Colonial Offices 15 Dec. 184c), H. C. 
1854s XXVII (1715)s ff. 79-97. 
4. J. M. Wardp J. H. H. 9 =s iiis 1959v pp. 19-39. Taylor said so 
explicitly: Taylor to Grey., 17 Nov. 1847j, Grey Papers, Taylor. 
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1 
plantationst as a high consultative body on colonial policy". Stephen 
performed some useful work on this committee in 1849 but, like all the 
other schemesp it eventually failed. Its failure was partly owing to the 
opposition of the Prime Minister, Lord 
I Russellp and partly because Stephen 
could not be satisfactorily accommodated in it. Grey had no interest in 
2 
any of their plans beyond securing Stephents assistance in his work. 
Nonethelessp Stephen's influence on the Colonial Office did not end 
in 181+7 or even in 18/+9. He had by 1833 evolved a coherent theory on the 
functioning of his office; by 1847 he had been able to test some of his 
theories in practice. He bad not abandoned his early reforming ideas; on 
the contrary his experience convinced him that further reform was still 
necessary. In 18/+9 he was given an opportunity to put his case when the 
government committee of enquiry which was then in process of examining the 3 
whole civil service made its report on the Colonial Office. 
It seems hardly an exaggeration to say that Stephen influenced every 
one of the recommendations in the report of the 1849 commission. Indeed 
the commissioners themselves believed so: 
1. J. M. Ward) J. M. H. # =j, iiiP 1959P P. 197. Stephen's views are set 
out fully in Stephen's memorandum., 12 Oct. 181+9p Grey Papersp Stephen. 
2. T. M. Wardt ibid. j. pp. 
197-205. 
3, - Stephen was approached 
in Jan. 18/+9, - Stephen to Grey., 24 Jan. 1849p 
Grey Papersp Stephen. 
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"in the view we have taken of the defects of the 
existing system of the Colonial Office and of the 
general nature of the measures required to remedy 
themt we have the entire concurrence of Sir James 
Stephen ... 11 1 
Of these recommendations the most important wasthe division of the 
clerical staff into two grades., 'intellectual' and Imechanicall. They 
also recommended an age limit for candidates in the 'intellectual' grade 
(between 20 and 25 years old on first entry)., a system of scrutinising the 
applicants in advance (by an examination to test their learning and abilities) 
and a probationary period on being admitted to the office. They were also 
in favour of making merit as well as seniority the grounds for promotion., 
and they supported the notion that the 'mechanical' grade of clerks should 
consist of copyistsp employed at piece-ratesj, and working under the charge 2 
of the Superintendent of Copyists. Many of these were either ideas which 
Stephen had mooted in 1833 or borrowings from what he had achieved between 
1836 and 18479 
3 
By 1850 most of 
: 
the commission's si4-gestions had been implemented in 
the Colonial Office. But Stephen's final victory was still to come. In 
1853 Stafford Northcote and Charles Trevelyanp the two men principally 
responsible for the departmental commissions of enquiryj were called upon 
1. 'Committee of Jkquiry into the Colonial Office, 15 Dec. 18,49P. H. C. p 18541 XXVII (1715)p f. 86. 
2. Ibid. 9 ff. 79-97. Stephents evidence is not printed. 
3. Pugh, rather grudgingly, alone suggests this: Pugh, C. H. B. E., 
III, p., 717, fn. 1. - 
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to present a general report on the reorganisation of the permanent civil 
service. Their report is now regarded by historians as one of the turning 
I 
points in the history of the civil service: and yet their avowed depen- 
dence on what had already been achieved in some of the more 'Progressive' 
2 
offices is striking. Their dependence on the views and activities of 
James Stephen and the Colonial Office in particular has received too little 
3 
attention. 
Lord GranviUe., defending the Northeote-Treve-lyan report in the House 
of Lords in 1854Y claimed that its recommendations were welcomed by Sir 
4 
James Stephen. Stephen., who in fact had profound reservations about the 
reports insisted upon a retraction and instead was encouraged and given 
the opportunity by Gladstonep then chancellor of the exchequer., to make 
5 
his views public. In 1855 Stephen's letter to Gladstones together with 
E. W. Cohen,, The Growth of the British Civil Service, (London 1941)p 
pp. 87-103. 
2. The Board of Excise and Inland Revenue was specially commendedplReport 
on the Organization of the Permanent Civil Servicd, H. C. 1854p XXXVII 
(1713).. P. 11- 
3- The only comment comes from Professor Hughesp "Civil Service Reforms 
1853-55". Public Administration, =Is 1954s PP- 33-5. Most 
historians have contented themselves with easy censure: e. g. W. L. Bum, 
The Age of ýj3uipoisep(Iiondony 196/+)p pp. 141-2. 
Hansardy P. D. 0 3rd serieso CXXXIj elms. 659,764- Soy in a private lettery had Charles Trevelyan: E. Hughes, "Sir Charles Trevelyan and 
Civil Service Reformp 3.853-5"o English Historical Review, LXIV, p. 219. 
5. Stephen to Gladstonet 13 Apr. 1854, B. M. Add. MS. 44379. 
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those of several other eminent public figures., was published along with 
1 
the report itself. From Stephen's letter it is possible to see both 
why Lord Granville was mistaken and why Stephen objected to being presented 
as a defender of the report. 
On two basic principles Stephen and Northoote and Trevelyan were in 
complete agreement. They felt that the-system of ministerial patronage 
for choosing clerks was the root cause of the defects in the civil service 
and they agreed that the best solution was to adopt some method of prior 
examination for civil service candidates. Their agreement went even 
further. Stephen's belief in a service divided into 'intellectual' and 
Imechanical" gradest adopted in 1849 for the Colonial Officep was now 
given the accolade of recognition by the commissioners asp in their viewt 
of benefit for the whole civil service. Moreovert Stephen's copying 
class was exactly the kind of model which they recommended for the 'mechanical', 
grade. Even down to details, that there ought to be age limits for candid- 
atest for examplep or that promotion by merit ought to be recognisedt they 
were in substantial agreement. These were for Stephen all old causes 
2 
which had already triumphed in the Colonial Office. 
They disagreed, ftmdamentally., on how their reforms were to be 
Tapers Relating to the Re-organisation of the Civil Service') H. C., 
1854-5, XX) 1870. 
2. They are hinted at in the 1832 memorandum and in the letter to 
Taylor on statesmanship: Stephen's memorandum) 30 Mar. 1832, C. O. 
537/22) f. 3 and Stephen to Taylor, 16 Nov. 1835P Stephen Papers. 
See also Pugh., C. H. B. E., IIIP P. 739. 
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effected. The principal recommendations in the Northeote-Trevelyan 
report were the unification of the civil service2 the opening to competitive 
examination of all civil service postst and the reliance entirely on merit 
1 
for promotions in the service. This programme was presented as a panacea 
for all the ills of the service. As Professor Edward Hughes wrote: 
"the impression which the Report conveys is of a 
brilliant airing of pre-conceived ideas which 
might or might not have any relation to the facts". 2 
Stephen's rebuttal of their reco=endations in his letter to Gladstone 
conveys u=istakably the opposite impression., that of ideas deriving from 
a wealth of practical experience and even with something of the cynicism 
which his 35 years in administrative office had given him. 
Stephen's analysis is the more impressive for its moderation. He 
did not deal with recommendations which fell outside his experience) such 
as the advantages of a unified civil service. His attack was on fundamen 
Hb repudiated the suggestion that all civil service posts should be filled 
by open competitive examination since he could not accept the premise on 
which it was based - that the civil service should attract "the most 
promising young men of the day". Stephen asserted categorically that the 
civil service could never do this: its richest prizes were inferior to 
those which the highest talents would desirep being purely financial and 
providing no opportunity for fame or even for independent exertion. What 
For a summary, see R. G. Greavesy The Civil Service in the Changing 
State (Londong 1947), pp. 19-44. 
2* E. Hughes, "Civil Service Reform, 1853-551ty Public Administration, 
=I) 1954P P. 31. 
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the civil service should try to recruit was not "statesman in disguise 
but ... intelligent., steadyp methodical men of business". For this purposey 1 
the most clever candidates were unlikely to be the most suitable. 
Stephen did not reject the idea of central examinations by a scholarly 
and respected independent tribunal. But he confined this to a more 
subordinate rolet that of ensuring that candidates possessed the minimm 
qualifications required for office service. The retention ofsome element 
of patronage, he felty was essential. The idea of a civil service recruited 
entirely on impersonal2 intellectual grounds utterly repelled him. The 
civil servicep like the church or any other organisationý was not simply 
a calculating machine. As an organisation it represented a social unit 
andp like societyp must embrace the mediocre with the intelligent2 the 
dull'with the able. This simple fact also cast doubts on the Northcote- 
Trevelyan faith in merit promotions. But Stephen felt this less of a 
problem since he was convinced that, in practice, no secretary of state 
would ever be able to rely on merit alone. An office in which every 
promotion was to be decided strictly on the grounds of merit was an office 
2 
in a state of anarchy. 
There was a weakness in Stephen's argument. He did not explain how 
Stephen to Gladstonep 12 Apr. 1854Y 'Papers Rolating to the Re-organ- 
isation of the Civil Service', H. C., 1854-5, XXv 1870) Pp. 71-80. 
2. lbid. ý pp. 76-79. 
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his system of reformed or circumscribed patronage was to operate. Any 
candidate, provided he -was qualified., could apply to an office for a 
position. But his request would be decided presumably according to the 
influence which his sponsors had with the minister at the head of the 
office or, at bestp on the reputation which he had gained for himself. 
The range of choice., which was obviously important in improving the quality 
of candidates, and which the Northcote-Trevelyan plan immeasurably widened, 
was left by Stephents suggestions to the discretion of the ministers 
themselves. This seems a rather careless exercise of trust in the 
11unconscientious patrons" whose choice of weak candidates he was implicitly 
deploring. But he may have presented only one side in an effort to 
combat the undoubted authority of the report. Certainly his closing 
remark, that a period of preparation was required to test the political 
effect of ary changesf seems to suggest that he did foresee, the partial 
adoption of the plan to broaden the basis of recruitment by opening more 
positions to public-'examination. 
But the rest of his darts hit the mark. When in 1855 a Civil 
Service Commission was establishedp it followed Stephen's suggestion 
of acting as an examining board to determine whether candidates were 
3 
adequate rather than adopting examination,, as a means of selection. Even 
1. Stephen to Gladstonep 3.1 Ju2y 1855) B. M. Add. MS. 4438/+j f. 115. 
2. Stephen to Gladstonej 12 Apr. 18549 'Paperolp H. C., 1854-5t XXP 1870t 
p. 80. 
3- Cohen) British Civil Service, pp. 110-U9. 
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when open competitive examination was finally instituted and a large 
number of posts were filled in this way Stephents principles of finding 
the men best suited to the jobs and not relying entirely on intelligence 
tests continued as part of the civil service tradition. So also did his 
1 
belief in grading the profession. When these facts are considered can 
it really be doubted that in his work on administrative reform, covering 
at least twenty years, Stephen made one of his greatest contributions as 
2 
an official? 
Herman Finer, The British Civil Service, (London 1937)., pp. 66-9, 
75-80. 
2. Cf. Pughs C. H. D. E. v III, p. 724, who says Stephen's interest "probably 
Jay more in policy itself than in the machinery for putting it into 
effbct". 
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HAPTE R- I-11 
James Stephen and the Administration of Trinidad 
3.63 
By 1813 it was clear that representative institutions would be V 
1\10 
witheld from Trinidad and that the power of the crown to legislate for 
the Island would be preserved and utilised. There were various reasons 
for this decision. Trinidadts free population consisted overwhelmingly 
of free coloureds whereas in the British Ikpire political rights and GLK% 91 
privileges were enjoyed exclusively by whites. The white population of 
Trinidad was also largely foreign$ French or Spanisho whereas in the older 
British possessions British institutions were operated by natural born 
British subjects. But perhaps the most crucial factor was that Trinidad's 
future constitution w in JO . ý, s 
treated as a matter of imperial concern relat n 
I 
to the abolition of the slave trade. The decision to withold represen- 
tative institutions . however,, did not prevent local governors from taking 
it upon themselves to legislate for the colony by proclamation though the 
British government was seldom informed of their legislative activities. 
2 
Legislation was simply divided between the two authorities. 
Despite the continuing respect for local initiative in legislation 
the crown's legislative powers were not left dormant. Mainly through 
pressure from anti-slavery groups in Parliaments the British government 
J. C. Millette, constitutional Development in Trinidad. 1783-1810., 
University of Iondony Ph. D. thesisp 1964: D. J. Murrayp The West IndieOp 
pp. 67-88. 
2. Stephen to Twiss, 19 June 1829, C. O. 295/831 Stephen. 
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began to adopt a more positive policy on the slavery question. This 
was done initially by assisting in the implementation of the Slave Trade 
Abolition Act of 18CY7. By an order in council for Trinidad in 1811 an 
attempt was made to register all slaves on the Island so that illegal 
importations could be discovered. It was hoped that this order might be 
extended eventually to the other crown colonies and also,, by persuading 
the local legislatures to adopt itp to the older plantation colonies. 
The metropolitan interest in the use of the crown's legislative powers 
was also supported by some of the governors in the now colonies. When 
doubtful of their right to legislate on important internal questions., they 
sent drafts of laws to the Colonial Department with a request for them to 
2 
be enacted in Britain by orders in council. 
A governor's proclamation was not officially a legislative act andt 
since the framing of orders in council was outside the counsel's regular 
duties, Stephen was not required initially to deal with Trinidad's 
3 
administration. Though uninvolved professionally., he wasp howevers not 
uninterested. His father had been the principal proponent of tho regis- 
tration scheme and the author of the Trinidad order in council of 1811, 
Murray, The West Indies, pp. 78-9p 93-7. 
2. Stephen to Hortonp 6 Oct. 1825p C. O. 295/68p Stephen. 
3- Stephen to J. G. Stephenp 10 July 1816, Stephen Papersp Journal to 
J. C. S., 1816-1845; Stephen to Horton, 6 Oct. 18251 C. O. 295/68# 
Stephen. 
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and there can be no doubt that Stephen was fully aware of all the details 
1 
of his father's scheme. This special-ised knowledge proved useful when 
the old West Indian colonies began to send home for scrutiniX±m VMve 
registration laws supposedly based on British models. Stephen suggested 
that the legislation should be judged not solely by validity in point of 
law (which was all that the counsel was supposed to consider) but also by 
their conformity in both the spirit and the letter with the registration 
order for Trinidad and with Wilberforce's abortive parliamentary bill on 
2 
the subject of 181/+. When Bathurst accepted this suggestion Stephen 
took full advantage of the opportunity which he had created for himself. 
His reports on the West Indian registration bills judged by the normal 
standards of counsel's reports were, as, he himself confessed, of "unusual 
3 
and .... alarming bulk". They were also of considerable political signifi- 
cance since they enabled the secretary of state to offer direct criticisms 
to the governors on the subject and so ensured that attempts to evade tho 
4 
system of registration by defective legislation would not be successful. 
1. Stephen to J. C. Stephens 19 June 1816p Stephen Paperap INA. 
2. Stephen to Goulburnp 20 May 1817, C. O. 323/40p f. 173; Stephen's 
report, 31 May-1817. C-0.323/40j. f. 175. 
3- Stephen to Bathurst, 6 Oct. 1817, C. O. 323/40, f. 216. 
4. Paul Knaplund, "Sir James Stephen: the Friond of the Negroes", 
Journal of Negro jjkqt=v xxxt 1850, pp. 368-72. 
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A detailed knowledge of the slavery question was one source of 
Stephents professional influence; another was his knowledge of the pre- 
conqýiest Trinidadian legal system. In 1823 when a legal appeal from 
Trinidad was submitted to him for his opinion, Stephen wrote to his 
superior: 
W knowledge of the law of Spain, as-, administered 
in Trinidadt is slight and superficial.. and therefore 
is probably inaccurate". 1 
Unquestionably this was more than merely a reflection of his customary 
modesty since Trinidadto Spanish legal system was notoriously confusing. 
But even a slight and superficial knowledge of the subject was much more 
2 
than any other government legal officer could claim. Stephen was at 
least keen to learn. Within a few years of joining the office he had 
acquired some knowledge of Trinidad case law and over the following two 
decades he made several attempts to increase and deepen this knowledge. 
These professional efforts were soon rewarded. When in the course of 
the 1820s the Colonial Department began to scrutinise the legislative drafts 
and proposals which were sent from Trinidady Stephen was requested to offer 
1. Stephen to Wilmot, 18 Apr. 1823., C. O. 295/61, Stephen. 
2. Stephen to Horton, 6 Oct. 1825) C. O. 295/680 Stephen. Stephen 
asked for specialised aid in 1823p e. g. Stephen to Wilmot, 18 Apr. 
1823, and Stephen to Horton, 17 Dec. 1823P C. O. 295/61p Stephen; but 
in 1824 he wrote the drafts himself., e. g. Stephen to Hortonp 1 Jan. 
1824 and Stephen to Hortonp 16 Jan. 1824p C. O. 295/64P Stephen. 
3. E. g. Stephents report2 C. O. 323/39v f. 175; Stephen to StahleY2 
la May 1833, C. O. 295AOO, Stephen. 
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criticisms and then to undertake the task of preparing and drafting the 
1 
amended legislation. One instance of this work was Stephen's preparation 
of the famous Trinidad order in council on the amelioration of slavery in 
182/+ which sought, basicallyt to provide a model slave code to try to 
2 
improve the treatment of slaves. This was by no means an isolated case. 
From 1823 onwards he drafted orders in council on a great variety of topics 
from rules for civil courts to laws governing the ownership of land by 
3 
aliens. In addition to drafting lawsp Stephenp as his reputation grow, 
was asked to deal with the governors' requests for legal advice and with 
appeal cases arising from colonial litigation. Often these required 
only technical criticisms but on slave amelioration questions Stephen's 
reports were distinctly more political. As with registration legislation 
they involved an attempt both to keep the secretary of state informed on 
whether the policies worked out in Britain were being fully applied in the 
5 
colonies and also to suggest methods of countering attempts at evasion. 
1. E. g. Stephen to Hortont 17 Dec. 1823, C. O. 295/61t Stephen; Stephen 
to Hortonp 1 Jan. 1821+ and 26 Jan. 1824, C. O. 295/64P Stephen. 
2. Draft order in council., 1821+, C. O. 295/64p Stephen. 
3. E. g. Stephen to Horton, 6 Jan. 1825, C. O. 295/68s Stephen; Stephen 
to Horton, 16 Jan. 1824p C. O. 295/64p Stephen. 
4. E. g. Stephen to Wilmot., 18 Apr. 1823, C. O. 295/61p Stephen. 
5. Draft order in council 1824f C. O. 295/64P Stephen; Stephen to 
Horton, 7 Dec. 1825, C. O. 295/68p Stephen; Stephen to Hortonp 
5 Oct. 1826, C. O. 295/73, Stephen; Stephen's memorandum, 28 Jan. 
1831, Grey Paperst Slavery; Stephen's reporto 30 Aug. 1830, C. O. 3231 
47, f. io6. 
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The political bias in Stephen's reports on slavery is striking. 
On judicial appeal cases arising from slavery registration or amelioration 
legislation he acted consistently as a defender of the rights and interests 
of the slave rather than as an impartial judges. He even confessed on one 
occasion that he was forced to use I'legai subtlety" in his review but 
this was necessary "to reach substantial justice" to the slave concerned. 
Where even legal subtlety failed he would go further. In cases of disputed 
ownership of slaves he persuaded the secretary of state to get the British 
goverment to purchase the slave's freedom in return for a promise to end 
2 
the litigation. The welfare of the slave was often his chief concern 
even when the subject at issue was not directly connected with slavery. 
In 1830, while reviewing sympathetically a proposed alteration in the law 
on property inheritancehe commented: 
"an argument which weighs greatly with me is the 
discouragement which the existing rule of law 
opposes to testamentary manumissions". 3 
So successful was his work in virtually making legal review part of the 
anti-slavery campaigi; in facti that the supporters of the movement in 
Britain came to judge its progress by its capacity to secure acceptable 
1. Stephen to Howick2 6 Dec. 1830P C. O. 295/86, Stephen. 
2. Stephen to Howick, 15 Jan. 1831 and Stephen to Taylor.. /+ Mar* 1831y 
C. O. 295/90., Stephen. 
3- Stephen to Twiss, 26 Oct. 1830, C. O. 295/86, Stephen. For other 
examples of aiding the slaves see Stephen to Twissp 17 Oct. 1828p 
C. O. 295/79p Stephen; Stephen to Twiss, 24 Feb. 1830P Stephený*, -11', 
194ý 
Stephen to Howick, 21 Mar. 1831) C. O. 295/90, Stephen; and Stephen 
report) 4 Dec. 1832, C. O. 323/1+8y f. 329- 
1 
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legislation in the West Indies. For Stephen his work on the slavery 
question was a labour of love. He felt he 
2 
was carrying forward the 
family campaign which his father had begun. 
Stephents contribution to the final achievement of slavery emancipation 
and his authorship of the emancipation bill hom been examined many times 
by historians buts in general) they have concentrated too exclusively on 
3 
the last phase of the movement when he was less influential. A study 
of his administrative views on Trinidad would show that emancipation was 
merely the culmination of almost twenty yearsof work on behalf of the 
slaves. This work was quite exceptional for a counsel being both prodigious 
in amount and extremely complex and minute in detail. Even before his 
appointment as permanent counsel in 1825 Stephen had undertaken the most 
elaborate and painstaking criticism of the provisions of Trinidad's plan 
4 
for slave amelioration. In 1831 on the same subject he was writing a 
report of weU over a hundred pages to brief Lord Howick,, the-incoming 
5 
under-secretaryo on the subject. These two qualitiess the prodigious 
1. Murray, The Vest Indies., p, 187. 
2. Stephen to J. C. Stepheny 12 June 1816p Stephen Papers# Journal to 
J. C. S., 1816-45. 
3. W. L. Burnp Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies 
(London, i9_37T PP. 114-132.. 137-9; I-LT. Manningp tColonial Crises 
before the Cabinetp 1829-18351P Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research, =I 1957p pp. 41-61. 
Stephen's report 1824, C. O. 295/64) Stephen. 
Stephents memorandum., 28 Jan. 1831) Grey Papers., Slavery. 
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labour and the technical expertise, which account for his rise in the 
office, also explain his influence over policy. His influence when combined 
with his persistent vigilance as the self-appointed protector of the rights 
of the slaves must be considered an important factor in any full account 
of the achievement of slavery emancipation in Britain. 
The appointment of a professional legal commission of investigation 
for the West Indies in 1822 temporarily affected Stephen's position as 
legal expert since all important legal disputes which arose were referred 
to them. He found compensation in another direction. Beginning in 
the early 1820s and consistently from 1825 Stephen showed a willingness. 
to review not only the legislation of the older colonies but also that of 
2 
the conquered colonies including Trinidad. There were obvious objections 
to dealing with questions "in point of law" when the legislature itself 
rested on dubious constitutional grounds but Stephen was not prepared to 
3 
let these stand in his way. On the contrarys he asked his superiors to 
demand that all colonial legislation from whatever source should be 
formally forwarded to the office for review. All such legislation should 
For the origins of the co=ission see Murray, The West Indies., 
PP. 104-5. For its effect on Trinidad see e. g. Stephen to Bathursty 
22 Sept. 1825ý C. O. 295/68p Stephen. 
2. Stephen's reports 1823t C. O. 323A22 f. 306; Stephen to Bathurstp 
22 Sept. 18252 C. O. 295/68s Stephen. 
11) 
1) 
3- Stephen to Twissy 19 June 1829, C. O. 295/83, Stephen. 
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have one uniform format (for Trinidadp he suggested that the title of 
"ordinance" should be used) and it should be stated whether the act was 
passed with or without the advice of the governor's advisory council - 
"a distinction of essential importancef and 
which, I conceivef ought always to be made". 1 
The adoption of Stephen's suggestion marks an important stage in 
the history of the crown colony system. By utilising the same procedure 
for dealing with crown colorq legislation as had been adopted for the 
colonies with representative institutions. the local legislature of 
governor and council was strengthened, the governor was discouraged from 
acting autocratically and it was officially recognised that the initiative 
in colonial legislation would come from the colony. The Colonial Depart- 
ment's administrative efficiency was improved also by being provided with a 
fu3_1er knowledge of colonial conditions. Above a3.12 the role and influence 
of the legal counsel was considerably extended. Since Stephen's reviews 
of crown colony legislation were not submitted to the cumbersome formalities 
of a secondary review at the Board of Trade., he was able to dispense with 
customary procedure andto write informal criticisms for the secretaries of 
state2 often of a non-legal naturep which frequently served as the basis 
2 
of reply dispatches to the governor concerned. 
The submission of crown colony legislation to review by the Colonial 
1. Stephen to Horton., 6 Oct. 1825s C. O. 295/68., Stephen. 
2. HM to Glenelgs 23 Aug. 1838s Stephen's minutep 8 Oct. 1828j 
C. O. 295/121, Stephen. 
I 
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Department was one part of a general scheme to render the colonial 
executive answerable to the secretary of state and to ensure that the 
government was kept well enough informed to be able to exercise efficiently 
1 
its administrative functions. Nonethelesst as it is quite clear in the 
case of Trinidadp Stephen did not believe in using metropolitan powers to 
dictate day-to-day colonial policies. He believed that in a remote colony 
governed by foreign laws., like Trin1dad, the British goverment was 
"unavoidably incompetent" to appreciate or to remedy local grievances 
2 
unaided. In general, he was convinced; 
"with a view to the real efficacy of a colonial 
law, the best method is to leave the framing it 
to the public officers in the colony, except in 
cases when the influence of local prejudices may 
be expected to operate too strongly". 
This procedure utilised local information, which was bound to be more 
accurate., and enlisted the self-love of colonial authorities in ensuring 
that the law was skilful. 1y prepared before its submission to the Colonial 
3 
Department. It also provided an opportunity for local opinion to make 
4 
itself known before a final decision on the act was pronounced. 
Though he supported local legislative initiatives even in crown 
1. Murray.. The West Indiesy pp. 150-4. For a Trinidad case see e. g. 
Stephen to Hortont 19 July 1826, C. O. 295/733 Stephen. 
2. Stephen to Hortont 6 Oct. 18252 C. O. 295/68, Stephen. 
3- Stephen to Twisst 8 Apr. 1829t C. O. 295/83t Stephen. 
4- Stephen to Twiss., 26 Oct. 1830t C. O. 295/86, Stephen. 
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colonieso Stephen initially always excepted cases where local prejudices 
had to be counteracted. Slavery was one such question and the rights and 
duties of free coloured citizens was another. The free coloured population 
of Trinidad was unusually large. In 1828 the Islandis population consisted 
1 
of 16,1+12 free colouredsý onlY 4P326 whites, and 22.. 436 slaves. The 
free coloureds were not only numerous but a section of them at least was 
organised and vocal. Under Spanish law free coloured citizens had enjoyed 
extensive civil rights butlafter the British conquestp the local governors 
had begun to discrimimte against them and their complaints ultimately 
2 
reached the Colonial Department. There they fell on attentive ears. As 
with slave questions Stephen was more of an advocate than a judge when 
dealing with questions involving the free coloured inhabitants and he 
sought eagerly to protect their social., economic and political welfare. 
All attempts at discrimination on the grounds of colour were attacked. 
Stepping outside his briefp Stephen aTgued that the civil rights of free 
coloured peoples must depend not on law alone but on "the wider basis of 
justice, national faith and sound policy". Even discrimination which 
benefitted the coloured man (such as cheaper medical care) was objectionable$ 
since it implied legal inferiority. Officially sponsored segregationp such 
3 
as separate seating arrangements in church, he strenuously opposed. 
1. L. M. Fraserp History of Trinidad., 11, p. 211. 
2. Gertrude Carmichaely The History of the West Indian Islands of Trinidad 
and Tobago, 1498-1900, pp. 82-85. 
3- Stephen to Horton2 27 Sept. 1825) C. O. 295/69, Stephen; Stephen to 
Hay, 15 -Tan. 1829, C. O. 295/83, Stephen. 
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There was also a positive side to Stephen's advocacy of the rights 
of the free coloured population. During the years between 1830 and 1833P 
when the structure of goverment and the Judicial system in Trinidad was 
liberalized, Stephen insisted that the free coloured citizens should be2 
admitted to all the new franchises and be eligible for all civil and 
judicial offices. The British governmentp he felt, should aim at "throwing 
open the door indifferently to all classes" so that: 
"that which is most nimerous and best'affectedo 
name3, y the free coloured peoplep will acquire a 
preponderating influence in the administration 
of justicep and the cabals of the cabildo Zthe 
planter-dominated municipal council in Fort-of- 
Spai2n will be effectually broken down". 1 
These views were written into the legislation of Trinidad and it is in no 
small measure owing to Stephen that the slaves on emancipation entered 
into the full enjoyment.. at least in so far as laws alone could secure them, 
2 
of the civil rights of free citizens. 
His concern for the welfare of tho free coloured population may also 
have been the reason for Stephen's active interest in the question of land 
legislation. Under Spanish rule.. land grants had been made to both white 
and colouredfree settlers; but successive British governors in their attempts 
to reward supporters or to raise a revenue began to inquire into land titles 
and to impose a quit rent on landed property. Since few of the pre-conquest 
settlers could produce a valid title to their lands they were considerably 
1. Stephen to Howick, 25 Aug. 1832, C. O. 295/93., Stephen. 
2. C. H. Wesley, "The Emancipation of the Free Coloured Population in the British Empirelly journal of Negro History., 193/+g xixy pp. 137-70. 
1 
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embarrassed by this action. When their protests were submitted to 
Stephen, he decided that they had a good case; but the secretary of state 
preferred to refer the question to the West Indian legal commission of 
1822. This seemed likely to involve an indefinite postponement since 
neither the governor nor the secretary of state was disposed to raise the 
subject again. Stephen insisted that they must do so. In 1829.. relying 
on the evidence adduced by the legal commissiony he finally convinced his 
2 
superiors to allow the claimants to secure title to their p roperties. 
Stephen's determination to become a friend of the West Indian Negro 
is indisputabley but his success is more difficult to gmige. Henry Taylor 
maintained that Stephen's liberal policies towards the free coloured 
population were partly in conflict with his liberal constitutional policies 
3 
towards the white settlers. This is a rather harsh verdict. Certainly 
Stephen would have no more truck with the notion of a Covernor ruling as 
4 
an autocrat than with the total direction of administration from Britain. 
In his early years as counsel. he believedv constitutionally., in a system 
1. Stephen to Twiss, 8 Apr. 1829, C. O. 295/83, Stephen. 
2. Stephen to Bathurst, 22 Sept. 1825t C. O. 295/68, Stephen; Stephen to 
Bathurstp 2 Sept. 1826, C. O. 295/739 Stephen; Stephen's reports 4 July 
1827s C-0 . 323/44p f. 201; Stephen to Twissp 8 Apr. 18299 C. O. 295/83P Stephen. 
3. Murray., The West Indiesp pp. 170s 173-4t 176. 
4- Stephen to Twiss, 19 June 1829p C. O. 295183, Stephen. 
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of checks and balances. The executive., for examplep should not be 
1 
allowed to encroach on the sphere of the judiciary nor vice versa,. 
Eaua 
, --l: 
Ly, the governor's legislative powers should be exercised only through 
a local body in which local interests were representedeven if not dominantp 
since this alone could allow for popular criticism to be brought to bear on 
2 
the colonial government. Wher4in 1831,, after years of pleading on his 
part, a-definite constitution was created for Trinidadqthe appointment of 
a legislative council consisting of six official and six unofficial repres- 
entativest chosen by the governor from among4t the local proprietors, went 
3 
some way to meet Stephen's ideas. 
From the point of view of a free coloured citizen, there were obvious 
objections to creating a council so unrepresentative of the majority of 
the people. But Stephen arguedp with some justicep that the concession 
gave no extra power to the local legislature and did not prevent the 
reservation of certain subjects, to the crown nor destroy the power of 
4 
legal review. In other words, though direct representation of the 
E. g. Stephen to Bathurst, 7 Oct. 1826, C. O. 295/73., Stephen; 
Stephen to Horton, 12 July 1827, C. O. 295/76, Stephen; Stephen to 
Twiss, 19 June 1829, C. O. 295/83, Stephen; Stephen to Lefevre, 
12 Dec. 1833P C. O. 295AOO, Stephen. 
2. E. g. Stephen to Horton) 12 July 18Z7, C. O. 295/76, Stephen; Stephen 
to Twiss.. 19 June 1829# C. O. 295/83., Stephen; Stephen to Twissi 
26 Oct. 1830, C. O. 295/86j Stephen. 
3. H. Craig, The Legislative Council of Trinidad and TobapO (London., 1952)) 
pp. 17-22; Murrayy The West Indiesp pp. 160-4; 3-69- 
4. Stephen's reportv 1 Ju3y 1830, C. O. 323/47v f. 102. 
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majority was postponedp the Colonial Office would continue to exercise 
its powers to prevent the colonial minority from abusing their control. 
Stephen can have had no illusion about Trinidad's "Popular voice" since 
he himself had been the butt of the furious attacks of the planterst agent.. 
1 
Joseph Marryatt. But he tried to be realistic. "Trinidad is almost 
exclusively owned by British merchants and planters"y he reminded his 
superiors on one occasion. Even when the governor was at one with the 
local oligarchy) a legislative council might still act at times as a forum 
for the expression of the discontent of the leading settlers with the local 
2 
government. 
Even before the creation of a new constitution in 1831, Stephen had 
often demonstrated his conviction that the British government should not 
allow its liberalism to blind it to local popular prejudices. This was 
exemplified in the debate over the introduction of English law which the 
legal commission of 1822 attempbed to settle. Stephen refused to allow 
the governing clique to alter the system in their own interests. Spanish 
laws and institutions which had stood the test of time and proved their 
usefulness for the average citizen were not to be overthrown because of 
the protests of English cabals. What was required in his opinion was the 
gradual assimilation of Trinidad's legal system to that of the Mother 
1. Stephen to Goulburnp 20 May 1817., C. O. 323AO. - f. -173. 
2. Stephen to Twiss, 26 Oct. 1830P C. O. 295/86, Stephen. 
1ý 11 -, 
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Country but only after consultation with the local official authorities. 
His persistence had its customary reward. In 1831 when legal reforms 
were introduced following the Commissioners"Report., Stephents opinion 
was represented in the new laws. No rapid overthrow of the existing legal 
institutions was planned but a framework was to be provided to allow the 
local government to undertake the transition from the Spanish to the 
2 
English system. 
During his years as counsel before 1836 Stephen had utilised to the 
full the potentialities for legal reviewing which the crown cololly system 
presented in Trinidad. He had increased his functions., provided indispen- 
sable specialised aid for his superiors and brought his opinions to bear 
on the Island's administrative problems. He had also simultaneously 
-the cause he supported. In doing so he had advanced his career and',. 
basically altered the entire function of a legal reviewer and had gone a,. 
considerable way to making the quality of local legislation theaccepted 
criterion in Britain for judging the success or failure of colonial policy. 
When Glenelg succeeded to the secretaryship of state in 1835 Trinidad's 
administrative problems were becoming acute. The slaves had been freed 
but freedom had been accompanied by Lord Stanley's scheme of apprenticeship 
1. Stephen to Wilmot., 18 Apr. 1823, C. O. 295/61, Stephen; Stephen to 
Horton, 1 July 1825, C. O. 295/68, Stephen; Stephen's memorandum on 
property inheritance n. d. (1825). C. O. 295/68.. Stephen; Stephen to 
Twiss, 19 June 1829., C. O. 295/83) Stephen; Stephen to Twissp 26 Oct. 
1830) C. O. 295/86, Stephen. 
2. Murray., The West_Indies, pp. 161-73. 
179 
which tied the former slaves to their plantations for periods of four to 
six years and so virtually postponed the final day of emancipation. When 
that day finally came the ex-slaveswould possess; the right to decide 
whether or not to continue to work on the plantations. Trinidad was amply 
supplied with fertile and uncultivated land which might provide them with 
an alternative means of subsistence. The government had to decide whether 
it was prepared to influence the ex-slavets choice by placing restrictions 
on land ownership or by providing legal guarantees for employers who wished 
to bind their employees to contracts. Ptephen was well aware of the 
intricacies of this problem. When hej Howick and Taylor had planned 
2 
their emancipation scheme., they had discussed the question fully. 
Their agreed solution had been the adoption of a land tax on cultivated 
land so as to maintain the size of the labour force on the plantations. 
Of the three Stephen was the least enthusiastic about the scheme. He 
was uncertain that society as a whole would suffer from the slave's' depar- 
ture from the plantations but quite sure that artificial restrictions on 
land ownership would be extremely unpopular with the ex-slaves whose welfare 
they were attempting to advance. He predicted that after emancipation 
there would be no great dispersal of settlement. A movement of ex-slaves 
1. The question is well presented by Burnley. See W. H. Burnleyp 
Observations on the Present Condition of the Island of Trinidad and 
the Actual State of the Experiment of-Negro Emanci]2ation (Londonp 1842). 
2. Memoranda by Stephen, Taylor and Howickt July 1832, Grey Papers, 
Slavery. 
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into the towns and into small farming was likely so that markets and 
towns would flourish. In view of this, land taxes) he feared) would 
simply lead to squatting. But this was a purely technical objection. 
In general Stephen approved of the attempt to safeguard the interests of 
1 
the proprietors. Since Howickts plan encountered Opposition in the 
colonies, however, it was never implemented and the question remained 
2 
for Glenelg to tackle. 
In addition to the problem of the future of the freed slaves, Glenelg 
had to decide what action to take on the Trinidad immigration schemes 
which were designed for the importation of free labourers. Labour immi- 
gration was, of course) no new project in Trinidadp but the attempt after 
1833 to recruit labourers to replace slaves on the sugar plantations 
obviously required regulation and imposed special p;! oblems which demanded 
the governmentIs attention. Being a labour problem, immigration was 
connected with the problem of apprenticeship since one major difficulty in 
regard to both was the settlement of the terms for contracts between 
3 
employers and employees. 
Glenelg's third concern uas the constitutional problem. He had 
to take a decision on the colonial suggestions for changing the composition 
1. Stephents memorandum, 6 -TulY 1832j, Grey Papersp Slavery. 
2. Murray, The West Indies, pp. 196-7. 
3- K. O. L aurence, "The Evolution of Long-Term Labour Contracts in 
Trinidad and British Guianap 183/, -1963"o Jamaican Historical Reviewy 
Vy 1,1965, pp. 9-2.1. 
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of the legislature and the Judiciary and for introducing English 3. aw.: Ln 
order to liberalise the local constitution. In Stephen he was supplied 
with an expert assistant whose work on these problems had made him an 
undoubted authority by 1836. Stephen had originally discussed the possi- 
bility of liberalising the constitution of Trinidad with Howick in 18.32* 
Together they had persuaded Goderichy their secretary of statey to promise 
the settlers a greater share in their internal government once slavery had 
1 
been extinguished. The institution of apprenticeshiPp however., led to 
a further delay and suggested a new consideration. Representative 
goverment, in Stephenýs opinions could only work if the different classes 
in society could defend their own interests. In Trinidad the non-white 
classes had not been allowed to acquire political strength or maturity and 
P- 
they could not therefore be safely entrusted with representative institutions. 
Glenelg was2 as secretary of state.. a politician as well as a statesman2 and 
he had to consider political as well as legal or administrative criteria. But 
the adoption of Stephen's procedural reforms on the handling of departmental 
correspondence in 1836 ensured that whatever his ultimate decision he was 
obliged to listen to the advice of his permanent under-secretary on all 
these pressing topics. 
At the beginning of 1835 the British goverment decided to control 
Stephen to Howickp 26 Jan. 1832v Grey Paperap Stephen; Murray, The 
West Indies., pp. 206-7. 
2. Murray., ibid., pp. 211+-6. 
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and regulate one aspect of immigration - the removal to Trinidad of the 
so-called Liberated Africans., the Negroes who had been released from 
captured slave vessels and liberated at the Ilixed Commission Court in 
1 
Cuba. This immigration also attracted the attention of the Trinidad 
government which produced an ordinance to regulate the conduct of the now 
immigrants as a labour force. A three year indenture was to be imposed 
2 
under the supervision of the local executive. The Trinidad ordinance was 
duly submitted to the legal counsel. Stephen's advice to his superior on 
the subject was rather subtle. He offered no objection to indentures, even 
those as long as three years) but this was not because he felt himself 
on the side of the employer. On the contraryx he judged the law from the 
point of view of its effect on the labourer. A contract of three years 
seemed to Stephen long enough to make the employer value his labourer and 
short enough to ensure that the labourer would be conciliated. He found 
cause to object only in the inadequate supervision and the indefinite 
nature of the contracts. Stephen insisted that the stipendiary magistrates 
who had been appointed, to supervise the apprentices should also be respon- 
sible for the indentured labourers and that the rations and pay of inden- 
3 
tured labourers and apprenticed Africans should be the same. 
1. Foreign Office to H. M. Co=issioner in Havana) 31 Jan. 1835., C-0- 
295/109, Printed Paper no. 1. 
2. Hill to Aberdeen, 3 Mar. 1835y C. O. 295/lo6. 
3- Stephents report, 18 MaY 1835Y C. O. 323/512 f. 237. 
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These amendments were endorsed by Glenelg and imposed by order-in- 
I 
council on Trinidad. Their significance can hardly be overrated. 
Unobtrusively, the British government was making itself responsible for 
the welfare of immigrant labourers whom, it felt., could not adequately 
protect their own interests in a free labour market. As with slavery 
questions, Stephen dealt with immigration as; a partisan,, as the special 
guardian of the rights of the weaker element in society. The welfare of 
the African immigrants., he insisted., must be the special concern of the 
British government. The governor alone should have the right to choose 
which employers would receive immigrants and he would select according to 
three main criteria; the facilities for religious instruction which the 
prospective employer could offer the immigrant, the provisions for the 
labourer's bodily health and the opportunities which the employer could 
present for the immigrant to learn a trade which would be useful when his 
2 
indenture expired. 
Despite his own exacting standards., Stephen was not disposed to 
frustrate the planters' efforts in the interest of expediency. When the 
Trinidad goverment suggested the adoption of a bounty system to attract 
female immigrants,, James Speddings the Colonial Office clerk,, wished to 
veto their proposal. He felt the project was unlikely to succeed in 
1. Order in councilp 15 July 1835P C. O. 295AO9, printed paper no- 3- 
2. Stephen's draft replyp 15 July 1835pafter Hill to Aberdeenp 13 May 1835, 
C. O. 295/106. 
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making up the numerical deficiency of females in the Island and, in any 
casey such immigration m, it did attract would find service with the big 
plantations exclusively. Stephen did not feel this an adequate reason 
for using the veto. "It is on bastard rather than on legitimate virtue 
that almost every social interest is promoted". he reminded Spedding. Any 
attempt to make society more stable) more domestic and more moral by 
introducing female immigrants was at least worth trying whoever benefitted 
financially by it. 
Stephen also supportedthe planters' attempts to recruit labourers 
for Trinidad among the older West Indian islands where sugar cultivation 
was declining and wages-. were low: 
IfIt is absurd for the planters of Dominica to maintain 
that their black neighbours must stay to partake of their 
own poverty when high wages and increased comforts invite 
them to Trinidad". 
But he again insisted that this migration should be regulated by the 
British government. Since the newly freed Negroes were still unaccustomed 
to a free labour markety it was essential to limit their absolute freedom 
of choice by imposing contract regulations on them such as had been adopted 
for the Liberated Africans. This would ensure that the terms of work 
were fair and that the labourer would have-: th3 right to return home if he 
so chose. He recormended the extension to Trinidad of rnorder in council 
worked out for British Guiana which limited contracts to three years terms 
Hill to Glenelg, 17 Sept. 1836, Stephents minute 8 Apr. 1837 on 
Spedding's memorandum, 21 Feb. 1837, C. O. 295/112. 
1 
and supplied the safeguards which he thought desirable. 
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Though willing to allow the migration of Negroes between the West 
Indian coloniesp the Colonial Office consistently refused to allow the 
direct immigration of Negroes from Africa. Such a migration, it was 
feltp would resemble the slave trade in the eyes of other countties too 
2 
much to be tolerated. BY 1837 Stephen had a further objection. Though 
3 
he had considered the abolition of slavery a Christian duty, though he 
4 
had looked tolerantly on the Negro state in Haitip he was not willing 
after 1833 to start on his troubles again. If any bounty money was 
available for emigrationp he felt., it would be best to offer it in Europe 
not -Africa: 
"The less we people the Western hemisphere with 
Africans or their descendents the better. I 
cannot doubt that of all the members of the human 
family they are the least calculated to advance 
the great ultimate objects of civilization. 
Beyond doubt they are the worst adapted to 
algamate with the natives of Europe into one 
homogeneous societyn. 
Hill to Glenelg) 17 Sept. 1836, minutes and memoranda by Stephen, 
8 Feb. 3.837,19 Feb. 1837t 8 Apr. 1837; and by Spodding, 21 Feb. 1837., 
24 Apr. 1837, C. O. 295/U2. The limit was reduced to one year if the 
contract was made outside the colorjy in which the work was to be 
performed. In 1838 this was amended and all contracts were to be 
made in the colony. Laurence., Jamaican Historical Review, Vp ip 
19 65, p. 11 . 
2. Hill to Aberdeen, 3 Mar. 1835., minutes by Taylor and Greyp C. O. 295/106. 
3- Stephen to Taylor) 29 June 18Z7, Bod. MS. Eng. letters c3t f. 84- 
4. Stephen's memorandum, 6 July 1832p Grey Paperso Slavery. 
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Maltesey he advised) not Africans would make the better immigrants for 
Trinidad. 
This opinion exhibits an awareness of racial differences and an 
assumption of white superiority to the Negro which was perhaps a deep 
undercurrent in Stephen's humanitarian conscience. This is not altogether 
surprising. The concept of race was everywhere assuming greater importance 
2 
in Bý? itish thought at this time. Normally with Stephen it remained well 
below the surface; but undoubtedly his motivation in struggling for the 
recognition of the Negro's rights as a man stemmed paradoxically from this 
feeling of white superiority. It was not justice for the Negro that 
3 
Stephen asked but "an enlightened and liberal policy" towards him. it 
was not a, true appreciation of Negro society that he felt the British 
4 
government should show but merely tolerance and sympathy. Where the Negro 
was the predominant element in a white-dominated society these distinctions 
became blurredp but the idea of creating a new African diaspora brought it 
into sharp focus. Stephen's alternative, suggestion of Maltese emigration.. 
howeverp proved quite impractical and the notion of further non-white 
1. Hill to Glenelgj 17 Sept. 1836p Stephen's minute 8, Apr. 1837 on 
Spedding's memorandum 21 Feb. 1837, C. O. 295/112. 
2. Philip Curtin2 The Image of Africa (Madison, Wisconsin, 1964)2 
pp. 289-478. 
3. HiU'to Glenelg, 9 Dec. 1836, Stephen's minute 27 Jan. 1837p C. O. - 295/112. 
4-- Hill to Glenelgo 12 Jan. 1838, Stephen's minute 28 Feb. 1838p C. O., 
295/120. 
1 
i=igration had still to be faced. 
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Stephen's concern for the immigrant was matched by his solicitude for 
the welfare of the apprentice. To him apprenticeship so closely resembled 
2 
slavery that the legal distinction seemed immaterial. While apprentice- 
3 
ship lasted he felt it impossible to slacken his customary vigilance. He 
searched out and stopped all attempts to entrench the legal distinctions 
of slaveryp insisting that legal inequality should not outlast the period 
4 
of apprenticeship. Equally.. he insistedp the planterss who were the 
main beneficiaries of the apprenticeship systemp ought to be 2iable to the 
same taxation burdens which they had borne during the slavery era. This 
was an extremely unpopular doctrine with the Island's plantocracy but 
5 
Stephen convinced Glenelg to implement it. 
Hiil to Glenelgp 17 Sept. 1836, Greyýs minixLe 7 Dec. 1837 on Spedding's 
draft,, 27 Apr. 1837j, C. O. 295/U2. 
2. Stephen's report 17 Apr. 1835,, C-0- 323/51p f. 233; Hill to S. of S.., 
26 Jan. 18352 & draft reply, C. O. 295/106. 
3- E. g. Hill to Glenelgp 7 Fob. 1836, minutes, C. O. 295/110; Hin to 
Glenelgp 9 Apr. 1836p draft replyp C. O. 295/110; HM to Glenelgp 
20 Nov. 1836, minutesp C. O. 295/112. 
E. g. Stephen's report 17 Slýpt- 1835, C-0,323151.. f. 233; Hill to 
Glenelg., 25 Ju: Ly 1837., minutes., C. 0 . 295/ý-15; Hill to Glenelg,, 17 Sept. 1836, Stephen's report 8 Feb. 1837, C-O-ý295/112. 
5. Hill to Aberdeeny 21 May 1835P Stephen's minute 9 July 1835. - C. O. 295/106; Burnley to Glenelgp 26 Dec. 1835-, C. O. 295/109; Hill to 
Glenelg, 9 Jg. na 1836, no. 77t minutes, C. O. 295/111; Burnley to 
Glenelg, 5 Dec. 1836, minutes, C. O. 295/113. 
188 
The defence of the rights of apprentices and the attempt to safeguard 
their future civil rights was Stephen's min contribution to the working 
of the apprenticeship system in Trinidad. There is evidenceý howevero 
that he distrusted the whole notion of an apprenticeship for freedom and 
certainly he frequently carried his defence of apprentices' rights further 
than his official colleagues thought desirable. In 1836, for eimmpleo he 
took exception to an attempt by the Trinidad executive to improve the 
abysmal state of communications on the Island. By passing a capitation 
road tax they had hoped to compel all those inhabitants who were unwilling 
or unable to pay., to labour on the construction of roads in their free time. 
Henry Taylor thought this an admirable scheme which would allow the state 
to impress the virtues of labour upon the mind of the Negro. Stephen 
disagreed. The taxo he pointed out# rested on the traditional assumption 
that the Negro was a naturally idle person who must be compelled to UDrk 
in his own interests - an assumption which could be made to justify slavery. 
If limited to the period of apprenticeship, the proposed tax could be 
allowed but it could hardly be justified: 
"Compulsory industry is a contradiction in termso for 
industry is a virtue and it is of the essence of a 
virtue to be voluntary. We shall. never improve the 
moral character of the negroes by compelling them to 
work for the tax gatherer". 
Taylorts opinion was overruled in favour of Stephen's. 
Hill to Glenelg, 26 July 1837f Stephen's minutes 29 Sept. 1837j, 
10 Oct. 1837, Taylor minute /+ Oct. 1837., Grey's minute 11 Oct. 
1837.. & draft order in councilp C. O. 295/115. 
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In 1838 the British government decided to try to end the apprenticeship 
system prematurely on August l., 1838., although it had been previously 
determined that predial labourers would continue as apprentices until 
1840. Since legislation on the subject was to be adopted by the local 
colonial legislatures, the government had to work by persuasion even in 
the crown colonies like Trinidad. This proved no simple task. The 
Trinidad planters who had seen their free labourers drift away to establish 
small-holdings for themselves were resolved to stand by their promised 
2 
rights to their two further years of compulsory labour. 
The termination of apprenticeship had been decided upon in parliament 
3 
and thereafter parliament maintained a watch on the local proceedings. 
As a result most of the important minuting in the Colonial Department was 
4 
left to the parliamentary under-secretarys Sir George Grey. But Stephen 
could not resist the chance to intervene when the Trinidad planters in the 
local council proved intransigent. He agreed that the government, was 
pledged to a two-year extension but the fact that the older colonies had 
1. W. L. Burn, Emancipation and Apprenticeship, pp. 333-361. 
2. Hill to Glenelg, 2 Feb. 18382 No. 17, C. O. 295/120; Hill to Glenelgj. 
27 Feb. 1838., No. 21., minutes, C. O. 295/120j, Hill to Glenelg., 17 Mar. 
1838, C. O. 295/120; Hill to Glenelg, 21 Apr. 1838,, C. O. 295/120. 
3. C. H. B. E., vol. iit PP. 332-3. 
4. Hill to CELenelg, 2 Fob. 1838, No. 170 Stephen's minute 16 Mar. 1838p 
C. O. 295/120; Hill to Glenelg., 12 &q 18382 No- 48, minutes) C. O. 
295/121. 
190 
decided to abolish apprenticeship)made it impracticable for the government 
to maintain its pledge. He advised that the planters should be warned of 
the consequences of their intransigence: 
"The ZT-rinidad7 council must not indulge the expectation 
that their refusal to adopt this measure would really 
prevent the adoption of ity although it may deprive them 
of the opportunity of conciliating the gratitude and 
goodwill of the labouring population". 1 
This was too strong language for Grey's tastes and he removed the threat 
2 
in sending his rep2y. Glenelg's thinkingý howevery was obviously closer- 
to Stephen. At the beginning of September, 1838, still- under the impression 
that the Trinidad council would reject the suggestion to terminate appren- 
ticeship., Glenelg and Stephen prepared an order in council to impose the 
3 
measure, cathe Island. Fortunately., the Trinidad council had already 
given way. In July 1838p some of the leading supporters of continued 
apprenticeship fled the Island and the governor was able to get the measure 
through the council. With an appropriate flourish which must have pleased 
Stephent the amendment was finally proposed by one Dr. Philip) the first 
45 
coloured man on the council. The draft order was withdrawn and tempers 
subsided in the Colonial Office when the news arrived. 
1. Hill to Glenelgo 5 June 1838, No. 59.. minutes, C. O., 295/121. 
2. Hill to Glenelgp 5 June 18A No. 59, Stephen's minute, 17 July 1838 
& Greyts draftp 30 July 18A c. o. 295/121. 
3. Hill to Glenelg.. 21 July 1838, No. ? 9p minutesp C. O. 295/121; Stephen's 
draft order in c ouncilp 12 Sept. 1838, Council, C. O. 295/123. 
Hill to Glenelg, 22. July 1838, Private, c. o. 295/121. 
5. Hill to Glenelg, 21 July 1838j No. 79) Grey's minute) 13 Sept. 1838y 
C. O. 295/121. 
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Having terminated apprenticeship for former slavesp the Colonial 
Office again had to consider the relation between labourer and employer 
in a free society. For Trinidad they were immediately given the assistance 
of local ordinanceadefining the mutual rights and responsibilities of 
masters and servantsp setting up a new system of summary jurisdiction and 
creating and regulating a new police force. These ordinances were sent 
to Stephen for his opinion. Parts of them could be ignored since they, 
had been superseded. The British goverment had also decided to legislate 
for the crown colonies on free labour and their order in council of 7 
September 1838) "the handmaiden of emancipation"p had been transmitted to 
the colonies before the local legislation arrived. This order summarised 
the experience which the office under Stephen had gained by regulating 
contracts for free West Indian Negroes and for Liberated Africans. It 
allowed contracts for up to a year if made within the colony in which the 
labour was to be performed under the customary regulations and subject to 
3 
the enforcement of the stipendiary magistrates. While these regulations 
1. Bill-to Glenelgq 28 June 1828, No. 66., & Hill to Glenelgp 10 Aug. 1838j, 
No. 80, C. O. 295/121. The ordinances were framed under Grey's 
instructions; Hill to Glenelgj, 12 May 1838., No. 1+8p Grey's minute 
Z7 June 1838p C. O. 295/121. 
2. Hill-to Glenelg., 23 Aug. 1838j. No, 83p Stephen's minute 8 Oct. 1838., 
C. 0.. 29 5/121. 
3- Order in council,, 7 Sept. 1838j. P. P. 2 1846o xxwii (168). 
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made much of the Trinidad ordinances unnecessary, much still remained to 
be considered. 
Stephen offered two general criticisms. His first contention was 
that the powers of the local executive over its police forces should be 
completely independent of the council and that all appointments should be 
subject to the crown's veto. This would ensure that the administration of 
justice was kept outside the direct influence or control of the planters. 
His second comment took this further. Stephen strenuously opposed the 
governorts attempt to extend the powers of Trinidad's justices of the peace 
to cover cases of summary punishments for common assaults. Since the 
J. P. s in Trinidad were exclusively proprietors., such a power would subject 
the happiness and liberty of the labourers to the sense of equity and 
forbearance of employers. A more just and effective systemp in Stephen's 
opinionp would be to allow a process of summary trial by a jury composed 
of men of the same class as the accused. Glenelg agreed with his under- 
secretary and forwarded these views to the colony, In doing so he 
undertook for the government not only to safeguard Negro civil rights but 
to try and guarantee those rights by an impartial judicial system. 
The continuance of apprenticeship during most of Glenelgs secretary- 
ship decided Stephen's attitude towards constitutional reform in Trinidad. 
Initially he grew less raýher than more liberal in dealing with the local 
Hill to Glenelg, 23 Aug. 1838,, No. 83) minutes IZr Stephen2 Taylor 
and Grey., C. 0.295A21. 
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council. In 1835t when the council refused to pass-a law taxing the 
owners of apprentices, Stephen minuted: I 
"I am inclined to think that this is a proper 
opportunity for proving that the king in council 
is stronger than they are". 1 
This was a highly controversial judgment. Not since when Trinidad 
had been granted a legislative council., had coercion been applied to the 
council by the British government on a purely local question. Even Stephem 
was forced to admit later that his advice may have been injudicious in 
2 
practice though justifiable in theory. But he had Howick's support and 
3 
Glenelg was prepared to abide by their verdict. 
Glenelg perfectly expressed their united opinion in a dispatch to 
William Burnley., one of the leading planter members of the Trinidad council. 
The British govermentp Glenelg said; 
"recognises to the fullest extent the principle that 
the legislative power of the King in Council over 
those Colonies which are subject to it should be 
used most abstemiously in originating laws for their 
goverment; and that this authority must be considered 
as reserved for the greater and unusual exigencies of the 
public service. On the other hand his Lordship cannot 
admit that it is a right which could be abandoned with 
safety to the interests of the colonies in question until 
they shall possess-, local legislatures fairly representing 
the interestst opinions and feelings of the different 
classes o. f the inhabitants"- 4. 
1. Hill to Aberdeený 21 May 1835p No. 41, Stephenýs minute 9 July 1835p 
C. O. 295/106. 
2. Burnley to Glenelgp 5 Dec. 1836p StephWs minute 16 Dec. 1836j, 
C. O. 295/113. 
3- Burnley to Grey, 26 Dec. 1835f C. O. 295/109; Journal entry for 2 Feb. 
1836, Grey Papers, Journals. 
Burnley to Glenelgj. 26 Dec. 18350 draft reply 15 Feb. 1836, C. O. 295AO9\., 
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This implied both that the colonies were moving towards a state where 
representative institutions would be conceded and also that political 
maturity would be signified by the abandonment of minority rule. But 
since the introduction of an elective element had been ruled out for the 
immediate futurep it was difficult to see how the state of maturity could 
be reached. 
Stephen's solution was simple. The unofficial members of the council 
should be chosen from outside the white plantocracyp either from the 
professional or the commercial classes or$ preferably, from "someone of 
2 
African descent" suitably qualified as a counsellor. He would have been 
prepared to issue a policy statement on the question. He strongly recomm- 
ended to Glenelg making: 
"an announcement that it was intended to change the 
composition of the Council by introducing coloured 
people, merchants, professional men etc. to destroy 
the existing authority of the pl=ters. With such 
a Council it might be needless to interfere". 
For once Glenelg would not support Stephen's view. The time for such an 
announcementy he told his under-secretary was still "not ripe". 3 
1. Hill to Glenelgi 4 Jan. 1834, No. 1., drafts, C. O. 295/UO. 
2. Hill to Glenelgp 19 Aug. 1836y No. 112f Stephen's minute 5 Oct. 1836p 
C. O. 295/112. 
3- Burnley to Glenelg, 5 Dec. 1836y Stephen's minutey 16 Dec. 1836, 
C. O. 295/113. 
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The final termination of slave apprenticeship in Trinidad had two 
incidental results. It turned the attention of the Island's plantersý, to 
the possibility of reviving immigration by new, methods and., by removing 
one of the main objections to the grant of representative institutions., 
raised again the question of constitutional reform. Glenelg was able 
to avoid a general reconsideration of both issues before his departure 
from the officep leaving to his successorp Lord Normanby) an embarrassing 
legacy. Normanby, howevert in his very short period in office was far 
from eager to grapple with difficult problems and perfectly prepared to 
2 
let the matter drift. 
Once given a free choice,, many former slaves in Trinidad., as the 
planters had fearedy preferred to leave the plantations, despite the high 
level of wages., and to set up as independent or semi-independent agricultural 
producers. To recoup their labour force., the planters in the council 
secured the adoption of an emigration programme paid by the local treasury. 
This was designed to supply emigration agents in countries with suitable 
potential emigrants and to provide fare-paid passages for the immigrants 
3 
they were able to recruit. The planters also attempted to persuade the 
secretax7 of state to allow them to recruit emigrants in Africa and to 
1. W. H. Burnleyo Observations, p. 4. 
2. Macgregor to Normanbyp 23 Apr. 1839, No. 2. minutesp C. O. 295/126. 
3- Hill to Glenelgp 3-1 Dec. 1838$ No. 120, C. O. 295/122. 
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1 
legalize labour contracts made outside the color7. Normahby offered 
no opinion on these subjects. Stephen, who was too busy coping with his 
superiorts inefficiency to deal with the problem personally, could do no 
more than simply insist upon a strict adherence to the rules already 
established and) predictablyp to exhort his subordinate clerks to ensure 
2 
that the interests of the potential immigrants were scrupulously safeguarded. 
On the constitutional questionp Normanby's lassitude did result in 
one interesting experiment. In 1832 Stephen and Howick had planned and 
completed a division of the old colonies in the Lesser Antilles into two 
groups., one of which was composed of the Windward Islands of Barbadost 
Grenadap St. Vincent and Tobago. In each island a lieutenant governor was 
appointed as chief executive under the supervision of the Governor who 
normally resided in Barbados but made annual. visits to all the other islands 
in his group. This reorganisation was seen as both politically and econ- 
omically desirable in that it provided a measure of unity (and., hopefully., 
also an impartial executive aloof from local prejudices). It would also 
3 
be cheaper than a system of separate governorships. Matters of purely 
Hine to Normanbyf 25 MaY 1839p C. O. 295/128; Mein to Normanbyf 
-U Apr. 1839 . No. 3.41 C. 0.295/125. 
2. Mein to Normanby2 6 May 1839, No. 27ý minutes; C. O. 295/125; Hume 
to Normanby.. 25 May 1839j. minutes, C. O. 295/128. 
3. Howick to Stephen) 29 Aug. 1832., Grey Papersq Private Letter Bookp 
1831-3t P. 91; Stephen to Howick, 31 Aug. 1832p Grey Papersp Stephený 
Stephen saw support for such a plan coming from "anti-slavery people" 
and it was obviously the possibility-of an independent executive acting 
in the interests of the majority which attracted him to the idea. 
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local concern might be settled by the governor general without reference 
to Britain and the', executive federation would also tend to encourage a 
1 
movement towards a more general consolidation of West Indian islands. 
In 1836 Stephen had suggested that on a change of governor Trinidad 
2 
should be brought into the executive federation of the Windward Islands. 
He was increasing: Ly dissatisfied with the governor, Sir George Hill., who was 
3 
far from active in his duties and it seems possible that after two years 
of tension it was Stephen who persuaded Glenelg to replace him. At any 
ratet in 1838 it was decided to remove Hil4 whose term of office had already 
considerably exceeded the regulation periodtand then to take the opportunity 
to place the new lieutenant governorship (with a reduced salax7) under the 
4 
authority of the governor general of the Windward Islands. At that point 
Glenelg resigned. Normanbyj, howeverf though he knew nothing at all about 
the arrangement when pressed for a decision by his under-secretarys allowed 
5 
the changes to proceed. 
Unfortunately., Glenelg had failed to explain the plan with sufficient 
clarity either to Hill's successor., Sir Henry Macleodý or to the governor 
1. Murray., The West Indiest pp. 181-3. 
2. Hill to Glenelg, 9 Dec. 1836j Privates minutest C. O. 295/112. 
3- War Office to C. O., 27 Mar. 1837p Stephents minute.. 7 Apr. 1837p 
C. O. 295/j-i8. 
4. Treasury to Stephen., 29 Dec. 1838., minutes., C. O. 295/123. 
5. Macgregor to Normanbys 23 Apr. 1839y No. 21 minutest C. O. 295A2t. 
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general.. Sir Evan Macgregorp and., by the time Normanby had done so., misunder- 
standings had resulted. Macleod) the ex-governor of St. Kitts and a man 
who enjoyed his comfortsp seems to have suspected that the salary had been 
reduced purely as an economy measure and, on learning of his appointment, 
he sailed for London in the hope of bargaining with the Colonial Office for 
2 
the restoration of at least part of the original salary. Normanby., faced 
with this opposition to the new arrangements close at home as well as in 
the colonywas determined., characteristicallyj, to give way. Stephen had 
to work hard in order to convince him that the scheme ought at least to be 
3 
given a trial. Even then Normanby insisted on a compromise. Despite the 
fact that the coloured inhabitants.. to Stephen's delightp sent an address 
to the secretary of state urging their support for the new arrangementsp 
Normanby decided that Macleod should be told that the goverment would 
re-open the question provided he and his council could produce new reasons 
4 
for reverting to the original constitutional position. 
1. Macgregor to Normanbyp 10 Apr. 1839., No. 1. C. O. 295/126; Draft 
Instructions to Macleodt 8 Feb. 18.39, C. O. 295/126; Draft Instructions 
to Macgregorp 3 Mar. 1839y C. O. 295/126. 
2. Macgregor to Normanbyy 10 Apr. 1839., No. 1, C. O. 295/126; Macleod to 
Normanbyt-30 MaY 1839p C. O. 295/126. 
3- Macgregor to Normanbyp 23 Apr. 1839, No. 2p minutest C. O. 295/126. 
4. Macgregor to Normanbyp 8 June 1839., No. 3., minutes.. & Macleod to 
Norman, by., 30 MaY 1839., minutest C. O. 295/126. 
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If Stephen's attempt to render the Trinidad executive independent of 
local pressures in the council met with difficulties through Normanbyts 
weaknessv the pressure groups in the council were equally unsuccessful in 
moving the new Secretary. They attempted to subordinate the governor to 
their control through the appointment of an independent agent to act as an 
intermediary between themselves and the government. Stephen considered 
the suggestion and rejected it out of hand: 
I'The governor is an essential and integral part of 
the Council. It is through the governor only that 
communications can properly pass between tho Council 
and the ministers of the Crown". 
Assemblies had been allowed agents by tradition but Stephen refused to 
consider the unrepresentative Trinidad legislative council as a popular 
1 
assembly. Normanby agreed to abide by Stephen's verdict. 
Though inflexible on the general constitutional POsitionp Stephen 
became increasingly less disposed to interfere in the internal concerns of 
the colony. Even on an issue as important to him as Negro rights he was 
prepared to give way a littlep once apprenticeship was over. Whenp for 
example, his attempt to secure a system of trial by jury was opposed by 
the acting governor and the council, he agreed to comPromice. The council 
had suggested the sulnissiom of all cases involving summary punishments to 
1"0 
the courts of stipendiary magistratesp whose impartiality wasuKuostionable, 
2 
and agreed to lower the punishments involved. Henry Taylor supported 
Mein to Normanby, 25 Apr. 1839, No. 24, Stephen's minute, 14 June 
1839ý C. O. 295/125. 
Hill to Glenelgý 3 Jan. 1839.. No. 1. C. O. 295/125. 
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them pxovided they agreed to allow two magistrates to sit at each session 
instead of one as-they had recommended and to permit an appeal when the 
magistrates disagreed. In view of the categorical rejection of his own 
hope for a trial by jury systemý Stephen felt this the best that might be 
gained and Normanby acquiesced in his judgment. Stephen justified his 
new opinion on theoretical grounds. There seemed less point to him in 
quibbling over details when., by leaving the local laws to their operation., 
he could ensure that the council itself would have to learn from experience 
I 
and, in time) make the necessary adjustments itself. 
With Russell at the head of the department., the Normanby ethos of 
indecision disappeared. Russell was quick to make up his mind on Trinidad's 
problems and to suggest a course of action. Within a few months of taking 
office he was publicising the government's immigration policy. He had 
decided to allow colonial finances to be used to assist immigration from 
several countriespthough still excluding the whole of Africayand to retain 
the strict regulations which had been devised by the Colonial Office to 
2 
protect potential immigrants. His action brought him what no doubt he 
desired - the attention of the planters. William Burnleyp the newly 
appointed general agent for Trinidad immigration, replied by sending Russell 
a long letter in which he advanced the comforting thesis that the suppression 
1. HM to Glenelg) 19 Jan. 1839P No. 6, C. O. 295A25- 
2. Circular, Russell to West Indian Governors, 5 Nov. 1839) P-P- 1840, 
xxxiv (82). 
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of the African slave trade., on which the government had spent vast sums, 
could be finally achieved by a successful demonstration of the economic 
I 
superiority of free over slave agricultural labour on Trinidad's plantations. 
His letter earned him an interview with Russell at which he was invited to 
2 
set out his views in detail in a memorandum for the Colonial Office. 
Burnley's main contention was that Trinidad's real weaknesses were 
the shortage of labourers and the lack of a middle class. He proposed to 
overcome both these obstacles by a Plan of Negro immigration. Canada and 
the United States would provide educated Negro immigrants to supply the 
missing bourgeoisie. Their presence, in turny would attract free labouring 
immigrants from the other West Indian islandst from Central America and the 
Liberated African stations in Cuba and Brazil. Free labour at work in 
Trinidad would then outproduce, and undersell slave labour and slavery would 
be extinguished. But none of this would be achieved without at least two 
changes in imperial regulations governing land sales and immigration. 
Although Glenelg bad decided to stop all grants of crown land his efforts 
had failed to prevent squatting on private as well as on crown lands. it 
was vital to the success of Burnley's plan that squatting should be stopped 
and that crown land should be sold in sizeable lots at a high price in order 
to attract capitalp provide an immigration fund and prevent labourers from 
1. Burnley to Russells 30 Nov- 1839) minutes) C. O. 295/127. 
2. Burnley to Russell.. 13 Dec- 1839, C. O. 295A27. 
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acquiring property too soon. To get planter support Burnley suggested 
that short-term contracts made with immigrants in countries outside Trinidad, 
should be allowed. Finally2 he proposed that the import duties on tobacco 
and cotton reaching Britain from Trinidad should be abolished to encourage 
the production of those staples in the Island. 
Burnley's views obviously impressed Russell andv equally., his 
reasoning left Stephen cold. Stephen felts quite reasonablyp that since 
estates were being deserted by their owners all over the West Indiesp it 
was very difficult to imagine ary great immediate demand by capitalists for 
land salesithough he did not oppose making an exploratory attempt. He 
also believed that Trinidad was not suitable for the cultivation of cotton 
and tobacco on account of its climate and soils. To him the real weakness; 
in Trinidad's economy could be attributed to one general cause which affected 
the West Indies as a whole - absentee proprietorship in the plantations: 
"We are still retaining the commercial and proprietary 
habits which formed an intelligible part of the old slave 
systems but which are glaringly absurd now.... If West 
Indian proprietors are to have permanent incomes they 
must either let their estates. cr live upon them". 
To save the Trinidadian economy what was required was not desperate attempts 
to revive a flagging capitalist industry but frugal agricultural production 
and a willingness. to use crops which might yield only a small return on the 
Burnley to Russell, 13 Dec. 1839Y minute by Russell, 16 Dec. 1839., 




Despite these criticismst Russell insisted on making further enquiries 
2 
into Burnley's proposals. While these were pending a new immigration 
crisis arose in Trinidad. In December 1839 the first of several hundred 
European immigrants (mainly French and Germans) arrived in the Island. 
3 
Five months later the governor informed the Colonial Office that one tenth 
of them had died and the rest were in a wretched state since they had 
failed to acclimatise themselves and had been unable to got adequate medical 
attention. The governor, supported by Stephen, strongly advised Russell 
4 
to take action to inform prospective European immigrants of the calamity. 
The creation of the Land and Emigration Commission in 1840., howeverp led to 
a postponement since Russell insisted upon referring all emigration questions 
5 
to them. Stephen seems to have been rather annoyed at this decision. He 
appreciated expert advice but in this case Russell was'abdicating respon- 
C&b 
sibility in favour of 
=informed 
subordinate agency. When tho Commiss- rz 
ioners' report arrived at the Colonial Office the question was found to be 
1. Ibid. p minutes by Stephen, 18 Dec. 1839j, and 21 Dec. 1839. 
2. Ibid.., minute by Russell,, 2/+ Dec. 1839, C. O. 295A27. 
3. Macgregor to Russell., 20 Dec. 1839, No. 50j. enclosing Mein to 
Macgregorý 24 Dec. 1839, C. O. -295/126. 
4- Macleod to Russell., 29 May 1840., No. 20, minutes, C. O. 295/130- 
5. Macleod to Russellp 29 May 1840, No. 20, minutes by Smith and Russellp 
C. O. 295A30- 
24, 
no further advanced. Since they knew nothing of Trinidad's circumstances 
before 1840y the Commissioners could only express their sympathy with the 
lot of the Europeans and make vague suggestions about other possible 
locations and employments more suitable for Europeans. On their report 
Stephen minuted with obvious point: 
"It does not appear to me that this contributes 
any information or suggestion of which any use 
could be made". 
1 
His superiors were forced to agree. 
The intervention of the commissioners2 however2 was not always rejected 
by Stephen in this way. Once they 4ad-acquired some specialist knowledge 
and their reports became more positive he was prepared at times to support 
2 
them. He approved of their suggestion of altering Burnley's proposals on 
land sales2 for e=ple, sincep in company with the acting governor to whom 
Burnley's report had been referred., they favoured the selling of land in 
small lots of forty to fifty acres at 91 an acre and advocated the creation 
of villages with half acre allotments near the plantations. This went 
some way towards meeting Stephen's objections to the monopolisation of land 
ownership by the sugar planters and he clearly thought it a suggestion worth 
3 
considering. Two years after the creation of the Board it was Stephen 
1. Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephenp 1 Aug. 1840, minutes, 
C-0- 295/132. 
2. Macleod to Russell, 8 June 1840) No. 26, minutes, C. O. 295/130. 
3. Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephen, 4 Aug. 1840, C-0- 295/132. 
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who was insisting on obtaining the Commissioners' advice and the secretary 
of state, Lord Stanleyy who felt reluctant. 
A-more surprising development was Stephents espousal of the planters' 
demands for the recruitment of labour in Africa. As the decline of the 
West Indian plantations had coincided with the rise of the slave-grown 
plantations of Cuba and Brazilp Stephen became convinced that the goverment 
was morally obliged to give some aid to the British planters in their attempts 
2 
to revive the free sugar industry. In Sierra Leone the. growing population 
of Liberated Africanst released in Freetown from slave ships, was proving a 
3 
difficult administrative problem. The Trinidad planters had frequently 
4 
asked for permission to recruit among them and in 1840 Stephenýcame round 
to supporting themy perhaps impelled by the possibility of killing two 
administrative birds with one stone. Sierra Leonep being a crown colony, 
was under the close supervision of the government and b3r limiting recruit- 
5 
ment to the colony. immigration regulations could be made effective. 
1. Macleod to Stanley., 21 Oct. 1841s No. 2 minutess C. O. 295/134. 
2. Colonial Land and Einigration Office to Stephen, 3 Dec. 1841, Stephen's 
minutes 11 Dec. 1841s C. O. 295/135. 
3. Doherty to Russells 20 Mar. 18/+Ol No. 9. C. O. 267/159. 
4. E. g. Hume to Normanbys 25 May 1839, C. O. 295/128. 
5. Doherty to Russelly 20 Mar. 1840, No. 9t Stephen's minute, 1 June 
1840y C. O. 267A59; Macleod to Russell, 21 July 1840, No. 42y C. -O. 295/130; order in council$ 8 Dec. 1840, Council, C. O. 295/132. 
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It may be that Stephen was simply devising suitable means for 
implementing the goverment's policy since Russell himself had decided to 
give the planters aid by altering the regulations. At his behest the 
ban on contracts made in Europe was raised, -and just before leaving office 
Russell went as far as to state that his policy had been to eliminate 
gradually the impediments which had been placed on the introduction of 
2 
free labour into Trinidad. But this was an exaggeration. With Stephen 
at the legal helm, the officedespite Burnley's effortshad in no way 
3 
departed from the general policy of government oversight and control. 
On the question of the colony's constitution, howeverp Russell defied 
the opinion of his under-secretary and reversed the decision which Stephen 
had wished to adopt. The Trinidad council and plantocracy greatly resented 
the proposal, to subordinate their executive to the control of the governor 
general in Barbados.. and Macleod., Trinidadto new governorp resented it even 
4 
more. Initially Stephen was able to bring Russell round to his point of 
5 
view) and this decision might have been allowed to stand but for one 
1. Order in council, 23 June 1841, P. P. 1846p xxvii (168). 
2. Macleod to Russellp 25 June 181+1, No. 59, minutes, C. O. 2951133. 
3- E. g. Macleod to Russellp 18 Feb. 1841, No. % minutes, C. O. 295/133- 
4- Macgregor to Normanby, 6 July 1839j. No. 12p enclosing Mein to Macgregorp 
25 June 1839.. C. O. 295A26; Macleod to Russell, 18 Oct. 1839, C. O. 
295/126. 
5. Macgregor to Normahby, 6 July 1839, No. 12p Stephents minute 6 Sept. 
1839 and Russell's minute 13 Sept. 1839, C. O. 295/126. 
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exceptional circumstance. Governor Macleodý despite his orders to return 
to his postt remained in London and in touch with the secretary of state 
for over a year after his appointment. By threatening resignation and 
by hinting at further reprisals he won the ear of the secretary and then 
offered to compromise. If the role of the governor general was limited 
to an emergency supervisory power and if the governor of Trinidad was 
allowed to correspond directly with the secretary of state and if his 
2 
salary was slightly raised, he would return to his post. 
Stephen objected to any compromise on this issue since this would 
3 
undermine the general plan but he was overruled. A new set of commission 
and instructions was prepared which left Macleod in sole charge of the day- 
to-day administration of Trinidad.. But Stephen's opinion was not entirely 
ignored. The governor general in addition to emergency powers retained 
supreme authority with the right to intervene at any time that he thought 
A+ 
necessary, and not only when requested, as Macleod had suggested. Even 
5 
soo Stephen felt the compromise was a sell-out to the white minority. 
1. Macleod specialised in avoiding his duties. See Macleod to Stanleyp 
29 Apr. 1845, Private,, memo. by Talbot, 9 June 3.845,, C. O. 295/146. 
2. Macleod to Russell) 18 Oct. 1839p minutes.. C. O. 295/126; Macleod to 
Russell. 25 Nov. 1839p minutesp C. O. 295/126. 
Macleod to Russell. 5 Dec. 1839, C. O. 295/126. 
He listed his objections in a memorandum to V. Smith., 17 Oct. 18390 
after Macleod to Russellt 18 Oct. 1839p C. O. 295/126. 
Draft instructions., 19 Dec. 1839., C. O. 295/126; Macgregor to Normanby., 
26 Sept. 1839, No. 35p enclosing Mein to Macgregorp 13 Sept. 1839, 
minutesy C. O. 295/126. 
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He had the dubious satisfaction, however,, of finally convincing Russell 
that he must order Macleod peremptorily to his post on pain of losing his 
appointment and to refuse Macleodts claims for an increase in salary until 
1 
he had departed. It was a hollow victory. Macleod was able to secure 
an increase in salary from his council immediately after his arrival in 
the colony by pointing out that this would imply Trinidad's independence 
2 
of Barbados. Stephents only success was a paper one. The governor 
general remained theoretically superiory butýafter Macgregorts retirement, 
even the extra salary which the governor general received for his respon- 
3 
sibility in Trinidad was dropped. Within a few yearsp even the formal 
subordination to Barbados was removed:. 
Lord Stanley) Russell's successor, was more of a supporter of the 
plantersIviewpoint than his predecessors. It was Stanleyp for example) 
who final2. y took the decision to allow Trinidad to break its ties with the 
governor general at Barbados and he did so explicitly in order to gratify 
5 
the wishes of the ruling minority. Equally on questions of immigration 
Macgregor to Normanbyt 31 Dec. 1839, No. 51p minutest C. O. 295/126. 
W"t, At 'A % btli. "M 
2. Macleod to Russellp 13 May 1846j. No. 15p minutepp 51130. C. O. 
3. Macleod to Russellp 3 July 18/+l, No. 67p minutes, C. O. 295/133- 
Macleod to Stanley) 28 Dec. 18/+lt No. 229 minutes and draft commission 
11 Apr. 1842p C. O. 295/134. The lieutenant governorship was raised 
to a full governorship in 1846 now with Stephen's supportt Harris to 
Greyt 27 Aug. 1846, No. 51., minutes., C. O. 295/151. 
5. Macleod to Stanley, 28 Dec. 1841) No. 22p minutest C. O. 295/134- 
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and on land policies2 the two major administrative concerns of his period 
in office, Stanley made substantial concessions to the plantocracy. 
Gradually2 the restrictions which had been imposed on the free immigration 
of labourers to Trinidad were relaxed. The countries in which labour 
contracts could be made with prospective immigrants was widened to include 
North America as well as EUrope; and new immigration channels were opened 
up between Trinidad and the East to bring in Chinese and Indian immigrants. 
1 
These were major concessions which ultimately altered the racial composition 
of Trinidad's society and decisively affected its constitutionalý social 
and economic development. In Dr. Williams' opinion Stanleyýs concessions 
meant "that the formation of a society as well as a miniature state would 
2 
have to be deferred for over a centuryll. 
James Stephen was not entirely pleased with this new development. 
He was convinced that imigration would provide at best only a partial 
economic solution to Trinidad's problems while it would distract attention 
3 
from the more serious problem of organising a free society. These 
differences of opinion made his working relationship with Stanley difficult 
but it did not silence the under-secretax7. Though Stanley ignored 
4 
Stephents political or philosophical observationst he could not entirely 
overrule the objections which, as legal counsellort Stephen made when 
1. K. O. Laurence, Jamaican Historical Review, V, 1,1965, pp. 3.1-12. 
2. Eric Williamsp History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago (Port-of- 
Spainy 1962)., p. 9-7. 
3. Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephen, 3 Dec. 1841P Stephen's 
minute, 11 Dec. 181+1, C. O. 295/135. 
4. Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephen.. 3 Dec. 1841, Stanley's 
minuteo 26 Dec. 181+ly C. O. 295/135. 
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dealing with immigration legislation. Throughout Stanleyls secretaryship,, 
in fact, Stephen maintained a vigilant watch on the operation of the new 
immigration laws reminiscent of his work on slavery before 1836. He 
insisted on the immigrant's right to be fully informed about labouring 
1 
conditions in Trinidad and to be compensated when the promised terms were 
2 
subsequently dishonoured. He also insisted on a strict observance of 
the rules governing the transportation and provisioning of emigrants and 
3 
of regulations governing their recruitment. Where concessions were made, 
as on allowing indentures for Liberated Africans., Stephen examined the new 
4 
regulations with the immigrant's welfare in mind. He also relied heavily 
on the advice of the Land and Emigration Commission which had adopted his 
role of insisting upon the strict observation of rules protecting the 
5 
immigrant. 
1. Macleod to Russell, 28 Aug. 1841, No. 86, minutes, C. O. 295A34. 
2. Macleod to Stanley., V Jan. 1842, No. 37y minutess C. O. 295A36. 
3. E. g. Marx7att to Hope, 17 Jan. 1842) minutesý C. O. 295/138; Macleod 
to Stanley, 29 Nov. 1841, No. 14, minutes,, C. O. 295A31+. 
4- E. g. Macleod to Stanley,, 27 June 181+2., No. 61+., minutes, C. O. 295/136- p Fuller to Stanley2 8 July 1842, No. 68.. minutesp C. O. 295/137; Macleod 
to Stanleyp 3 Feb. 1845o No- 13, minutesý C. O. 295/146; British and 
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to Stanley, 17 Mar. 1845y minutesp C. O. 
295/148; Macleod to Stanleyj, 5 Aug. 1845, No. 58, minutes., C. O. 295/147. 
5. Ylacleod to Stanley, 18 May 1844, No- 37p minutes, C. O. 295/143; 
Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephenp 27 July 1844p C. O. 295/34-5. 
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Stephen had considerable success in converting his superior to his 
view on questions relating to land use and land ownership. He had opposed 
immigration not only as an economic panacea but because he believed that 
the bulk of the free population in the West Indies would stand to lose by 
it. Stephen wished to impress on his superior that emancipation had been 
a great success. It vindicated the Negroes as a race-, and though profits 
on capital investment may have declined this wasý in his view) largely 
compensated by an increase in the material comforts and an improvement in 
the moral and intellectual state of the people. This progress might be 
1 
prejudiced by immigration. 
One of Stephen's comments in 1841 on an immigration plan amounts 
almost to a political credo and deserves extensive quotation: 
"Is it clear that the state of things in Trinidad is 
not the best possible state of human society as far 
as relates to the condition of the many - that is of 
the hand working class? In the partnership which 
subsists everywhere between the capitalist and the 
labourer the labourers decline as their numbers 
increase. But the larger their share the better for 
society in general if it be not so large as to drive 
the capital elsewhere in search of profit. If the 
whole people are employed and are willing to work 
and if the returns are sufficient to prevent the 
withdrawal of capital.. the only evil is that capital 
accumulates more slowly than it otherwise would do. 
But on the other hand there is a prosperous, contented 
and increasing population. All these arguments are 
raised by the rich and in the interests of the rich 
and assume that the rapid increase of wealth and the 
general good of society are convertible terms - which 
is at least a debateable point. 112 
Colonial Land and Ihigration Office to Stepheny 3 Dec. 1841, Stephen's 
minute 11 Dec. 1841, C. O. 295A35. 
2. Ibid. 2 Stephen's pencil comments on the Board's report. 
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Stephen would have been extremely dubious about Joseph Chamberlain's 
concept of estate development. When one governor complained in 1843 
L 
about the lack of British loans for developing agriculture he minuted in 
1 
the margin: "Is the want of this debt any real disadvantage? " To Stephen 
the welfare of society was a quite different concept from the economic 
development of its natural resources. Shortly before his retirements he 
confessed; 
"I never could perceive the wisdom of the eagerness 
for tdeveloping the resources' of all parts of the 
world with which we happen to be connected. To 
myself it seems no great evil if Trinidad should be 
left for the next half century to the natural growth 
of affairsp agricultural., commercial and political". 2 
Just as a racial streak ran through his humanitarianism.. this simple., 
laissez-faire economic philosophy., the belief in the natural operation of 
market forces, seems to have underpinned his real concern for the lot of 
the labourer and peasant proprietor. 
The fear that the few and not the many were benefitting from the 
plantation system undoubtedly coloured Stephents attitude to the growing 
numbers of independent and semi-independent agricultural producers in 
Trinidad. Some of them held their lands as freeholds but a large proportion 
were simply squatters on land which had been left uncultivated by its 
3 
owners, or ungranted by the crown. So great a threat did they pose to the 
1. Macleod to Stanley, 8 Jan. 1844j. Separate, C. O. 295/1/+2. 
2. Harris to Gladstone, 21 May 1846p No. Up Stephen's minute, 20 June 
1846, c. o. 295/151. 
3- Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephen, 8 Dec. 1841, with 
report of a Committee of the Agricultural and Immigration Society of 
Trinidad., C. O. 295/135. 
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planters that from the beginning of Stanleyts secretaryship the local 
Trinidad gove rnm ent began to press for the removal of the squatters and 
1 
for the restriction of crown land sales to plantation-sized lots. Stanley 
was disposed to agree with the planters but Stephen was not. The necessity 
of framing legislation on the subject all-owed Stephen his chance to convert 
his secretary of state. 
When the acting governorp on Stanley's instructions, forwarded a draft 
order in council to the Colonial Office which was designed to remove the 
squatters on both crown and private landso Stephen pronounced it objection- 
able. In his view squatting was not criminal but quite inevitable in a 
2 
country with Trinidad's ample supply of free and fertile land. Laws 
aloneý he insisted, could not prevent the general desire of a plantation 
labourer for independence. Short of convict or military rule or slavery 
there was no way to prevent men from setting up on their own on the 
unguarded frontier. But even if squatting could be stopped the aspiring 
independent farmer could buy or rent land since portions of the 1,500,000 
acres of uncultivated land in private hands would be offered to him by 
impoverished landowners or enterprising landlords. Either way his labour 
was lost to the planter. The plan of a tax on all cultivated lands which 
1. Macleod to Russellp 18 Aug. 18/+lp No. 83, C. O. 295/134- 
2. Colonial Iand and Emigration Office to Stephen, 30 Nov. 181+lp minutesp 
C. O. 295/135; Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephent 3 Dee, 
18/+l, minutes. C. O. 295/135. 
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he and Howick had devised still seemed to Stephen the best solution but 
the colonists would not-accept it. The only alternative was to rely, 
on the provisions of the sqiiatting law of 1838 which had been passed on 
1 
the termination of apprenticeship. 
Stanley was unhappy with this verdict but after Taylor and the 
governory Macleod, who was then on holiday in Englandy had both written 
2 
to support Stepheny he was persuaded. Stephen's opinion was eventually 
also endorsed by the Iand and Emigration Board and put into operation in 
1843. As a result those whose squatting claims extended beyond 1834 
received a full title to their land. Squatters whose occupation dated 
from 1834 to 1838 were allowed a title provided they agreed to bIW their 
lands at an arranged price. Those who had squatted after 1838 were merely 
to be prosecuted under the order in council of that yeary as Stephen 
suggested, which allowed them to claim against landlords who had connived 
at their squatting in order to attract a labour force to their plantations. 
Finally., one piece of land extensively used by squatters was to be publicly 
3 
surveyed and titles distributed to the occupants. This unexpected 
Chichester to Stanleys 8 Oct. 1842p Separateý Stephen's memorandum 
24 Nov. 1842, C. O. 295/137. 
2. Chichester to Stanleyy 8 Oct. 1842., Separates minutes by Stanley) 
Hope and Taylor, C. O. 295A37. 
3- Chichester to Stanleyo 13 Jan. 1843, No. 959 minutes and draftsp 
C. O. 295/139; Chichester to Stanley, 14 Feb. 1843P No. 102p minutes., 
C. O. 295/139; Colonial Land and Emigration Office to Stephenp 29 Apr. 
1843j, minutes, C. O. 295/141. 
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government support for the small agricultural producer must obviously 
have encouraged the movement to purchase freeholds and to create agricultural 
1 
villa: ges which is such a marked feature of Trinidad in the 181+0s. 
His understanding of legal questions was the main weapon with which 
Stephen combatted Stanley's customary indifference. At times it proved 
I ------------ -- 
an invaluable asset) especially when a technical question arose. In 
1841, for example) Governor Macleod embarked upon his(Opet project of 
assimilating Trinidad's Spanish laws and institutions to English models. 
He sent proposals for imperial legislation on the subject'to the Colonial 
Office. Stephen scrutinised them. Three years after the final abolition 
of slavery, he was more sympathetic to such a scheme than he had been before 
. 
1838 and now saw it as eminently desirable. But there was a new objection. 
The anglisized laws and the new procedures (including trial by jury which 
he had himself advocated earlier without success), Stephen feltp would have 
to be settled and framed initially in the colony. British attempts to 
initiate or settle colonial penal codes, he insisted, were doomed to failure: 
"The colonial framer of the law will probably commit 
several blunders but in the main he will be right. 
If without compromising any English authority the 
law is at once enacted in the local legislature the 
advantage is gained, and from this country the errors 
are pointed outp and either by force of admonition or 
by force of experience come gradually to be corrected# 
and perhaps do no great harm while uncorrected. But 
if such laws are suspended for the signification of the 
royal pleasurey or are sent here as mere projectsp a 
kind of responsibility is thrown on the government here 
Macleodto Stanley, 6 July 1841+, No. 53) Taylor's report 30 June 
1844) C. O. 295/143. 
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which virtually paralyzes them. Every comprehensive 
improvement of the Penal Code of every coloW where 
such improvement3 have been made has been brought about 
by the method I recommend. As often as the Head of 
the office has insisted on a preliminary voice in such 
legislation so often has the scheme proved a failuro. "l 
Here was both faith in the local legislature (and in the power of 
his reviews as counsel) and disillusionment with interfering secretaries 
of state. Stanley was forced to agree with the need for local initiative 
on legislation but he baulked at the prospect of being rendered a rubber 
stamp and insisted on the right to choose between alternative methods of 
2 
altering the judicial structure. Unfortunately for him his attempt to 
interfere had precisely the effect which Stephen had predicted. When the 
attempt to elicit alternative suggestions led to deadlock, he was forced 
3 
to back down. Thereafter it was Stephen's opinion which was followod. 
As the anglicized laws arrived, Stephen tried unsuccessfully to get them 
examined by the legal counsel to the Home Office in order to ensure a 
A+ 
strict comparison with their English models. The Home Office counsel., 
however, declared himself incompetent since he had no local knowledge of 
5 
Trinidadp and Stephen undertook the intricate and wearisome task. His 
1. Macleod to Stanleyt 3 Ibc- 1841p No. 16, Stephen's minute 14 Jan. 1842, 
C. O. 295/134- 
2. Ibid., Stanley's minute 18 Jan. 1842. 
3- Macleod to Stanley., 17 Aug. 1843., No. /+it minutest C. O. 295/11+0. 
4. Chichester to Stanley., 1 Jan. 1843., No. 93, minutes , C. O. 295/139- 
5. Bethune to Phillips, 2 June 1843) Home Offices C. O. 295/141. 
careful amendments were then incorporated in the laws. 
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Even the thorry 
problem of laws on inheritance which had baffled the government for years 
2 
was successfully overcome in this way. By the time Macleod left office 
in 1846y he could boast) thanks in large measure to Stephenp of having 
3 
achieved a revolution in the laws and judiciary of Trinidad. 
Gladstone, as secretary of state, in the main followed the Policies 
of his predecessor. For example., he removed certain further restrictions 
on immigration labour contracts while retaining the government Is supervision 
4 
and control and he agreed to the completion of the plan to assimilate the 
5 
Spanish laws and institutions to English models. But his most singular 
contribution was the discussion which he instituted on the future constit- 
ution of Trinidad. Though the possibility of introducing representative 
institutions into the goverrment had been rejected, the idea of creating 
elective institutions at the municipal level remained. In 1838 the 
governor and council had proposed to abolish the Spanish cabildo in Port-of- 
Chichester to Stanleyp 1 Jan. 1843, No. 93P Stephen's report 14 May 
1843t C. O. 295/139; Macleod to Stanley., 3.6 Sept. 1844, No. 69, 
Stephents report., 26 Oct. 1844) C. O. 295/144; Macleod to Stanleyt 
2 Feb. 1845p No. 12y Stephen's report, 15 Mar. 1845p C. O. 295/146. 
2. Macleod to Stanleyt 18 Aug. 1843, No- 43) minutes.. C0 295/140; 
Macleod to Stanley, 1 Jan. 1844, No. It minutes,, C. 0: 
ý95/21+2. 
3. Macleod to Stanley.. 3 Jan. 1846, Separatep C. O. 295/150. 
4- Gladstone to 'West Indian Governors, 29 Apr. 18/+62 P. P. 181+6p 
xxvii (323). 
5. Macleod to Stanley, 16 Oct. 1845P No. 84; minutes, C. O. 295/147. 
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Spain and to substitute for it an elected municipal goverment of mayor 
and aldermen. Though few objected to the disappearance of the CabildOp 
the government's unhappy dealings with the Kingston corporation in Jamaica 
persuaded them to oppose the proposal. Stephen felt that an institution 
chosen by an electorate mainly of free coloured citizens might be dangerous, 
since it would lead the free coloured classes to claim the right to represent 
the popular voice and this might ultimately work against the interests of 
the Negro majority. But he was still in favour of trying the idea experi- 
1 
mentally after the end of apprenticeship. His opinion was accepted. 
In 1840 the plan was put into operation and the municipal corporation 
2 
created. Though the electorate was very smallp Port-of-Spain could boast 
3 
an elected institution. Five years laterp however, the difficulty which 
Stephen had foreseen led to a new crisis. The coloured class in Fort-of- 
Spain was becoming increasingly annoyed at the government's policies, 
especially on immigration and the anglicization of the lawsp and they 
demonstrated their opposition in the municipal council. To combat them 
the governor used his power of veto and immediately precipated a request 
1. Hill to Glenelgp 20 Apr. 1838j, No. 39p minutes, C. O. 295/120. 
2. HUI to Glenelg, 15 Dec. 1838y No. 123, C. O. 295/122y- HUI to 
Glenelg, 16 Feb. 1839, No. M, C. O. 295/125; Macleod to Russelly 
11 July 1840, No. 36p C. O. 295/130- 
3- Macleod to Russell, 15 June 1840, No. 292 minutes2 C. O. 295/130; 
Týýle, r to Russellp 13 Jan. 1841, No. 22 minutes, C. O. 295/133. 
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by the corporation for representative institutions in the colonial 
legislature. This request was forwarded to the Colonial Office. 
Stephen advised Gladstone to give the matter serious consideration but 
he offered no definite guidance on how to answer it. "I must avow myselfylt 
he minuted., t1to be ... much prepossessed in favour of the system of governing 
colonies by a council and assembly (many and obvious as are the objections 
to it)". But in Trinidadp with its Roman Catholic majorityp a popular 
franchise) in Stephen's opinion., might be turned against Anglicans. 
Gladstone, obviously perplexed by Stephen's ambiguous advice) decided to 
reject the request on the grounds that the British section of the population, 
2 
by which he meant the planters and merchants) did not support it. Privately, 
however) Gladstone made known to the governor his support for constitutional 
3 
reform and recommended a reconsideration of the subject. 
Lord Greyp who succeeded Gladstonep was much more sensitive to 
Stephen's views on Trinidad than any previous secretary of state since 
4 
Glenelg. This was less because of the similarity of their opinions than 
1. Macleod to Stanley, 5 Dec. 1845P Confidential C. O. 295/147ý Macleod 
to Stanley, 3 Dec. 1845Y No. 95., C. O. 295/147. 
2. Macleod to Stanley) 3 Dec. 1845, No. 95) minutesp C. O. 295/147. 
3. Gladstone to Harris, 13 Feb. 1846., 29 Apr. 1846 & June 1846p 
B. M. Add. MS. 41+528p ff. 14t 39y 61. 
4. He consulted Stephen on confidential matters immediately on joining 
the office; see Stephen's letters to Grey, 4 Aug. 1846 et geq. p Grey Papersp Stephen. 
220 
because of the mutual trust which strikingly altered the way business was 
conducted. Stephen gave Grey his advice with a frankness which was quite 
new. He pronouncedp for example, on the baneful effects of encouraging 
Indian emigration in a way which made clear how little he had supported, 
personallyp the government's immigration policies and how determined he 
1 
had been to retain the regulations on this subject. In return Grey 
2 
held himself open for discussions with his permanent under-secretary. 
But Grey was too dogmatic in his views and too well informed to take 
dictation even from Stephen. While agreeing with the doubts about coolie 
emigration2 for examplep he nevertheless believed that government encourage- 
ment and assistance to the sugar industry was in the highest interest of 
the labourers as well as the planters. He also felt that the white prop- 
rietors were the real backbone of Trinidadts society -a very different 
3 
view from Stephents. 
These differences of opinion with his chief might have caused Stephen 
some concern but throughout his last year in office he seems to have worked 
without his usual energy. He frequently had to confess. 'ignorance of some 
1. Harris to Gladstone., 18 July 1846,, No. 30j, Stephen's minute 22 Aug. 
1846, C. 0.295/151. 
2. Harris to Gladstone, 4 July 1846, No. 22p minuteso C. O. 295/151; 
Harris to Gladstone, 17 July 1846p No. 299 minutesp C. O. 295/151. 
3. Harris to Grey, 4 Sept. 1846, No. 58p Grey's minutep 12 Oct. 1846p 
C. O. 295/151. 
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very important topic. 
2 
1 
The loss of his legal duties also made supervision 
more difficult. He did continue to interest himself in the welfare of 
3 
squatters and smallholders but apart from this his only singular contri- 
bution was a remark on a suggestion by the governorp originating with 
Gladstone's encouragements to reform the legislative council. The reform 
was a compromise and Stephen was unimpressed by it% 
"Among the many projects of colonial goverment 
which at different times I have had occasion to 
consider I never before heard of the scheme of a 
legislature composed of three classess viz. office- 
holders) unofficial nominees of the Crown and 
members elected by the people. I avow a rooted 
distrust of all such theoretical innovations. I 
believe that the elected members would render the 
rest impotent and helplesso that the unofficial 
nominees would rival them in the race for popularity.. 
and that we should have one of the most unmanageable 
bodies which it is possible to constitute. I am 
convinced that the old scheme of a Governort Council 
and Assemb: Ly is far better than anything which has 
ever yet been proposed as a substitute for it". 4 
But Grey had already decided against the introduction of representative 
institUtIons and the idea was dropped even before Stephen left office. 
As his remarks on African and Asian immigration in Trinidad showv 
E. g. Harris to Greys 20 Jan. 181+71 P! rivatep Stephen's minute 23 Feb. 
1847, C. 0.295/156. 
2. E. g. Rogersts report., 5 Aug. 18/+7j, Stephen's minute 2 Sept. 18/+7f 
C. O. 323/62p f. 372. 
3. E. g. Harris to Grey, 28 Nov. 18/+6, No. 98, minutesp C. O. 295A52; 
Harris to Greyp 16 Jan. 181+7y No. 6, C. O. 295A54- 
4. Harris to Grey, 21 Dec. 1846, Privatep minutes by Stephen 26 Jan. 
1847 & Greyf 27 Jan. 1847, C. O. 295A52. 
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Stephen had little faith in the capacity of the non-Lwopeans to 
I 
appreciate Western civilization. But his devotion to concepts of justice 
and humanitarianism raised him at times from a level of racialismp not 
unusual in his day.. to remarkable heights of sympathy and understanding. 
In his last year in the office he was sent a dispatch from the governor 
of Trinidad recounting a rumour that the state of Virginia intended to 
deport its free Negro population and suggesting that the British government 
should ask for them to be sent to Trinidad as immigrants. To Stephen this 
was utterly reprehensible. As free men the Negroes must choose where they 
wanted to goi 
"It seems to me that the British government would be 
utterly disgraced by lending any aid whatever to the 
perpetuation of such tyrarmy .... One camot help hoping that they Zthe Negroe. 2/ would resist such oppression by 
force if nothing else would avail". 2 
For a man of peace these were brave words. Yet this was the spirit in 
which Stephen worked when considering those whom ho felt needed the protec- 
tion of the law, the slaves., the free coloured, the immigrants and the 
labourers. Over the years he had evolved something like what was later 
called a native policy or a policy of trusteeship for the weaker majority 
ruled by an alien minority. And this was no mean achievement. 
For his remarks on Asians see Harris to , Gladstone 9 18 July 1846 No- 30, Stephen's minute., 22 Ab, -,. 18460 , C. O. 295A51. 
2. Harris to Greyt 15 Jan- 1847P No- 5) Stephento minute 20 Feb. 1847, 
C. O. 295/156. 
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C H,, A PTER IV 
James Stephen and the Administration of 
Sierra Leone 
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Throughout his long official career Stephen enjoyed very close 
personal connections with the West African colony of Sierra Leone. The 
colony had been founded in 1787 under the aegis of Granville Sharp as a, 
settlement of 'free persons of colourt and it was not until 1808 that it 
1 
was taken over by the crown. During this early period the settlement 
was supervised by the Sierra Leone Companyp a charitable and commercial 
endeavour whose directors included many of the Clapham friends of the 
2 
Stephen family. Their influence over the colory's life prevailed even 
after it became a royal colony. It was initially through his acquaintance 
with the Macaulayst who were leading figures in the early administration 
and in the commercial life of Sierra Leonep that Stephen was privately 
kept informed of the colony's activities. After he joined the Colonial Office. 
this contact was maintaine2Even as late as the 1840sp only a few years 
before his retirementp his interest in Sierra Leone was still involved with 
4 
his private family concerns. 
1. For the early history of the colony see Christopher Fyfej A History 
of Sierra Leone (London) 1962), pp. 1-98. 
2. Stephen discusses them in his famous essay on 'The Clapham Seatt in 
James Stephent Essays in Ecclesiastical Biographyp PP. 523-584. 
3. A private letter from Henry WiUiam Macaulay to Stephen was treated as 
sound first-hand evidence in the office: see e. g. Stephen to Hay, 
1 Nov. 1827, C. O. 267/85, Stephen. 
4. Stephen to J. C. Stephenp 21 Feb. 18/+21 Stephen Papers# Journal of 
letters to J. C. S., 1816-45. 
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Such personal contacts with a colory were unusual and undoubtedly 
influential. Sierra Leone had long suffered a bad reputation in Britain 
as a rather costly and corrupt imperial venture; but his Clapham upbringing 
1 
provided Stephen with a useful antidote to current opinion. There can 
be no doubt that he regarded Sierra Leone as an important-pxperiment in 
humanitarianism. He made this clear in a sharp remark to an official 
colleague in 1834: 
"I need not remind you that the settlement of 
Sierra Leone was established upon the express 
and avowed principle of advancing the cause of 
justice and humanity) by studiously respecting 
the rights of the native inhabitants, till then 
perpetually violated by all the nations of Europe 
and emphatically by this country". 2 
But if this suggests that his concern for Sierra Leone was especially deep, 
it is misleading. The causes which Stephen had championed elsewhere were 
largely those which he championed in Sierra Leone. Just as he used the 
question of slavery in Trinidad to bolster his authority and increase his 
departmental prestiges so he took up Sierra Leone cases involving slave 
trading and made them central issues of administration. But though the 
pattern was similars, there were, of courses, important differences of 
subject and treatment. 
Part of Stephen's early work on Sierra Leone administration was 
designed to protect the rights of the indigenous African peoples living in 
or around the settlement. In doing so he hoped to aid the cause for which, 
1. Fyfe) Sierra Leone, p. 224. 
2. Stephen to Hay, 23 Jan. 1834, C. O. 267/125- 
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in his opinioný the colony had been founded. In 1817 Stephen was 
required to eynmine local regulations governing the conduct of Kru, settlers. 
The Krumen were West Africans from the Cape Palmas region who had migrated 
1 
to the colorq to work as labourers. Stephen disliked the way in which 
the Sierra Leone goverment proposed to organize them. Not only were the 
regulations loose and inaccurate but the central proposal to divide the 
Krumen into tribes and exact tribal as well as individual punishments in 
cases of crime seemed objectionable. Although this proposal was supposedly 
based on Granville Sharp's plan of a medieval frankpledge system., it 
appeared to Stephen to require considerable modification to meet the circum- 
stances of Sierra Leone. What disturbed him was not so much the departure 
from European models or even from English views of equity but the manifest 
injustice to individuals to be punished for the crimes of others and the 
failure to provide real authority to the tribal units to match the respon- 
sibility demanded of them. His objections were upheld and the laws were 
2 
vetoed. 
The Ya-umen were immigrants in the colorq but most of the contacts- 
and collisions between settlers and indigenous peoples took place on the 
colony's frontiers or beyond its boundaries. Here Stephen initially took 
1. Fyfe, Sierra Leone, p. 78. 
2. Stephen's report, 3.1 July 1817, C. O. 323AO,, f. 193. Ten years after 
this report Stephen was again successfully urging consideration for 
the rights of the Krumen by preventing their exclusion from the 
settlement: Stephen to Hay, 1 Nov. 1827, C. O., 267/85, Stephen. 
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a strong line in upholding the rights of the indigenous peoples. He 
insisted that the British goverment was pledgedas "an inviolable principle", 
to claim sovereignty only over areas where the chiefs had ceded their lands 
officially to Britain in return for payment. He declared invalid all 
claims made by virtue of prior discovery or through treaties between chiefs 
and private individuals. All attempts by tho local goverment to extend 
their jurisdiction beyond the colonial boundaries were rejected outright. 
This dogmatic stance was highly significant. By implication Stephen was 
insisting that) despite the existence of a formal British colony in West 
Africa, the indigenous coastal peoples still possessed all the attributes 
of sovereignty. British settlers could not push back the official frontier 
of the colony by occupying native lands. This view came under fire from 
many quarters-, in the following decades butýsince it had a political as 
well as legal significance for him, Stephen upheld his opinion even after 
2 
he became Under-Secretary. 
The first settlers in Sierra Leone were mainly free Negroes from the 
West Indies and North America (usually called the Maroons and the Nova 
Scotians). With his interest in Sierra Leone as a humanitarian experiment, 
Stephen to Hayp 23 Jan. 1834, C. O. 267/125P Stephen; see also 
Stephen's reporty 14 Feb. 1834P C. O. 323150) f. 424- 
2. It meantp of coursep that British subjects were under local tribal 
laws when outside the colony: Stephen to Hay, 23 Jan. 1834, C. O. 
267A25ý Stephen. For a later instance see Jeremie to Russell, 
4 Mar. 1841p No. -24p minutesp C. O. 267/163- 
2Z7 
Stephený not surprisingly,, was also prone to favour them in their battles 
with the local government on such questions as land disputes or debates 
about the constitution. He was acutely conscioust as some of the governors 
were not) of how much the goverment had been forced to default on its 
early promises of extensive land grants for Sierra Leone settlers. When 
the governor proposed to investigate all land titles in 1828, Stephen 
suggested that the government was morally obliged to recognize even defective 
1 
titles. Hb also successfully opposed the governor's attempts to exact 
quit-rents on those land holders who could not prove their exemption to 
such taxes. In the counsel's view the onus on proving liability ought 
more justly to lie with the local governmentp especially when titles were 
2 
defective. He also battled, as in Trinidadp for the rights to security 
3 
of the squatters on government lands. 
His faith in the political sense of the settlers was well expressed 
when he was asked to comment on a legal case in 1833. A grand jury 
composed of settlers had gone beyond their proper legal sphere to criticise 
the general conduct of the colonyts affairs. Stephen did not object. 
Since Sierra Leone had no Popular institutionp he stated., it was unwise to 
resistp even though impossible to officially acknowledgep such an unorthodox 
1. Stephents report, 8 Mar. 1828; C-0- 323/45t f. 422. 
2. Stephen's report, 28 May 183/+v C-0. 323150) f. 425. 
3. Stephen's reportv 8 Mar. 1828, C-0. 323//+5.. f- 422. 
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method of expressing public feeling. He opposed the suggestion that the 
chief justice who had accepted the grand jury's remonstrance should be 
reprimanded. His concern about the unrepresentative nature of the local 
government may also explain why Stephen invariably Insisted upon the 
governor consulting his council on all legislative questions. since the 
council alone could give some colour of popular endorsement to the acts 
2 
oi the government. 
In these and other ways Stephen used his influence as counsel to 
protect those whom he considered were not being adequately protected by 
the local legislature. This was typical of his work on crown colony 
administration. But in Sierra Leone he also went as far as to question 
the whole basis of the local government's authority to make laws binding 
on the settlers. As a lawyer. Stephen was unhappy with the legal basis 
of the Sierra Leone constitutions perhaps because he saw the ambiguity in 
a settlement colony possessing the institutions of a conquered colony. As 
early as 1820, he expressed some doubts about the jurisdiction of the Sierra 
3 
Leone, legislature. It cannot be purely coincidental that, in the following 
year, the statute which abolished the African Company and vested its forts 
and other possessions on the Gold Coast in the Sierra Leone government was 
4 
also intended to remedy defects in the original constitution. But 
1. Stephen to My. . 14 Aug. 1833j, C. O.. 267A21p f. 157. - 
2. Stephen's reportp 4 May 1833P C-0- 323/49, ff. 236,238. 
3- Stephents report, 10 July 1820,, C-0.323/412 f. 96. It can be argued 
of course) though Stephen himself did not say this., that Sierra Leone 
became a conquered colory by the defeat of the Temne in 1801 and the 




Stephen took no part in the preparation or drafting of the 1821 act. 
Two years later, he was drafting a billdealing with the power of 
the governor and council to legislate for Sierra Leone and its dependencies, 
which was avowedly designed to remove the objections to which the 1821 act 
had been adjudged liable. In view of the care which he put into this work 
and his later statements about it., it seems certain that Stephen himself 
shared these objections. But his amendments were purely technical and in 
no way sought to change the structure or nature of the government. He 
2 
tried only to formalise the legislative powers of the governor in council. 
In the eventp the technicalities must have been thought unimportant since 
the amendments were dropped. If the direct result of Stephen's inter- 
vention was small., however., it may have helped to remind the secretaries 
of state to treat Sierra Leone as a colory without representative institut- 
ions which had to be checked occasionally rather than as a long-settled 
community which could merely be cajoled. It my also have forced the 
governor to consult his council. For his part Stephen reinforced this 
4. (continued) Treasury to Goulburnp 27 Dec. 1820, C. O. 267/52j Treasury. 
This suggestion was also supported by governor McCarthy: McCarthy 
to Hill, 16 Nov. 1820, C. O. 267/52. 
1. Treasury to Goulburnp V Dec. 1820p C. O. 267/52 says explicitly that 
the draft was prepared outside the Colonial Office. 
2. Stephen's draft billp n. d., C. O. 267/55., Stephen; see also Stephen 
to Wilmoto 20 Apr. 1823P C. O. 267/59, Stephen; and Doherty to Russellf 
10 July 1840. - No. 26, minute, C. 0.267A59- 
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-)q policy of treating Sierra Leone as a-crown colony by asserting the power. 
10 
to amend the governor's commission and instructions. 
As with Trinidadý slavery questions took up the bulk of Stephen's 
time and energy during his yearsas counsel. Sierra Leone had been foundedy 
in his opiniont as an experimental settlement of free Negroes., to undo some, 
of the wrongs which Europeans had done to Africans by the slave trade. 
After its foundation the colony became a major centre of British activity 
in combating the slave trade. The West African naval squadron which 
patrolled the coast in an attempt to intercept slave ships used Sierra 
Leone's port of Fi-eetown as a base. A Mixed Commission Court) set up 
for the trial of slave trade cases) vas established in the colony. Mixed 
Commission Courts derived their authority from international agreements 
which outlawed the slave trade for citizens of the signatory nations. 
Though most of these agreements were partially defective and were often 
evaded, they were of great importance for the colony. Slaves whose ships 
were captured in transit to the New World were brought to Sierra Leone and., 
when judged by the courts to have been transported Illegally, were settledp 
at the expense of the British government, in villages in the colony. These 
so-called recaptives or Liberated Africans rapidly became the major element 
2 
in the colonial population. 
1. Stephen to Horton, 14 July 1824., C. O. 267/63., Stephen. 
2. Rifey Sierra Leone, pp. 99-206. 
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Stephen appreciated that Sierra Leone's contribution to the extermin- 
ation of the slave trade was the major Justification for the expense 
incurred there by the British Treasury. He was as tireless in the detection I 
and investigation of slave trading caseslin Sierrw, Leone as in protecting 
1 
the slaves in Trinidad. He supported every colonial attempt to attack 
European slave trading even to the point of condoning illegal proceedings. 
He tried to demonstrate the inadequacies of the international agreements 
2 
(particularly the Portuguese agreement which applied a ban only on slaves 
3 
shipped north of the Equator).. He even gave moral support-, to the governor 
4 
who took the law into his oun hands. To prevent the return to slave 
trading of captured slave vessels, he advocated breaking them up on condem- 
5 
nation of their cargoes -a policy which was officially sanctioned in 1835. 
In factwhatever measures the local government undertook to destroy the 
slave trade could be sure of Stephen's encouragement and support. 
Cases of slavery within the colony were few but the re-enslavement of 
1. E. g. Stephen to Hayp 5 Mayp 1826, C. O. 267/77, Stephen; Stephen to 
Hay, Sept. 1830P C. O. 267/106p Stephen. 
2. E. g. Stephen to Hay, 31 Oct. 1826p C. O. 267/77, Stephen (on dispatch 
no. 61). 
3. E. g. Stephen to HaYP 31 Oct. 1826, C. O. 267/77, Stephen (on dispatch 
no. 60). 
Stephen to H#., 25 Nov. 1830, C. O. 267/106,, Stephen; see also Fyfef 
Sierra Leonet p. 197. 
Stephen's reportp 27 July 1829) C-0.323A6t f. 280. 
'S. smom c V)Ls Q-vt %,; L-T IIS-\t 
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recaptives who strayed to the frontier was not entirely unknown. To 
combat this danger, Stephen urged close attention to the supervision of 
the Liberated African Department which was responsible for maintaining 
and settling the released slaves. Hb felt very strongly on this subject 
and suggested in 1830-that the punishment for settlers who engaged in slave 
1 
trading should be death. The adoption of his suggestion in a few cases 
which followed a series of kidnappings in the early 1830s may well have 
2 
helped to check the crime. 
By the time Stephen became permanent under-secretary the colony of 
Sierra Leone had become an imperial possession of some importance. Not 
only was it a centre of anti-slave trade activity but its population and 
resources were a major factor in British dealings with West Africa. The 
colorypstill confined to the small area of the Sierra Leone peninsulay 
was becoming more densely populated. In the 18303, as the capture of 
slaving vessels continuedt the recaptive population grew to outnumber the 
original settlers of New World Negroes and Europeans and slowly began to 
integrate socially and economically with them. Recaptive villages with 
their individual allotments spread throughout the peninsula: and the busy 
commercial life of the colorq attracted additional immigrants from the 
surrounding country,, Kruy Mandinka and Bullom. So great was the pressure 
1. Stephen to Hay, Sept. 1830v C. O. 267/106., Stephen. 
2. Fyfej Sierra Leone) pp. 182-4. 
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on land2 that the enterprising colonists began to encroach on the 
territory beyond the colonial frontiers. But economic statistics, if 
viewed in an imperial context) were still disappointing. West Africa 
took only about 018% of British exports and Sierra Leonets share of this 
2 
total trade was trifling. 
Inevitably British attention centred on these two crucial facts - 
the growing population and the backward economy. Sierra Leone still 
received considerable attentionp even if just intermittently,. from humani- 
tarians and missionaries intent upon the dissemination of Christianity or 
European civilisation. But statesmen generally could muster little 
enthusiasm for a colorq so inadequately endowed. Somep impressed by the 
bad reputation which the colory had acquired as a white man's grave.. even 
recommended the total abandonment of the colory though this was scarcely 
3 
possible by 1836. 
Neither Stephen nor Glenelgp whose father had been a director of the 
Sierra Leone Company., paid much attention to such critics. They wished 
rather to improve the administration of the colony so that it fulfilled 
its imperial role. This was no simple task. In 1835 Lieutenant Colonel 
H. D. Campbell had been appointed governor of Sierra Leone. He was an 
Cole to Russell, 1.1 Aug. 18491 C. O. 267/162j. f. 11+3; Fyfe, Sierra 
Leone., pp. 209-210. 
2. N. A. Cox-Georgep Finance and Development in-West Africa: The Sierra 
Leone Ex P. D. Curtint The Image of Merience (London., 1961),, p. 1/+2; 
Africa (Madison., Wisconsinp 1964)v pp. 277-95. 
3. Curtin,, ibid. j pp. 161,196) 340; see also Hayto memorandump n. d. 
1830, Murray Papersy N. L. S... vol. 171,43-3.6, f. 66. 
234:, 
energetic but irresponsible mant temperamental2y unsuited to dealing with 
a smallp quarrelsome colonial establishment. To make matters worse he 
had also a private grudge against Glenelg. In his short period in office, 9 
Campbe4 with his insane suspiciousnes; reduced the local administration 
to chaos. His dispatches to the Colonial Office consisted largely of 
wildý vindictive charges against his officials or against a1vone who in the 
I 
least offended him. 
2 
Stephen was clearly repelled by Campbell's lack of self-control. 
Initially he tried to preach concillationp urging the governor to put the 
3 
interests of his colony above arq personal concerns. Butý before long, 
Campbell became convinced that his enemies were not confined to the local 
establishment. A torrent of dispatches from Sierra Leone hinted at the 
4 
complicity of the Colonial Office in his officials t imputed insubordination.. 
Though it is difficult to prove conclusivelyp Stephen probably decided 
that there was no other solution for the government but to recall Campbell 
5 
and then successfully attempted to convert Glenelg to his point of view. 
le His dispatches are found in C. O. 267/132 to 139. See also Fyfe, 
Sierra Leone, pp. 198-206. 
2. E. g. CampbeU to Glenelg,, 3 Nov. 1836, Privatep minutesp C. O. 267/134. 
3. E. g. CampbeU to Glenelg, 6 May 1836, No. 67, minute, C. O. 267/138. 
4- E. g. Campbell to Glenelg, 23 May 1836p Private, C. O. 267/132. 
5. Stephen's minute of 20 Jan. 1837 on Campbell to Glenelg, 2 Nov. 1836, 
No. 174, C. O. 267/134 strongly suggests Stephen's initiative and the 
fact that the minutes (which are in this period almost always by Stephen) 
C\ were covered-up subsequently again suggests this conclusion., %ý 
-., - --, '' tl-, 
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If Campbell's governorship had been limited to vituperative attacks 
on his superiors and subordinates, the damage which he did could easily 
have been repaired. But he was also a man of action. He saw himself 
as a peacemaker in the wars between the Temne and Loko peoples which had 
for years disrupted the stability of the lands beyond the colony's frontier. 
In 1836, acting entirely on his own responsibility, he mounted an expedition 
to the interior and induced both sides in the war to sign an agreement at 
a place called Magbele. At the same time he secured from the chiefs 
certain trading rights for British subjects in their lands in return for 
1 
the payment of subsidies or 'presents'. 
Since the negotiation of treaties to end native wars and open trade 
2 
relations was a recognised part of British West African policyy Stephens 
when faced with the Magbele agreement.. recommended that Campbell receive 
the customary congratulations of the secretary of state. Buts more 
critical than his predecessor who had allowed a vex7 similar treaty to 
3 
pass without objection five years earlier2 he insisted that three of the 
main articles signed at Magbele were objectionable and must be revoked. 
Curiously., he does not seem to have anticipated any great difficulty in 
rescinding three clauses in a treaty already formally agreed to and signed. 
1. Campbell to Glenelg, 2 May 1836, No. 63, C. O. 267A32. 
2. Fyfe, Sierra Leone, pp. 185-6. 
3- For detailsý Fyfep ibid., pp. 192-3. 
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Perhaps the governor's assurance that the chiefs were extremely willing 
1 
to sign further agreements misled him. Even if such criticisms were 
practicablep howeverv two of Stephen's three points seem rather dubious. 
He firstly objected to a clause which specified that the Sierra 
Leone governor should be allowed to extradite colonial debtors from Temne 
lands since he felt that this was against English legal practice and 
endangered individual liberty by giving too much power to the executive, 
This criticism, though legally correct, showed no awarenessiof the importance 
of debtor laws in the commercial transactions of the West African coast 
2 
where tmiddle-men' were widely employed. Secondlyp Stephen wished to 
veto the provision that Temne runaway domestic servants should be returned 
to their owners. He based his conclusion on the fact that domestic 
servitude as practised by the Temne constituted slavery as defined by 
British laws; however mild slavery might be in its operation., slaves in 
British territories automatically became free. Since the extradition was 
therefore a form of enslavement it was as illegal as it was impolitic. Stillt 
lad he been more practical and less, legalisticStephen might have given 
some consideration to questions of compensation to the Temne. 
Stephen's third objection was more defensible. He took exception to 
a clause which stated. that the permission of the Siorra Leone governor was 
1. Campbell to Glenelg, 28 Dec. 1836., C. O. 267AAA-011ý. 
2. See e. g. Reidp Hutton and NichoUs to Stephenp 16 Mar. 1836p C. O. - 267A36, f. 130. 
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to be required before the chiefs could execute the severest degrees of 
country punishments on British subjects in their territories who broke 
their laws. This clause involved for Stephen a question of principle. 
He objected not to the chiefs exercising Jurisdiction over British immigrants j 
- on the contrary thi4 he thoughtwas 'Just and humanel - but to the British 
governor exercisingt even in this moderate wayp a right to interfere in 
native justice and therefore a kind of extra-territorial jurisdiction. He 
seems to have feared that unless. the doctrine was repudiated decisively 
it would provide a pretext for colonial intervention andp ultimately, 
forced territorial expansion. Native sovereign rights would be undermined 
1 
by colonial aggre-ssors. 
Faced with these objections in a dispatch from the Colonial Officep 
Campbell did not bother to argue. Instead he mounted a second unauthorised 
expedition up-country. Unfortunately, his small force found itself out- 
numbered militarily in a brush with the Temne at Magbele and he was forced 
to conclude a second more expensive agreement with them. In the second 
treaty he conceded all three of Stephents points from the earlier agreement 
which he had intended to revoke. Even this did not prevent the Temne and 
2 
Loko from resuming their war. Inevitablys when Stephen became aware of 
Campbell to Glenelgp 2 May 1836, No. 63., draft reply 26 June 1836.. 
C. O. 267/132. 
2. Cole to Glenelg, 14 June 1837, C. O. 267/140; Doherty to Russe112 
22 Apr. 1840, No. 17, C. O. 267/159. 
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the provisions of the second treatyt he reco=ended that a32 the non- 
commercial clauses in both treaties should be unilaterally repudiated by 
the British government. 
This unfortunate beginning to his administrative work on SierrA Leone 
haunted Stephen for years. Campbell, on his return to Britainwas asked 
2 
to explain his behaviour and tried to counter the charges against him by 
attempting to prove that he had been wrongfully dismissed. The unpopular 
permanent under-secretary was only too obvious a candidate for his invective. 
To defend himselftStephen seems to have taken the unprecedented step of 
erasing all his minutes on Campbell. 's-dispatches for 1834 obviously to 
prevent Campbell from discovering his part in the decision to recall the 
3 
governor. But this peculiar performance did not prevent Campbell from 
4 
continuing his attacks. 
Campbell's governorship had demonstrated the vital importance to 
colonial administration of good relations between the governor and the 
Colonial Office. Fortunately for Sierra LeoneCampbell. 's successorp 
1. Campbell to Glenelgp 2 Mar. 1838, No. -26, minutes., C. O.. 267/149. This was not finally settled however until 1840; Doherty to Russellp 
22 Apr. 1840p No. 17p minutes., C. O. 267/159. 
2. E. g. Campbell to Glenelgp 14 Nov. 1837, minutesp C. O. 267/140. 
3. This applies to vols. C. O. 267/1329 133., 131+. For proof of Campbell's 
intention to make the minutes on the dispatches public, see Campbell 
to Russell'.. 30 June 181+0j, C. O. 267A62. 
4- Stephen to Russell", 26 June 1840, C. O. - 267A62, f. 75; Campbell to Russell., correspondence 1840, C. O. 267/162p ff. 65 et seq.; Campbell 
to Lyttletont 3 July 1846, minutes, C. O. 267/196. 
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Colonel Richard Doherty., stood in marked contrast to his predecessor in 
temperament; he was patientp conciliatory and methodical.. and he enjoyed 
the entire confidence of the permanent under-secretary during his years 
in Sierra Leone. Stephen, in facl; may have tried to learn something from 
the bitter experience of Campbell's recall. For example., before Campbells 
^Vý 
recall Stephen had 
Asislnd 
upo4 publishing and investigating the many 
charges against the Sierra Leone officials of complicity in slave trading.. 
But when Doherty appealed for the withdrawal of all these investigations 
2 
so as not to excite suspibionss Stephen agreed to his request. 
With a reliable governor in office it was possible for Stephen to 
reconsider Sierra Leonets problems. He had determined when counsel to 
defend the sovereign rights of the native peoples and to protect, if he 
couldý the interests of the colonists where the local government failed to 
do so. As under-secretax7j, he continued this policylbut he also adopted 
a more positive role by attempting to press the government into aiding the 
group whom he felt most needed assistance - the recaptives or Liberated 
Africans. During Doherty's governorship the recaptivesp who had already 
taken up street trading or huckstering., began to compete -with the older 
settler and European communities for a share in the commercial life of the 
colony. Their opportunity came with the international agreements of the 
1. E. g. Campbell to Glenelgp 9 Har. 1837, No. 206B, C. O. 267/140- 
2. Doherty to Glenelg, 6 Nov. 1837, No. 302 minute, C. O.. 267". 
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1830S on the slave trade which made goods as well as slaves when seized 
on captured slave ships liable to confiscation. The goods, sold by 
auction in the colonyt were bought by the recaptives for retail. By 
their policies of bt7ing co-operatively and selling with low profit marginsp 
1 
they enjoyed spectacular successes in petty trading during the later 1830s- 
Stephen, like Dohertyp wished to encourage this commercial enterprise. 
When attempts were made by the European and Settler merchants to frustrate 
the commercial activities of the recaptives., Stephen insisted upon helping 
2 
them. Both Stephen and Doherty also wanted to encoixage recaptive 
industry and would have liked to have offered the contracts for making 
clothes for the Sierra Leone militia to the colonists. But the Board of 
3 
Ordnance refused to allow a market for English industry to be lost. 
Foiled in this direction) Stephen then tried to open army recruitment to 
4 
the recaptives on terms of complete equality with other settlers. 
Stephen also looked sympathetically on the recaptives' attempts to 
acquire land but he was not always able to help them. To the legal 
A. T. Porter) Creol (Iondon, 1963)t PP. 19-50; Pyfep Sierra Leone, 
p. 204. 
2. Doherty to Glenelgj 23 Sept. 1838, & 24 Sept. 1838., Nos. 65'& 66, 
minutes and drafts, C. O. 267/1/+8; Doherty to Russell., 3 Oct. 1840o 
No. 48, minutes.. C. O. 267/160 
3. Doherty to Glenelgp 8 Mar. 1838, No. 18, minutes., C. O.. 267/146; 
Ordnance to Colonial Office, 9 July 1838., minutesf C. O. 267A50. 
4- Somerset to Stephenp 28 Feb. 1837, C. O. 267/142p C. in C. 
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complications of British landownershipý the British goverment tried in 
the later thirties to add the new set of imperial regulations governing 
land sales in accordance with the plan evolved for Australia. Restrictions 
on land ownership-ý even when not strictly enforced, had their effects. 
Rather than stay and compete many recaptives resorted to a solution trad- 
itional in the British Empire - settlement on the frontier --in this case 
a fertile area called Quia to the east of the colony. In doing so they 
imposed a new problem for Stephen by re-raising the disputed issues of 
expansionism and the conflict of interests between settlers and indigenousý 
2 
people. 
Colonial expansionism threatened all the canons of early nineteenth 
century imperial goverment., especially the reluctance to acquire formally 
territorial possessions and the constant insistence on governmental 
retrenchment. Yet it proved impossible to control. By 1838 there were 
said to be three thousand recaptives in Quia. As an added complication 
most Quia immigrants were Mende from the eastern border of the Temne lands., 
and., by settling on the western bordertthreatened the Temne with encirclement. 
Doherty, with Stephen's approvaly tried at first to dissociate the Quia 
settlers from the colony and to abandon them to native rule. But when 
1. Doherty to Glenelgp 4 May 1838.9 No. 30j. C. O. 267/146; Doherty to 
Glenelgj, 10 Apr. 1839, No. Z7. C. O. 267/153; Glenelg to Doherty, 
17 Aug. 1838, C. O. 268/382 p. 106. 
2. Fyfep Sierra Leonep pp. 209-210. Quia is now commonly known as Koya. 
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the Temne ruthlessly attacked and defeated them, Doherty, fearing the whole 
colory threatenedý recommended buying peace by Purchasing the whole of 
Quia. between the Rivers Kates (now Ribi) and Rokelle. This purchases he 
claimedx would have the additional advantages of containing recaptive 
expansion, pacifying the frontiery providing natural boundaries.. opening a 
permanent trade route to the interior and adding a piece of fertile territory 
1 
to the colony. 
Stephen recognized that there were good reasons for annexing Quia 
though he insisted that a full survey should be made first to examine the 
extent of the expenditure involved. But though he favoured an inquiry he 
was not without doubts about the wisdom of unlimited expansion. He explained 
his objections in words which have since been taken - perhaps wrongly - as 
containing his creed: 
"I cannot but think that even if our national resources 
were far more ample than they at present are it would be 
very bad policy to employ in Africa that part of them 
which is available for colonization. In North America 
and in Australia we have vacant continents to occupy and 
every shilling well expended there may be made to yield 
a large and secure return. But in Africa we cannot 
colonize at all without coming into contact with numerous 
warlike tribes, and involving ourselves in their disputes) 
wars and relations with each other. If we could obtain 
the dominion of the whole of that continent it would be 
but a worthless possession..... "2 
Though this extract is normally all that historians quote2 these words 
are merely part of a very long., complex minute and are misleading when 
1. Doherty to Russelly 29 July 1840j No. 34, C. -O. 267/159. 
2. Stephen's minute 21 Dec. 1840 on Doherty to Russellp 29 July 1840, 
No. 34., C. O. 267/159; see also * 
R. Robinson, Z. Gallagher & A. Denny, 
Africa and the Victorians (Londohy 1961)j p. 16. 
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considered out of context. In the sentence followingj, for examplev 
Stephen excepts dominion over all the sea coasts of Africa from his charge 
of worthlessness -a rather sizeable exception! Nextt he points a 
comparison with France whose expansion in the Algerian interior though 
only a limited-success had been expensive and had detracted from her other 
imperial ventures. Two sentences further and the practical administrator 
in Stephen had left the over-worked polemicist in him far behind. Sierra 
Leone was a settlement, its expansionist tendenciesp though deplorable 
perhaps, had to be accepted and the inclination of the flag to follow trade 
3- 
taken for granted: 
nFix that limit fof the boundary of settlement2 where 
you will., there will still be growing up among the 
colonists new, temptations to wander beyond itv and on 
the part of the government there will still be felt 
motives just like those now at work for overtaking the 
fugitives by acquiring the sovereignty of the coimtry 
into which they have escaped". 
Though expansion was inevitable) however., it was not uncontrollable. 
The decision to extend the area of the colory, Stephen believeds should not 
be based on the need to save emigrants whose aggression alarmed the native 
chiefs, but on 'the natural and accidental advantages' of the territory 
concerned$ weighed against the cost to biV and maintain it: 
"I believe it to be quite true that the colony at present 
is too contracted in its limitst and that the boundaries 
are inconvenient and ill-defined. It might perhaps be 
very right to obtain more land and a better line of 
demarcation. 
Stephen's minute, 21 Dec. 1840 on Doherty to RusselI, 29 July 1840) 
No. 34' C 0.. 267 59. Stephen's views on the subject of expansionism 'Ith 1frica 
ýlve 
recently been discussed by John Galbralth in in Sou 
Reluctant &pire (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963),, p. 6. 
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My objection would be to acting on the principle 
of arresting the evils of emigration by acquiring 
the sovereignty of whatever lands the emigrants 
may occupy". 
When the question came up for decision in the Colonial Officep however, 
Glenelg had been replaced by Russell and Grey by Vernon Smith and it was 
Vernon Smith andp at a later date, Stanley-and not Stephen - who set 
1 
their faces determinedly against all formal expansion. 
Stephen had rather more success getting his views accepted on such 
subjects as social welfare legislation and the recruitment of local 
offic . ials. During Doherty's governorship, he made a most important contri- 
bution to the cultural and spiritual development of the recaptives by 
committing the British goverment to provide directly for the education 
of recaptive children rather than subsidising the missionary societies 
to allow them to do so. When H. W. Macaulay, a chairman of the Mixed 
Commissiorýwrote privately to Stephen in 1836 to urge him to aid tho cause 
of education in the colony,, Stephen ordered his letter to be registered 
and circulated in the Colonial Office. This at once forestalled criticisms 
by making his support overt and also gave Macaulay2s scheme political 
consideration since the letter passedp in the normal routine of business., 
to the secretary of state. Thereýwas some opposition to Macaulay's idea: 
the chief clerk, for examplep thought that though the scheme sounded 
admirable the Treasury would refuse to pay for it. But Stephen insisted 
See minute by Vernon Smith, 22 Dec. 1840, on Doherty to Russell, 
29 July 18/+0, C. O. 267/159; 81 Stanley's minute 31 Mar. 1843 on 
Barrow to Stephen., 28 Mar. 181+3, C. O. 267/182p Admiralty. 
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that the Treasury should still be asked and that the case should be 
presented-to them saforcefully as possible by making preliminary enquiries 
to prove its desirability. As a result of these tactics the Treasury 
was convinced and gave its support. 
Sir George Greyj, the parliamentary under-secretaryf was also unhappy 
with the proposal. He felt that the missionary societies who had controlled 
education in the colony should not have to face competition from the state. 
But Stephen knew that the missionaries had overtaxed their resources and 
2 
could find neither the men nor the money to expand their service. in 
18382 therefore2 a new establishment for schools was written into Doherty's 
Instructions so that the education of children in the Liberated African 
3 
Department became a government responsibility. It was also at Stephen's 
suggestion that teachers and preachers for the recaptives were sought in 
the West Indies since he felt that Negroes would fare better in Sierra 
Leone's climate than British missionaries and would provide a model in 
4 
civilized living for the members of their own race. 
During Doherty's governorship three outbreaks of yellow fever and one 
1. Macaulay to Stephens 25 Nov. 1836, minutes, C. O. 267A37- 
2* Smith's memorandum and Stephen's minute on it, 14 Dec. 18360after 
Macaulay to Stephens 25 Nov. 1836p C. O. 267/137. 
3- Instructions to Dohertyp 2 May 1837y C. O. 268/33P PPý 331--57. 
4- Coates to Glenelgp 28 Dec. 1836o minute, C. O. 267A35s C. M. S. 
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violent hurricane caused much loss of life and dealt a serious blow at 
attempts to maintain a-European establishment; the Europeans usually 
1 
succumbed first. Even major postsy like Queents Advocate or Chief 
Justice, had to be filled by deputies as no suitable British candidates 
could be found to risk their lives for the meagre salary of a Sierra Leone 
2 
official. Stephen was convinced that the westernized Negroes of the - 
West Indian empire should be brought in to lead their fellows in West 
Afribaý. He would have preferred recruiting Sierra Leone officials exclus- 
3 
ively from West Indians of African descent. Such a wilful alienation of 
patronage., howevery was more than Glenelg was prepared to stand. Though 
they agreed on a compromise to appoint West Indians with British patrons, 
it uas only during Russell's secretaryship that Stephen's plan was elevated 
4 
into a deliberate gove rnm ent policy. But even GlenelgIs small concession 
did result in the appointmentgamongst others, of Robert Dougan and John Carr.. 
two West Indians of some abilityt both of whom were later to serve for a time 
5 
as acting-governor. 
1. Fyfe.. Sle=a Leoney p. 150. 
2. Doherty to Glonelgt 12 Dec. 1837, No. 42 and 18 Dec. 1837j, No., 44p 
C. 0. ý 267/141. 
3. E. g. Doherty to Glenelt) 18 Dec. 1837, No. 4/+, minute, C. O.. 267/141. 
4- Instructions to Madden) 26 Nov. 181+0p and draft to Treasuryy V Aug. 
18/+l.. C. 0.267A70j. ff. 2j, 1+16. 
5-- Fyfe,, Si6rra Leonep pp. 211y 220-ly 261) Z76-8. 
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Stephen's paternalistic interest in the welfare of the recaptives 
continued to affect policy even after Normanby and then Russell succeeded 
Glenelg. He noted especially that care was required when the recaptives' 
'propensity to wander' carried them outside the boundaries of the colony. 
Not all recaptives who felt cramped in the colony chose the rigours of the 
frontier. Many preferred to explore the lands to the south or the east 
and many., especially amon,,.,, the recently released slavesp returned to their 
2 
original homes in the interior. The most ambitious recaptive undertaking 
was a plan for several hundred settlers together with a missionax7 to 
colonize a district round Badagry, in the Bight of Benin, an area notorious 
for slave-trading. They hoped to establish there an asylum of Christian 
enlightenment and western civilization which eventually by good example 
3 
would oust the slave trade. 
Despite the fact that it involved an extension of British influence 
in West Africat Stephen had no objections on principle to the Badagry 
settlement. But he considered it an impracticable scheme. Tho lack 
of finance augured ill for a colony; the dangers of recapture into slavery 
were too great to be ignored; -and such a settlement seemed unlikely to 
succeed in its object of replacing slavery by legitimate commerce as its 
1. Campbell to Glenelgp 11 JUIY 1836, No. 104p minute., C. O. 267/132. 
2. Fyfe, Sierra Leone, pp. 212-3$ 227-8. 
3- Doherty to Russellp 30 Nov. 18390, No. 79, C. O. 267A54- 
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proposers hoped. He therefore advised against giving governmental 
assistance though he felt that the governor should be left to decide 
whether or not to a3low them to go on their own. Though Russell agreed 
with himp Stephen was mistaken in his predictions. The recaptives went 
unassisted and secured far more solid results in the dissemination of 
European ideas and in stopping slave trading than the government-supported 
2 
and vastly more expensive expedition to the Niger. 
A second proposal for dealing with the peripatetic recaptive was to 
transport him to the West Indies. Stepheny as already noted., agreed to 
the plan but he was never very hopeful about the prospects. He felt that 
it was necessary to apply some form of coercion. such as passport controls, 
to divert Sierra Leone emigration to the West Indies and away from other 
West African settlements such as at Badagry. But Russell was against this 
and preferred instead to send out to the West Indies recaptive delegated 
'observers' from Sierra Leone villages to gather the news of the attractions3 
3 
of the New World. This plan was -largely a failure. 
1. Doherty to Russell. 20 Mar. 1840, No. 9p minutes, C. O. 267/159; 
Lushington to Russell., 20 Apr. 1840, C. 0 . 267/162.. f. 259. 
2. Stephen had thought of employing them as Buxton's auxiliaries: Doherty 
to Russellp 30 Nov. 1839., No. 'IV., minute, C. O. 267/3,54. For the 
Niger Expedition see Tohn Gallagher, 'Fowell Buxton and the New 
African Policy, 3.838-421., Cambridge Historical Journaly X, 1,, 1950., 
PP. 36-58. 
3. Doherty to Russell. 20 Mar. 1840) No. 91 minutesp C. O.. 267/159; see 
also Torrens & Villiers to Stephen, 1 Jan. 1841) minutesp C. O. 267/168p 
Iand Board. 
4. Fyfej Sierra Leone, pp. 224-5. 
249 
Stephen and Russell were more in agreement and probably more successful 
in dealing with the recaptives who remained in the colorq than with the 
emigmnts. At Governor Doherty's suggestion, they decided to offer subsidies 
for agricultural produce and to set up a model farm to instruct and encourage 
1 
the colonists in the ways of commercial agricultural production. But 
this was an exceptional effort in the later part of Russell's secretaryship. 
Býr stages Russell had beg-un to move away from accepting the suggestions of 
his under-secretary or of the Sierra Leone governor and to consider instead 
implementing a West African policy influenced from a quite different 
direction. 
Russell's short administration is of great importance in the history 
of Sierra Leone. Because of the instability of the Melbourne governmentp 
colonial policy had become extremely susceptible to parliamentary pressures. 
On West African questions one group led by Sir Thomas Fowell Burton became 
particularly influential. Buxton's supporters consisted of a-disparate 
collection of humanitarian and Christian groups. Their strength lay in 
the fact that though their leader was not himself a member of parliament 
he possessed in the House of Commons a body of committed voters whose 
defection from the government could have brought it down. Buxtonts views 
also appealed to the government in that they managed to embrace both 
humanitarianism and retrenchment* He claimed that the successful adoption 
of his plans would lead to the end of slave trading from West Africa and 
1. Jeremie to Russell.. 6 Jan. 1841, No. 7p minutesp C. O. 267/163. 
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so would cut down the goverment's expenditure on suppressing the trade. 
Buxton suggested two basic plans. The firstp which concerned Sierra 
Leone only indirectly, was the establishment of a colony in the Niger 
region which, by serving as a successful experiment in legitimate commercet 
would eliminate the slave trade. The second was to negotiate treaties 
with African chiefs in which the chiefs would agree to abolish the slave 
trade in return for a promise of legitimate trade with the British. The 
latter proposal was not now, Sierra Leone governors and patrolling naval 
commissioners had already concluded several such agreements and Stephen 
was on record as favouring the idea. But the treaties were now to be 
2 
made more precise and given the full support of the goverment. 
Russell himself eventual], v undertook the task of drawing up a model 
slave treatyt utilising the services of two other government departments 
3 
and experienced clerks in doing so. The model which finally emerged from 
this cumbersome procedure contained a very large number of stipulations 
including several favouring the assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction 
4 
by the Sierra Leone governor. Stephen undoubtedly would have questioned 
Jo Gallagherv C. H-J! -. 9 Xp is 1950, Pp. 36-58; P. Curtin, Image of Africa, 
pp. 289-317. 
2. For earlier examples see the appendix to C. O. 267/148; Doherty to 
Normahby, 10 Oct. 1839, No. 60, minutes, drafts & appendicest C. O. 
267A54- 
3- Doherty to Normahby., 10 Oct. 1839, No. 60, minutes & draftsý C. O. 
267/154- 
J. Gallagher., C. H., T. p X, 1,1950, PP. 46-7y 51-2. 
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these if he had been consulted but., after the prel I minary stages, he was mt. 
It is possible that he was deliberately ignored because of the current 
1 
strength of the colonial reform- movement in Britain. Nonetheless 
Stephen found an opportunity to air his views. 
Governor Doherty., worried by continued frontier lawlessness and 
dubious of Temne law., arranged with the Temne chiefs for British subjects 
who committed crimes in their lands to be handed over to the British 
2 
authorities for trial. This act was open to precisely the same objection 
which Stephen had earlier raised in condemning the Magbele agreements since 
it arrogated to the local government the power of extra-territorial juris- 
diction. Stephen was obviously in a dilemma. He could not bring himself 
to support Doherty., but experience had shown that something would have to 
be done about clashes between settlers and indigenous peoples on the frontier. 
There seemed to be only two possible solutions. Russell would either have 
to secure an act of parliament to provide the Sierra Leone governor with 
the authority to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction (there were prece- 
Xdents for this in Canada and elsewhere) or he must order Doherty to revoke 
the agreement and proclaim that settlers residing outside the colony were 
subject to the laws of the lands they inhabited. Both solutions seemed 
'in some degree' objectionablep the former involving the intervention of 
l.. Curtin, Image of Africa, pp. 291-2p 340. 
2. Doherty to Russellp 29 Nov. 1839, No. 74, C. O. 267A54- 
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parliament., the latter embarrassing the chiefs and the governor. Of 
the two Stephenp because of his concern for hative sovereigntyp leaned 
towards the latter. 
Russell initially favoured an act of parliament; but it was ultimately 
decided to submit the whole question to the one-man commission of investi- 
gation which had been appointed to inquire into the British West African 
2 
possessions. This commissionwhich was undertaken by Dr. Richard Robert 
Madden, was also a product of the Buxton pressure group. Madden was a 
controversial choice for an investigation which was to deal mainly with 
slave trading allegations. During previous goverment service in the 
West Indies, his animus against merchants and planters had been undisguised 
3 
but thist of coursep was no criticism in the eyes of Buxton's group. So 
far as can be established Stephen too had no objections to the appointment: 
but he apparently felt that Madden should be required to deal not with 
slave questions alone but with the general administration of the British 
West African possessions. 
In the interval between Madden's appointment in the summer of 1840 
1. Doherty to Russell# 2 Dec. 1839, No. 76, minutesp C. O. 267/154. 
2. Doherty to Russell., 27 July 1840P No. 33, minutesp C. O. 267/159. 
3. G. E. Metcalfep Maclean of the Gold Coast (London., 1962)p pp. 245-75; 
Curtin2 Image of Africa, p. 305; Gallagher., C-H-J-P Xj Ip 19502 P. 53. 
4. Cole to Russell, 11 Aug. 1840., minutes, C. O. 267/162., f. 143. 
I -- I 'T.. 1-1 -1 
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and his departi=e for West Africa in the following year., Dohertyj the 
Sierra Leone governorp was- transf erred-'to the West Indies and John Jeremie 
was appointed to replace him. Jeremie2 like Madden2 held notoriously 
extremist views on slavery questions and doubtless his appointment also 
1 
owed something to Buxton's influence. The choice may not have entirely 
pleased Stephen. In February 18/+Op just seven months before Jeremiets 
appointment., Stephen emphatically dismissed the idea of preferring him to 
Doherty. DohertYp he wrote, was "a man who has every advantage over Mr. 
2 
Jeremie both in youth and vigour". But as long as Buxton's influence 
was paramount with the government, Stephen's voice went unheard. 
ýýC, OýUý)2 once Jeremie's appointment was known., Stephen2 perhaps 
playing the perfect subordinate for Russe112 chose to co-operate fully 
3 
with him. This was certainly a miscalculationý and it is difficult to 
decide why Stephen so completely changed his mind. It is possible that 
he decided to adopt wholeheartedly the government's new approach. He 
believed that on such subjects as the Niger expedition "half measures are 
1. Metcalfe, Macleanp p. 260; Gallagher, C. H. J., Xp J, 1950., P. 52. 
2. Mackenzie to Normanby., 5 June 1839., Separateý Stephen's memorandum 
17 Feb. 1840, C. O. 54/171. See also Mackenzie to Russell, 16 Dec. 
1839,, Separate., minute., C. O. 54/173. 
3- See e. g. Doherty to RusseU, 10 July 181+0,, No. 26y minutet C. O. 
267/159. 
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worse than none" and "if we venture at all it is wise to venture bravely 
1 
and to throw for a large stake". This would explain whyt when the 2 
policy collapsed in 1841, Stephen simply abandoned it. There is some 
evidence for this. Jeremiep for exampley following one of Buxton's 
suggestions, asked to be allowed to act direct3y as governor in each of 
the British West African territories and Stephen supported him even though 
3 
he had earlier repudiated the idea as impracticable. Before this could 
be implemented2 however,, he discovered constitutional objections which 
resulted in a postponement. The scheme was in any case unsound and 
Jeremie was far too inexperienced in West African affairs to be safely 
4 
trusted with such wide-ranging powers. Another possibility is that 
Stephen was acting under strict instructions from his political masters 
5 
to aid Jeremie and Madden. 
Whatever the explanation, both Jeremie's and Maddents appointments had 
1. Gallagher, C. H. J. ) X, i't 1950, p. 46. 
2. - Cf Stephen's minutes on 
Jeremie to Russell, 4 Mar. 1841y No. 2/+.. 
C.;. 267/163, and Carr- to Russell, 20 July 18/+l, No. 172 C. O. 267/164. 
3. Doherty to Glenelg, 7 June 1838) No- 33, C. O. 267/147; Jeremib to 
Stephen, 2 Oct. 181+Oy minutes, C. O. 267A60; Jbremie to Stephen, 
14 Nov. 1840, minutesp C. O. 267/160. 
4. Law Officers to Russell) 26 Mar. 18/+lt minutesp C. O. 267/168. 
5. Stephen suggested this to Stanley: Carr to Stanley, 16 Aug. 1841, 
No. 32, C. O. 267/165. But it seems dubious since -Teremic corresponded 
privately with Stephen: e. g. Jeremie to Stephen., 10 Jan. 1841y privatej, 
C. O. 267/163. 
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unfortunate repercussions. Jeremie succumbed to the climate in four 
monthso leaving behind him in draft a legion of chimerical schemes. 
Stephen had the embarrassing duty of repudiating them as government policies 
1 
despite the support he had given them earlier. -Jeremie's one lasting 
achievement was a treaty-with the Temne based on Russelits model treaty 
instructions and designed to replace Campbell's Magbele conventions. 
X6remiels treaty illustrates the length to which Stephen was prepared 
to go with the government's newpolicy. He recommended for acceptance 
Jeremie's plans for a naval and military blockade of the rivers around the 
colory mhere slave trade activity was allegedly rife. He endorsed the 
setting up of full trade and diplomatic relations with the Temne including 
a postal servicep a customs station and a permanent residency. He agreed 
to the proposal to extend the colonial frontier to include Quia by negot- 
iation with the chiefs. Most strikingly of all., he relinquished his 
position of outright opposition to every exercise of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. He still protested about the illegality of extending British 
jurisdiction to British subjects outside the colony but, having learned the 
lessons of Magbele.. he insisted only that this should be rectified by 
passing an act of parliament. In conclusion he recommended the immediate 
2 
acceptance of the treaty in the hope of stabilising the frontier. 
E. g. Ferguson to Russel-I, 2 Oct. 1841, No. 8, C. O. 267/166 compared 
with Jeremie to Russell, 6 Jan. 1841, No. 7, minutesp C. O. 267/163. 
Jeremie to Russell,, 4!. Yar. 181+lt No. 24t minutes., C. O. 267/163. 
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Unfortunately Treasury wranglings over the payment of 'presents' held up 
ratification for years. 
Madden's investigations were equally unfortunate. Stephen and 
Russell disagreed over the scope of the Madden commission but they agreed 
on the basic premises. Madden was to investigate a series of allegations 
2 
relating to British complicity in West African slave trading. In fact., 
on all of the main points to be considered the Colonial Office had already 
3 
made up its mind long before Madden was even appointed. Doubtless 
influenced by his instructions and briefings Madden obligingly proceeded 
to prove that the Colonial Office was basically right in its suspicions. 
In fact his report had limited value as an independent inquiry. 
Madden survived his residence in Sierra Leone by making his stay 
brief. Instead of the eighteen months' tour which Stephen had envisagedt 
Madden spent only four and devoted a mere fortnight to examining conditions 
4 
in Sierra Leone. His analyses2 of courses were full of errors and most 
of the sound recommendations originated with the Colonial Office. But 
l.. Treasury to Stephen., 15 Apr. 1842., C. O. 267A78, Treasury. 
2. Compare their suggestions for the instructions to Madden: drafts by 
Russell and Stephenp 11 Nov. 181+0, C. O. 267/17o., ff. 17 & 22. 
3. On Sierra Leonep for example., the subjects were the mortality rate for 
officials., frontier expansion and West Indian immigration from West 
Africa; Instructionsp 26 Nov. 181+0., C. O. 267/170p f. 2. 
Metcalfe# Maclea . pp. 260-2. 
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initially Stephen was not displeased. At least on the key points which 
he had been asked to examine Madden produced conclusive evidence to 
substantiate what Stephen had been advocating for some time., particularly 
I 
on the wealmesses. of the anti-slave trade campaign. Apart from a rapid 
perusal of these pointst it seems unlikely that Stephen or his superiors 
even looked at the report. Instead they requested that Madden make a 
2 
digest of his compendious analyses. 
Out of the many points which Madden recommended for attention Stephen 
3 
then selected those which interested him and abandoned the rest. With 
regard to Sierra Leone (which, of courseý occupied only a fraction of the 
total report) Stephen chose two min points1from a long general report 
4 
which he was later to condemn as wildly inaccurate in detail. He firstly 
endorsed Maddents proposal to abolish the inefficient Liberated African 
Department which supervised the newly landed recaptives though he insisted 
on retaining the educational facilities for recaptive children. Secondly 
1. Madden's reportp first part, 31 July 1841 & Stephen's memop 1+ Aug. 
1841., C. 0.267/171. 
2. Madden's 'Recapitulations It 19 Aug. 3.841.. C. O. 267A70,, f. 141. 
3- This may mean that Stephen did see the weaknesses straight away since 
in demolishing the report subsequently ex-governor Doherty singled 
out almost the same points as Stephen for praise; Stephen to Hopep 
30 Oct- 1841., C. O. 267A65p appendix; Doherty to Hope., 27 Oct. 181+1j, 
C. O. 267A66; Cf. Gal-lagherj, G. H. J., X) is 1950, P. 53) fn. 120. 
Stephen to H6pev 30 Oct. 1841.. on slave treatieso P. O. 267/165p 
appendix. 
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he praised the idea) which he himself had first suggested.. that the whole 
public service in Sierra Leone should be composed entirely of Negroes or 
1 
people of Negro descent. These reco=endations were included in a series 
of drafts which he pressed an Russell only a few days before the secretary 
2 
of state left office. 
Stephen also asked Russell to leave a memorandum for his successor 
urging him to implement these two recommendations and - here deviating 
very far from normal official propriety - announced that he favoured one 
William Ferguson, a coloured army doctor who had been acting governor., to 
3 
replace Jeremie as governor. This was obviously an attempt to force 
Russell into committing the incoming secretaryp Stanleyp to a policy which 
he might find difficult to reverse. But it failed. Russell insisted that 
4 
the choice of 'men and measures' should be left to his successor. 
It is difficult to say exactly what Stephen thought of what Professor 
Gallagher has called in a recent article the $new African policy' of 
expansionism and intervention in West Africa during the period 1838-1842. 
For Stephents earlier support for these measures., see e. g. Doherty to 
Glenelg, 18 Dec. 1837, No. 41+1 minute, C. O. 267/1/+l; Doherty to 
Normanl: ýy, 2 Sept. 1839., No. 52., minute., C. O. 267/153; and Doherty 
to Glenelg, 23 Sept. 18389 No. 65, minute and draftp C. O. 267/148. 
2. The report on Sierra Leone probably owes something to a memorandum by 
Cole which Stephen forwarded to Madden; Cole to Russell, 3-1 Aug. 1841, 
C. O. 267/162, f. 143; see also Stephen's drafts on Sierra Leone, 
27 Aug. 1841, C. O. 267A70p f. 412. The full report is in C. O. 
267/171, and 172. 
3. Stephen to Vernon Smithp 26 Aug. 18/+l., C. O. 267/170p f- 303. 
4. Russell's minute 28 Aug. 184-1y on Stephen's draft 26 Aug. 1841, 
C. 0.. 267/17 0., f- 412. 
5. Gallagher., C. H. J. 2 X, i., 1950P PP. 36-58. 
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To some extent the policy apparently involved a conflict between two of 
his cardinal principles - the belief that the British government must do 
all in'its power to stop the slave trade and the determination to maintain 
the rights of the indigenous people. The experience of Commissioner 
Maclean at the Gold Coast and the American colony at Liberia had suggested 
to Stephen by 1838 that the extension of European or American power at the 
expense of native sovereignty might aid the process of exterminating the 
1 
trade. But other methods might achieve the same result. 
For Stephen the chief Coal of West African policy remained the extermin- 
ation of the slave trade. Convinced that the trade could be attacked through 
the merchants and speculators in England and in Sierra Leone who either 
lent credit or had trade dealings with suspected slave tradersp Stephen 
2 
recommended warning and then prosecuting them. His superiorsý however, 
were deterred by their fearscf political repercussions since they felt 
that slave trading and legitimate trading were inextricably linked in 
34 
West Africa. The Crown Law officers also had reservations. Even so 
16 Commissioners to Grey) 18 June 1838., minute, C. O. 267/150y f. 551; 
Barrow to Stephen, 25 Nov. 1836, minute, C. O. 267/135t Admiralty; 
Barrow to Glenelg, Sept. 18360 minute, C. O. 267/137, Barrow. 
2. Carrpbell to Glenelgj. 9 liar. 1837, No. 206B., Stephen's draft 17 May 
1837) C. O. 267/140; Nicholls to Stephen, 11 Oct. 1839P minute,, C. O. 
267/156, f. 284. 
3. Doherty to Russelly 17 July 1840, No. 31Y minutes by Russell 18 Nov. 
1840 & Stephen 16 Nov. 1840y C. O. 267/159. 
4. Doherty to Russell) 20 Aug. 1840f No. 37y minutesy drafts and reply2 
C. O. 267/159. 
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expended elsewherep the cause of civilization could best be advanced by 
allowing the British colonies in West Africa to be managed and controlled 
by westernized Negroes andp if possible, like Liberiap as politically 
independent units. This independence., howeverp could not apply to Sierra 
Leone whichp as a long-established colony and head-quarters of the British 
anti-slave trade campaign in West Africap must continue to be an imperial 
1 
responsibility. 
This vision disappeared when the tnew African policy' collapsed after 
the arrival in office of a government under Peel with a secure parliamentary 
majority. Stephen did not immediately abandon Madden - in fact he recom- 
mended Stanley, the incoming Secretary of State) to read Madden's digest 
2 
of August 181+1 and added "I have myself gone carefully through it". But 
Stanley was unwilling to take any decision on the report until a further 
digest had been compiled on the evidence and he asked that Stephen undertake 
3 
this task. Before doing so,, Stephen for the first time offered his opinion 
on some of Madden's recommendations on the subject of slave trading. He 
1. This seems the most likely explanation of Stephen's famous remark that 
Ineither the Gambia nor the Gold Coast are worth retaining - or that if 
retained they should be placed exclusively in the hands of mulattoes 
and Negroes from the West Indies and left to maintain themselves like 
the American Settlement of Liberia". Stephen's memorandums 26 Dec. 
1842p C. O. 96/2, quoted in Curtinp Image of Africap P. 459- 
2. Stephents memorandums 3 Sept. 18/+ls C. O. 267/170p f. 310. 
3- Stanley's memorandums 25 Sept. 1841, C. O. 267/170) f- 317. 
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again protested about the illegal assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction 
-though Madden had approved it - without a supporting act of parliament. I 
In Stephen's opinion it could only lead to continual warfare and endless 
usurpatiom of native sovereignty. In opposition to Madden he also insisted 
that the British slavery abolition acts covered all cases of aiding and 
abetting slave trading and so could not be improved by further legislation. 
And he repeated his view that the only change necessary in West Africa to 
ensure that anti-slave trade policies were enforced vas to appoint trustworthy, 
officials and competent Judicial officers. He was still prepared to accept 
that anti-slave trade treaties with native chiefs could be useful but, 
unlike Madden, hetlpught they were hazardous since2 if broken2 they would 
involve military intervention. Obviously2 even before he had examined 
them in detailý not all of Maddents recommendations had appealed to Stephen@ 
In the digest which he completed a month later2 Stephen challenged 
Maddents views much further. It may be that this was because he was 
criticising the full reports for the first time: or perhaps the fact that 
2 
expert criticism had demolished much of the evidence impressed him. But 
he stressed as never before the inadequacies of Madden's investigations. 
He offered partial defences for those individuals whom Madden had attacked; 
and he denied Madden's competence to pronounce on such subjects as emigration. 
1. Stephen to H6pev 30 Sept. 1841) C. O. 267/3.70, f- 319. 
2. Gallagherý C. H. J. v Xy i's 1950P P- 53P fn. 120. 
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His sl3mmary was a dry statement of the points which Madden had raised and 
was accompanied by a note to Stanley reminding him that decisions were 
1 
still to be taken on most of the questions which Madden had examined. 
Stanley was not the man to be brave where Russell had been cautious. He 
postponed consideration of the drafts and., typicallyý failed to keep Stephen 
2 
informed of his intentions. 
Stephen's concern about expansionism and the undermining of native 
sovereignty had been partly reawakened by acting-governor Carr, a twenty- 
3 
two year old lawyer who had temporarily replaced Jeremie as Sierra Leonets 
governor. In 1841 a disturbance broke out between the Temne inhabitants 
and recaptive settlers in Quia in which a settler was killed. Carr 
A+ 
immediately resolved to use this incident as a pretext for annexation. He 
opened negotiations, backed by threats of force, for the cession of the 
territory. Stephen was obviously upset by this action. He advised 
Stanley strongly against using force to acquire Quia. He again repeated 
his opinion that though the purchase--of Quia might be desirable it was 
first necessary to submit the proposal to detailed examination. Carr's 
action, he feltp was evidence that some assertion of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction might also be desirable to keep British colonial settlers from 
involving the colony in native wars. But this, of courseý could be 
1. Stephen to Hope, 29 Oct. 1841f C. O. 267/170p f- 329; see also Stephen 
to H6PeP 30 Oct. 1841,, C. O. 267/165. appendix. 
2. Carr to Russellt 16 Aug. 1841t No- 32f minutes, C. O. 267/165. 
3. Carr to Russellt 27 Apr. 1841t No. 3t C. O. 267/164. 
4- Carr to Russell., 27 May 1841.. No. 10, C. O. 267/164. 
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legalized only by passing an act of parliament. Stanley would have to 
decide whether either or both proposals were expedient. On receiving 
2 
this advice Stanley decided to consult the cabinet. 
Stephen's role in the formation of policy inevitably changed under 
Stanley since his superior kept secret many of his aims and objects in 
conducting his administration. Stephen continued to write memoranda on 
important questions relating to the slave trade in Sierra Leone but these 
concluded not with recommendationsp as under Russell., but with questions 
3 
which the secretary was left to answer. Nor were Stanley's decisions.. 
when they finally emerged.. always very satisfactory from Stephen's point 
of view. For examplehe decided that Quia was not to be annexed and there 
was to be no formal assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction. Instead 
the governor was to be asked to use his influence with the chiefs to stop 
the slave trade and to allow British subjects involved in criminal cases 
4 
in country areas to be tried in the colony's courts. This seemed an 
unfortunate compromise since it asked for the exercise of power without 
the responsibility. Stephen may have been happier with the provision that 
1. Carr to Russell., 20 July 1841j. No. 17., minutes, C. O. 267/164- 
2. Carr to Russell, 5 Aug. 1841P No. 27y minutes, C. O. 267/165. 
3. E. g. Stephen's memorandum,, 23 Oct. 18410 C. O. 267/165, appendix. 
4. Carr to Russellp 1 Sept. 1841ý No. 39, minutesp C. O. 267/165. 
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the governors were prohibited from making treaties with native chiefs 
which involved the sovereignty or protection of native lands or guaranteed 
1 
military aid. But this was the limit of Stanley's concessions. 
It is quite clear2 in fact, that Stanley was determined to limit 
Stephenýs role by remaining as far as possible independent of hisýadvice. 
From the start of his secretaryship this antagonism had become obvious. 
Stanley rejected Stephents choice for the vacant governorship of Sierra 
2 
Leone and appointed his own nominee., Colonel George Macdonald. It wasp 
however, a short-lived triumph. Stephen was able to insist that Fergusson 
be allowed to succeed to the acting-governorship if a vacancy occurred and., 
on Macdonaldts resignation three years later, Fergusson was finally appointed 
3 
to the chief position - the colony's first coloured governor. But 
normally Stanley was able to reject Stephen's advice with impunity. Within 
a, month of his arrival in the office he had made this quite clear. When 
Stephen minuted on a dispatch from the Treasury that the British government 
ought to provide a healthy residence for the Sierra Leone governor as an 
economic measure as well as a moral dutyý Stanley curtly reminded his subor- 
dinate that he expected to be given facts; and not opinions from his civil 
1. Carr to Russellp 16 Aug. 1841P No. 32j, draft reply., C. O. 267/165. 
2. Fyfep Sierra Leone, p. 241. 
3- Macdonald to Stephenp 9 Oct. 1843y minutes, C. O. 267/*183., Macdonald; 
Treve2yan to Stephenp 8 Dec. 1841, minutes,, C. O. 267/168p Treasury; 




servants. Small wonder if Stephen2s minutes became more impersonal! 
Stephen was not unaccustomed to Stanley's coldness and indifferencep 
and he certainly had not forgotten their encounter in 1833. But the 
reappearance of a definite policy of avoiding or rejecting his advice 
suggests that there were new and possibly localised reasons relating to 
Sierra Leone for this to happen again in 181+2. An explanation is probably 
to be found in the activities of Mathew Forstery a British West African 
2 
merchant whom Madden accused of being involved in slave trading. Unfor- 
tunately for Madden, Forster quickly got word of these charges and immediately 
3 
prepared his defence. Using his contacts inside and outside parliamentp 
he was able to dominate the Select Committee of the House of Commons which 
looked into Madden's charges in 1842. To prove his innocence beyond doubt) 
Forster decided that it was in his interests to demolish every part of 
4 
Madden's report. 
Forster secured as witnesses for the Committee's hearings such unbiased 
authorities as the merchant R. Nicholls who called Sierra Leone "a sink of 
financial iniquity of all sorts, Of follyp cruelty and crime of every 
56 
descriptiont'2 and ex-governor Campbeno Stephen's in7eterate enemy. 
1. Treasury to Stephenp 13 Sept. 1841p minutes., C. O. 267/168p f. 128. 
2. Madden's report, 31 JUIY 1841t C. O. 267/171. 
3- Stephen gives a full account of the question under 'Results' at the 
end of his report in Stephen to Hope, 29 Oct. 1841, C. O. 267/170.. f. 329. 
4. Metcalfy Maclean, pp. Z76-86. 
5. P. P. 0 H. C. p 
(551), 1842, xii) evidence by Nicholls. 
6. P. P. 2 H-C-, v 
(551), v 1842., xi and xii contain the reports and evidence. 
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Stephen was deeply upset by this treatment from a man whose guilt as a slave 
1 
trader he thought almost certain. But Forster did not confine his attacks 
to the obscurity of parliamentary papers. Using his local Berwick newspaperp 
The Warder., Forster told his public: 
"I have been at variance with the Stephen and Macaulay 
party whichp for the last forty years have governed or 
rather misgoverned our colonies on the coast of Africa. 
I have repeatedly exposed their jobs and corrupt influence, 
particularly at Sierra Leone". - 
Ob7iously in view of this kind of virulent public abuse) Stanley could not 
afford to give the least impression that he might be bounden in ary wayto 
his under-secretary. But even this is no excuse for his failure to reply 
2 
to these scurrilous attacks. 
Despite Stanley"s coldness. 9 Stephen had plenty of scope left for his 
energies. In 181+2t when the government decided to refer the disputes over 
the Madden report to the parliamentary select committee on West Africa# 
Stephen spent some of his time assembling material for submission to the 
3 
Committee. His function of legal reviewer also became again an important 
See his minute., 4 Aug- 1841Y on Madden's report., 31 JulY 18419 0-0- 
267/171 and Stephen to Howardy 13 Aug- 1841v C. O. 267/170, f- 308- For 
the abiding nature of this impression see Stephen's minutes 12 Dec. 18460 
on Forster to Hawes., 10 Dec. 1846, C. O. 267/196y Forster. 
2. Forster to Stanley., 18 Nov. 181+2p minutes., C. O. 267A792 Forster. 
3- Yargusson to Stanley., 30 Jan. 18/+2p No. l2p minutes,, C. O. 267/175. 
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element in his work since he could get round Stanley by pronouncing 
ex cathedra judgements on subjects which might otherwise be treated politi- 
1 
cally. Occasionally) too., on subjects in which he took a particular 
interestý Stephen continued to be extremely influential. 
One of his principal interests was in education. Stephen noted with 
pleasure that the missionary societies.. while engaging in friendly competiticr4l 
had made a very substantial contribution to public education in the colony 
in the years since the government had made provision for recaptive schools. 
But when the acting-governor suggested that the local government should 
extend its contribution and-. also engage in public education programmes 
by-setting up a number of schools on its owny he advised against supporting 
the proposal. He feared that missionary societies, if confronted with 
government competitioný would simply withdraw part of the sums which they 
spent on education. The best method for the government to help was by 
promising a subsidy of l0pý' of their current expenditure to each missionary 
group engaging in educational work., provided their contribution from their 
2 
own funds was not diminished as a itsult. He also approved of the local 
government's proposal to build a select school for what Stephen called 
rather bluntly "the more respectable (that is the wealthier) classIt of 
citizens, on the understanding that it should maintain itself by fees. 
1. E. g. Fergusson to Stanley., 26 Jan. 1842, Nos. 6& 7p minutes, C. O. 
267/175. 
2. Yergusson to Stanley, 30 Jan. 181+2, No. 12., minutes, C. O.. 267/175. 
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"The good education of the comparatively rich".. be believedp "is an object 
of great importance for the advantage of all branches of the community". 
This view clearly shows that he was not unmindful of the future welfare 
of the colony. 
Stephen's recommendations for education had a difficult passage 
2 
despite support from the Church Missionary Society. Since the Treasury 
was notoriously keen to keep expenses on education to a minimum., Stephen 
suggested that the governor should be asked to review the whole question 
without considering Treasury reservatiom But Stanley dogmatically 
insisted that any form of state intervention was harmful and that the 
Treasury was justified in its complaints. Government-aided education for 
the recaptives, Stanley maintainedy had led them "to look to the government 
for everything, and has tended to check the feelings or the desire of 
3 
independence". The governor, howevert ultimtely reported in favour of 
4 
Stephents plans and the small government commitment to education survived. 
By 1845 the success of the recaptive emigration to Badagry and the V 5 
Wesleyan mission which accompanied it and the relative failure of emigration 
1. Macdonald to Stanley, 20 May 1842, No. 24, minutesp C. O. 267/175- 
2. Goates to Stanley., 23 May 1842p C. O. 267A78, C. M. S. 
3- Trevelyan to Stephen, 2 Aug. 1842) minutes., C. O. 267/178, Treasury. 
4. Macdonald to Stanley, 12 June 1843, No. 45, minutes and draftsy 
C. O. 267/181. 
5. J. H. Kopytoff, A Preface to Modem Nigeria: The "Sierra Leoneans" in 
Yorura, 1830-jýTO (Madisony Wisconsinp 1965), pp. 24-133- 
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to the West Indies led to an alteration of Stephen's views on emigration. 
Instead of wishing to see the newlyýarrived recaptives shipped off to the 
West Indies for their material and moral benefit Stephen became convinced 
that the salvation of the reclaimed Negro must lie in Africa itself. He 
pointed out that the Church Missionary Society had almost completed the 
building of a college "in which African teachers are to train African 
missionaries": and even in material terms the condition of the recaptives 
under missionary leadership in the villages was fast improving. These 
developmentsv according to Stephen, had resulted in "inducing the Africans 
to regard Sierra Leone as their settled home and as the cradle of African 
civilization". By implication the government should give support to 
educational programmes in Sierra Leone rather than to emigration programmes 
2 
to the West Indies. His superiors, howeverý were not convinced. Not 
until Gladstone replaced Stanley was Stephen's opinion officially endorsed. 
Even in an age of goverment retrenchment Stanley's period at the 
Colonial Office was remarkable for its concentration on economy. Not 
in education alone but in public works and in almost every other field 
of government expenditure) the Treasury was allowed to retrench severely 
4 
3 
on colonial estimates. The sums spent on the Liberated African Department 
1. Carr to Russe112 19 Aug. 1841, No- 352 minute, C. O. 267/165. 
2. Fergusson to Stanley, 8 Apr. 1845, No. 242 minutes2 C. O. 267/187. 
3. Fergusson to Stanley, 26 Nov. 1845, No. 942 minutes2 C. O. 267/189. 
4- See e. g. Trevelyan to Stephent 13 Oct. 1842, C. O. 267/178j. Treasury; 
Trevelyan to Stephen2 13 Sept. 1841, C. O. 267/168j, f. 128) Treasury. 
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were cut substantially and charges transferred from the imperial to colonial 
1 
funds. Stephen became alarmed at this indiscriminate parsimony. On 
one occasion the Treasury threatened to stop the parliamentary grant for 
the support of the colony altogetherbut Stephen2 with the help of ex- 
2 
governor Dohertyp forestalled them. 
This renewed faith in the coloriy at a time when it was again under 
attack is most striking. It brought results even in the constitutional 
field. In 1843 parliament finally passed two foreign jurisdiction acts 
to provide that necessary legalistic basis to the assertion of extra- 
territorial jurisdiction in West Africa which Stephen reluctantly had 
3 
insisted upon for years. He himself undertook the task of drafting the 
bills. But Stanleyts influence was still marked. The provisions governing 
the origins of this power were probably much more vague than Stephen would 
have liked and it was not until 1850 that it was decided to limit the 
jurisdiction to territories in which the sovereign chiefs had agreed to its 
4 
exercise by treaty. 
1. Fyfe, Sierra Leone2 pp, 228-9. 
2. Doherty to Hope) 30 Oct- 1841, minutes, C. O. 267/166; Treasury to 
Stepheny 13 Oct. 18/+l) minutes, C. O. 267A68., Treasury. Stephen also 
attempted to keep slave trade expenditure on imperial funds: e. g. 
Admiralty to C. O. ) 7 June 184: 5y C. O. 267/190, Admiralty. But he was 
not always successful: Trevelyan to Stephen, 2 July 18452 C. O. 267A90f 
Treasury. 
Statutes) 6 Viet. 0- 13 and 6&7 Viet. a. 94- 
C. H. B. E. j II p p. 667. 
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At the same time it was decided to introduce into one of the acts a 
provision which would put beyond any doubt the legislative authority of 
the West African governmentso another of Stephen's favourite topics since 
1823. Again this was less than a total triumph for him. He had suggested 
in preparing the draft that the crown should relinquish its power of direct 
legislation in crown colonies -a far cry from his view in the days when 
West Indian slavery was under consideration. Time and experience had 
given him greater faith in local institutions. "The Crowntly he wrotes 
"may almost always calculate with absolute confidence on the obedience and 
support of colonial legislature of its own nomination". But this idea did 
1 
not appeal to his superiors and was dropped. 
Stephen's faith in the future of the colony is also shown in his 
willingness to allow legislative initiative to pass back to the local 
legislature. This applied particularly in the case of judiciary reform. 
The original charter of justice had proved unsatisfactory and imperial 
attempts to correct its defects had not been uniformly successful. To 
Stephen, since no-one in England was competent to deal with Sierra Leone's 
particular needs, the best solution seemed to beto authorise the Sierra 
Leone legislature to make arq regulation it wished for the administration 
of. justice in the colory. Twenty years before the passing of the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act, Stephen was attempting to destroy one of the reserved 
spheres of imperial authority by allowing the local legislature to determine 
1. Law Officers to Hope., 31 Mar. 181+3y minutes, drafts & memorandat 
C. O. 267/182j, Law Officers. 
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the composition and constitution of judicial tribunals. He had his way. 
C 
The new regulations2 drafted 
1 
1: ýr the permanent under-secretary himself, A 
went into operation in 18/+6. 
It was Gladstone who final2y decided to accept Stephen's advice in 
dealing with the charter of justice. Gladstonep unlike his predecessor, 
felt few qualms about resorting to his under-secretar7 when in need, of 
assistance. In fac% after coping with Stanley's indifference., Stephen 
2 
found himself confronted with the new problem of Gladstone's deference. 
An emphatic change took place on questions of policy. Instead of allowing 
the Treasury to transfer the costs of the local establishment from imperial 
to colonial fundsp for example, Stephen was able to offer them a rebuff. 
Confident of support.. he*issued his warning even before his superior had 
pronounced on the subject: 
"Gladstone is strongly impressed with the conviction that 
the policy of throwing additional burdens on the poor and 
innumerous population of a colony not sufficiently advanced 
to possess a representative assemblys should not be adopte& 
without much caution nor without some preliminary reference 
(when possible) to the local authorities". 3 
As Stephen's influence over policy returned, so significantly did the 
concentration on furthering anti-slave trade activity. In the free trade 
1. Fergusson to Stanley., 27 Sept. 1845, No. 76p drafts2 minutes & memcranda., 
C. O. 267/189. 
2. E. g. Fergusson to Stanley2 29 Nov. 1845, No. 96., minutes, C. O. 267/189. 
3- Trevelyan to Stephen, 21 APr- 1846., minutes and drafts, C. O. 267/195f 
Treasury. 
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decade of the 18/+Os several proposals were made which tended towards the 
opening up of West African trade to every nation on equal terms. In 
184/+, for examplef the Foreign Office proposed to the Board of Trade that 
the Hanse towns should be given warehousing facilities in Sierra Leone. 
in passing this on to the Colonial Office., the Board then widened the 
p)7oposal by asking that Freetowny capital of Sierra Leonej, should be made 
a free warehousing port. Stephen considered the qgestion in relation to 
the general benefits for the colony and decided to advise against its 
implementation. He pointed out that there were two main objections: the 
warehousing system might encourage slave trading there or at least make it 
more difficult to prevent. In addition it might adversely affect the 
colony's customs revenue orf by requiring extra expenditure on administration) 
indirectly affect its finances. The first point was considered crucial 
and since Stephen's fears were subsequently substantiated by the governor 
1 
and by other goverment officialsf the plan was dropped. 
Grey2 like Gladstoneý depended heavily on Stephen's opinions when 
dealing with the administration of Sierra Leone. When the papers were 
very long, Grey preferred to rely wholly on his under-secretary rather than 
2 
waste time on mastering details. Consequently, even in his last year in 
Canning to Stephen, 22 Aug. 1845., correspondence2 minutes & drafts; 
C. O. 267/190, Board of Trade; Addington to Hope, 29 Sept. 1845, 
C. O. 267/190,, F. O.; Macdonald to Stanley., 30 Jan. 1846, No. 28, minutess 
C. 0.267/19L 
2. E. g. Macdonald to Grey, 10 Nov. 1846, minutes, C. O. 267/19/+. 
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offices Stephen continued to be a major influence in the determination 
of policy. He used this power to advance two basic causes which he had 
come to feel were the most important - to free Sierra Leone from the stigma 
1 
of being a slavers' den which Madden had unfortunately encouraged, and to 
prevent frontier expansion from disrupting the settlement or undermining 
2 
the rights of the native peoples. The latter cause consistently suffered 
reverses. Neither Stephen nor his secretary of state could possibly 
control effectively the daily actions of the settlers or governors. In 
181+6) despite all the Colonial Office attempts to prevent it, a war broke 
out between settlers and Temne over a settlement of recaptives on the 
Bullom shore, near the north end of the Sierra Leone peninsula) in a 
3 
situation almost exactly like that of Quia. But. while he remained in 
officeyhis vigilance was unceasing. For example, he stopped the Bullom. 
shore war immediately by getting his superiors to threaten Governor Macdonald 
4 
with dismissal. 
Even in his last years in officesStephen never became an advocate of a 
1. Macdonald to Gladstonep 31 Mar. 1846, No. 64, minutesp C. O. 267/191. 
2. Macdonald to Gladstone2 9 Apr. 1846, No. 71) minutes.. C. O. 267/191. 
3- Macdonald to Gladstoneý dispatches Nos. 71p 1(77p 109p 123) C. O. 267A93Y 
appendix. 
4- See minutes by Stephenp 18 Sept. 1846, Hawesp 21 Sept. 18/+6 and Grey., 
2 Dec. 1846 after dispatches Nos. 71p 107p 119p 123) C. O. 267/193., 
appendix. 
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forward policy in West Africa. He certainly urged the Sierra Leone 
governor to abandon customary tokens of fealty to African chiefs and insist 
I 
that the colonial authorities be treated with respect. But he did not 
approve of unnecessary involvement in African affairs. Western commerce 
and agriculture, he believed, ultimately would conquer the slave trade and 
advance civilization; treaties with the chiefs would aid this process; 
but the costs to the goverment of extending their African commitments were 
almost prohibitive. The most that could be done was to wait till opportun- 
ities presented themselves for the government to step in and encourage 
legitimate trading or discourage slaving. Ary more ambitious programme 
2 
would fail. 
One historian has recently suggested that Stephen was "not perhaps at 
3 
his best on African questions". Since he was liable to confuse the Niger 
4 
and the Congo, this is no doubt fair comment! Especially in his later 
years Stephen was inclined to get bored or frustrated by the attempts to 
advance the interests of the colony of Sierra Leone. In a letter to his 
wife in 18/+2 about a meeting at the Colonial Office with her brother Henry 
Venno the later Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, Stephen amusingly 
1. E. g. Stephen to Hawes, 18 Sept. 1846, after dispatches 71t 107p 119j. 
1232 C. O. 267/193p appendix. 
2. Stanley to Stepheny 12 May 1847p minutes, C. O. 267/2012 F. O. 
Metcalfe) Maclean., p. 201+. 
Gallagher2 C. H. J. ý Xý ip 19502 P- 462 fn. 57. 
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described this feeling: 
"Your brother Henry has been here talking about 
Sierra Leone with an interest in the place and 
people i; hich I quite envy. To me a colony is 
as turtle soup to an alderman - daily fare and 
hardly palatable". 1 
Certainly Sierra Leone never appeared to him as one of the more promising 
imperial ventures and enthusiasm was correspondingly difficult to maintain. 
But the remark was meant to amuse and engage and must not be taken too 
literally. His official actions were more accurately epitomised in a 
remark which he, once addressed to the irascibaegovernor CampbelL "Sierra 
Leone", he wrote, "is a colony emerging after many disasters and difficulties 
into great importance not only in a national view but also in its bearing 
2 
upon the future condition of the African race". The Clapham. spirit had 
not deserted him. 
Stephen to J. C. Stephen, 21 Feb. 18422 Stephen Papers2 Journal 
afletters to J. C. S., 1816-1845. 
2. Stephen's draft 27 Sept. 1836 after Campbell to Glenelgo 6 May 1836, 
No. 67, C. O. 267/138. 
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G HA PT ER V 
James Stephen and the Administration of Ceylon 
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Stephen's work on Ceylonese administration in the period before he 
became under-secretary was much more purely technical and much less 
personally involved than his work on Trinidad or Sierra Leone. Ceylon 
was not one of his earliest concerns nor one of his particular interests. 
1 
He was asked to consider one Ceylonese question in 1816 but his services 
were not used thereafter until 182,3 when Wilmot Horton began to refer 
2 
Ceylonese legal problems to him regularly. Even for several years after 
3.8232 his reports and memoranda display nothing of the specialist knowledge 
or enthusiasm which characterised his early work on the West Indian and 
West African colonies. 'When asked to review proposed amendments to the 
governor's commission and instructions in 1823j, for exampley Stephen's main 
comment was strictly formal and correct: "I do not think.. " he-wrotej, "that 
3 
any question of a legal nature will arise". It was only very gradually 
that he began to acquire sufficient confidence to take a more positive 
approach. 
Though he initially limited his attention to forensic subjectes he 
could still find an opportunity to demonstrate his special talents to his 
1. List of Stephen's reports for 1816, C. O. 323/40, f. 120. 
2. Section labelled 'Stephen'. C. O. 54/85. 
3. Stephen's report., 31 Mar. 1823, t C-0.54/85., Stephen. 
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superiors. Legal enquiries were seldom purely technical. In drafting 
one order in council., for example.. Stephen ranged so much more widely than 
instructed that he felt obliged to apologise to his chief: 
"You will observe that the terms of the draft 
are more general and extensive than those which 
your letter has pointed out., but I conceive that 
the necessity of this deviation from the precise 
language of your instructions will. be apparent on 
referring to the documents which accompanied them". 1 
If he was less well informed on Ceylon than on other coloniesp Stephen, as 
this remark shows., remained alert when performing his technical duties. 
Specialised knowledge was nott after allp the only basis for a legal judge- 
ment. As counsel., he could always insist on the observance of certain 
2 
abstract principles of contemporary British jurisprudence. His early 
reports on Ceylon have exactly those characteristics which distinguish his 
work elsewhere. Two subjects especiallyp the defence of the rights of 
indigenous peoples against the preponderant influence of European settlers 
in the legislature and the protection of the individual against the author- 
itarian local governmentt occupied his mind and informed what he wrote just 
3 
as much in the case of Ceylon as with other colonies. 
Stephen's reluctance to assume the initiative more frequently was a 
policy decision which he deliberately adopted as well as a reflection of 
1. Stephen to WJ-Imot., 18 Apr. 182.3., C. O. 54/85., Stephen. 
2. E. g. Stephen to Horton, 6 July 1824,, C. O. 54/87j. Stephen. 
3- E. g. Stephen to Horton., 19 Apr. 1824p Stephen; Stephen to Horton., 
23 June 182/+j, C. O. 54/87,9 Stephen. 
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his ignorance of local Ceylonese detail. In 1823 the home goverment had 
appointed an official commission of investigation for the eastern colonies. 
Its members were to visit South Africa., Mauritius and Ceylon in turn to 
examine into the state of goverment and administration in these crown 
colonies. Ceylon came last and,, since the commissioners"investigations 
were prolonged., it was not in fact until 1829 that the first commissioner.. 
William Colebrooke2 arrived in the island., followed a year later by his 
I 
colleague.. Charles Cameron. In the six or seven intervening years the 
consideration of Ceylonese questions was frequently postponed to await the 
commissioners' reports. Quite often Stephen was responsible for these 
postponements. He wanted the commissioners to be thorough in their work 
and to deal with fundamental questions. If before their investigations 
had even begun the Colonial Officewas to take decisions based simp3y on 
the regular sources of informationv he reasoned., the commissioners would be 
reduced to sitting in judgement on "contemporary determinations of the 
goverment at home on the subject of their enquiries". It was far preferable 
2 
that they should be allowed to tackle the subjects in depth. 
Outside the legal sphere where the reasons against interfering did not 
operate so strongly there was a still more fundamental objection to the 
home government assuming the initiative. Stephen felt that geographic 
1. For the origins of the commission asAt affected Ceylon,, G. C. Mendis (ed), The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers ýOxford., 
. 
1956), 1., pp. xiii-xiv; 
xxxi-xxxw. 
2. Stephen to Hayj, 19 Sept. 1825,, C. O. 54/90, Stephen. See-also Stephen 
to Hay., 6 May 1826, C. O. 54/95., Stephen. 
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separation and British ignorance of the East combined to render interference 
im-practicablez 
.W 
ItIn so distant a possession as Ceylonj, and in a 
country of which the usages are so remote from 
those of England., it would., I apprehend., be 
impossible to regulate with propriety the details 
of businessp whether political or judicialo except 
upon the judgement and responsibility of the local 
authorities". I 
Of course, the British goverment could not abdicate its control: the 
local authorities would be required to determine what measures were necessary 
or expedient in practice. But the home goverment would still pronounce 
on general policy. The counselts work.. though rather negativeg remained 
an important part of the process of imperial supervision. 
Perhaps the most important Ceylonese, subject which Stephen dealt with 
in the 1820s was the dispute between the chief justicep representing the 
Supreme Court2 on the one hand2 and the governor on the other. Their 
disagreements were partly personality conflicts and partly a reflection of 
a competition for power. The t-wo offices were mutually independent and 
bad similar status through their direct appointment by the Crown. The 
charter of justice of 3.801 conferred extensive powers on the Supreme Court 
over the criminal jurisdiction of subordinate courts. This implied in 
Ceylon., (where many officials combined both judicial and executive functions) 
a degree of control for the Supreme Court over the public service which the 
2 
governors resented as an intrusion into their authority. 
1. Stephen to Horton, 28 Aug. 1825p C-0.54/90., Stephen. 
2. P. D. Kannangara., The History of the Ceylon Civil Service. 1802-1833 
(Dehiwa: Lap Ceylon., 1966),, pp. 12-15. 
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To bring Ceylon more into 3-ine with other coloniesp the home goverment 
in 1823 decided to check the growing independence of the Supreme Court ty 
insisting that a number of the highest judicial offices should be reserved 
for appointment by the Crown instead of by the chief justice. Where the 
chief justice retained his right to appoint to officesp the governorts 
approval was to be required. No new judicial offices were to be created 
until both agreed. Stephen was employed to draft the requisite legal 
forms to give effect to these decisions. The work immediately involved 
him in controversy. Neither the governor nor the chief justice would 
accept the new arrangements. The governor demanded the right to appoint 
to judicial offices without consulting the chief justice and the chief 
justice objected to losing a power which he felt had been guaranteed to his 
office by the constitution. Stephen., since he had been involvedý was asked 
to comment though the dispute was not purely a legal one. He saw force in 
both arguments but was not prepared to concede that the government had acted 
wrongly. On the contraryp he justified the decision to give the patronage 
of leading offices to the crown on the grounds that the secretary of state 
possessed a wider choice of candidates and was more likely to be impartial 
than local authorities. He was also of opinion that for professional and 
legal reasons the chief justice should retain his powers and be required to 
act in concert with the governor when judicial appointments were made. Even 
Stephen to Wilmot, 6 Mar. 1823j, Stephen; Stephen to Wilmot., 18 Apr, 
1823P C. O. 54/85,9 Stephen. 
-, -x-T 
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if they disagreedy a compromise between their two different viewpoints., 
1 
he felt,, was both possible and desirable. This opinion is typical of 
his early work in the stress laid on exerting greater imperial control 
over the local officials and in the belief in a separation of powers theory 
of government. 
In this case Stephen was arguing that the constitutional balance between 
the executive and judiciary had been threatened by the governor's attempt 
to act alone. The dangers of autocracy were also involved in his opinion 
on a celebrated legal case in 1824. The governor had attempted to deny 
the Supreme Court's right to issue a habeas corgus writ to an arrested 
army deserter called Rossier by passing an ex post facto, ordinance to 
invalidate judicial interference. Stephen's co=ent was forceful and 
direct: 
W opinion is that the Supreme Court of Ceylon 
had the right to award the habeas corpus in Rossier's 
case; and that the Lt. Governor in Council had not 
authority to promulgate a law so directly repugnant 
to the fundamental principles of the British Consti- 
tution; and that if it was necessary to provide for 
the safe detention of the particular state prisoners 2army desertern7 to whom the governor refers, that 
object might have been effectually secured without 
putting in jeoparc]y the personal liberty of all 
classes of H. M. s subjects in Ceylon". 2 
Whatever the local circumstances individual liberty was to be safeguarded 
even under an autocratic government by an appeal to the principles of the 
British constitution. 
1. Stephen to Horton., 28 Aug. 18250 C. O. 54/90v Stephen. 
2. Stephen to Horton,, 23 June M24, C. O. 54/871 Stephen. See also 
Stephen to Horton.. 6 July 1824, C. O. 54/87, Stephen. 
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The notion of a constitutional balance implied that both sides would 
be kept in check. Though he was an opponent of gubernatorial despotism 
in these years., Stephen was also no friend of a chief justice who sought 
to increase his powers at the governorts expense. In 182S on his advicep 
it was ruled that the Supreme Court legally possessed only the power of 
regulating its own practicej, process; and proceedingsp and not., asIt had 
attempted to exercise for yearsy the power to make general regulations for 
the police force. A supervision over the policep Stephen suggested., 
properly lay with the executive of governor and council. His decision may 
have been influenced by the fact that the Supreme Court, in determining 
police regulations., had fixed the provisions for granting bail so that the 
1 
rights of the poor were ignored. Stephen did not see the dispute between 
the governor and chief justice asýone between an authoritarian and popular 
2 
agencyp as some later commentators have done$ but as a conflict between two 
authoritarian officers which could be resolved if the home government kept 
3 
them to their respective spheres. 
From this insistence on local initiative and the rather negative role 
of preserving the constitutional balance which he ascribed to the home 
1. Stephen to Hay, 17 Sept. 18252 C. O. 54/90p Stephen. 
2. Kannangaras CgZlon Civil Service., p. 16. 
3. E. g. Stephen to Hay., 3 June 1826., C. O. 54/95., Stephen; Stephen to 
Hay., 6 June 1826, C. O. 54/95) Stephen; Stephen to Goderich) 3.8 Aug. 
18Z7t C. O. 54/99j, Stephen; Stephen to Ilay., 30 Juno 1830P C-0- 323/47j, 
f. 198. 
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governments Stephen gradually came to adopt a more positive approach. 
The pressing need for judiciary reform especially served as a catalyst 
in breaking down his reluctance to take action. As his earliest reports 
shows he had immediately gained an unfavourable impression of the workings 
I 
of the Ceylon charter of justice and he was con7inced that the commissioners 
2 
of investigation inevitably would recommend extensive reforms. When it 
appeared that the commissioners' inquiries would be delayed for yearss 
howeverv his decision to await their report could no longer be supported. 
3 
He felt obliged-to make recommendations for reforms himself. His main 
proposals in keeping with his earlier policy.. was to ask the governor and 
chief justice to submit separate suggestions for judiciary reforms. When 
they had done so.. the home government could collate their suggestions and 
4 
issue a news amended charter of justice. This proved unnecessary. Before 
the reports could be completodp the commissioners arrived in Ceylon. 
In other fieldsp toop he became impatient with the survival of what 
seemed to him illiberal customs and usages. In 1827t for examples he 
1. Stephen to Wilmot, 6 Mar. 1823., & Stephen to Wilmot., 18 Apr. 1823., 
C. 0.54/85j, Stephen. 
2. Stephen to Wilmot Horton. 9 28 Aug. 1825., C. O. 54/90, Stephen; Stephen to Hay.. 6 May 1826, C. O. 54/95, Stephen. 
3. Stephen'to, Hay# 18 Nov. 1826., C. O. 54/95p Stephen. 
4- Stephen to Twiss.. 21 Oct. 3.828 P C-0- 323A5P f. 292; Stephen to TiAssp 10 Nov. 1828p C-0.323/45.. f. 296. 
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protested about a local regulation which attempted to safeguard a royal 
commercial monopoly by forbidding private individuals to cut cinnamon plants 
even on their own lands. The regulations were legally unimpeachable since 
they were in accordance with past laws and precedents on the subject., but 
to Stephen they contained "a maxim of much apparent hardship". His 
superiors concurred and decided to submit the question to the commissioners 
1 
for a full enquiry. A year later the governor., learning that plants were 
being smuggled from Ceylon Into the Dutch colonies in Indonesiap passed an 
ordinance to prevent the private exportation of cinnamon. To Stephen this 
was even more objectionable. It was inconsistent vith the "common obli- 
gations of mankinclu-to share the fruits of the earth-and also politically 
unenlightened. But on this occasion his superiors., protecting their 
2 
monopolistic profitsj, could not agree. 
Royal economic monopolies were not the only entrenched Ceylonese customs 
which Stephen attacked. By 3.828 he was also prepared to question laws 
which countenanced the maintenance of the caste system.. the very basis of 
contemporary Ceylonese social life. "The obligations of caste being purely 
of a religious nature".. in Stephen's view,. "they ought not to be enforced by 
human laws,, unless the legislator sincerely adopts the religious opinions of 
Stephen's memo and minutesv n. d.., 3-827., C. O. 3231 p f. 232; Stephen to Hay.. 21 Feb. 1829., C. 0.5/+AO6,9 Stephen. 
44 
2. Stephen to Twiss) 9 Dec. 18280 and minutes, C. O. 323/45t f, 298. For 
another instance of an attack on monopolies; Stephen to HaYs 30 June 
3.830.. C. O. 323/47., f. 198. 
the people at large on the subject". 
1 
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This was certainly a much more 
radical opinion than his superiors - and perhaps than Stephen himself - 
rea3ised. In Kandy., which had been conquered as recently as 1815., the 
distinction between civil and religious spheres which Stephen drew was 
2 
largely spurious., and even in the maritime provinces the British adminis- 
tration had utilised service land tenures and caste obligations like the 
Portuguese and the Dutch before them. To dissociate the gover=ent from 
the caste system except where it could be justified on non-religious grounds 
3 
was a major 'undertaking. 
Nonetheless Step#en was sincere in wishing to see British liberal 
conceptsp however incongruousy introduced into Ceylon. By 1830 he had 
acquired sufficient confidence to feel able to generalise about the needs 
of Ceylonese society and he began to see the home goverment as the special 
protector of the rights of the majority. His knowledge of the people 
suggested that they did not resent an autocratic government interfering in 
their daily lives as much as Europeans would do. "It may readily be 
believedn, he wrotep "that the sensibility of an Oriental people is much 
less lively upon amoyances of this natures than those of a free European 
society". But in some fields which he investigatedp such as the right of 
1. Stephen to Twisso 9 Dec. 18280 and minutes) C. O. 323/45p f. 298. 
2. Palph Pierisp Sinhalese S6c: L 
(Colombo.. 1956)j, pp -lT9--liT7-. 
Nannan a., Cfflon Civil Service., pp. xi-xmd. 
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the wealthy to acquire and possesmthe social symbols of wealth and status# 
the feelings of Europeans and Orientals., he decidedj, were identical. It 
was desirable., thereforep that the local government should adopt a more 
liberal approach where comparisons between Ceylon and Britain were applicable. 
When an attempt was made by the governor to create a monopoly for Europeans 
in elephant hunting., Stephen concluded that even with the authority of the 
imperial goveri3ment: 
"it is impossible but that in their measure and 
according to the comparative submissiveness and 
languor of their mtional character the Cingalese 
should regard such a regulation ... as an harsh and 
painful badge of servitude". 
As the upholders of "the nindamental laws of civil societyu., the British 
government., in his opinionq should use its powers to ensure that the rights 
1 
of the Ceylonese were not compromised by the local government. 
In his book on the history of the Ceylon civil service Dr. Kannangara 
has recently maintained that "the balance between authoritarian and liberal 
forms of Govermentp which had been prevalent in the Colonyp was tilted in 
favour of more liberal institutions even before the Colebrooke-Cameron 
Commission submitted its recommendations, for administrative reform in Ceylon". 
There is no doubt that before 1833 liberal forces were at work in Ceylon 
and their success must be in large measure attributed to the -help and 
encouragement of the legal counsel at the Colonial Office. But at no time 
Stephen to Hay, 26 Aug. 1830, C. O. 323/47s f. 200. 
Kamiangaraj Cfflon Civil Service, P. 213. 
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did he.. or anyone elsep really threaten the autocratic nature of Ceylonese 
government. 
The Colebrook-Cameron report is rightly regarded as a landmark in 
1 
Ceylonese history. It provided one of the great state papers of the 
19th century.. a counterpart to Lord Durham's report on British North Americao 
based on extensive research and observation, and illuminated by a philosophy 
of : Liberalism and utilitarianism. The commissioners successfully urged 
the adoption of far-reaching reforms in Ceylonese administrations in an 
attempt to create in the East a model capitalist.. competitive., liberal 
society in the image of the mother country. Their work was not entirely 
novel. Many of their proposals., though often carried much furtherp bear 
a distinct resemblance to those which Stephen had been advocating. For 
examplep they questioned government monopolies in agricultural production 
and in commerce and recommended the abandonment of the government plantations 
in cinnamon and the abolition of its mompoly in trade. They also objected 
to the system of compulsory services and criticised the maintenance of the 
2 
caste system. 
On legal reform particularlyp the commissioners' report and Stephen's 
3 
recommendations were extremely similar. Indeed., Stephen helped to defend 
1. For two recent interpretationsp see Mendiss Colebrook-Cameron Paperst 
: 1.9 PP. ix-lxiv & Kannangaraj, Ceylon Civil Service., pp. 223*-61. 
2. Colebrooke's reports are printed in Mendiss Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, 
10 pp. 9-120p 189-233. 
Mendis., ibid. p Iq pp. 121-188; see also Stephen to Hayp 8 Oct. 183/+p C-0- 323150. - f- 381. 
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the commission's suggestions when they encountered criticism. It was 
Stephen,, too., who was employed to'draft the charter of justice of 1833, 
2 
based on Cameronts report., which gave Ceylon a new judicial structure. 
The charter attempted to introduce into the judiciary many of the newest 
ideas of English jurisprudence derived from Jeremy Bentham's speculations. 
Stephen and Cameron co-operated on the mork at various stages and disagreed 
only on one, pajor point. Stephen.. with his usual concern for the poor in 
society, felt that some provision should be made for a sirnwry jurisdiction 
of petty criminal and civil cases to give cheap and rapid justice. But 
Cameron disagreed and got his way. 
There is also some evidence to suggesto though not conclusivelyt that 
Stephen favoured, and perhaps helped to supportg the proposal that the 
governorts powers should be curbed. Dealing with a case in 1834j, a year 
after most of the commission's recommendations had gone into force., Stephen 
presented a general historical argument to justify the removal of the 
governor's autocratic powers. At its conquest,, Ceylons he maintainedy had 
been given a constitution modelled in some respects on that of the old West 
1. Stephen's observations 7. Aug. 1832 on Marshall's observationsp 1461uly 
1832j, C. O. 54/120., f. 238. 
2. Howick to Stepheny 25 Aug. 1831, C. O. 55/71p P. 365; Stephen's 
memorandum 20 Jan 181+2., after Campbell to Stanleyp 22 Nov. 181+1, 
No. 3) C-0- 54/191. 
3- Stephen to Hayt 16 June 1832t C. O. 54A20p f. 200; Campbell to Stanley., 
18 Apr. 181+2, No. 56p minutep C. O. 54A96, - Stephen's memorandum 20 Jan. 
181+2 after Campbell to Stanley, 22 Nov. 1841, No. 3t C-0.54/191- 
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Indian colonies though without the assembly. The constitutions particularly 
after the conquest of Kandy., became incongruous. With a native population 
larger in numbers than all the West Indian islands put together) living 
under a code unlike any in Europep and a European population living under 
Roman-Dutch law., the ambiguities in the original constitution were made 
evident. The people of Ceylon were too accustomed to gubernatorial auto- 
cracy to complain. But the commissioners rightly feared that the governor's 
powers might become oppressive and., therefore., sought to curb them. The 
new commission and instructionsp which the governor received in 1833, were 
1 
accordingly designed to reform the original constitution. The Colebrooke- 
Cameron reforms) thens were viewed by Stephen as both a measure of liberal- 
isation in goverment and as part of the process of adaptation to an oriental 
environment. 
Despite these large areas of agreements Stephen was not completely 
satisfied with the commissioners' reports. His main criticismp judging by 
his later, remarks., was that they were inclined to be too speculative or 
2 
theoretical in analysis and too radical or sweeping in their recommendations. 
There is an interesting insight into Stephen's immediate impressions in a 
minute which he wrote in 1835 on a7Ceylon law dealing with judicial evidence. 
Mentioning that the subject brought to mind one of Jeremy Bentham's treatioes., 
1. Stephen to Hay.. 9 May 1834p C-0.54/138p Stephen. 
2. His later criticisms were much more explicit on this point. E. g. 
memorandum on the civil service, 9 June 1845.. C. O. 54/222. 
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Stephen pointed out that in drafting the law the local government had 
ignored Bentham's speculations in favour of English, precedents. He approved: 
"for however weighty may be the arguments of the great 
jurist to whom Ihave referred., I think it desirable 
that on such subjects the legislatures of the colonies 
should rather follow than attempt to precede the course 1 
of public opinion and of legal reform in the parent state". 
It could well be argued.. as ex-governor Barnes did'at the times that 
Colebrooke's attempt in 1831-3 to create a fully egalitarian society in 
Ceylon, with a competitive capitalist economy and a government committed 
to free trade, was too far in advance of public opinion and of legal reform 
2 
in the parent state. Stephen does not say he thought so explicitly but 
this is certainly a possible implication of what he wrote. His attempts 
to dissociate civil law from the caste system, to put curbs on the governor's' 
absolutism and to liberalise the legal system.. all fell very far short of a 
Colebrooke's plan to re-make Ceylonese society anew on A basis of a thorough- 
goingl all-embracing plan of reform. There was also another obstacle. 
Stephen had expressed his faith in the desirability of consulting the local 
authorities: and the current governor., Robert Wilmot Horton (the man who 
had been Bathurst's under-secretary in the 1820s and Stephen's dynamok was 
3 
an outspoken critic of many of Colebrooke's proposals. 
1. Stephen to Aberdeen, 5 Aug. 1835Y C-0- 3231512 f. 282. 
2. Mendis., Colebrooke-Cameron Papers., I., pp. x1vii-19 II, pp. 2-4-38; 
Ka=angara, p Ceylon Civil Service, p. 208. 
3- Mandisp Colebrooke-w0ameron Papers, I. p. lp 39-41+; Kannangaras Ceylon 
Civil Service., pp. 241-2/4.3. 
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While Stephen was counsel most of these doubts and difficulties 
were lost in his general approval of the legal reforms. But when he 
became under-secretary, they began to approach the surface. In particularp 
Colebrooke's suggestions for the reform of the Ceylonese civil service 
(again a subject where Colebrooke's reforms had outpaced the mother country) 
slowly brought Stephen to the point of outright opposition. There can be 
no doubt that the Ceylonese civil service in 1833 had many weaknessesV but 
in the eyes of the British administrators its chief defect was its expensive- 
ness. An extensive., highly paternalistic and exclusive organisationý the 
Ceylon civil service was one of the biggest.. most highly organised systems 
of civil administration in the empire., comparable with the East India 
Company service in India. On its efficiency the government's success 
depended. Colebrooke was auare of its importance and of its defects but 
in making suggestions for reform he concentrated almost exclusively on its 
expense. This allowed him to propagate his own ideas on the need to use 
Ceylonese in the administration since they would do the same work as Europeans 
at less cost. With this in mind, he recommended the abolition of a large 
number of offices and the drastic reduction of many salariess fully realising 
that this would discourage Englishmen from seeking civil service posts in 
Ceylon. At the same time he suggested that the service should be opened 
to free competition for everyone wiihout reference to race or caste in order 
to find the men locally who possessed the requisite qualifications. When 
the new servants were recruitedi, Colebrooke suggested,, the pensions normally 
1 
paid to civil servants could be abolished. 
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Dr. Kannan ara has recently presented a cogent case for Coletrooke's 
beliefs that qualified Ceylonese could have been found for many civil 
service posts and that free competition could have triumphed over caste 
2 
barriers and other obstacles. He concludes: 
"the practicability of the plan rested on the question 
whether the officials who would be sent to govern the 
country would., like Colebrooke regard it as compatible 
with security., and whether in the light of the past 
development of the Civil Service and the nature of the 
Governmentp the rulers sent to the colony would be able 
to divest themselves of the feeling of being an exclusive 
and superior class". 3 
This analysis largely ignores the interests of the current English-appointed 
office-holders since they had accepted their appointments under specific 
terms which were now to be revoked. Their salaries were to be reduced and 
their prospects for promotion greatly diminished and some of them were to 
lose their offices altogether. Inevitably., it was on these peoples' 
4 
grievances that the Colonial Office had to concentrate. 
This was the problem which Stephen first encountered as under-secretar7. 
During 1836 and 1837 Horton submitted several cases for the attention of the 
secretary of state where English civil servants had been deprived of pay or 
1. Mendis., Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, I., pp. 212-230. 
2. Kannangara.. Ceylon Civil Service, pp. 2/+1-50. 
3- lazinangara., ibid. j, p. 243. 
4. Barrow's memorandum after Horton to Gleneigp U Fob. 1836, No. 36, 
C. O. 54/147. 
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prospects owing to the Colebrooke reforms. Stephenp in dealing with 
their claimsy maintained tha% judged by contemporary standards in Britainp 
their appeals were valid. Certainly there were instances Where the cuts 
1 
could be shown to be unfair. But even where it was impossible to satisfy 
their claims, Stephen insisted., the Ceylon civil servants deserved to be 
treated with "attention and respect" as befitted "a meritorious class of 
2 
public officers". Initially this general support was as far as Stephen 
felt able to go. He refused to follow the criticisms made as to the 
justice of the reforms in general. Since the Treasury was demanding the 
strictest economiest he could do no more. But he did insist that despite 
Treasury parsimony every appeal by a civil servant should be reported and 
dealt with as a separate case on its own merits. As the complaints built 
up and the governor grew more insistent in their supportp Stephen's patience 
began to wear thin. On one occasion the governor irregularly attempted to 
raise a number of salaries to stop the civil servants working in remote areas 
from deserting their posts. Stephen referred all his increasest though 
they were triflingj, to the Treasury. When a clerk questioned this policy, 
he received a curt reply. "I understand that we are not to increase the 
establishments by the smallest fraction of a penny without the permission 
of the Treasury. If that be not the rule where is the line to be drawn? " 
E. g. Stephen's memorandump 8 June 1836, C. O. 54/146 on Ieyard case; 
Horton to Glenelgq . 11 Feb. 1836p No. 36., minutes and drafts, C-0.54/147. 
2. Horton to Glenelgo 3 May 1836p minute, C. O. 54/348. 
Horton to Glenelgj. 29 June 1836, No. 102., minute.. C. O. 51+/*l/+8. 
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In other words., the Treasury was to be plagued with every niggling complaint 
until it could see the need for a general reform. 
An opportunity for a more constructive approach occurred late in 1836 
when governor Horton submitted a new plan for a reform of the civil Sex-Vice. 
Horton rejected Colebrook0s plan for the admission of Ceylonese to the 
service. He stated that British recruits were and ought to be at the 
head of the civil service and that they should be paid according to a 
European and not a local scale. But he also criticised the goverment for 
insistingp against Colebrooke's recommendationp that the top class of civil 
servants should be appointed from England. Experience was essential in 
the leading offices and this implied the introduction of servants lower 
down the scale. Finally., he suggested introducing into Ceylon some of the 
civil service reforms with which he had been associated in Britain such as 
generous retirement pensions to get rid of incompetent older clerks and 
graduated salaries and pension scales to encourage the lower ranks to remain 
2 
after they had acquired a little experience. 
Stephen was slightly dubious of all these changes coming so soon after 
the major reorganisation of 1833. But on the whole he supported his old 
1. E. g. Spearman to Stephen, 6 July 1836, with Stephen's memorandum., 
21 May 3.836, C. O. 54/151j, Treasury. 
2. Horton to Glenelgp 1 JulY 1836, No. 3.04, C. O. 5,4/2,48. For his earlier 
work on civil service reformp see Kennangara,. Ceylon Civil Service, 
pp. 208-213. 
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superior. "Although it originates with a mind singularly fertile in 
schemes for expenditure recommended by the Promise of ultimate saving"y 
he wrote to Sir George Greyy "it is yet as far as I can judge well worthy 
of serious regard". The Colebrooke retrenchments now seemed to Stephen 
after observing them in practice "unskilful and unsparing" and "more 
distinguished by parsimony than economy". Horton's plan to bring Ceylon 
into line with recent British civil service reforms seemed much more 
justified. Unfortunately.. Goderich.. who had adopted Coletrooke's sugges- 
tions in 1833y had moved to the Treasury and., as chancellor of the exchequer., 
refused to reverse his earlier decision. The Horton plan was therefore 
1 
rejected. Only the recommendation that pensions should be increased for 
2 
those who had served for a long period was carried out. 
It seems clear from what he wrote that Stephen largely agreed with 
Horton on reforms in the nature and structure of the service. There would 
be and should be in the near future no considerable displacement of British 
by Ceylonese civil servants. Viewed in this light., Colebrooke"s reforms 
were bound to appear a reckless blunder. Neither Horton nor Stephen 
questioned the value of open competitionp indeed Stephen strongly supported 
Horton to Glenelg., 1 July 3.836, No. 104., minutes., drafts & replies., 
C. O. 54/148. 
2. Spearman to Stephen, 1 Sept. 1837v & Baring to Stephen, 26 Sept- 1837., 
C. O. 54A58# Treasury. For a further attempt to force the Treasury's 
hand (the Iayard case) see Mackenzie to Gleneig.. 3 Jan. 1838j, No. 2. 
minutes, C-0 54/160; Mackenzie to Glenelgp 17 Oct. 1838., No. 157, 
minutesp C. O: 54/164; & Spearman to Stephen., 9 May 1838,, minutesp 
C. 0.54/167j, Treasury. 
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1 
the governor in making merit a prime consideration in promotions; but it 
is clear that both expected the service to remainp at least for some timep 
predominantly European. If they sought to make the service attractive to 
Europeans., however., they did not forget the native recruit, Stephen 
2 
strongly encouraged the governors to promote Ceylonese where 'practicable'. 
He also questioned the policy of paying smaller salaries to the native 
official and., though little was done about this2 he seems to have persuaded 
3 
Glenelg that it was wrong in principle. To encourage professionalism and 
Stephen supported the idea of retaining the top create an esprit de corps. 
positions in the civil service for personnel with local experience. Whea 
the Lords of the Treasux7 insisted upon using their patronage with regard 
to customs commissioners by appointing men directly from Britain they received 
a sharp rebuke from Stephen's pen. The Treasury's method of making appoint- 
ments, Stephen informed them, "is viewed in the colony 'With a deep and 







Horton to Glenelgj, 34 Oct- 18371 No. 1519 minutes., C. O. 54/156. See 
also Mackenzie to Gleneig, 6 Mar. 1838, No. 451, minute., C. O. 54A61- 
Horton to Glenelgp 1 June 1837., No. 81, minute, C. O. 54/154- See 
also Horton to Glenelg# 31 Aug. 1837p No. 127p minute., C. O. 541155. 
Mackenzie to Glenelg, 7 Mar. 1838) No. 48t minutest C. O. 54/3.61. 
Horton to Glenelgp 8 July 1837j, No. 97P minutest C. O. 541155. 
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Stephen attached great importance to the structure and Axnctioning of 
the civil service in Ceylon in part because he seems to have felt that the 
people depended heavily on the local government agent. Since so much of 
the success of government depended upon themt the standards of the civil 
service) he stressed., -should be high. For this reason he strenuously 
opposed governor Horton's recommendation that civil servants should be 
allowed to engage in trade. Horton argued that the-civil service reductions 
in 1833 had been so great that the officials should be allowed to engage in 
commercial ventures to make up their incomes. Stephen profoundly disagreed. 
Not-only did he consider such a suggestion of questionable legalityp but it 
seemed also highly impolitic. The public had a right to the full-time 
dedicated service of its civil servants. Business was too distracting and 
failure would be too huniliating for public officers to bear. Besides, if 
civil servants engaged in trade their commercial rivals would be suspicious 
of their official influence. The most Stephen would allow was that civil 
servants.. if they 
1 
wished to speculate with their savings., could make remit- 
tances to Europe. To keep up standards, he was equally insistent that 
leading officials should not be granted home leave without some pressing 
2 
reason. On the other handp there often were good reasons for getting 
Horton to Glenelgj, 27 July 1836, minutes.. C. O. 5"8; Horton to 
Glenelgp 9 Dec. 1836, No. 161p minute, C. O. 54/3.49. 
2.4. g. Mackenzie to Glenelg., 1 Feb. 1838., No. 3.8s minute., C. O. 54A61. 
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temporary'leaves of absence. Since the old rules did not permit this.. 
he advocated a1lowing civil servants who found it necessary to take short 
leaves at sea. 
Stephent's wish to achieve high standards in the civil service even at 
the cost of the economic development of the colony (Horton felt that few 
2 
other settlers had the necessary capital) was also a further reflection of 
his economic philosophy- Just as in the case of Trinidad., he was opposed 
to forcing the pace of colonial economic development. He took exception 
to all Horton's schemes to use the government's powers to open up the 
undeveloped areas of Ceylon. To attempt to create artificially a demand 
for land and a new outlet for capital was to sacrifice the public interest 
and the general wealth to misguided economic notions. Nor would the 
cultivators themselves benefit. He minutedt on one such proposal: 
"The demand of 51- per acre- will certainly not prevent 
the land being cultivated, if there is an effective 
demand for human food., or of any other article which 
may be grown there# and if there is no such demandp it 
is not apparent why until it arisesp the land shall not 
be permitted to lie waste. To tempitthe poor by low 
prices of land to settle in districts dangerous to their 
health Za"s-Horton feared they might b_e_7 would seem 3 
objectionable on other grounds than those of mere economy". 
Unfortunately for Stephen's plans., when a demand for a Ceylonese product - 
coffee - did arise in the 181+0s., it was not the savings of the frugal small 
1. E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelgp 12 Feb. 1838, No 24ý minute) C. O. 5/+/161; 
Spearman to Stephen) 9 May 1838., minute.. C. 
6.54/167, Treasur7. 
2. Horton to Glenelg) 27 JU1Y 1836p C. O. 54/148. 
3- Horton to Glenelgj, 7 Apr. 1837s No. 63., minute. - C. O. 54/154. See also Mackenzie to Glenelg, 2 May 1839, No. 65, minutet C. O. 54/170. 
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cultivator which supplied the requisite capital but., as Horton suspectedp 
1 
the earnings of the civil servants. Outside the plantations., however., the 
indigenous population'also substantially increased their holdings which 
2 
suggests that they were responding to the new economic policies. 
Despite these instances of forceful administrationj, Stephen was never 
on the whole well informed on Ceylonese questions. He tended to rely heavilyý 
for information on his subordinates., especially the leading clerks in the 
Eastern department. Initially the role of principal adviser on Ceylon was 
played by George Barrow., the son of the Secretary to the Admiraltyp who was 
3 
subsequent1y to write a popular history of Ceylon. Barrow kept himself well 
4 
informed of all the intricacies of Ceylonese administration. He and his 
successors., Gordon Gairdner and W. H. C. Murdoch.. were useful in dealing with 
financial and economic questions particu2arly but their influence extended to 
1. I. H. Vanden Driesen, 'The History of Coffee Culture in Ceylon'. Ceylon 
Historical Journals 1953P III., pp. 41-4; K. M. de Silva., Social Polic-1 
and Missionary Organizations in CpZlon, 181+0-1855 (Londoný, --1965). 
PP. 14-15.9 297. Mackenzie estimated that there were only fifty settlers 
with capital excluding civil servants and military officers in 18/+0: 
Mackenzie to Glenelg2 29 Jan. 18/+Op Separates C-0- 54A77. 
2. I. H. Vanden Driesenp 'Plantation Agriculture and Iand-Sales Policy in 
Ceylon - The First Phase2 1836-1886; Part 11f University-of Ceylon 
Revi , 1956j, xiv, pp. 6-9. 
3- George Barrow, Ceylon. Past and Present (London., 1857); D. M. Young2 
The Colonial Offices pp. 86j, 271. 
4. E. g. Horton to Glenelg, 6 June 1836, No. 91. j minutest C. O. 54/11+8; Horton to Glenelgj 20 Aug. 1836, No. -117t minutesp C. O. 54/149; Horton to Glenelgt 14 Oct. 1836, No. 51, minutes, C. O. 54/149. 
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almost every sphere. Frequently.. Stephen's dependence on them for 
I 
information was absolute. 
While Wilmot Horton was governor, with his "mind singularly fertile in 
schemes of expendituren, relations with the Treasury were always difficult. 
Stephen objected to the Treasury's parsimonious control on a great many 
2 
occasions but without success. As a result# he was forced to be stricter 
3 
with Horton in asking for justifications for an financial proposals. Thiss 
in turn,, undoubtedly strained relations between the governor and the Colonial 
Office. Horton proved to be a difficult govemor to deal with in more than 
simply his improvidence. His heightened sense of his own importance and his 
assumed special relationship with the Colonial Office as an ex-under-secretary 
4 
made him resent any form of criticism. Stephen could praise him for his 
5 
preparation and presentation of ordinances but norma3-ly they were at odds. 
1. For Gairdner and Murdochp see Young., The Colonial Office., pp. 270-2. 
Examples of their work can be found in Horton to Glenelg., 9 Feb. 1836, 
No 30,, minutes., C. O. 54/1/+7; Spearman to Stephent 31 May 1837j, minute., 
C. 6.51+1158, Treasury; Mackenzie to Glenelg,, 2/+ Nov. 3.838.. No. 175., 
minutes & draftsp C. O. 54/3.65; Campbell to Stanley., 7 Aug. 1844t No. 1299 
minutesq C. O. 54/212. 
2. E. g. Horton to Glenelgp 5 Jan. 1836, No. Ilp minute., C. O. 5/+/146. 
3- E. g. Horton to Glenelgp 27 Feb. 1836., No. 1+9. minute,, 'C. O. 54/147-, 
Horton to Glenelg, 6 June 1836, No. 93P minutep C. O. 5"8. For a 
later examplep Mackenzie to Glenelg) 3 Feb. 1838, No. 17# minutop 
C. 0.54/161. 
4. E. g. Horton to Glenelg., 23 JU: Lv 1836., private, C. O. 54/148; Horton (unsi-i 
gned) to Glenelgv 28 July 1836, Separate., C. O. 541]J+S. 
5- Horton to Glenelg,, 9 Feb. 1836, No. 31., minute., C. O. 54/247. 
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Often Stephen was driven to great lengths to try and counter some Horton 
proposal without offending him or to pacify him over some imputed but 
entirely imaginary personal slight. 
It is possible that Horton was suspicious of the new policies which 
Colebrooke had announced of limiting the governor's authority. On one 
occasiony for examplep Stephen had to challenee the governor's attempt to 
2 
prevent the removal of the government monopoly in cinnamon trading. A 
few months later he was reminding Horton that he should not attempt to 
interfere in the ordinary commercial transactions of his colony except under 
3 
exceptional circumstances. But their main dispute was over the operation 
of the executive and legislative counci3swhich had been introduced at 
Colebrooke's suggestion in 1833. Horton felt that the executive councillors, 
who were all appointed, officials.. ought to vote as directed by the governor 
when they sat., in their dual capacity,, in the legislative council. Oaly 
in this way could the governor be certain of his control over the legislative 
council which also contained. QTicials from outside the executive council and 
unofficial members such as leading merchants and distinguished native-born 
1. E. g. Horton to Glenelgp 12 Apr. 1837, No. 67, C. O. 54/154; Horton to 
Glenelg, 26 Mar. 1835Y No. 17p minute,, C. O. 54/347- Horton took the 
post only because he was in debt: Campbell to Stanleys A+ June 3.8/+4, 
Private, Stephen's minute.. 21 A: ug. 18/+4, C. O. 51+/23-1. 
2. Horton to Glenelg.. 14 Oct. 1836, No. 51, et seq., minute., C. O. 54/149- 




Stephen disagreed. For him it was extremely necessary to the efficient 
working of the new system that every member of the legislature should be 
free to express his opinion and to vote as he chose on every legislative 
proposal. Exceptions would be made on: Ly for I'very extreme cases" where 
nthe main principles upon which the administration of the colony is conducted" 
were discussed. On such a question the official members must either vote 
with the governor or be prepared to risk suspension or even expulsion from 
their offices. The governor., however.. would use his powers over recalcitrant 
officials with the nutmost imaginable resemell. Since there was little 
danger of a popular vote against the government in Ceylons unlike colonies 
with popular assembliesp the local government could "much better sustain the 
2 
occasional opposition even of its own agents". To ensure that the system 
worked smoothlyp Stephen took care that the men selected as unofficial members 
were not likely to be troublesome. In 2838 it also proved necessary to pay 
one of the native members since he refused to give up his employment unless 
the goverment compensated him for his lost sa3. ary: - but Stephen decided that 
3 
this did not compromise his independence too much. He realised that Horton 
1. Horton to Glenelg, 23 Jan. 1837., Separate, C. O. 54A53. 
2. Stephen's minute, 27 June 1837s on Horton to Glenelgo 23 Jan. 1837, 
Separate., C-Q- 54A53- 
3. Mackenzie to Glenelgp 12 June 1838p No. 88p minutes C. O. 54/163. 
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would not take kindly to losing his absolute control of the councils and 
therefore'did not press him too much on the point; but he made certain 
that Horton's successor Was immediately informed what the constitutional 
1 
position ought to be. Subsequently Stephen helped to establish that the 
governor in his executive capacity would always consult with his executive 
council and in his legislative capacity would allow the greatest possible 
2 
freedom of debate and deliberation in the legislative council. 
Stephen from the first showed his usual solicitude and care for the 
3 
Ceylonese who were unrepresented, in the local government. But the confidence 
and energy with which he dealt with Trinidadian freemen or Sierra Leone 
recaptives has no parallel in Ceylon. It seems likely that he was so 
impressed by the size of the native populationt compared to the number of 
British officials and settlersp that he felt the administration insecure. 
4 
The Randyan rebellion of 1817-18 seems also to have affected his thinking. 
In 1837p for example) he said that the British government in Ceylon rested 
"emphatically on public opinion" and vas "in mary parts of Ceylon very 
1. Horton to Glenelgs 20 Jan. 1837v No. 62., minutej, C. O. 541153- 
2. Stephen's memorandum., 28 Nov. 181+1., point 100 on Anstruther's memorandum# 
23 Nov. 1840j. C. O. 54/185- 
3- E. g. Horton to Glenelgo 14 Jan. 1837y No. 26., minutej C. O. 541153; 
Horton to Glenelgy 3 Oct. 1837p No. 3Uj minutes., C. O. 54/156. 
There werep for example., 24084 signatures on the address in support of 
the legislative council: C. O. 51050. 
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imperfectly consolidated". This made him suspicious of extensive reforms 
n 
and more willing to let sleeping dogs lie. In writing to the Treasury to .,, 
urge them to allow the governor to control the customs officials., his wordss 
even though exaggerated for effect., do show the direction of his thought: 
"Accustomed to depend upon the government fthe Ceylonese 
ar2e to an extent unknown in the other colonial possessions 
of the crown ... habituated to consider the governor as 
invested with an authority to which all other public function- 
aries are subjected and which is and ought to be the object 
of peculiar respect and deference". 1 
This was precisely the opinion which the ultra-conser7ative Governor Barnes 
2 
had used in attacking the Colebrooke-Cameron proposals. Stephen., however., 
though undoubtedly quite sincerep was using the argument for the more 
progressive purposo of ensuring cohesion and co-ordination in the local 
administration. 
The fear of popular unrest was an argument which Stephen often used to 
support maxq of his liberal gestures. In 1837,9 for examplep he insisted 
that despite the governorts protestsy the Burghersp men of Dutch or Portuguese 
descent born in the islands had a rights if suitably qualified by office, to 
sit in the executive council. He offered three reasons for this opinion: 
the general regulations of government had to be decided without reference to 
specific individuals; the government considered it desirable to conciliate 
the Burghers who were an influential class in Ceylon; ands finallys "it would 
be dangerous even if it were not unjust to exclude them from the honours and 
1. Horton to Glenelgj 7 Apr. 1837p No. 64p C. O. 54/154. 
Mendis, Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, Up pp. 25-Z7. 
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emoluments of the public service to which their fellow subjects of European 
birth are admitted". The secretary of state found this convincing and 
1 
Stephen's suggestion was implemented. 
Hortonts successor) Stewart Mackenziep who was governor from 1837 until 
181+1, was ultimately judged by the Colonial Office to be even more troublesome 
than his predecessor. Meeting him in London in 1837.9 Stephen had initially 
2 
formed a good opinion of Mackenzie as a man of practicality and sound sense. 
Probab3, y as a resultj, the new governor was well briefed on the problems which 
would confront him and it was hoped that he would be able to effect some 
3 
judicious reforms. But this confidence had disappeared by the end of 
Mackenzie's first year in office. L2 his correspondence with the Colonial 
Office on whichq of course., the success of the administration entirely 
dependeds he proved far more obstinate than Horton. Despite orders to the 
contraryp he insisted upon writing long.. rambling private letters to the 
4 
secretary of state on assorted public topics. His mode of expression in 
speeches and dispatches was far from clear and his presentation of evidence 
1. Horton to Glenelgj, 16 June 1837, Separate, minute, c. o 54/154; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgp I Feb. 1838p No. 18p minutep C. O: 54/161. See- 
also the remark to the Treasury on Horton to Glenelg# 8 July 1837j No. 
97.9 minute., C. 0.541155- 
2. Horton to Glenelgp 3.4 Oct. 1836., No. 51P et geg. y Stephen's minute 27 Apr. 1837j, C. O. 54/21+9- He., like Hortontook the post because he 
was in debt: Campbell to Stanley, 4 June 1841+. 9 Private., Stephen's 
minute 21 Aug. 1844) C-0- 54/211. 
3. E. g. Horton to Glenelgp 18 Jan. 1837, No. 28, minute., C. 0- 541153.0. 
Horton to Glenelgp 31 Aug. 1837, No. 127, minute., C. O. 54/155- 
4- E. g* Mackenzie to Glenelg, 12 Feb. 1838, Pýrivatef minutesp C. O. 54A61; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgj, 1 June 1838, C. O. 54/163- 
., -, -1 1., --, -, --, 
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wasýoccasionally bewildering. He was also totally tactless and lacking in 
2 
1 
propriety in an office which caUed for great discretion. 
His personal deficiencies were compounded by political blunders. Like 
Horton he was prone to indulge in schemes of considerable public expenditure 
3 
without going through the necessary formalities. More commendably but 
equally embarrassingly for the home government,, he tended to sacrifice 
imperial interests to his oTm conception of what was best for the colony. 
A+ 
But worst of all., in disgust at the Treasury's parsimony he allowed the 
5 
civil service to deteriorate very badly. It was during Mackenzie's admin- 
istration that the senior civil servants began to devote their energies to 
coffee planting to the detriment of their official duties. Fortunately for 
the Colonial Office., his son-in-law.. Philip Anstrutherj, who had held the 
post of colonial secretary since 1830j. proved to be both energetic and able 
1. E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelg., 13 -Tuly 1838.. No. 13.5., minutesy G. O. 51+A63; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgp 13 Aug. 1838, No. 130s minutesp C. O. 54A6/+. 
2. E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelgp 20 Aug. 1838,, No. 136j, minutes, C-0.54/16/+; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgp Z7 June 1838, No. 95, minutesp C. O. 5/+A63. 
3. E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelgp 3 Feb. 1838v No. 17j. minutes., C. O. 54A61; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgv I/+ Feb. 1838,9 No. 27j, minute., C. O. 54A61. 
E. g. the dispute over the military in Mackenzie to Glenelg, 6 June 1838, 
,, minutesp 
C. O. 54/ No. 82 163; Mackenzie to Glenelg) 19 Sept. 1838, No. 
245, minutes., C. O. 54A64; Somerset to Stephen,, 16 Nov. 1838P minutesp 
c. o. 54/167 . c. in C. 
5. Anstruther's report., 23 Nov. 1840, C-0.54/1.85; Anstruther & Mackenzie 
to Russell,, 6 Apr. 1840, No. 54s C. O. 54/179. 
1 
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and he partly compensated for his superior's weaknesses. 
The arrival in office of Russell and Vernon Smith in 1839 gave a certain 
impetus to the consideration of Ceylonese questions. Russell had little 
sympathy for traditional institutions and ways in Ceylon and he supported 
2 
policies of cautious westernizationp aimed at reforming Ceylonese-society. 
Vernon Smith., with his experience as Joint secretary at the Board of Control 
for Indiap also took a special interest and was sometimes referred to In the 
office# rather flatteringlyp as an orientalist. ; But the most important 
stimulus to action came from Anstruther., the colonial secretary., who arrived. 
in London on leave in 1839 and remained for a year. He was frequently 
A+ 
consulted by the office on general questions. With his unrivalled exper- 
ience of administration in Ceylon and his great fund of knowledge., Anstruther 
proved extremely valuable. He was encouraged to proceed gradually from 
tackling occasional questions submitted to him, to setting out in detail his 
views on the reforms necessary for the future development of the island,, 
1. de Silva., Social Polic-vp p. 21 & fn- 3- 
2. E. g. his opinion on the adigars:; Mackenzie to Normanbyj, 24 June 1839j, 
No. 4:, Russell's minutep 12 Dec. 1839j, C. O. 54/171. Ke baulked at 
tackling questions of inheritance; Mackenzie to Russell.. 1/+ Mar. 181+0) 
No. 48., Russell's minute.. 25 Sept. 1840, C. O. 54/179. 
3. For Vernon Smithy see D. N. B.., Stephen's memorandum 28 Nov. 1840 on 
Anstruther to Stephen., 23 Nov. 1840P C. O. 54/1852 Anstruther; & 
Mackenzie to Russell$ 9 Dec. 1840, No. 1851 minutesp C. O. 54/182. 
4- See the minutes on dispatches from C. O. 51+/172 onwards. A typical 
reference is Mackenzie to Russell, 16 Dec. 1839j, minutes., C. O. 54/173- 
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1 
particularly in the legal and administrative fields. His work.. in fact., 
virtually amounted to a one-man commission of investigation and as such his 
recommendations won more general approbation in the Colonial Office than 
2 
even those of Colebrooke and Cameron. 
Stephen acted as intermediary between Anstruther and the secretary of 
state and he may have helped to select many of the general questions which 
were raised. He had a particular interest.. for examplep in the legal 
system; and he had already suggested a plan to initiate in Britain a general 
amendment of the charter of justice after prior consultations, with the 
3 
Ceylonese judiciary. Anstruther agreed with the need for reform and with 
the idea of local initiative; but he suggestedp in additionp that a full 
revision of Ceylon*o civil and criminal codes by a series of local enactments 
was equally necessary. He pointed outp for examplep that the laws governing 
property inheritance restricted capitalist development. Other civil laws 
4 
he characterised as medieval. Stephen agreed with this suggestion to 
1. His reports are in C-0.54/185, Anstruther. 
2. Stephen vas a staunch supporter: Anstruther to Stephen, 23 Nov. 1840, 
minutes., C. O. 54A85j. Anstruther. 
1 
3. E. g. Horton to Glenelgy 13 Jan. 1837p No. 22p minute.. C. 0 541153; - Mackenzie to Glenelgj. Z7 June 1838j. No. 95s minute.. C. O. 
; 4A63; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgs 17 Nov. 1838j, No. 178, C-O--54A65- 
4- Anstruther's memorandums 23 Nov. 31 -840P C. O. 54/185s Aiistrutherlff. 88-136., 
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revise the legal codes and proposed that the penal code which had been 
produced for India should serve as the starting point for the revision of 
the criminal law in Ceylon. To amend the civil law was more difficult. 
Stephen would have suggested employing an able jurist to work for some years 
on the civil code; but he doubted whether this would be practicable and 
nothing else seemed adequate. Some more immediate measure was therefore 
1 
required. 
The doubts he bad felt and Anstruther confirmed about the Ceylon - 
charter of Justice., which Stephen himself had drafted and initially defended., 
seemi to have raised other doubts in Stephen's mind. He began to despair 
of the policy of anglicising the law and legal practice which had been 
adopted following Cameron's report. In 1839 he noted that native-born 
Ceylonese were showing some opposition to governor Mackenzie's proposals 
to assimilate the laws on property inheritance to those of England. Stephen 
felt this a conclusive objection: "the best philosopbyv as I take it"v he 
advised Russellv "is to consult the habits and to respect the prejudices of 
those for whom laws are to be made". On certain critical subjects such as 
property inheritance "habits and prejudice will always be too strong for 
legislative control". The only possible solution was to employ two legal 
systems. As a westernizing measure the Roman-Dutch laws on property could 
be made to apply to all native-born including those of mixed ancestryp and 
Stephen's memorandump 28 Nov. 18/+Og points 11 & 12, on Anstruther's 
memorandum., 23 Nov. 1840, C. O. 54A85., Anstruther. 
312 
the English laws could be used for the British immigrants. There was a 
precedent for this two-fold division of law,, Stephen claimed., in the position 
of Scottish property owners in England. But Russell was afraid of 'meddling' 
in such an explosive subject and decided to postpone his decision pending 
further enquiries. 
Perhaps under the influence of Anstruther., who was not conspicuously 
2 
. liberal on race questionsp or perhaps 
through his acquaintance with Macaulay 
3 
and British administration in Indiay Stephen had become pessimistic about 
idealistic reforms. He realised that the existence of two legal systems 
would add another-barrier between natives and settlers but., since he saw no 
real signs of amalgamation, 9 this seemed unimportant-t 
"Ma ny a generation must pass away before the two 
populations of Ceylon can be blended into one 
homogenous mass, or can make any material advance 
towards an amalgamation. It is impossible to 
sacrifice the interests of the present times to 
such remote and doubtful interests". /+ 
This doctrine applied not only to the law but to the judiciary. Under 
pressure from the Colonial Office one native-born candidatep Mr. Staples., 
had been promoted in the legal service to the point where he qualified for 
1. Mackenzie to Russell, 34 Mar. 1840s No- 50, minutes., C. O. 54A79. 
2. His remarks on "half-castes" are most illuminating in this respect: 
Ahstruther's memorandump 23 Nov. 181+0., C. O. 54/185., Ahstruther. 
3. Eric Stokes, The Eng-ligh-Utilitarians and India (Oxfordp 1959)t PP. 191- 
3., outlines Macaulay's thought. 
Mackenzie to Russell., 14 Mar. . 1840, No. 50, Stephen's minutep 24 Sept. 18/+Ox C. O. 54/179. 
1 
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admission to the bench. This constituted a threat to those who believed 
in an exclusive3, y European establishment and terrified the governor and two 
of the leading local civil servants. They declared that Staples was 
incompetent for high judicial office. Stephen accepted their word unq1jest- 
2 
ioningly and reversed his earlier demonstration of "liberality". 
The experience of having to correct himself in supporting the promotion 
of a native-born Ceylonese seems also to have made an impression on Stephen. 
When dealing a few days later with a suggestion for the education of 
Ceylonese youths in England as a means of qualifying them for the bar, 
Stephen was decidedly hostile. Such a plano he said, would awaken hopes 
which inevitably would be disappointed: 
rIt appears to me that so long as an artificial and 
complex system of European'law is to be administered 
in such a country,, none but Europeans can be entrusted 
with such an administration". 
For the sake of the Ceylonese themselvess it was "better and more prudent 
to say at once# and in so many words, that such probably may be the case". 
3- 
His superiors agreed and the plan was vetoed. This pessimistic view is 
in sharp contrast to Macaulayts famous minute on education in India and yet 
1. Horton to Glenelg. 9 16 June 1837., Sisparatel minutesq C. O. 51+1154. 
2. Mackenzie to Normanby., 5 June 1839o Separate., minutes., C-O* 54A71. 
He became more critical when it was too late to affect the issues 
Campbell to Russell, 18 Aug. 2841., Separatev minutep C-0- 54/189; 
Campbell to Russell.. 15 Nov. 1841P No. 1121 minutet C. O. 51+AgO; 
Buller to Stephenj, 5 June 1841., minute., C. O. 54/3-942 Buller. 
3. Mackenzie to Russell.. 17 Dec. 1839, 'No. 13, minutes., C. O. 54A73- 
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the history of the Indian Civil Service in the following fifty years surely 
1 
supports the accuracy of Stephents observation. 
Many of Anstruther's suggestions which Stephen singled out for special 
commendation were merely repetitions of some of Colebrooke's proposals which 
for various reasons had not been implemented in 1833. This was particularly 
true of economic matters where the system of free trade - in land as well 
2 
as produce - which Colebrooke had envisaged was still not complete. in 
the intervening years Stephen had kept up his campaign to open up trade and 
3 
he doubtless appreciated the help which Anstruther gave him on this issue. 
On financial questions., too., they were in agreement. One of Stephen's 
constant complaints had been that the Treasury was impossibly miserly in 
A+ 
considering public works expenditure in Ceylon. As Stephen recognised) 
this ultimately cameback to the fact that the expenditure of the Ceylon 
government exceeded its income with the result that its financial deficiencies 
5 
became a burden on the British Treasury. 
1. H. Woodrow (ed. ), Minutes on Education-in India. (London,, 1862)y 
pp. 107-9; L. S. S. O'Malley, * The Indian Civil S ice (Londony 1931), 
pp. 205-21. 
2. Stephen's memorandump 28 Nov. 18/+Ov points 2-6y on Anstruther's 
memorandump 23 Nov. 1840., C. O. 51+1185v Anstruther. 
3- E. g. Horton to Glenelgj. 1/+ Oct. 1836, No. 51, et, se-q., Stephen's minutep 
27 Apr. 1837p C. O. 54/149; Clay to Smithy 31 Oct- 1840# minutep C. O. 
51084., India Board. 
4. E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelgj 21 May 1838y No. 76, minute., C. O. 5/+/170. 
5- E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelgy U Feb. 1839, No. 1+0j minutey C. O. 54A69. 
315 
The solution was clear. Ceylon must balance her budgets by 
retrenching in whatever way she could. To Stephen.. it appeared impossibl% 
after the rigorous economies in the civil service for uhich Colebrooke was 
responsible, to retrench further on the public service. Nor was it possible, 
because of Britain's commitments in India, to reduce 
1 
the military costs 
again) though Governor Mackenzie had tried to do so. But., sine e it could 
fairly be maintained that the army in Ceylon was an imperial interest from 
which the colony derived no benefit., Stephen felt that the Treasury should 
2 
be called upon to assume the burdens of Ceylonts military costs. If it 
agreed to do sot a favourable financial balance would allow for schemes of 
public expenditure to give the colony the civil amenities, especially roads.. 
canals and buildingst which were judged desirable. As his acid comments 
to the Treasury shows Stephen felt very strongly on this issue. But on 
matters of imperial expenditures the Treasury could not be moved. 
Anstruther shared Stephen's concern for many other aspects of Ceylonese 
administration. In 1840 he presented the Colonial Office with a damning 
account of the results of the Colebrooke reforms on the civil service. With 
1. E. g. Mackenzie to Russell., 16 Dec. 1839, No. 32,, minutes.. C-0.54A73- 
2. Somerset to Stephenp 19 Oct. 1840, P minute., C. O. 54A84t C. in C. 
3- E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelgj, 3.1 Feb. 1839t No. 1+0j, minuteg C. O. 54/ 69p I 
Mackenzie to Yormahby., 22 Nov. 1839., No. 9/+., minutep C. O. 5 3. 
Anstruther felt and Stephen agreed that land sales could provide one 
source for a public works fundr StephenIs memorandump 28 Nov. 1840y 
points 8& 13., on Anstruther's memorandum., 23 Nov. 18,40., C. O. 54/185t 
Anstruther. 
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their salaries and prospects diminished., most of the best men., he-claimedt 
had departed for India or elsewhere. Their places in the higher postsýhad 
been taken by "half-castes and adventurers"p men lacking in education and 
morality in a service unchecked by public opinion since the masses were 
ignorant of their rights. Since patronage was still left largely to the 
governor,, these undesirablei; who were the only candidates available on the 
islandp had perforce to be appointed to the leading positions. Anstruther 
did not oppose the suggestion of appointing native-born Ceylonese - on the 
contrary., he strongly favoured their appointment - but only in small numbers 
and only after they had received an English education. He attributed the 
weaknesses in the service to the low pay and lack of pensions., the survival 
of seniority promotions., and the fact that civil servants were allowed to 
engage in plantation agriculture despite official orders to the contrary. 
Like Hortono he felt that the continuance of appointments from England was 
desirable and advised instituting an examinatior4for both English and 
Geylonese candidates for the services9to weed out incompetents. Successful 
candidates in England., he suggested, could be distributed, by the secretary 
1 
of state throughout the entire empire as required. 
This report seemed to confirm everything that Stephen had maintained 
about the weaknesses of the Ceylon civil service. The one difference was 
that Anstruther said little about raising the pay of the offices normally 
Anstruther's memorandum on the civil service.. 23 Nov. 1840.. C-0.54/185) 
Anstruther, ff. 137-56. 
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held by Ceylonese -whereas Stephen had come to consider this as important. 
"The highest salary ever given to a black man in Ceylon"s Stephen minuted 
on an appeal case in 1839p "is such a pittance that no imaginable thrift 
could raise from it a maintenance for his declining years". Because of 
the racial prejudice of the local governmentq prudence as well as equity 
demanded that the imperial authorities should attempt to help the native-born 
1 
civil servant. Even a trifling claim was "important in principle as 
indeed everything is which involves the claims of the natives to have their 
2 
interests carefully weighed and impartially protected". Individual cases 
could be given consideration by particular representations even though the 
Treasury might remain unconvinced of the need for a general reform of the 
3 
service. 
Apart from this single instance where Anstruther was silenty he and 
Stephen were in almost total agreement. Stephen had constantly denounced 
the low salaries for senior posts in the civil service and their attendant 
4 
evil effects on the work performed. He had also opposed seniority 
promotions at the expense of merit and the involvement of civil servants in 
1. E. g. Mackenzie to Glenelg, 9 Apr. 1839, No- 47j. minutes, C-0.54/170. 
2. Mackenzie to Russelly 14 Dec. 1839., No. 52 minutesp C. O. 54/173. 
3. E. g. Mackenzie to Russell, 7 Jan. 181+0. No. 2) minutesp C. O. 54/177; 
Mackenzie to Russell# 5 Feb. 1841p No. 10t minutes# C. O. 54/187; 
Mackenzie to Russell., 31 Mar. 1841, No. 51., minutes, C. O. 54/187. 
4- E. g. Mackenzie to Russell, 6 Apr. 181+0. No. 54, minutes, C. O. 54/179. 
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business occupations such as plantations. Anstruther's report on the 
civil service proved an excellent opportunity for Stephen to push for a 
decision. As he told Vernon Smith: 
"I can only say that I cordially subscribe to every 
recommendation it containsp and earnestly hope that 
Lord John Russell may see fit to execute them so far 
as it rests with himself to do so, and to recommend 
to the Treasury the execution of that part of them 
which falls within their province". I 
Vernon Smith and Russell.. under pressure of vork., both insisted on further 
delays; but they at least decided to inform Sir Colin Campbell., who had 
2 
been chosen to replace Mackenzie as governorp of the new proposals. 
The most explosive topic which Anstruther touched on in his reports 
was that of religion. His advice came at a particularly crucial time., 
just as the campaigns against the special privileges of the Church of England 
in Ceylon and against the British goverrment's connection with Buddhism in 
3 
the Island were beginning to have an effect. Neither subject had passed 
unnoticed by Stephen at the Colonial Office before 18/, 0. As far back as 
3.837., the office had issued directions to the Ceylon governor to encourage 
missionary schemes for the 1ýnoral and religious education of the people of 
Ceylon". At the same time it was pointed out that the Anglican Establishment 
1. Stephen's memorandum.. 28 Nov. 18/+Op point 18, on Anstruther's memorandums 
23 Nov. 1840p C. O. 54/185p Anstruther. 
2. Minutes by V. Smith on Stephen's memorandums 28 Nov. 181+0.. minutes by 
Russell,, 28 Jan. 18/+ls 10 Feb. 181+1, &8 Apr. 1841; Stephens 8 Feb. 
18/+lj 2J+ Mar. 1841 & 18 May 18/+l; & V. Shith, 28 Mar. 1841, on 
Anstruther2s memorandums 23 Nov. 1840, C. O. 54A85-9 Anstruther. 
3. de Silva# Social Policy, pp. 29-39; 64-70. 
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was greatly over-endowed if judged by the number of members in communion 
1 
with it. This fact certainly influenced the way that Stephen-dealt with 
religious questions. Every proposal for special extra expenditure, on the 
Established Church was met by a refusal or a demand for a corresponding 
2 
retrenchment. Because of the political power of ecclesiastical groupso 
however# and perhaps because of his own commitments on the subject,, Stephen 
was normally content to leave church questions to be settled by the parlia- 
3 
mentary under-secretary. But he could seldom resist a comment on the 
contrast between "the general poverty prevailing amongst the nativest and 
the comparative wealth of the European inhabitants" whenever proposals were 
made to increase uthe very large outlay already incurred for the support of 
4 
the Established Church of England". 
Stephen's ill-concealed feelings on the iniquities of the Established 
Church in Ceylon finally boiled over when he examined a case involving the 
1. Glenelg to Mackenzies 2 Oct. 3.8372 No. l8t C. O. 55/ý9; do Silva., 
Social Policyp pp. 29-30. 
2. E. g. Horton to Glenelgf 1 Fob, 1837# No. 4,2t minutest C. O. 54/154; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgy 12 Mar. 1838, No. 53P minuteg C. 0.54/161. 
3- E. g. Horton to Grey) 28 July 1838j, minutet C. O. 5/+/. 168,, Horton; 
Mackenzie to Glenelgp 3 May 3.839, No. 67., minutest C. O. 54/170; 
Mackenzie to Normanbyp 14 Sept. 1839, No- 52, minute# C. O. 54/i72. 
4- Mackenzie to Glenelgp 21 Feb. 1839, No. 38, minuteg C-0.54/169. 
See also Mackenzie to Normanbyt 28 June 1839, No. 8j, minutep C. O. 
54/171. 
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Ven. J-. Glennie, the archdeacon of Ceylon. Glennie had conceived a hatred 
for governor Mackenzie's attempts to broaden the educational structure of 
Ceylon (by ending the dominance of the Church of England on the goverment 
teaching committee) and to institute an enquiry into the work which the 
Anglican clergy were performing. Glennie convinced his son2 Owen2 an 
Anglical clergyman who ran the newspaper., The Ceylon Herald, to undertake 
a press, campaign villifying the governor's work. When the attacks were 
reported to the Colonial Office) Stephen was outraged. , With all the passion 
of a fellow-suffererj, he declared: - 
"The propagation of rancorous and uncharitable feelings 
iss I take it, quite as great a corruptIon of good morals 
as the patronage of any of the grosser forms of sensual 
intemperance although such may not be the prevalent 
opinion1l. 
Had it not been that he believed the civil government had lost the power to 
dismiss a cleric., he would undoubtedly have recommended a dississal. Instead 
he suggested that 
1 
the younger Glennie should be reported to his superior, 9 the 
Bishop of Madras. This proved quite ineffective since the governor bungled 
the charge and the bishop unhesitatingly took the side of his clergyman. 
Stephen, in despair2 then asked to be relieved of the need to give advice 
2 
on the subject. Thereafterp he washed his hands of the whole question. 
1. Mackenzie to Normanby., * 4 June 1839.9 Private., minute.. C. O. 54A71. 
2. Mackenzie to Russell., 9 Dec. 1839p Separate., minutes., C. O. 54/173. 
3- Mackenzie to Russell., 17 Dec. 1839) No. 15t minutes# C. 0 54A73; 
Mackenzie to Russellp 29 Jan. 1840., No. 150 minutesp C. O: 54A77; 
Anstruther's memorandum.. 2A Feb, 18,40, minute, C. O. 54A85, Anstruther. 
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This fit of petulance reflected Stephen's deep distress at the contrast 
between the overendowed and apathetic Established Churchl surviving on a 
forced public levee.. and the underpaid and energetic missionary societies 
which were on their own undertaking considerable sacrifices in order to keep 
1 
their work going. Since he was notoriously a supporter of the mission 
movementp he refrained from advising his superiors on all missionary 
2 
questions. But,, angered by his brush with the local clergy.. he did not 
feel equally obliged to remain silent on what he considered to be the grossly 
extravagant public expenditure on maintaining the Church of England. Russell 
agreed that something Should be done and the governor was asked to re-investi- 
gate the subject with a view to making reductions. This was not enough 
for Stephen. In 1840j, undoubtedly as a measure of reform., he took up a 
suggestion originating with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel,, 
and advised that Ceylon should be made a separate see. Russell promised to 
5 
give this suggestion further consideration; but still Stephen fretted about 
E. g. Stephen's minutes on Mackenzie to Glenelg, 7 Mar. 18380 No. 48, C. O. 
54A61 and Mackenzie to Normanby., 11 Sept. 1839., No. 50, C. O. 54/172. 
Notice the heavy irony in the remark "to attribute anything short of 
perfection to our episcopal system is exceedingly hazardous". Mackenzie 
to Russell., 9 Dec. 1839.. Separate, Stephen's minute 3 Mar. 1840P C-0- 
54/173. 
2. E. g. Mackenzie to Russello 30 Jan. 1840s No. 16, minuteo C. O. 54A77. 
3- Mackenzie to Russell) 5 Feb. 1840s Privatet minutes & memorandaO C. O.. 
54A78; Mackenzie to RusseUo 8 July 1840., No. 13.10 minuteo C. O. 54A80. 
See also Bishop of Madras to Russell, 13 Jan. 1840) & 15 Aug. 1840p 
minutes, C. O. 54/186, Bishop of Madras. 
j+. do Silvas Social Policyo P- 35. 
5. Campbell to Smithp 9 June 18/+Ov minuteq C. O. 51, A81+p S. P. G. 
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the future. "Ecclesiastical reformation" seemed impossible "unless there 
should appear amongst us bishops and archbishops ready to sacrifice the 
temporal interest of the clerical order to the spiritual interests of the 
Church., a moral martyrdom which few men have ever had enough energy to 
undergon. 
The crisis in the Church of Eagland in Ceylon was Ismall beer' compared 
to the second religious topic which Anstruther examined. What he asked 
for was virtually a revolution in the relationship between the state and 
Buddhism. He had three main suggestions:: he wanted the InOs held in 
mortmain for the support of Buddhist temples to be opened up for agriculture; 
he wished the colonial gover=ent to withdraw from all connections with the 
"idolatrous" Buddhist ceremonies- and he advised making the income from 
2 
temple lands available for Christian. education. Since 1815P when the 
British promised to maintain and protect the "rites, ministers and places of 
worship" of the Buddhist religion in Kandyj. the official policy had been to 
carry out to the letter the obligations which this implied. Anstruther in 
fact was associating himself with a quite new missionary campaign,, inspired 
by contemporary developments in India.. which, sought to sever the connection 
between the government and Buddhism. 
1. Mackenzie to Russe3l., 8 July 18400 No. 13.1j, minutesp C. O. 51+/180. 
2. Anstrutherlb memcrmdump 23 Nov. 1840., C. O. 51+A85., Ahstruther. 
3- de Silva., Social Policyp pp. 69-73. 
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Stephen would not endorse Anstrutherts suggestion. The use of temple 
lands for agriculture was an important subject but of such "extreme delicacy" 
that it could not be re-considered without an on-the-spot investigation. 
The other two suggestions appeared "such arduous questions" that Stephen 
felt unable to "hazard even a conjecture upon them". He preferred to leave 
the whole problem to Vernon Smith whose knowledge of India might be of 
assistance. But Vernon Smith) though ful3, y aware of the current missionary 
agitation in Indiap was not prepared to meddle without public support and 
1 
the matter was, for the moment.. dropped. Stephen's timidity and Vernon 
Smith's complacency lasted only four months. The Ceylonese missionary 
campaig3ývhich had begun in 1839 with the publication of a pamphlet by the 
Rev. R. Spence-Hardy entitled "The British Government and the Idolatry of 
Ceylonn,, eventually conquered the Church Missionar7 Society and entered the 
correspondence of the Colonial Office in March 3.8/+l. Thereafter Stephen 
2 
was to ensure that it would not be forgotten. 
At the start of his administration of the Colonial Officef Lord Stanley 
was faced with the problems which Russe3.1 had tackled without finding a 
solutiony especially the reforms in the civil ser7ice., the amendments to the 
charter of justice and the questions of church-state relations in Ceylon. 
Stephen's memorandum# 28 Nov. 18,40t points 34 & 16, with V. Smith's 
minutes on Anstruther's memorandum, 23 Nov. 1840. - C. O. 51+1185., Ahstruther. 
2. de Silvap Social Policy., 'Ppi 70-76; Coates to V. Smiths correspondence., 
C. O. 54/193, C-M-S'* 
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Since Stephen was the chief adviser to the in-coming secretary of state, he 
was in a position to influence his superiors on those questions where he was 
himself well-informed and held strong opinions. Buti, in fact,, there is no 
evidence that he immediately attempted to convert Stanley to his point of 
view. On the contraryp there are cases where Stephen reversed his opinion., 
apparently in the hope of attracting the sympathy and attention of his 
superior. One of the striking differences between his work for Russell and 
Stanley is that Stephen after 3.841 began to write rather long., Philosophical 
or theoretical disquisitions on mary problems rather than simply offer 
straightforward advice. These idiosyncratic minutes, judged by their 
contentp would seem designed to demonstrate the non-political.. technical 
nature of the permanent under-secretary's work while producing conclusions 
which his superior might find congenial. 
Two i3lustrations of this changing technique and attitude can be found 
from the first few months of Stanley's arrival in the office. Up to 18/+1 
Stephen had written-consistently in impeccable whiggish terms on the virtues 
of capitalismo the division of labour in economic life and of social progress 
through the natural operation of economic forces. His antipathy to the 
concept of 'artificial' colonial economic development was partly a reflection 
1 
of this faith. Writing for Stanley late in 18/+1 about Ceylon's rising 
population as a consequence of its growing economic prosperityj, Stephen 
1. E. g. Mackenzie to Russell. 2 May 1839, No. 65, minute, C. O. 54/170. 
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expressed his viewpoint rather differently. The private development of 
European plantations was lowering the wa-ges cf the masses and could not 
possibly be construed as a general benefit to society: 
"a comparatively poor society where manual labour is dear,, 
is usual. 1y more happyt more virtuous.. and more powerful 
than a comparatively wealtby society where such labour is 
cheaps for in that case the wealth is concentratedp and 
not diffused; and so are the enjoyments which wealth 
procures, and so is the conservative spirit and the con- 
tentment which thrive only with the prosperous". 1 
In other words., social stability and comparative economic equality were 
preferred to even private economic development in order to strengthen the 
forces of conservatism. 
The change is most obvious in the case of the military estimates. 
With complete consistency before 1841, Stephen maintained that Ceylon needed 
a public works programme which it was denied through the Treasury's parsimony 
and by having to pay for a military force from which it derived no benefit. 
As he wrote in November 18/+0: 
"There is no other colony except Malta and Gibraltar . 
which contributes anything to its own militar7 defences, 
except that here and therev as in Jamaica., local allow- 
ances are made from the colony to indemnify the troops 
against the increased expense of living". 2 
In -Januar7 18/+2 he had changed his minds 
CampbeU to Russellý 9 Aug. 1841., No. 53Y Stephen's memorandum, 
16 Oct. 1841, C. O. 54/189. 
2. Stephents memorandumj, 28 Nov.. 3.8412 point 81 on Anstruther's memorandum, 
23 Nov. 18/. 0.. C. O. 51+1185. 
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"The Treasury are or have been inexorable on the 
question of military contributions. I cannot venture 
to say that they are wrong. Ceylon is not a petty 
colonys but a considerable state with a million and a 
half of inhabitants and maF--perhaps therefore be fairly 
called on to contribute to its military defence as all 
our Iarger colonies do - Jamaica, for example,, by direct 
contributionp and British North America by maintaining 
a large militia". 1 
Since Ceylon's population figures were not unknown to the Colonial 
Office before 18/+l.. it is very unlikely that the. increase between 1840 and 
2 
181+1 could have counted as much in his calculations as this suggests. Nor 
was he unfamiliar in 1840 with the improving state of the Ceylon revenue 
3 
though this might still have affected his thinking. And from his continuing 
bitter remarks about the Treasuryto stanglehold in Ceylon after 18/+l.. it 
4 
seems clear that his previous criticisms still obtained. The example of 
Jamaica which he quotes twice refers to the same fact presented in a differentl 
light so that he was not in possession of arjy new evidence on this point. 
The only important change which had taken place., in factwas that Stanley., 
a believer in retrenchment and social conservatism.. had replaced the more 
dynamic Russell as secretary of state. Stephenq who knew that the Treasury 
1. Campbell to Stanley., 22 Nov. 18/+l., No. 3-1.9 minutep C. O. 51+A90. 
2. Ile mentioned the large population specifically as an important factor 
in 1834: Stephen to Hay., 9 May 1834., C-0- 54/138, Stephen. 
3- It is mentioned in the memorandum 28 Nov. 18/+l on Anstruther's 
memorandum 23 Nov. 1840,, C-0.51+1185. Stephen,, in fact# continued to' 
protect Ceylon from purely imperial expenditure: e. g. Hampton to Stanley, 
5 July 1844j, C-O.. 54/214s Royal Society. 
E. g. Trevelyan to Stephen, 2 July 3.8/+lp minute, C-0.54A94) Treasury-; 
Campbell to Stanley.. 22 June 3-843, No. . 115.. minutep C. O. 54/204. 
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would not give way in the least., made the best he could of the situation 
I 
by presenting himself as its supporter. 
To say that Stephen adapted his usual technique and tried to accommodate 
Stanley is not to say that he ceased to have influence or personal opinions. 
On the three main topics which Stanley attempted to tackle - the civil 
servicep the church and the charter of justice - Stephen's aid was a crucial 
factor. The major difference was that Stephen no longer performed every- 
thing by himself but simply gave advice and criticised work which was done 
by others. Is a result his influence was exerted in different ways and the 
extent to which his advice was adopted varied considerably with each question. 
In examining the governor's report on the state of Ceylon in 18/+0., 
Stephen noted particularly the corrupt state of the civil service. Reminding 
Stanley that A: nstruther had reported on the subject at great length., he 
expressed the opinion that the governors' misuse of their patronage and the 
narrow range of the choice available to them appeared to be the root causes 
of the evil. But Stephen made no Personal recommendation for action. This 
analytical approach, if it was meant to appeal to his superior., worked 
perfectly. Stanley minuted on Stephen's comments: "I shall beg for some 
It is always possible that Stephen simply changed his mind. In the 
course of Peel's prime ministership from 1842-/+5 he does seem to have 
given upp to some extent, his Support for the Whigs and to have become 
something of a Peelite in politics. This is clear from his diary for 
18/+6. He was certainly also more inconsistent after 3.8/+1 partly through 
lack of knowledge. When he went on holiday he minuted only important 
documentsy leaving the rest to his subordinates. As a result he began 
to lose touch with the detailsr e. g. in 1842 he takes August off and 
subsequently minutes only when asked to do sos, as in Nos. 83 & 90. - Me 54/197. 
1 
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conversation with Mr. Stephen on the whole state of the case". Perhaps 
as a resultp Stanley apparently resolved to undertake a fun re-consideration 
2 
of the state of the Ceylon civil service. 
Having attracted his superior to the notion of reformo Stephen 
proceeded to supply him very subtly with suggestions. He did this by 
throulng out proposals for radical reforms when supposedly dealing with 
quite different topics. Using evidence produced ty the governor to justify 
expenditure on sick leaves., for example., he argued that reductions in the 
civil service seemed to have gone too far and "some permanent increase of 
3 
the whole disposable force ia necessary". He similarly diverted complaints 
about judicial administration by blaming the bad service morale caused by 
reduced salaries which contrasted unfavourably with those offered by the 
East India Compary: 
"The consequence has been that all. our officers (the 
clergy not excepted) have betaken themselves to sugar 
and coffee planting: and find themselves with little 
leisure for their duties and in no friendly relation 
to the natives". 4 
Whenever an opportunity presented itself., Stephen proceeded to hammer these 
5 
points home in successive minutes. 
1. Campbell to Russelli 9 Aug. 1841, No. 53j, minute., C. O. 54/3.89. 
2. Campbell to Stanleyv 5 Feb. 1842, No. 22, Hope's minutes C. O. 54A96. 
3- Campbell to Stanley., 5 Feb. 1842., No. 22p Stephen's minute, C. O. 54A96. 
4- Campbell to Stanley.. 18 Apr,. 1842p No. 56, Stephents minute., C. O. 54/196. 
5. E. g. Campbell to Sta nleyp 28 May 1842, No. 83s minute., C. O. 54A97; 
Campbell to Stanley., 4 June 1842, NO- 91P minutes C. O. 54/197; CampbelI 
to Stanley, 20 Oct. 1842p No. 168p minutes C-0- 54/199. 
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Indirect persuasion could be powerful but Stephen did not neglect a 
frontal assault where this seemed permissible. He wast for, example, 
particularly insistent that high standards should be continually cultivated. 
On those grounds he successfully challenged the governor's proposal to 
relax the rule which required senior officers to learn native languages. 
Characteristically in doing so he offered another suggestion for reform: 
"I would announce that great oficiency in this kind r -ative languages7should not pass without of learning Zn 
reward sooner or later in the way of promotion". 1 
This was not the only instance. While Stanley was still gathering evidence 
2 
and preparing his plan of reformy Stephen received a private letter from 
Anstruther on the weaknesses in the civil service. Though officially deplor- 
ing Anstruther's failure to use official channels for his correspondencey 
Stephen nonetheless registered the letter and sent it to Stanley for his 
3 
inspection. 
In the summer of 1844 to assist Stanley to find some solutionp Stephen 
was required to present a memorandum on the civil service question. In 
thist his first piece of direct advice, Stephen again blamed the weaknesses 
of the service on the misuse of its patronage. The Fast India Company, 
he claimedp had a wide choice whereas in Ceylon Colebrooke had insisted 
upon local appointmentsi, so that the governor was largely limited to a tiny 
number of undesirable immigrants. The best solution was to send out from 
1. Campbell to Stanley, 23 Dec. 1842j, No. 217., minute., C. O. 54/199. 
2. Campbell to Stanley., 19 A ?. *. 1843, No. 87s Murdoch's minute., C. O. 54/209. 
3- Anstruther to Stephen., 23 Nov. 1843., minutest C. O. 54/209, Anstruther. 
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Britain all civil service candidates and all junior officersp leaving the 
1 
local goverment to decide what particular place each man ought to fill. 
In a mord., he wished to see the old exclusive civil service restored and 
patronage revert to Britain. 
When Stanley's drafts were completed they were sent informally to 
Stephen for comment. They included new provisions on efficiency (salaries 
were to be raisedp officials were to be required to devote their full 
attention to their dutiesj, and exams were to be instituted for now clerks) 
and on promotion (offices above the third clerical class were to be awarded 
on the basis of merit alone). Stephen did not feel able to object to these 
suggestions since they obviously went some way to meet his earlier ideas. 
But he decided to keep one step ahead. He advised turning over the uhole 
question of a general. civil service reform to a now governor invested with 
strong powers and specially chosen for his ability and capacity to take 
2 
decisions on the spot. In fact he may well have felt that the plans were 
inadequate especial3. y on salar7 increases and on the attempts to prevent 
3 
civil servants from engaging in coffee planting. A: governor with local 
knowledge and absolute powers could adjust the reforms as, required. Stephen 
obvious3y had Lord Durham as well as Sir Charles Metcalfe in mind. He had 
achieved his aim to see the reform of the service adopted by a secretax7 of 
Memorandum by Stephen, 9 June 18/+4., C. O,, 51+/222., Memoranda on civi3- 
service. 
2. Campbell to Stanley., /+ June 18"., Private, minute., C. O. 54/211,, 
3. Langslow to Stanleyq 17 Sept. 1844,, minutep C. O. 54/215y langslow. 
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state; but by 1844 even this seemed inadequate. 
Stephen's disillusionment with reforms made in Europe was a character- 
istic feature of his later policy in Ceylon. It is equally well illustrated 
by his views on the charter of justice. In the course of his years at the 
Colonial Office Stephen wrote no less than ten charters of justice for 
different -colonies and only the Ceylonese, code proved a failure. From 
its first promulgationj, the Ceylon charter had been continually criticised 
and amendments demanded. Russell. when secretary of statep decided to 
submit all the proposals (including those by Anstruther) to one Mr. Empson,, 
Professor of Iaw at 11ýileybury College. Empson's report was then sent to 
Ceylon where it was commented on by the leading legal figures. Eventually, 
in 1842., Stephen was asked to co=ent on the resultant morasse of collected 
papers on the subject. 
Stephen blamed the failure on two main causes$ "ignorance of Asiatic 
usages and character" and the fact that the charter was "based on speculations 
(chiefly those of Bentham)" which Cameron had adopted in his report in 1831. 
Though'the speculations were profound., subtle and sensible., "the theox7 was 
spun somewhat too finely and... had the fault of all laws wrought out in the 
cabinet without being properly winnowed by public debate". Stephen's 
solution was as simple as it was radical: 
1. , See the volume of correspondence on the charter of justice, C. O. 54A91. 
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"My own full belief is that unless the requisite 
amendments to the charter be made at Ceylon itself 
they never can be made effectually. There are no 
doubt great objections to local legislation in such 
a case as this. Prejudices. 9 and selfish interests, 
and feelings of castep and the riva3x7 of different 
classes of Europeans# are all fertile sources of error. 
But the most certain and abundant of all such sources., 
that in ignorance of the place and the people, is 
stopped up. If they do not frame a very wise or 
equitable law,, they will at least, make a very practi- 
cable one". 1 
There were some obvious technical legal difficulties in overriding 
imperial legislation in this way. 9 but Stephen felt that they could be over- 
come 
I 
by using a special procedure for confirming the local laws. Other 
more minor objections he discounted entire3y. The fear that the checks 
and balances in the constitution might be overthrown in favour of a strong 
executivep he disproved.. In the West Indian and British North American 
colonies local legislative initiative had not destroyed the powers of the 
legislature or judiciary. Moreoverp autocracy could no longer be regarded 
as a real danger in Ceylon since there were other checks in that unofficial 
members sat on the Legislative Councilp a free press gave voice to a section 
of public opinion and the political consciousnesxof the population was 
2 
continually increasing. Since he was on very firm ground on legal questions 
Stephen could afford to be peremptory with his chief. Stanley was warned 
that unless he agreed to the main suggestion., he could expect no help from 
3 
his permanent under-secretary on the subject. The point struck home. 
1. Stephen's memorandum to Hbpej, 20 Jan. 18/+2v after Campbell to Stanley., 
22 Nov. 1841., No. 3. C. O. 54/191. 
2o Stephen's draft reply., 21 Feb. 18/+2,, after correspondence on Campbell to 
Stanley, 22 Nov. 1841t No. 3, C. O. 54/191- 
3. Notethe last sentence in Stephen's memorandum to Hbpe, 20 Jan. 181+2j, 
after Campbell to Stanley,, 22 Nov. 18411, No. I. C-0.54A91. 
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Stanley professed to "see no possible mode of bringing this question to a 
conclusion except that suggested by Mr. Stephen". 
The decision to allow the local government to settle part of its 
constitutioný even though its I ro'ojil-b were still subject to an imperial PP 
veto meant an important break with the past. Stephen claimed that it 
.12 
reversed the tradition of the preceding 35 years. Certainly it marks a 
stage in the process by which 
3 
the crown colonies achieved their legislative 
autonomy in the 19th century. The decisivbness of the change was illu trated 
within a few months of Stephens first report. Dealing with a request-from 
the governor for guidance in the event of disagreement on constitutional 
reform,, Stephen suggested that changes in judicial administration should take 
effect immediately without waiting for the secretary of state's approval. 
He initially laid down certain conditions:: 
"a local law in amendment of the charter might take 
effect immediately if it were a law passed unanimously 
by the legislatures and if the judges should unanimously 
certify in faVOUr of the immediate operation of it". 4:, 
Within a year, howeverlas-the Judges attempted to frustrate the governor and 
council by disapproving of every law they made,, Stephen advised that both 
1. Stanleyts minute., n-d. j, on 
StephenIs memorandum to Hope., 20 Jan. 1842., 
after Campbell to Stanley., 22 Nov. 18/. lj, No. 3. C. O. - 54A91., 
2. Stephen to H6pe,, 21 Feb. 18429 after Campbell to Stanley., 22 Nov. 18/+l., 
No. 3, C. O. 54A91- 
3. Stephen's respect for colonial autonomy is seen in Rogers to Grey., 
24 Sept. 1846, minute., C. O. -323/61.. f. /+24. 
4- Campbell to Stanley, 20 Oct. 18/+2., No. 1702 minute., C. O,, 54/199. 
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safeguards should be abandoned and that all legislation on the charter should 
be put on an identical basis with arq other laws. This suggestion was 
adopted. 
The third main subject uhich Stanley tackled under Stephen's influence 
was the reconsideration of the statets relationship with Buddhism. Stephen 
adopted a strong line on the Buddhist question in 1841 though only four 
months before he had refused to hazard even a conjecture on the subject. He 
had clearly realised neither the extent to which the British goverment was 
committed to actively supporting Buddhism nor that missionaries might feel 
that the support given by the state to Buddhism constituted a barrier to 
2 
their attempts at proselytization. His consistent policy before 1840 had 
been to encourage the churches to engage in missionary work and he was 
therefore obliged to help them. Although the object of his attack - the 
Buddhist-state connection in Ceylon - was new, he had for many years opposed 
the official sanctioning of caste, on the grounds that this associated tho 
3 
state with alien religious practices. There isp thereforep a consistency in. 
his approach which has not always been appreciated and which was in no way 
1. Campbell to Stanley., 20 Oct. 1843P Itrivates minute, C. O. 54/205ý0- 
Campýell to Stanley, 23 Nov. 1843.9 No. 212., minutesp followed by 
memoranda and minutes on Nos.. U2_& 267. . 54/206; Stephen to t C. O. Hbpep 20 May 1844p C. O. 54/214 Council. 
2. Stephen's minute 21+ Mar. 18/+l,, after Coates to V. Smith., 23 Mar. 1841p 
C. O. 54/193P C-M-S- 
Stephen to Twiss., 9 Dec. 1828, C-0- 323/45.. f. 298. 
1 
related to missionary pressures. 
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In his later life Stephen became no more tolerant on religious questions. 
On the contrary., his feelings were obviously much more intense in 1841 than 
even a few years earlier. His remark to Russell makes this clear:. 
"No Christian government-should countenance or actively- 
participate in an idolatry which we are all agreed in 
regarding as not mere: Ly absurd but Positively criminal". 
Even if state policy did not require thisp divine law did. The argument 
that Buddhism had been guaranteed protection by the British in the Kandyan 
Convention of 1815, was also not acceptable. The Buddhists were guaranteed 
2 
only "absolute toleration" and the right to practice their religion freely. 
Under Stanley.. Stephen kept up his direct pressure on his superiors and 
3 
appears early to have converted them to his point of view. Stanley was 
not always prepared to go as far as Stephen; but he accepted the argument 
that Buddhism was idolatrous and therefore must be disestablished by the 
4 
British goverment in Ceylon. 
Stephents intolerance Of Buddhism contrasts markedly with his tolerance 
of non-Ahglican Christian denominations and indeed with his constant support 
He used the same arguments about Roman Catholicism in Canada: Knaplundp 
James Stephenp p. 142. 
2. Stephen's minutes) 2/+ Mar. 1841 & 30 Mar. 181+1 after Coates to V. Smithp 
23 Mar. 1841, C-0- 54/193P C. M. S. 
3- E. g. Stephen assumed Stanleyls support on an ordinance to restrain land 
gifts for religious purposes: Campbell to Stanley., 5 June : L8/+3, No. 106, 
minuteq C. O. 54/201+. 
E. g. Campbell to Stanley,, 2/+ Jan. 1844., No. 14, minutes, C-0- 54/210; 
Campbell to Stanleyp 8 May 1845P No. 96, minutes, C. O. 54/217. 
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for the attempts to prevent Christian ecclesiastical expenses being charged 
1 
to a non-Christian public. But in offering advice to Stanley on all 
religious topics except the disestablishment, of Buddhismp he refrained from 
2 
insisting on his own opinions. Some of his severest strictures were still 
reserved for the Church of England in Ceylon. But although he condemned 
in strong terms the sinecurism and absenteeism which he claimed was character- 
isticy he refused, ) except 
by implicationto recommend a course of action for 
3 
Stanley to follow. Nonetheless he frequently suggested in connection with 
other subjects that ecclesiastical reform could only be undertaken success- 
fully from within the church and that to ensure episcopal control was the 
A+ 
most effective method of proceeding. This was the suggestion which was 
finally adopted. With the blessing of the archbishop of Canterburyp Ceylon 
was elevated into an episcopal see in 18" and its incompetent archdeacon 
5 
was pensioned off. 
1. E. g. Campbell to Stanley, 14 Mar. 1843., No. 56, minute, C. O. 54/203; 
Campbell to Stanleyp 7 Mar. 18/+5., No. 47., minute, C. O. 54/216. Stephen 
was also extremely tolerant of the Moslems in Sierra Leone: See minute, 
3.8 Mar. 181+0p on Doherty to Russell.. 4 Dec. 1839., No. 77f C. O. 267/154- 
2. Campbell t6 Stanleyp 15 Mar. 1843., No. 59v minutes C. O. 51+1203; Campbell 
to Stanley., 8 Aug. 184/+p No. 131p minute# C. O. 54/212. 
3- Campbell to Stanley., 16 Mar. 1843, No. 60, minute., C. O. 54/203. 
4- E. g. Campbell to Stanleyp 22 June 3-843P No. 115P minutep C. O. 54/204; 
Campbell to Stanloyj, 18 Aug. 1843P No. 154., minute., C. O. 54/204. 
5" Archbishop of Canterbury to Stanley, 20 Aug. 1843. - minutes C. O. 5/+/209t Canterbury; Campbell to Stanley, 18 Apr. 1844.. No. 73., minutes C-0- 
54/211. 
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His contact with Buddhism proved to be too great a strain for Stephen's 
liberalism. He could agree that Buddhists were entitled to enjoy full 
civil and political rights but he could not see that there was arqthing in 
the Buddhist faith which might be of value or interest. Indeed he was 
highly sceptical of the intelligence as well as of the sincerity of a man 
whop given the choice between Christianity and Buddhism., would choose the 
lattert 
"Christianity is the only religion ever knoun among 
men in strict alliance with philosophy., civilization 
and human advancement in all arts and sciences". 1 
The equating of Christianity with western civilization natilrally consigned 
Buddhism to a level with oriental technological., social and political back- 
wardness. But this belief had two sides. In Stephen's attitude there is 
more than a trace of the idea that western civilization could only be 
achieved through the adoption of the progressive religion of Christianity. 
To destroy Buddhism was to open the way for the introduction of the superior 
civilisation of the west. 
Stephen had no hesitation in being both blunt and direct with Gladstone. 
The subtleties pervading his minutes to Stanley immediately disappeared when 
2 
Gladstone took over. But# of coursep Gladstone did not allow Stephen to 
have his own way in Ceylon arq more than elsewhere. As usual he got down 
to a detailed and painstaking examination of every problem and adopted 
1. Campbell to Stanleyp 20 Nov. 1844, No. 192, minute., C. O. 51+/213- 
2. E. g. Campbell to Stanley, 2/+ Nov. 1845., No. 241y minutesp C. O. 54/219. 
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scrupulously fair-minded compromises on every topic which he had, time to 
decide. In attempting to reform the civil services for examples Gladstone 
insisted that Stanleyts policies be implemented initially and then spent so 
long -examining the question that he was forced to leave the detailed appli- 
cation of the new plans to his successor. Stephen urged him to allow the 
governor to settle each question on his own initiative though in consultation 
with the executive council; but Gladstone felt unable to agree until he had 
considered the civil service reforms fully. Similarly Stephen advised 
Gladstone to institute an apprenticeship scheme to examine new candidates 
on the spot rather than rely on the written examination., which Stanley had 
recommendedtbut Gladstone repudiated his advice and insisted on using the 
2 
East India Company's examination. His love of compromise made Gladstone 
more sympathetic to those civil servants who had taken up plantation agri- 
culture and he agreedp to Stephen's obvious distress., to waive Stanley's 
absolute prohibition on their activities provided the governor felt their 
3 
official mork did not suffer as a result. 
The most bitter subject of disagreement between Stephen and Gladstone 
was the disestablishment of Buddhism. Stephen could perhaps have hoped 
1. Campbell to Stanleyp 16 Oct. 3-845.9 No. 208ý minutes, C 0.54/219; 
Campbell to Stanley., 3 Nov. 1845j, No. 2240 minutes., C.;. 54/219. 
2. Campbell to StanlWp 5 Nov. 1845p No.. 226, minutes., C. O. 54/219. 
3- Campbell to Stanleyp 16 Dec. 1845y Privatep minutess C. O. 54/219. 
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from a man with Gladstone's well-known views as a supporter of the Church 
to find in him a sympathiser in the struggle against Buddhism. If he did) 
he was not entirely disappointed. Gladstone agreed in theory that there 
was an obvious need to dissociate the Ceylon government from its idolatrous 
Buddhist connection. But Gladstone again wanted to compromise. It was 
first necessaryy he thought., to provide Buddhism with a central structure, 
with a kind of church hierarchy., before removing the support of the state. 
The Buddhists deserved to be left no worse off than before the British 
connection was assumed. This was a policy with exactly the same fault as 
Stephent, s - it assumed that Buddhism was analagous to a Christian church and 
so could survive without its state connection. The creation of a Buddhist 
hierarchyv which Gladstone wished to accomplish as an administrative reorgan- 
isationp had in, fact baffled all Buddhist leaders for centuries. It was not 
this objection which concerned Stephen, however) since he felt these difficul- 
ties were not a product of British rule and that the British government was 
not responsible for solving them. His fear was that the government's attempt 
to create a Buddhist hierarchy would result in producing a kind of Buddhist 
2 
Papacy to which future Ceylon governments would have to defer, 
Gladstone left office before his plans for Ceylon had matured. His 
1. de Silvaj, Social Policyv PP- 93-97. 
2. Campbell to Stanley., 7 Feb. 181+6., No. 37,, minutes.. C. O. 54/223. 
340 
successor,, Grey) in restoring Stephen to his preeminent place as chief 
adviser., inevitably altered the nature of Ceylonese administration. This 
was strikingly evident in every field. The vacillation and ambiguity which 
characterised Gladstone's policies on civil service reform,, church govern- 
mentp Buddhism and legal reform evaporated, to be replaced by the forceful 
policies which Stephen had consistently maintained on these topice. On 
these and other subjects, reliance on local administrative or legislative 
initiativep which Stephen had favoured under Stanley and Gladstone) was 
adopted as a policy by Grey. The occasions when'Stephen advised the imperiall 
authorities to coerce the colony were very few. Instead the colonial 
1 
goverment was encouraged to settle its own policies. 
Nonetheless Stephen could not afford to be complacent whilst Sir Colin 
Campbell remained as governor. CaMpbeU was a complete3, y ineffective 
governor. H6 was we3l over 70 before he succeeded to his post and quite 
2 
incapable of mastering the details of his work. As a result he was severely 
dependent on his officials for the execution of his duties and even for the 
drafting of his dispatches. One of his colonial secretaries openly claimed 
3 
to rule him. Being unable to sort out the mass of documents which daily 
This was particularly true on legal matters: e. g. Rogers to Grey , 24 Sept. 1846, minutes C. O. 323/61f f- 423; . see also Trevelyan to 
Stephens 18 July 1846., minute, C. O. 54/230s Treasury. 
2. Campbell to Gladstone) 7 May 1846.. Privatej minutes., C. O. 51+/224. 
3. Anstruther to Stanleyj, 15 Feb. 1845., minute., C. O. 54/221p Anstruther. 
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amassed on his desk, he was prone to take the line of least resistance and 
transmit them all., undigested and without c6mmentp to the secretax7 of state 
1 
much to the consternation of the Colonial Office. This behaviour 
intensely annoyed Stephen and he seems to have convinced Stanley to appoint 
in 181,5 a new colonial secretaryp Sir James Emerson-Tennent., to prop up the 
2 
"aged and feeble" governor. The experiment was not immediate3, v successful. 
Stephený judging by one of his minutes to Gladstonej, continued to complain 
bitterly that "decision,, vigourp and a preference for the public interest 
to the comfort of the persons immediately surrounding hims are gifts which 
the governor of Ceylon does not possess". Gladstone ignored the co=ent. 
But Grey agreed with Stephen. He decided almost immediately to replace 
Campbell., who had already served a term of five yearsp and began to look 
around for a strong i4ccessor. Stephen, impressed by this actionp recommencbd 
that several important topics awaiting consideration should be left until the 
A+ 
new governor was appointed. 
1. E. g. Campbell to Stanley.. 13 Aug. 1842., No. 125# minute., C. O. 54A98; 
Campbell to Stanley., 17 Sept. 1842., No. . 145.9 minute., C. O. 54/198; Campbell to Stanleyp 20 Oct. 1842p No.. 3.68., minute., C. O. 54/3.99; 
Campbell to Stanleyy 16 Feb. 3.843.9 No. 34p minutesp C. O. 54/203. 
2. Campbell to Stanleyj, 16 Oct. 1845) No. 208s minute., C0 54/219; 
Campbell to Stazley.. 4 June 1844j Private., minutes., C: O: 54/23.1. 
3- Campbell to Stanleyj, 16 Dec. 3.845, Private,, minute., C. O. 54/219. See 
also Campbell to Stanleyp 3 Nov. 1845) No. 224j. minute., C. O. 54/219. 
4- Campbell to Grey., 7 Nov. -1846, No.. 65, minute., C. O. 54/227. 
W. 2 
Grey was equal3y accommodating on the proposal to disestablish 
Buddhism. He pronounced Gladstone's policy on the subject incomprehensible 
and placed himself totally in Stephen's hands for recommendations as well 
I 
as information. Consequently the new governor.. Viscount Torrington., 
received instructions to withdraw state support entirely from Buddhism and 
to leave the Buddhists to make their own provisions for their future organ- 
2 
isation and government. This decision was to prove one of the most con- 
troversial aspects of British policy in Ceylon and since Stephen was clearly 
a prime mover in its adoption., he has recently come under heavy fire for 
.3 his views. It can be said in-his defence that as both his policy on caste 
and his definition of Christianity show., his motives were more than those of 
religious bigotry. He sought by persuasion and example to overturn the 
feudal and reactionary elements in Ceylonese life and to let in the forces 
4 
of science and liberalism. It is perhaps a little too much to expect that 
he should have seen that Buddhism and western civilization as he Imew it 
were not incompatible. 
At least his liberalism was uppermost in his dealings with the English 
1. Minute by Grey., 30 Apr. 1846, after Campbell to Stanleyq 7 Feb. : L8/+6., 
No. 37, C. O. 54/223. 
2. Campbell to Grey2 7 Nov. 18460 No. 65, minute, C. O. 54/2Z7. 
3- de Silvat Social Polic: ir, pp. 64-102. 
4- Notice his tenderness to "religious prejudices" in Campbell to 
Stanley., 7 Jan. 1845., No- 4Y minutep C. O. 54/216. 
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churches. in 1846v at Stephen's behest.. Grey agreed to end the custom of 
supporting Christian churches out of public funds. It proved impossible to 
dispense with public support altogether., but the "voluntary principle" - 
that those who wished to attend Christian churches must pay for their privi- 
1 
leges - was officially endorsed. Not even the Church of England was made 2 
an exception. Before Stephen left office a virtual equality had been 
established between all the Christian churches in Ceylon., such as obtained 
in Australia. * and there is no doubt that Stephen's insistent propaganda on 
behalf of ecclesiastical equality played a very big part in this final 
achievement. 
His influence on the civil service reforms also increas(d'. through Grey's 
support. In his last year in office., Stephen continually pressed his 
superior to deny civil servants the right to engage in coffee or sugar 
planting. In view of the compromises which Stanlcy and Gladstone had made 
even Stephen thought it inexpedient to attack those who held their lands 
before 1845. But for all officials appointed after that date he insisted 
upon clear and peremptory rules placing an absolute prohibition on their 
engaging in any way in plantation agriculture. Grey followed Stephen in 
this and in his decision to make all future promotions in the civil service 
1. Campbell to Gladstone.. 11 Jul 1846 No. V55.9 minutep C. O. 51+/225; 
Caampbe1l to Gla-dstonep -11 
Q 
-No. 73. Qip "C; ýQ. 225. 
2. Campbell to Grey, 10 Oct. 181+61 No. 37., minutes., C-0.54/226. 
3. de Silva., Social Policyv pp. 1+2-51. 
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conditional upon the candidate relinquishing his plantation interests. 
The ease with which Stephen communicated with Grey seems to have 
encouraged him to venture into now subjects to aid his superior. Despite 
his dislike of Treasury financial controls.. Stephen had never really lost 
interest in the 1840s in the subject of Ceylonese revenue., but he had kept 
2 
aloof from debates on it. Meanwhile., his views underwent a change with 
the British adoption of free trade policies. He began to appreciate that 
British economic policy might conflict with the particular needs of a colony. 
Ceylon., lying just off the Indian sub-continent,. could easily find itself., 
for example., becoming an exploited appendage of the Indian economy. For 
this reason among othersp he had agreed with the governor and council to 
reverse his earlier support for Anstruther's proposal to remove the customs 
3 
duties on a variety of products. He had also strongly opposed the creation 
of a free trade area comprising British India and Ceylon when it seemed 
4 
likely that this would adversely affect Ceylonese wages and exports. But 
5 
Stanleyj, dogmatic as ever) refused to support him. Nonetheless Stephen 
1. Iangslow to Stanleyp 17 Sept. 1844s minutes, C-0.54/215, Langslow; 
Campbell to Greys, 7 May 1846s, Privates, minutesp C. O. 5/+/224. 
2. Ideally he would have preferred a strong governor "managing the public 
revenue for the public good without the external check of minute 
Treasury regulations and interference", % Campbell to Stanley, 4 June 18" 
Privates minutes, C. O. 54/211. 
3- Campbell to Stanley., 1 Sept. 1842, NO- 129s, minutes, C-0.54/198. 
4- Campbell to Stanley., 22 Nov. 1841., No. 3.1j. minute., C. O. 54A90; Tennent 
to Stephen, 21 Nov. 1841, minutes, C-0- 54/193. - India Board. 
5. Tennent to Stephen,, 26 Feb. 1842s, minutesp C. O. 54/2-00s, 
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continued to hope for some compromise between local and imperial interests. 
With Grey as secretary Stephen felt able to tackle the subject more 
positive3, v. Just as his views on free trade were becoming more complex., 
so his appreciation of commercial development through priming the pump was 
also undergoing a change. As Ceylon's trade increased and its population 
grew,, expansion seemed more feasible and desirable. He argued that the 
government must be consistent in its decision to send grain seeds and live- 
stock to the settlement colonies in Australasia and apply the same doctrine 
to non-settlement colonies. "Where there is no commercial impulse urging 
merchants in the same direction" as in Ceylon., the home government had'to, 
assist economic development. Though he made no more specific recommen- 
dationst Stephen was even prepared to urge Grey to consider the "numerous 
'2 
and serious" complaints of Ceylonese merchants and planters. He distrusted 
his knowledge of economics too much to go further. Early in 1847, a report 
by Emerson-Tementp the colonial secretary., on Ceylonts finance and commerce, 
allowed him to consider the subject in greater depth. 
Typically of his later years in office., Stephen's solution was not 
political, but administrative. Pointing out that matters affecting trade 
and finance could never be settled by the Colonial Office alone., Stephen 
suggested that one of the Lords of the Treasury and the parliamentary under- 
secretaries at the Board of Trade and the Colonial Office should form them- 
1. Trevelyan to Stephen, 18 July 18/+6, minutet C. O. 51+1230, Treasury. 
2. Campbell to Greys, 10 Oct. 181+6, No. 36) minutep C. O. 54/226. 
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selves into a committee to settle policy and decide on all questions of the 
sort proposed by Emerson-Tement. This co=aittee would work in close 
co-operation with the three respective political chiefs in the offices of 
state concerned and on colonial problems would consult., where necessary.. 
with the governors and other experts. Decisions would be reached "Privately 
and definitely" in committee before an official correspondence on the subject 
was begun. This procedure would save months of wasted circular official 
co=espondence and uould lead to clear decisionsp mutually agreed to by all 
1 
interested parties. , Stephen's suggestion was adopted. The new tax 
proposals hammered out for Ceylon in 1847 were a product of his inter-depart- 
2 
mental committee. As an administrative device., Stephen's committee fitted 
in perfectly with Grey's plans to liberalise the imperial economy and shows 
how sensitive Stephen was to the requirements of his chief. As a method of 
conducting colonial governm it gives the lie to those who maintain that 
Stephen did nothing to solve the problem of inter-departmental co-operation. 
In Trinidad and Sierra Leone Stephea had viewed the inhabitants as a 
people who had been brutalised by European slavery. Britain had accepted 
the moral obligation to protect them and had learned to tolerate their 
weaknesses. As colonists and Christians.. the lost children of Ham were 
Campbell to Grey.. /+ Nov. 1846, No. 60, followed by Stephen's memorandum, 
14 Jan- 1847, C. O. 54/228. Stephen had proposed this procedure four 
years earlier but Stanley used it only once and insisted upon keeping 
personal control: MacGregor to Stephen, 1/+ Feb. 2-8/+2p minutest C. O. 
54/200t B. of T. 
2. See correspondence & papers. in reports on finance.. vol. 6, C. O. 54/23. 
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undergoing a process of redemption. "Asiatics" were quite different and 
their future less assured. Their degeneracy was-cf their own making and 
their salvation could only come through submission to the west. In India 
and in Ceylon Britain's conquest and colonisation had been distinctly lacking 
in principle originallyp an act of acquisitive aggression: - but atonement 
1 
was being made in the way the power thus gained was used. 
The Ceylonese, when the British arrived,, were wretchedly poor', utterly 
demoralized, sunk in idolatry and backward in all the arts of civilization. 
2 
Britain's mission was therefore to raise the people in the scale of civiliz- 
3 
ation. rather than to expect them to aid themselves. This difficult task 
had been cheerfully undertaken. The first forty years of British rule had 
seen the beginning of the fulfilment of one part of this mission - Ceylon 4 
had become more prosperous. But this in turn raised new problems. Ceylon 
began "degenerating into a colony .... cultivated for the benefit of absenteesý 
Stephents Di for 1846j, entry for 23 Feb. 1846; Campbell to Stanley, 
8 May 1845p No, 96, minutep C. O. 54/217. 
2. Campbell to Russell., 9 Aug. 184-Is No. 53j, Stephen's memorandums 16 Oct. 
1841 pC-0.51+A89. 
3- E. g. Campbell to Stanley., 20 Nov. 1844., No. 192y minute., C. O. 54/213. 
The attitude influenced his opinion on the possibility of granting 
Ceylon a representative assembly: e. g. Campbell to Stanley,, 22 Nov. 
18/+l,, No. Il., minute, C. O. 51+1190; Campbell to Stanley., /+ June 1844., 
Private2 minutei, C. O. 54/211. 
Stephen's memorandums 28 Nov. 1840.9 on Anstrutherts memorandum, 23 Nov. 
1840Y C-0- 54/185. 
348 
with a money-making European aristocracy to keep down the local government 
with the one hand and the natives with the other". To prevent this it was 
essential that Ceylon should be placed '"under the government of a local 
power absolute if not despotic and ruled for the good of the feeble mary 1 
rather than for that of the strong and wealthy few". 
The nfeeble manyn did not exist as individuals to Stephen but rather 
as objects of his solicitude and concern. There is no evidence that he 
ever met a Ceylonese whereas he was certainly familiar with Negroes from 
both the West Indies and West Africa. He apparently came to accept unques- 
tioningly, the standard caricature of the oriental as lethargic and volatile ' 2 
or., as he himself put it, as a man "with relaxed fibre and irritable nerves". 
He recognised that there were individuals who thought highly of the Ceylonese. 
But probably., like governor Hortonj, he felt that with personal contact they 
would think "more meanly of their capacity and of their character". 
Contemporary knowledge of sociology was extremely primitive and it is clear 
that Stephenp like most members of the Colonial Office, never learned to 
distinguish between a Sinhalese and a Tamil. More alarming3, Yp he did not 
even learn to distinguish between the Sinhalese and the Veddhas,. an aborig- A+ 
inal people living in remote isolation in the south-west of the island. 
1. Campbell to Stanley., A+ June 3-844P Private., minute., C. O. 54/211. 
2. Rogers to Greyp 10 Feb. 1847,9 minute., C. O. 323/63., f. 362. 
3- Campbell to Stanley$ 20 Nov. 184/+, No. 192, minutes., C. O. 54/213. 
4. Campbell to Russell., 9 Aug. 181+lp No. 53p Stephen's memorandum, 16 Oct. 
1841., C. O. 54/189- 
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The unflattering caricature of the Ceylonese, which he acceptedp however,, 
did not predispose Stephen to abandon them. He did notj, like his friend 
Macaulay., look forward with pride to the day when the Asiatic would have 
acquired all that western civilization could teach. But this was partly 
because he was more concerned with immediate questions such as regulating 
social and political 
1 
relations between the Asiatic inhabitants and the 
European immigrants. Ceylon in 1846, with its aggressive.. commercially- 
mindedp small white population and its largep submissive coloured population., 
reminded Stephenp significantly., of Jamaica before 1833- From the analogy 
he drew an inevitable conclusion. Since the Ceylonese could neither 
appreciate nor perfom the responsibilities and duties of civil libertyl 
the whites in Ceylon could not be permitted to enjoy a system of represen- 
tative government: 
"Such a legislature .... would,, in fact.. be an 
absolute oligarchy responsible to no-one for their 
actions# but armed with a powerv crushing and 
intolerable to the great mass of people among whom 
they live". 2 
Trusteeship) enlightened administrationp uas as much required in the eastern 
as in the western empire. 
1. Campbell to Grey, 10 Oct. 1846., No. 36, minute, C-0- 54/226. 
2. Stephen's memorandum, 1/+ Jan. 1847j, after Campbell to Croy# 4 Nov. 18160 





James Stephen began his official association with the administration 
of the empire before the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Thirty-four years 
afterwardsp when he retireds he could dim2y perceive a pattern in the chaotic 
events through which he had lived. It was an age not just of reform but 
of rebirth. The Britain into which he had been born had been transformed 
almost out of recognition. "How the world has changed its mind since my 
youth! 11 he wrote in his diary in 1846. "1 cannot think of a commonplace) 
politicalp philosophical or religiousý which has not-received a grave shove 
since then. The results will be marvellous but I shall not see them. Still 
to be a river headp knowing that it is so., may be just as soul-enlarging a 
1 
spectacle as to be at the estuary". 
The young man of twenty-four who had tentative: Ly embarked on an official 
career in 1813 had been a conscious as well as unconscious beneficiary of the 
great changes which he later described. As legal counsel# he had begun 
ambitiously.. seizing the opportunity presented to him by his appointment to 
restore the once important functions of his office. Within twelve years, 
he had converted his casual labo-urs into an essential part of the adminis- 
trative routine of a depa: 
ýtment 
of states growing in size and expanding in, 
function, This remarkable achievement was a demonstration not only of his 
1. Stephen's Diary, entry for 28 Jan. 1846. 
351 
ability and energy but of the growing professionalism of bureaucracy in the 
early nineteenth century. A: t bottom., his work was valued not just because 
it was well performed but because it could not be performed at all without 
specialist knowledge and technicalp legal skills. 
The decision in 1825 to accept a full-time appointment opened a second 
phase in his career. From rendering occasional professional services to a 
goverment department., he found himself part,, and only a very minor part, of 
a complex administrative machinep comprising statesmen and politicians., 
bureaucrats and clerks., copyists and messengers. Promotion in such an 
atmosphere was not easy. Though each man had individual tasksf officials 
required more than simply professional skills. The eager subordinate had 
to catch the eye of his chiefs by his ability to turn his hand to whatever 
work the dai: Ly routine required. To be influential., he had to persuade them 
that his solutions were not only practicable but expedient. Even expertise 
was no guarantee of ultimate reward. Colonial administration was a function 
of government and as such was part and parcel of the political life of the 
nation and the patronage which went with it. The selection of even the 
humblest clerk began with the electors at the polls. 
The prospect of becoming involved in the political lists hold no 
pleasure for Stephen. He refused to see his uork as political and denied 
that party interests were concerned. But events defied him. The door 
to advancement was opened to him in 1834 when his political friends were in 
office and rudely barred a year later by a similar intrustion of party politics' 
into the office promotions. His future careerv the position on which he had 
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set his sights twelve years befores was placed in jeopardy. By using his 
political connections he could be sure of achieving his aimss but this would 
prejudice his hopes of future security and cast doubts on his assertion that 
the official advisers were outside politics. Ultimately his ambition out- 
weighed his political scruples. In 1836 he forced Glenelg to dismiss Hay 
so as to make way for his own appointment. The lesson, as he feared, was 
not lost on interested observers. "I lament when old private friends are 
compelled to separate by the irrisistible forces of political disunionflo 
Wi-Imot Horton wrote to Glenelg from Ceylon., "but so it must be as long as 
1 
the English constitution lasts". 
To repair his fencest Stephenp when he became permanent under-secretary., 
devised a system of administrative routine in which a strict line was drawn 
between, political and administrative duties. In some respects his system 
was cumbersome and inefficient; but it had enough resilience to survive and 
adapt. In its constructive aspects it became a portent for the whole civil 
service in the nineteenth century. Essentially., what he did was to distin- 
guish between civil servants., in which category he included all of the perman- 
ent officialsp and responsible officersp meaning the political chiefs at the 
head of the office. Most administrative problems were to be wrought out by 
the permanent staff and their solutions submitted through the permanent under- 
secretary to the politicians. When the secretary of state's wish was knowng 
the, permanent staff again took over to give final effect to the decision. 
The general adoption of this Procedure throughout the civil service has 
given it an appearance of obviousness and inevitability which conceals its 
1. Horton to Glenelg, 23 July'1836, Private, C. O. 54/U8. 
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revolutionary character. Not only was it a remarkably shrewd solution to 
the problem of integrating a bureaucracy into a parliamentax7 system, but it 
enshrined a doctrine of ministerial responsibility., equally precocious and 
enlightened. Above ally it was a solution which peculiarly suited Stephen 
and which derived from his experience of working with and observing officials 
and politicians. nIt in one thing to suggest good measures for which another, *ý j 
is responsiblellp he wrote on one occasion, 9 "and a very different thing to 
find the courage and constancy requisite for sustaining that responsibility". 
Efficient government could be best obtained by a system where the different 
qualities and values of the politicians and the officials could complement 
rather than compete with each other. 
To the operation of the office machine Stephen brought his experiences 
as a lawyer. He could do little to overcome the current reluctance to 
expend governmental resources on building up the civil service but he could 
re-organize the work which the permanent officials performed so as to make 
the best use of the available staff. His main solution was the organization 
of a copyists department which anticipated in many ways the division of the 
civil service into clerical and administrative grades. While he remained in 
office the implications of his work were hardly appreciated outside the 
Colonial Department; but with the Northeote-Trevelyan report on the civil 
service in the mid-nineteenth centur7) Stephen appeared in public as an 
1. Anstruther to Stanleyp 3.5 Feb. 3.81+5., minute 27 Mar. 1845, C-0- 54/221- 
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authority on the subject. As a result his influence on the organization 
and functioning of the civil service long survived him. 
Though an understanding of the history of the civil service is essential 
for any appreciation of Stephents careerp the process by which a lawyer 
rendering occasional services was transformed into a powerful =der-secretary 
cannot be explained simply by the developing nature of the bureaucracy. 
Stephen's work attained political significance in large measure because of 
his ability and diligence in dealing with particular colonial problems. A 
study of the administration of three crown colonies, Trinidad,, Sierra Leone 
and Ceylont in the period between 1813 and 1847., reveals the extent to which 
Stephen was a self-made man with opinions which carried force. The slavery 
questiony the Stephen family crusade,, provided an opportunity to gain 
political authority. Arduous work and technical proficiency ensured his 
success* BY 1830 Stephents contribution was considered indispensible, 
In addition to slavery questionsp legal problems on the constitutional 
relationship between mother country and colonies or among the local agencies 
of government within colonies provided much of the early work on which he 
was engaged. But throughout -his career his work could and did include every 
feature of colonial life. His reports were meant to be technical., dispassion-ý I 
ate and formalr but often they were not. He hold too strong opinions to be 
so objective. Directly or under cover of an appeal to abstract legal princi. 
ples; his opinions found their way into many of his reports. By 1836 his 
distinctive influence had begun to permeate colonial legislation everywhere. 
On legal questions Stephen was an admirer of Bentham. He seems to 
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have believed that law was or should be the instrument for reforming society 
in the interests of the majority. He saw the British constitution as a, 
balance between individual equality guaranteed by law and individual freedom 
ensured by the limitation of governmental restraints. The local govern- 
ments in the crown colonies were authoritarian and unrepresentative of the 
mass of the people. Stepheny who wanted the blessings of the British 
constitution to be extended to the empire, used his influenceEs, legal counsel 
to introduce more liberal and egalitarian ideas into the colonial legislatures 
He had no single unifoxm plan but in each coloriy a similar policy resembling 
what was later called trusteeship emerged. The authority of the imperial 
government was utilised to ensure that colonial government was conducted in 
the interests of the majority of the governed. 
In Trinidad his main contribution was to protect the Negroes from the 
local white oligarc47. He helped to establish and defend the policy of 
slave amelioration -which sought to improve the conditions of slaves and to 
prepare them for their emancipation. He played an important rolo in the 
final achievement of abolition; and he tried to ensure that the apprentice- 
ship system worked to the benefit of the apprentices. In each case he made 
the local goverment answerable to the Colonial Office for its treatment of 
the Negro majority in the population. Legalised discrimination was not 
permitted to replace slavery. With slavery abolishedp Stephen's attention 
turned to the now schemes of labour recruitment and land policies by which 
Trinidad's government attempted to overcome the loss of its slave labour 
force. Since the immigrants and peasants found their interests threatened 
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by the influence of the planters in the local government., Stephen favoured 
imperial regulations and close Colonial Office supervision to restore the 
balance. Thereafterin protecting the welfare of the free Negroes., he was 
concerned to show that emancipation had been a success. 
Sierra Leone presented the difficult administrative problem of an 
expansive frontier. Stephen was not against contiguous colonial expansion 
but he had three provisos: expansion was permissible only where the rights 
of the native peoples., and particularly their sovereign rights over their 
landsp had been respected; the home government must also be persuaded in 
each case that expansion was necessary and expedient; and all territorial 
acquisitions were to be strictly limited to what was immediately required. 
Just as he protected the slave and free Negrop Stephen used the authority 
of the imperial government to protect the indigenous Africansp both inside 
and outside the colony,, against the discriminatory laws or aggressive designs 
of the settlers. Within the colony he tended to favour the recaptives 
against the Europeansp partly as a means of attaching them to the government 
and anglicising them., and partly because he felt they made better settlers 
than Europeans,, who succumbed too easily to the climate. Sierra Leone was 
seen as an outpost of the anti-slavery cause and the spearhead of Britain's 
civilizing mission. in West Africa. Though the colony was unpromising and 
a drain on imperial resourcesp the mother country was morally obliged to 
maintain it to sustain these great causes. 
On Ceylonese administration his work showed the same degree of 
enlightened paternalism. He was early associated with the westernizing and 
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liberalising policies which formed the basis of the more radical recommen- 
dations in the Colebrooke-Cameron report. His interests in time extended 
to further reforms in the civil service., the judiciary and the church. 
Largely under Stephen's influence the conditions for civil servants in 
Ceylon were improved in the 181+0s., the first step in the rehabilitation of a 
demoralised local government. He was also concerned in the judicial reforms 
to ensure that the law should protect the humble. More controversially., 
Stephen insisted upon the severance of the connection between the state and 
the religion practised by the majority of the people - Buddhism. But though 
the use of imperial authority was more striking and more arrogant in Ceylonp 
the pattern was the same. What Stephen aimed at was the overthrow of a 
'despotic' oriental society and the introduction of western civilization, 
through the legal system., the religion and the administrative network of the 
mother country. Like Macaulay., his greatest strength and greatest weakness 
was his confidence in the universal superiority of western lenlightenment'. 
Once the majority interests were safeguardedp Stephen became a staunch 
believer in colonial legislative and administrative initiative. Even in 
crown coloniesp he doubted the value of placing restrictions on the right of 
local legislatures to deal with amy subject of internal concern. He wanted 
the legislatures to be made as fully representative as possible of the 
colonial society. Elections were generally ruled out since the propertied 
and politically articulate section of the population was unrepresentative of 
the majority. But unofficial members from the majority groups could be 
appointed.. with advantage., to the legislature. He also wanted to give the 
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colonial legislatures greater responsibility. Governors were ordered to 
consult their councils in making decisions; and even control over the 
judiciary., which had been considered an imperial prerogativeý was surrendered.. 
on Stephen's advicef to the legislatures. Of course., the answerability of 
the local government to the imperial was demanded throughout. Represen- 
tation stopped well short of a legislature with a non-official or popular 
majority. Responsibility stopped well short of local autonomy. But, 
whatever the theory., Stephen was increasingly prepared to allow the colonies 
to govern themselves with merely an occasional word of counsel or command 
from London. He relied rather on the experience of political responsibility 
and the operation of the reformed law to gradually produce in the colonies 
a state of political maturity. 
Despite these progressive elements in his thoughtp Stephen was no bold 
theorist carving out the paths to the multi-racial Commonwealth. He was 
sceptical of the capacity of colonial peoples to assimilate fully western 
civilisation ands with the exception of religious subjectsp he distrusted 
the whole idea of forcing colonial 'development'j, whether political., social 
or economic. He preferred to move gradually., to lay the foundations of a 
westernized, liberal stateo and to hope that further changes would not out- 
pace the material and moral improvement of the colonial peoples themselves. 
His conception of the role of the permanent under-secretary was also limited. 
If one general conclusion can be drawn from his work on the Colonial Office 
and on the administration of Trinidad) Sierra Leone and Ceylon# it is that 
Stephen remained throughout his career a great subordinate. Nor did he see 
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himself as a statesman in disguiseq planning the long-term future policies of 
government. He preferred to serve his superiors as they wanted, to provide 
them with his expert knowledge of detailt his practical advicep and his 
proposals for immediate action - to be,, in shorty a power behind the throne. 
The role of zealous subordinate may have been somewhat frustrating for 
an aggressive man; but it suited him. He felt uncomfortable in the role of 
prophet and leader. As a pessimist with a touch of idealismt he generally 
eschewed the glorious visions of the future which moved some of his contem- 
poraries. He distrusted apocalyptic solutions and fixed his mind on the 
immediate problems. Consequently., his enormous labours seem impressive 
rather than inspiring. As always,, he was the perfect self-critic: 
"My biographer ..... will in describing ny intellectuals 
say.. He was distinguished chiefly for rapidity of conception 
and of execution - the things conceived and the things 
executed being however middling thingas efforts of sagacity 
not of invention., clear arrangements of obvious truths 
rather than curious assortments of truths remote from vulgar 
notice; a readyp plausible., handy., person in the whole 
circuit and region of his own affairs". I 
No biographer could missAhe sensitivity.. the modesty., or the acute intelli- 
gence embodied in that self-judgement. 
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